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ABSTRACT 
Ranked the third biggest cyber security threats of 2013 by Forbes, Internal Identity 
Theft-Related Crimes (IIDTRC) leave countless victims in their wake, including 
online retail companies and consumers. With the rapid growth in the use of credit and 
debit cards in e-commerce, the online retail has been a key target for the IIDTRC 
perpetrators. IIDTRC involve the misuse of information systems (IS) by the dishonest 
employees to steal victims’ personal identifiable data. The crimes pose significant 
socio-economic impact and data security risks. In the context of online retail, 
relatively little research has been done to prevent IIDTRC. A few studies focus on 
situational-based IIDTRC prevention approach built on an independent use of 
software security. Others develop IIDTRC prevention frameworks in the context of 
generic e-businesses.  The majority of the frameworks have little or no grounded 
empirical research. This research entitled the ‘The Prevention of Internal Identity 
Theft Related Crimes: A Case Study Research of the UK Online Retail Companies’, 
attempts to bridge this research gap. It provides answers to two questions – what is the 
nature of IIDTRC in online retail companies and what framework can be used for 
IIDTRC prevention.  
This research set out three aims to answer the two questions. First, it provides 
understanding of causes, methods of carrying out and prevention of IIDTRC. Second, 
it extends a role-based framework (RBF) for the prevention of IIDTRC. Third, it 
evaluates the extent the RBF can be applied in the prevention of IIDTRC in online 
retail companies. A qualitative case study was used to achieve these aims. The 
empirical data were collected in the northwest of UK from 2011 to 2013. The field 
study was carried through archival analysis, semi-structured interview and participant 
observation. Organisational role theory (ORT) was used to guide the concept of a role-
based framework (RBF) – a collaborative approach where the key components of 
management work in unison is required to prevent IIDTRC. The attributes of RBF 
were synthesised from the recommended IIDTRC prevention practices.  
The empirical evidence suggests that IIDTRC perpetrators in online retail companies 
are likely to be the top management and call centre employees. The findings suggest 
that online retail consumers’ credits/debits cards details are as much vulnerable to 
IIDTRC as the companies’ identities such as trade secrets and trademarks. 
Furthermore, the common methods used by the IIDTRC perpetrators include 
collaboration, collusion, infiltration and social engineering.  
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Some of the IIDTRC prevention practices, of which the majority is software security, 
are implemented without considering the contribution of human-centred security based 
on management roles. In examining the contribution of the management roles in 
implementing Information Systems security practices, major challenges that are faced 
by online retail companies were identified. They include lack of resources, lack of 
management support and lack of IIDTRC prevention awareness training.  
This research concludes that an application of RBF can reduce the impact of the 
identified challenges. This was suggested by applying RBF in conducting IS security 
auditing in three online retail companies. The finding from the selected companies 
suggests that the RBF approach can maximise management performance in providing 
effective IIDTRC prevention practices. It provides better returns on cost, quality and 
time in the IS security auditing. It has an impact on management attitudes on 
preventing IIDTRC by clarifying and aligning their roles in implementing effective IS 
security auditing. There is heterogeneity of this effect across the companies suggesting 
that some are utilising the RBF approach while others are not. The finding confirms 
the plausibility of the RBF attributes. It suggests that the human-centred security play 
an integral role for effective internal data security in preventing IIDTRC. It suggests 
that it pays to use the collaborative management roles approach for implementing 
IIDTRC prevention practices. Furthermore, the use of the RBF approach can improve 
the effectiveness of the online retail companies in preventing IIDTRC.  
The findings suggest that benefits may accrue from the RBF approach when 
supplemented with a collaborative IS auditing. The benefits depend on the level of 
management IT skills, their perception of their roles, top management support and the 
organisational operations. This research contributes to the literature in identity theft 
prevention in online retail. To IS security practitioners, it identifies the data security 
challenges and IIDTRC prevention practices. To theory, it extends a role-based 
framework for IIDTRC prevention. To the emerging research in the digital economy, 
it puts forward as a robust starting point for further related works in cyber security, 
cybercrimes prevention and criminology. 
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CHAPTER 1 
RESEARCH INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the background of this research. It introduces research aim and 
objectives, research questions, research methodology, research benefits, and outline of 
the thesis. 
 
1.1 Research Ba c k g r o u n d  
Ranked the third biggest cyber security threats of 2013 by Forbes, Internal Identity 
Theft Related Crime (IIDTRC) leaves countless victims in their wake, including online 
retail companies and consumers (Fraud Watch, 2013). The widespread use of credit 
and debit cards through information systems (IS) has led to rapid growth in the online 
retail. This increasing mode of online retail operation has left consumers vulnerable to 
identity theft related crimes. It has been a general belief that the external criminals such 
as hackers and their collaborators perpetrate IIDTRC.  
Several studies (e.g. Collins, 2006; Jamieson et al., 2008; Fraud Watch, 2013) suggest 
that dishonest employees perpetrate the majority of cases of identity theft related 
crimes.  IIDTRC involve unlawful manipulation’ of IS as well as human beings by the 
dishonest or disgruntled employees to steal business/customers’ identity to commit 
criminal offences (OECD
1
, 2013). IIDTRC perpetrators carry out ‘internal’ identity 
theft related crimes (IIDTRC) by exploiting the data security loopholes and accidental 
data leakages.  
Internal identity theft related crimes pose considerable socio-economic impact and data 
security risks to online retail companies, which in turn imposes responsibility on the 
data security management and IS researchers (CIFAS, 2013). The Ponemon Institute’s 
DarkReading, which was cited by Widup (2010), suggests that malicious insiders: 
internal identity theft related criminals are the most common types of attacks among 
web-borne attacks and malicious code. DarkReading suggests malicious insiders make 
more than 90 per cent of all cybercrime costs per organisation every year. 
 
                                                     
1
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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1.2 Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes: Extent of the Problem 
The evolution of e-businesses has left their customers vulnerable to internal identity 
theft related crimes (IIDTRC), which leave countless victims in their wake, including 
online retail companies. In 1990s, when the first third party services – First Virtual, 
Cybercash, and Verisign for e-businesses transactions were introduced, Greenberg and 
Barling (1996) noted that about 62 per cent of employees perpetrated IIDTRC in e-
businesses. Recent studies hold that IIDTRC is on the rise (Skolov, 2005), and that 
significant figure of as much as 70 per cent of IIDTRC are committed in the workplace 
(Collins, 2006). CIFAS (2013) suggests that the socio-economic costs of internal 
identity theft crimes to e-businesses are inestimable. Due to increasing incidents of 
internal identity theft related crimes across world regions and business sectors, it is 
arguably difficult to record actual socio-economic costs. The costs range from 
irreparable brand and psychological damage to the victims to name but a few.  
 
1.3 Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes: Global Issue 
The incidents of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) in businesses across 
the world have not decreased for the past decades. KPMG, Kroll and CIFAS Joint 
Survey suggest that employees’ fraud and IIDTRC related losses cost more than $1.4 
million per one billion US dollars of sales (Kroll Global Fraud Report, 2013). This 
survey indicates that information theft and internal financial fraud are top rated 
irrespective of the world regions, except in Pacific East where the intellectual property 
(IP) counterfeiting and collusion are of high percentages. This is in line with the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) suggestions cited in Wells (2010) 
which  suggests that majority of businesses lost 5 per cent of its annual revenue to 
IIDTRC – which account to more than 80 per cent of 1, 900 cases of employee’s fraud. 
Identity Theft Resource Centre (2008) reports that IIDTRC cost businesses across the 
world about $221 billion annually; with businesses in the UK and USA over £3.2 
billion and $50billion respectively per annum.  
In Canada, identity theft is rated fastest growing among other crimes. In Australia, the 
cost is estimated to be more than $3 billion of which businesses losses accounted for 
between AUD$1 billion and AUD$4 billion (Queensland Police Service Police (QPS) 
Major Fraud Investigative Group, 2009). The Queensland Audit Office attributed this 
cost to the muddled attitude of the most top business managers who generally believe 
that identity theft related crimes are principally carried out online by hackers and their 
collaborators (Prosch, 2009; Passmore, 2009; Walliker, 2006).  
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In contrast to the Australian case of IIDTRC, the Organised Crime Strategy Report 
(OCSR) (2005-2009) suggests that more than 80 per cent of the senior executives 
admitted that they have been hit by the IIDTRC. From this OCSR’s survey, IIDTRC 
accounted for the record loss by surpassing any kind of staff frauds for the first time in 
four year of OCSR’s survey history. This report further notes that 48 per cent of these 
top business executives agreed that risks of IIDTRC dissuaded their contemporary e-
business entries across the world.  Potter and Waterfall (2012) suggest that many 
institutions and business leaders have spent more than £38 billion as part of global 
cyber security strategies for the prevention of IIDTRC. Identity Theft Resource Centre 
(ITRC) (2008) noted that lack of reliable data on the cases of IIDTRC has been one of 
the major challenges of preventing of IIDTRC and may continue to inhibit research 
into possible intervention strategies.  
ITRC’s Identity Theft: The Aftermath (2005-2008) has consistently argued that 
business stakeholders in some cases declined to report internal thefts to law 
enforcement since they are deemed to protect the name of their organisation. This 
argument was supported by Dean et al., (2012) in their interview of 850 senior-level 
executives to examine the impact of IIDTRC on their companies’ brand names. Dean 
et al., (2012) found that with business brands that worth between $1 million to $10 
billion the average minimum loss associated with IIDTRC was 12 per cent of their 
brand value. This report supports the argument of ITRC (2008) in relation to the reason 
some business managers refuse to admit the scale of the IIDTRC problems. They tend 
to protect their jobs and the business brands names from the potential reputational 
damage. IBM Research agrees to this argument of business managers protecting their 
reputation and reported that 73 per cent of IS employees fears losing their job in the 
incident of IIDTRC (Chen and Rohatgi, 2008).  
 
1.3.1 Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes: UK Issue 
The UK National Audit Office Report (2013) on cyber security strategy suggests that 
cybercrime costs more than £27 billion per annum with the majority of this cost 
(£21billion) attributes to IIDTRC from UK businesses. National Fraud Authority 
(NFA) Report (2013) which uses systematic research techniques to analyse employee’s 
related fraud has estimated that fraud loss against the UK business to be more than £73 
billion per annum. In this report, identity theft related crimes accounted for 14.1 per 
cent while 31.3 per cent of this loss is associated with the IIDTRC. 
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Based on the UK’s Staff Fraudscape by Hurst (2010) which estimated the cost of 
IIDTRC in UK businesses to be £3.2 billion, it can be arguably concluded that the cost 
of IIDTRC to UK businesses has increased by 7 folds since 2010.In as much as the 
costs for IIDTRC are on the rise so are the numbers of victims. Kroll Global Fraud 
Report (2013) indicates that 48 per cent of businesses in the UK are victims of 
IIDTRC. This report agrees with the CIFAS: Fraud Prevention Fraud Service (2012) 
that the UK is second to Iceland with highest incidents of the IIDTRC amongst 25 
nations, which in turn supports Hub International’s (2010) report that IIDTRC have has 
become one of the fastest growing employee’s fraud in the UK. CIFAS (2012) 
indicates that there is more 50 per cent rise in the number of cases of IIDTRC 
compared to the previous years; which account for as much as 80 per cent of all 
computer and internet related crimes.  
In support of with CIFAS (2012), Dean et al., (2012) note that IIDTRC increase 
approximately by 30 per cent from 2011 to 2012. CSO Magazine (2011) also indicated 
that IIDTRC cases have increased from 55 per cent to 60 in every year period since 
2008. Romanosky, Telang, and Acquisti (2008) reported that in the 217 cases of 
IDTRC in the companies they investigated of which 53 per cent of the sources of their 
losses could be determined, 26.5 per cent of these cases originated from the companies. 
 
1.3.2 IIDTRC: Case of UK Online Retail Companies 
It is not an uncommon to report for a continuous rise in the cost of the IIDTRC in UK 
online retail sector. As cited in the previous section, Kroll Global Fraud Report (2013) 
placed the UK online retail as one of e-business sectors where the incidents of IIDTRC 
are prevalent. In line with the Kroll’s (2013) report, the British Retail Consortium 
(BRC) (2013) survey indicates that retail frauds have increased with the identity theft 
related crimes on the rise. This survey also suggests that one in three consumers do not 
shop from online because of perceived online retail information security loopholes. 
This suggestion agrees with Shah, Okeke and Ahmed (2013) that issues of privacy 
related to security concerns are a major challenge for the UK retail companies to 
tackle. The trend in the increasing cost of IIDTRC has not decreased for a decade in 
UK retail sector. In 2004, the estimated cost of IIDTRC to UK retailers was estimated 
to £498 million which was doubled to £282 million with respect to the 2003 report 
(CIFAS: Staff Fraud Report, 2012); which outweighs other business sectors in 
comparison.  
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The above reports support Stickley’s (2009) suggestion that the incidents of IIDTRC is 
considerably more in online retail than in other business sectors due to modes of its 
business operation. In contrast to the cause of rising incidents of IIDTRC that has been 
linked to retail business operation by Stickley (2009), the CIFAS Fraud Report (2011) 
note that 76 per cent of retailers agreed that the increase of the IIDTRC incidents might 
be linked to recent economic crises. This report revealed that there is an increase of 
19.86 per cent of identity theft related fraud cases in 2010 compared with the figures 
from the first quarter of 2009. This report suggests that more than 70 per cent of 
internal identity theft related crimes accounted for the total identity fraud committed. 
This report also corresponds to Gill’s (2011) suggestions that there are tendencies of 
employees engaging in IIDTRC due current global adverse economic climate.  
The impacts of IIDTRC losses and damage are inestimable. In some cases, businesses 
were unable to recover the cost of the damage, especially smaller businesses like 
online retailing where these crimes discourage emerging smaller retailers from going 
into e-commerce (Yuan, 2005). Other impacts reported by Kroll (2013) include 
outraged customers, soured B2B relationships, decrease in corporate earnings, loss of 
investor’s confidence, job losses, and legal settlements, psychological issues to 
victims, business disruption and governmental scrutiny. Sometimes, these impacts 
extend to businesses (banking industry) that provide payment cards to retail customers.  
If the findings from the above studies are anything to go by, companies would be 
expected to sack hundreds of their employees every year.  But sacking the employees 
might not be the better option to solve IIDTRC problems. Thus, the insights of these 
impacts of the IIDTRC incidents make it imperative for the need to proffer an effective 
internal data security in online retail. It reinforces the need for more comprehensive 
research on the prevention of IIDTRC. 
 
1.4 Related Studies on Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes 
There are few studies (e.g. Lacey and Cuganesan, 2005; Schulze and Shah, 2009) on 
IIDTRC prevention in the context of online retail. Existing studies (e.g. Jabbour and 
Menasce, 2009; Niekerk and Solms, 2010) have developed IIDTRC prevention 
frameworks based on the situational-oriented crime prevention approach. Some 
frameworks (e.g. Lupu and Sloman, 2007; Andi, 2009; Nellikar, 2010) are developed 
based on a sole approach of software security technology.  
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Others include: Systems Plan for Combating Identity Theft by Ji, Smith-Chao and Min 
(2008); a framework for identity fraud profiling by Jamieson et al., (2008); and a 
model of role of Organisations in IIDTRC Response by Lacey and Cuganesan (2005). 
These examples and others are designed in the context of generic e-businesses. A few 
(e.g. Currie and Galliers, 1999) have focused on the theoretical analysis of the role of 
management, organisation structure and IS security. And the role of management IS 
security from strategic and cross-functional perspectives and the impact of 
management responsibilities (Earl, 1988; Betz, 2001; Rowe, 2010; Andrea and Lowe, 
2009; Valrie and Rabih, 2013).   
Collectively, these contributors and many others (e.g. Kaffer, 2010; Kim, Newberger 
and Shack, 2012), provided insights to the IIDTRC prevention practices. However, 
there is little or no suggested framework with grounded empirical research. For 
instance, Lacey and Cuganesan (2005) attempted to address the scope of e-business 
operations in preventing IIDTRC. They set out to resolve the challenges through a risk-
based identity theft prioritisation framework. By applying theories and strategies that 
translate into IDTRC prevention practices, they identified the extent to which online 
companies can reduce data leakages. It was acknowledged that ‘in interpreting and 
generalising their results, its limitations must be considered’. Lacey and Cuganesan 
(2005) noted IIDTRC prevention is a challenging issue complicated by management 
structure. They noted that the use of interviews and questionnaires as research 
approaches were not enough, since limitations of these approaches threaten their 
results generalisation. Lacey and Cuganesan (2005, p.260) suggest that; 
“Further study requires a deeper understanding of organisation under study and 
the environment in which it operates and requires an in-depth case study for deeper 
understanding of e-businesses…”  
A recent study by Shah and Okeke (2012) also explores the IIDTRC prevention, by 
investigating the challenges faced by the IS security management of a group of UK 
online retail companies. Their study was based on the interviewees’ perceptions. They 
used a Role-based model to analyse the roles of management in handling IIDTRC 
prevention and data security. They noted that the use of the interview as the only 
research approach for their research may hamper the generalisations of their findings. 
These suggestions emphasise that further studies need to adopt a practically oriented 
approach which have a rather different research designs which may help investigate 
how the management roles interact with the identified IIDTRC prevention practices.  
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These identified challenges and weaknesses – design of the studies (e.g. Lacy and 
Cuganesan, 2005; Shah and Okeke, 2012), the sparse of a literature on the prevention 
of IIDTRC in the context of online retail sector, and the IIDTRC prevention relevance 
suggested by researchers (e.g. Collins, 2003; Jamieson et al., 2008), make the issue of 
how IIDTRC can be prevented in the online retail a salient research question.  This 
research bridges these gaps in a body of literature. It builds on the suggestions by the 
studies (e.g. Lacey and Cuganesan, 2005; Kardell, 2007; Jamieson et al., 2008) that 
there is a need for a comprehensive IIDTRC prevention framework. And that more 
IIDTRC prevention research should be done from the perspective of a particular e-
business with a critical examination of the management roles in handling of internal 
data security (Shah and Okeke, 2011).  
 
1.4.1 Prevention of IIDTRC: The Background of Role Sharing 
In 1993, the UK Department of Trade and Industry set up a Retail and Consumer 
Services Panel that focused on the prevention of crime arising from the online retail 
sector. In the report by the UK Foresight
2
 (2000), this panel noted that ‘well-defined 
partnership’ and ‘role sharing approach’ are keys to achieving the objectives of this 
panel if the opportunities the 21
st
 century world class retail sector present for UK 
would be achieved. It was envisaged that this role sharing approach of crime 
prevention should include relevant management, law enforcements agencies as well as 
the outsourcing companies. The concept of role sharing approach in the prevention of 
crimes has been established in some IS security studies (e.g. Chinchani et al., 2005; 
Park and Giordano, 2006). It has gained ground throughout the UK irrespective of the 
business operation, organisational structure, and institutional landscape (Crawford, 
2002; Ekblom, 1994). The collaborative role sharing approach has been applied in the 
1980s in other UK business organisations. For instance, the UK Home Office (1985) 
set up an inter-departmental working group on crime reduction. They emphasised the 
importance of co-ordinated approach to crime prevention in business organisations 
with limited crime prevention resources. This approach was conceptualised because 
most crimes incidents are not reported due to privacy related issues.  
                                                     
2 The UK Foresight, launched in 1993 is Government White Paper on science, engineering and technology, and 
Realising our Potential which brings together the voices of business, government, the science base and others to 
look at what might happen in the future and what we need to do now to secure long-term competitive advantage and 
enhanced quality of life for all (http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/retail-and-consumer-services/retail-
revolution-dec-2000.pdf). 
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Some of the crimes incidents lay beyond the reach of the criminal justice system due to 
organisational policies or ethics. This approach has been also acknowledged by Home 
Office Crime Prevention Unit (HOCPU) who defined it as another name for the 
‘integrated situational-oriented and offender-oriented approach’. HOCPU 
recommended the coordinated crime prevention approach for any business context. 
They noted in circular 8/84 that the collaborative role sharing approach would be 
imperative for an organisational change that would impact not only on the managerial 
roles but also on their attitudes and procedures toward crimes prevention (UK Home 
Office, 1985). In the results of the British Crime Survey, Hough and Mayhew (1983) 
gave the role sharing approach a fresh impetus by suggesting that an organisational 
change in crime prevention was achievable. It could be achieved by ‘bending’ existing 
crime prevention programmes and priorities and by working together. In addition, the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 for Prevention of Crime placed a duty on the business 
managers and law enforcement agents. This Act tasks the businesses to develop crime 
prevention strategies in collaboration with relevant agencies.  
Some of the companies in the UK responded to this suggestion and formed a 
committee under the stewardship of the UK Department of Trade and Industry and the 
British Standards Institute. They establish a framework to adequately secure the IS 
within their companies.  
In 2011, the UK Cyber Security Strategy emphasised more on sharing of the roles and 
the knowledge of IIDTRC prevention practices across businesses as the appropriate 
priority for vision 2015 in promoting UK in a digital world. Only a few businesses 
have seemed to embrace these suggestions and attempted to develop a framework for a 
strategic IS security to prevent IIDTRC (Shah and Clarke, 2009). Many failed due to 
the possible practical implications of this approach. The implications varied in terms of 
organisational operations, management diversities, and different structure of internal 
decision-making processes. It was understood that different businesses had different 
operations, different views of IIDTRC (the nature, causes, methods of propagation), 
and what could be done to prevent them (Hope and Karstedt, 2003; Kimble and 
Hildreth, 2004). These issues are particularly pertinent, unique and necessary to be 
considered in developing an applicable IIDTRC prevention framework. And these 
suggestions formed the starting point of argument for this study and led to the concept 
of a role-based framework. 
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1.4.2 Concept of Role-based Framework 
The role-based framework (RBF) approach draws upon the idea that a systematic and 
integrated practices where the key components of IS management work in unison is 
required to prevent IIDTRC. It devolves IS security management with clear roles in a 
prevention of IIDTRC to collaborate with other complementary IIDTRC prevention 
agencies. RBF conceptualises that independent role do not provide required possible 
initiatives and mechanisms for an effective IIDTRC prevention. Thus, collaborative 
roles sharing of relevant management are needed to counter the multi-faceted nature of 
IIDTRC. In such, the collective contributions of the IS security management roles’ 
perspectives are required for IIDTRC prevention. Thus, two set of perspectives – 
theoretical and empirical, emerges from the extension of RBF. 
First, a theoretical argument is based on suggestions by researchers (Hodgson, 2006; 
Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2009). They suggested that the analysis of an interaction 
between the IIDTRC prevention management and their online environment starts with 
understanding both entities as an organisational configuration in the same 
socioeconomic setting. It extends to how they cohabit side by side with an utmost aim 
of greater efficiency and productivity. RBF concept builds also on Hodgson (2006) 
suggestion that it is not possible to carry out any analysis of how management in an 
organisation works without having adequate conception of what it is, and how the 
management interrelates with its business environment. Hence, this study uses 
organisational role theory (ORT) to explore these relationships; since management 
roles in any business operations are not defined in isolation but in a ‘social or 
organisational net of role relationships’ (Elliot, 1976; Cabri et al., 2006).  
Second, the empirical argument is based on the concept of RBF that the effectiveness 
of the IIDTRC prevention framework for online retail is dependent on the clarity of the 
shared roles of management. Therefore, effectiveness is dependent of a clarity of 
shared roles the management upholds (Zhu, 2006; Biegelman, 2009; Shah and Okeke, 
2011). Thus, to investigate how the management uphold their roles, the empirical study 
is very pertinent. So the extension of an application of RBF is based on the empirical 
analysis via a qualitative case study. It was carried out by investigation of the roles of 
management in implementing IIDTRC prevention practices synthesised from of 
recommended identity theft prevention practices. Although, Ekblom (2010) suggests 
that know-how-knowledge of the process of the crime prevention plays a central role 
for an implementation of a framework for preventing crimes, Redo (2002) argues that 
successful crimes prevention depends on understanding the context under study. 
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Hence, this research builds on both theoretical and empirical perspectives to cover: the 
integration of both the external and internal of the online retail environment for 
implementing IIDTRC prevention strategy; strengthening of strategic roles and other 
forms of collaborations across online retail management, and; adoption of strategies to 
consult, engage and communicate with stakeholders and employees in IIDTRC 
prevention. The rest of this chapter provides the scope of this research on how these 
perspectives were explored within the defined research scope. 
 
1.5 Research Aim and Objectives 
The studies on the identity theft in the context of the e-businesses have been carried out 
by a few researchers (e.g. Fichtman, 2001; Davis, 2003; Newman, 2004; Newman and 
McNally, 2005; Jamieson et al., 2008; Biegelman, 2009). In particular, the researchers 
cover three major perspectives: prevention (Collins, 2001; Davis, 2003; Newman, 
2004; Boyle et al., 2007; Prosch, 2009), and detection and/or investigation (Collins, 
2003; Lacey and Cuganesan, 2005).  
This research covers these perspectives – prevention, detection and/or investigation, to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the internal identity theft related crimes 
(IIDTRC) prevention. The aim is to provide a framework for prevention of IIDTRC in 
online retail companies. This research set out the following objectives to: 
i. Provide understanding of the nature of IIDTRC in online retail; 
ii. Identify a framework for prevention of IIDTRC in online retail; 
iii. Evaluate the resulting framework to understand how the attributes of the framework 
impact on online retail companies’ IIDTRC prevention practices; and 
iv. Examine how the IIDTRC prevention framework can be applied to the online retail 
Information Systems security management. 
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1.6 Research Questions 
To achieve the above objectives listed in 1.5, the following research questions are set 
out: 
1) What are the causes, the methods of propagation, and the preventions of 
IIDTRC in UK online retail companies? 
Reith (1956) suggests that the study of the nature of general criminal activities (nature 
of the IIDTRC in this case as suggested by Newman, 1984) within the distinct socio-
economic setting, the online retail in this case, may well herald in functional IIDTRC 
prevention framework. Given the relative scarcity of literature on the IIDTRC 
prevention in online retail, this research question is imperative. The motive is that an 
understanding of the nature of IIDTRC would help to synthesise a strategy to prevent 
these crimes. This question, however, is not designed to provide ‘every’ answer to the 
nature of IIDTRC in the retail industry. The central focus is to provide the explanations 
of the nature of IIDTRC for online retail companies that have operational IS 
management regardless of size, business culture and management. It is certainly the 
case that some distinctive features of crimes preventions in e-businesses were 
identified, that are relevant to the understanding of how crime prevention management 
works in this context.  
2) What framework can be used to prevention IIDTRC in online retail?   
This question flows from the question (1). Without the understanding of the nature 
IIDTRC in the online retail, it might not be possible to provide a comprehensive 
IIDTRC framework. Researchers (e.g. Gilling, 1993; Smith and Laycock, 1985; Pease 
1985) have suggested that the preventive crime framework should be grounded on 
sound information about the crimes in relation with context under study. This question 
is set out to provide a framework based on theoretical analysis of an organisational role 
theory (ORT). It synthesises the contribution of Information Systems management 
roles in a prevention of IIDTRC in online retail with the concept of ORT. In doing so 
arrived at role-based framework (RBF) for IIDTRC prevention.  As suggested by 
Gladstone (1980), crime prevention framework in the context of any business should 
entail a rational managerial role process. Gladstone added that the nature of a 
management of specific crime should be studied as fully as possible. In a further 
analysis of this question, as suggested by Emory and Cooper (1991) that breaking of 
research questions into simple forms may improve understanding of the question, the 
Question (2) was answered by addressing two additional research questions: 
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2a) To what extent do the attributes of the framework influence the internal 
identity theft related crimes prevention practices? 
2b) To what extent do the IS management influence the effectiveness of identity 
theft related crimes prevention framework implementation? 
These two investigative questions were answered to provide the background for the 
third research question. 
3) How can online retail companies achieve a practical IIDTRC prevention 
with respect to the attributes of the resulting IIDTRC framework? 
This question is set out to extend the use of the role-based framework by applying it in 
selected cases of UK online retail companies. Researchers (e.g. Jendly et al., 2010; 
Homel, 2010) suggest that a study of crimes prevention, as it is in this case, should 
entail an empirical examination of the recommended strategies. Others (Homel et al., 
2007; Anderson and Tresidder, 2008) suggest that IIDTRC prevention framework 
evaluation will enhance its applicability and generalisability. Thus, by providing the 
answers to these three research questions, this research aims to provide a strategic 
IIDTRC prevention framework for online retail companies. 
 
1.7 Research Design and Methodology 
A variety of research methods was considered, a qualitative case study was adopted as 
most suitable (Glaser, 1978; Yin, 1994; Glaser, 2001; Yin, 2003). It includes an 
archival research followed by a semi-structured interview and participant observations. 
These approaches were used for data collection to increase validity and to utilise 
triangulation (Vinten, 1994; Baxter and Jack, 2008). The research activity was carried 
out in three years – between 2011 and 2013. The research started with a review of the 
literature on the key concepts of identity theft related crimes in online retail. The 
review findings helped to refine the research aims, the research scope and the research 
questions. The review was followed by a case study of 4 selected online companies in 
the northwest of UK.  
Three case studies were preceded by an initial case study.  The field research also drew 
in managerial perspectives through British Retail Consortium (BRC)’s Retail Crime 
and Loss Prevention conferences. The following sources of data were drawn in this 
research; 
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(i) Archival analysis of online retail companies’ IIDTRC case reports. 
(i) 15 semi-structured and 7 convergent interviews; 
(ii)  Observation of the working of the IS auditing (ISA) of 3 online retail companies; 
This research is framed by constructive and interpretive paradigms so that the selected 
research methods had to be compatible with and reflect these philosophical views. 
While the interpretive concept enabled the researcher to affirm the significance of the 
participants’ knowledge of internal identity theft related crimes in an online retail, the 
constructivist concept enabled the researcher to make assumption about much complex 
behaviour of the subjects being studied. And that this knowledge ‘subjects’ possess has 
important consequences for how behaviour or actions are interpreted.  
This study required that all participants shared not only in the construction of 
developing knowledge but also had an understanding of each other’s objectives of 
participation and underlying reasons for participation so that these could be taken into 
account in the data analysis and interpretation. The collected data was analysed 
through combination of a coding system and content analysis approach aided by 
NVivo10. The data was categorised based on certain themes and concepts that 
establish the connection between the contents of empirical data and the research 
objectives. Using the concept of case analysis, the collated data from the research 
approaches formed the basis of the research discussion.  
 
1.8 Research Benefits 
The outcome of this research would be relevant to the researchers, business managers, 
and government and law enforcement agencies. It would help them to deploy effective 
Information Systems security mechanisms and IIDTRC prevention strategies to protect 
business Information Systems (IS) assets in online retail. To the academics and 
researchers, this research will help to: 
i. Identify an appropriate reference theory for studying the roles of the IS 
security management in implementing the practices for prevention of identity 
theft relate crimes. 
ii. Describe the impacts of management roles on effective IS practices for 
prevention of internal identity theft related crimes. 
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iii. Provide the critical analysis of the IS management roles on effective internal 
data security and operation. 
iv. Provide a background for research in internal identity theft related crimes 
prevention and cyber security related studies. 
To the business managers and IS security managers, this research will provide: 
i. A comprehensive framework for prevention of internal identity theft related 
crimes, which can be used for IS security governance and operations. 
ii. A strategic model of internal identity theft related crimes practices for IS 
security compliance management. 
iii. Practical analysis of the management roles and attributes which may impact on 
IS security implementation in the prevention of IIDTRC in online retail 
companies. 
iv. Options of the internal data security practices to counter internal identity theft 
related crimes prevention challenges face by the IS security management. 
 
1.9 Thesis Outline 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows; Chapter 2 reviews the literature. It 
begins with the concepts of IIDTRC, the nature of IIDTRC – the trends of IIDTRC, the 
mechanisms of IIDTRC and methods of prevention of IIDTRC. Chapter 3 synthesises 
lessons learnt from the literature review of Chapter 2 to conceptualise role-based 
framework (RBF) and builds the RBF concepts on Organisational Role Theory (ORT). 
Chapter 4 looks into Information Systems (IS) research philosophy and paradigm 
which underpin this research methodology. In addition, the choice of research 
methods, their relevance and designs in this research are discussed. Chapter 5 discusses 
data collection protocols of the four online retail companies that were investigated.  
Each case study is taken in turn and the collated data are analysed and summarised. 
Chapter 6 discusses the results of the findings of the chapter 5, based on the attributes 
and concepts of the RBF. Chapter 7 summarises the discussions provided in Chapter 6 
in relation to the propositions of RBF; and looks at their research implications and 
recommendations. Chapter 8 concludes the research by presenting both the theoretical 
and practical contributions of this research, limitations and areas of further research.  
Figure 1 below depicts the design and stages for the 3 years of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction                
This chapter reviews the nature of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) – the 
causes, the mechanisms of propagation, and the methods of IIDTRC prevention in the 
context of the online retail sector. In particular, it provides the review of the scopes of 
the nature of the IIDTRC that motivates their prevention in online retail. This chapter 
locates this research aim within the related studies of IIDTRC prevention, thus 
ensuring it is properly targeted. Most of studies cited were conducted in the UK with a 
few from other countries. This chapter concludes with lessons learnt from the review. 
 
2.1.1 Literature Review Framework 
This review is designed to explore the place of this research problem in the existing 
literature. The review provides a step towards the study and the understanding of the 
role of the online retail companies in preventing IIDTRC. It was carried out through 
the general internet search. See the Appendix 1 for the Review Framework and Search 
Strategy. Some relevant case studies and reports were garnered from the UK Credit 
Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS), the UK National Identity Fraud 
Prevention and the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD). A few 
unpublished reports of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) incidents across 
online companies are also included without revealing their identities. Figure 2 below 
depicts the review framework: concepts of IIDTRC, the nature of IIDTRC and the 
prevention of IIDTRC. The syntheses of the review framework are centred on this 
research aim to provide a framework for IIDTRC prevention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Literature Review Framework 
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The rest of chapter 2 is structured as follows; 2.1.2 extends the research background that 
has been introduced in Chapter 1. Section 2.2 discusses concepts of internal identity 
theft related crimes: definitions and themes. Section 2.3 explores the nature of internal 
identity theft related crimes at the workplace. Section 2.4 explores and discusses 
perpetration of internal identity theft related crimes. Section 2.5 provides a review of 
techniques for prevention of internal identity theft related crimes. Section 2.6 looks into 
identity theft related crimes prevention frameworks. Section 2.7 explores identity theft 
related crimes prevention theories and Section 2.8 summarises this chapter 
 
2.1.2 Review Background 
The prevalence of the IIDTRC in the UK online retail sector has lots of socio-
economic impacts. The costs of these crimes are inestimable. It ranges from the 
financial cost of preventions, increasing records of brand damage, costly customers’ 
account repair to Information Systems failure. While some studies (e.g. Gill, 2011) 
suggest that the current global economic crisis may have contributed to the increasing 
IIDTRC incidents, Schulze and Shah (2009) have noted that IIDTRC is the fastest 
growing crime in 21st century. These growing incidents of IIDTRC have contributed to 
the IIDTRC prevention’s research relevance. Though, there are some studies on the 
prevention of IIDTRC, the application of these studies remain doubtful. This is 
because most of these studies are developed without empirical consideration of the 
business culture, settings, and operations. Some of the IIDTRC prevention frameworks 
are designed to protect online retail businesses from the external identity theft related 
crimes. They neglect ‘within the companies’’ activities of dishonest employees who 
steal and leak the identity data (Collins, 2003). 
The implications of the negligence contribute to the increasing in incidents of stealing 
the identity properties, violation of identity protection policies, and mismanagement of 
biometrics data. For instance, decades ago, 62 per cent of employees committed 
IIDTRC in the online retail as compared to 33 per cent of hospital employees, 28 per 
cent of manufacturing industry (Greenberg and Barling, 1996). Recent research 
(Collins, 2003) holds that there is no significant reduction to these figures. Based on 
1037 cases analysis of identity theft related crimes in businesses, it is noted that as 
much as 70 per cent of all identity theft are committed in the workplace by the 
employees or their collaborators (Collins, 2003).  
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There are few published studies on a framework for prevention of IIDTRC in the 
context of online retail. A few studies (e.g. Andi, 2009; Bielski, 2008; Gates and 
Jacobs, 2008) have focused on the theoretical analysis of impact of management 
responsibilities, technological incentives and public sector involvement in mitigating 
IIDTRC. Other studies (e.g. MacInnes, Musgrave and Laska, 2005; Anderson, Durbin 
and Salinger, 2008) focused more on the examination of the enormity of the problems 
of IIDTRC rather than on the prevention.  
For instance, MacInnes, Musgrave, and Laska (2005) presented a model that identifies 
five causes of identity theft and related crimes: the incentives of the criminals, the 
characteristics of victims, the role of technology, the role of enforcement and the 
system related factors. They only developed a framework to determine the level of 
sophistication of these crimes. This model integrated these causes based on technical 
and non-technical factors without empirical suggestions of the model application for 
IIDTRC prevention. Some studies (e.g. Le Lievre and Jamieson, 2005; Jamieson, 
Winchester and Smith, 2007) deal with scientific approaches and techniques that only 
are implementable in computer systems. For instance, Le Lievre and Jamieson (2005) 
designed a Model of Identity Fraud Profiling. While this model is implementable on 
the computer systems and contributes toward understanding of the way personal 
documentation and information is obtained by perpetrators, it suggests little on the use 
of the model for IIDTRC prevention.  
However, these works contributed to a body of a literature for the prevention of 
IIDTRC by identifying some key issues of identity theft related crimes, there are still 
research gaps in a body of literature in the context of distinct business sector like 
online retail. The issues of the dearth of a comprehensive research make the 
availability of the preventive mechanisms for IIDTRC remain elusive. 
Researchers (e.g. Anderson, Durbin and Salinger, 2008; De, 2004) suggested that the 
attempts to develop solutions for the prevention of IIDTRC are hindered by issues 
related to: inappropriate definitions of identity theft, constraints in the form of cost and 
benefits in commercial business, privacy related issues, lack of understanding of the 
causes. Other barriers originate from legal entities and from the attitudes of managers 
that use incidents of IIDTRC as competitive advantage in companies affected by 
identity theft (Anderson, Durbin and Salinger (2008). There is also the case of the 
prohibition of unlimited data sharing between retail online companies by the legal 
bodies (Boyle et al., 2007).   
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Anderson, Durbin and Salinger (2008, p. 172) conclude that;  
“Both the empirical and theoretical literatures on internal identity theft related 
crimes are in their infancy”  
These hindrances have contributed to complexity in the prevention of IIDTRC in online 
retail companies; demanding new approach from both the researchers and stakeholders.  
Hence, there is a need for clear roles to be given to Information Systems security 
management team on how to enhance and implement data security strategies (Shah and 
Okeke, 2011). Researchers (e.g. Hosein, 2008; Salifu, 2008) suggest that identity theft 
has become a global issue that requires the full cooperation and participation of 
researchers and businesses.  
This research agrees with the researchers (Shah and Okeke, 2011; Salifu, 2008; Lacey 
and Cuganesan, 2005) and used this review to provide the background for the extension 
of the role-based framework (RBF) for prevention of IIDTRC. It explores the 
theoretical construct - Organisational Role Theory that underpins attributes for the 
Role-based Framework. This review looks into the nature of IIDTRC to understand the 
role of management in the crimes prevention. 
 
2.2 Concepts of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes: Definitions and Themes 
The search for an applicable framework to tackle internal identity theft related crimes 
(IIDTRC) may not yield a tangible success if there are no conclusive terms for defining 
themes related to the crimes. The need for the consensus on the definition of IIDTRC 
is imperative to proffering of the crimes prevention. Researchers (Lanier and Saini 
2008; Koops et al., 2009) suggest that the problem of establishing general accepted 
definition of IIDTRC is that different individuals from different business operations 
have different concepts of the crimes. Others seem to be subjective to different ideas 
and experiences when they discuss IIDTRC.  
In particular, Koops et al., (2009) noted that the generic or contextual meaning of 
IIDTRC is necessary, if not a sufficient factor in the study of IIDTRC prevention; and 
for the data security experts, the nature of propagation of these crimes is more 
important than the contextual meaning. Hence, there is need to underpin the concept 
and terms surrounding the theory of identity and its value. 
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Raab (2008, p.3) expresses the concept of identity as follows; 
“Identity and identification are not just specialist terms used only by researchers in 
our various technical discourses…..there is enormous and diverse literature that 
surrounds the term identity testifies to the growing importance of identity in the 
politics and social life of our time…, a fixed identity may be necessary if we are to 
function in daily life, and history attests to the severe difficulties that befall persons 
whose ‘papers’ have been destroyed or confiscated, and who therefore need to 
construct an identity…” 
The concept of identity, as it is in the context of most social theory, influenced the 
context of its discussion and analysis. Josselson and McAdams and Lieblich (2006) 
examined identity and state that: “identities are not fixed and frozen” as individuals 
evolve in time”.  
As defined by Burke (2008, p.2), An Identity 
“is a set of meanings applied to the self in a social role or as a member of a social 
group that define who one is” 
Koops et al., (2009) express identification of individual as it attributes to self is a vital 
element of identity explanation. They distinguished identity between ‘Idem Identity’ 
and ‘Ipse Identity’, as the ‘sameness of persons or things’, and ‘personal identity in the 
meaning of an individual sense of self’ respectively. This concept ‘idem identity’ is 
adopted in rest of this study. IIDTRC are committed against what make an ‘individual 
unique’, and this ‘individual unique’ is what Goffman (1990) termed ‘Identity pegs’. 
 
2.2.1 Definition of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes: The Contextual Issues 
As the definition around the term ‘identity’ is not straight-forward so is definition of 
the IIDTRC. The tactics adopted in this research is to deduce relevant questions to 
simplify the understanding of the complexity of defining internal identity theft related 
crimes. The basic questions that constitutes important elements in defining IIDTRC 
are: who are individuals or groups that commit the IIDTRC? Where are IIDTRC 
committed? When are IIDTRC committed? On the issues of the place and 
circumstances surrounding the crimes, the definition of identity theft related crimes 
could be extended to the online retail as an organisational entity with respect to 
management and operations within the organisations.  
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The distinctiveness of internal identity theft related crimes is also imperative to 
consider in considering the issues of the identity theft definitions. This is because an 
extensive number of different crimes often include the use or abuse of identity. Such 
crimes include financial fraud such as plastic card fraud, credit cards, cheque cards, 
debit cards and phone cards, etc.;  as well as immigration fraud such as counterfeiting, 
forgery, terrorism (using false identity); and other theft of various kinds such as postal 
fraud, pick-pocketing, robbery and burglary, etc. As IIDTRC have different meanings 
to private corporations as to the public sectors, some of them argued that credit card 
fraud and account hijacking should not be part of identity theft as would be discussed 
in the various contextual definitions below. Specifically, most financial institutions do 
not classify the fraudulent use of stolen credit card numbers as an identity theft but as a 
payment card fraud (Cheney, 2005; Meulen, 2011).  
To answer the above questions and provide definitions of IIDTRC, the UK Home 
Office Identity Fraud Steering Committee (2006) posits that Identity theft occurs when 
a False Identity details are used to support an unlawful activity. This position shows 
that the UK hardly distinguishes the definition of identity theft and identity fraud. In 
contrast, United States distinguishes between identity theft and identity fraud. As the 
cultural context in the definition of the identity is always considered alongside the 
region where the crime is committed, researchers from the US define identity fraud and 
identity theft as two distinct or mutually exclusive concepts. The US definition of 
identity theft crimes argues that identity fraud occurs when a perpetrator takes over a 
fictitious identity whereas identity theft is committed when the perpetrator takes over 
the existing identity (Gill and Binder, 2005). 
This issue of different contextual definition of identity theft goes for a number of other 
countries. In  Canada for instance, “theft” must involve ‘a deprivation of an actual 
thing to the owner’, thus ‘copying personal information from a computer or official 
document for future criminal use may not be an offence under Canadian Criminal 
code’ (Canada Countermeasure Committee, 2005).  
 
2.2.2 Definition of IIDTRC: The Circumstantial Issues 
In as much as the use of cultural perspectives and circumstances surrounding IIDTRC 
can be helpful to researchers in understanding the nature of the crimes, the term 
‘identity theft-related crimes’ is generally in most literature (Meulen, 2011).  
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Many States, Commonwealth Agencies and Territory consistently interchange the use 
of the terms ‘identity fraud’ and ‘identity crime’. Definition of ‘identity theft and 
identity fraud’ as put by the Federal Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 
USA, UK Home Office, and some researchers might not be an acceptable or a viable 
option. This is the reason for general belief that the definition of identity theft related 
crimes should be considered irrespective of its terms, location, region, and cultural 
background. Though, they argue that the most relevant issue is to explore the elements 
of these crimes and relate them to the circumstances surrounding its occurrences with 
particular business as an organisational entity. 
According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Expert Group (UNIEG) cited in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2008), the term 
‘identity fraud’ ‘the element of deception’ lies not only in the deception of technical 
systems and human beings to obtain the fraud but in deception of victims in the 
subsequent use of the stolen information. However, there is still no standardised 
definition in the field of offences related to the theft of identity. As noted above, 
American literature always adopts the term identity theft, while UK (HM Cabinet 
Office, 2002) and other countries these offences are termed identity fraud. This 
difference in defining identity related offences is still a big challenge in resolving the 
problem as noted by Koops et al., (2009, p.4) in the statement:  
“…It is also not clear what exactly constitutes ‘identity theft’ or ‘identity fraud’ 
and how these can be combated ... This lack of precision becomes especially 
apparent when comparing the various official media reports on these topics. 
Definitions are hardly ever provided, even though the statistics play a role in 
politically motivated discussions and policy decisions. Commonly accepted 
definitions are also lacking in the literature. This means that we are at the stage 
where comparisons of apples and oranges abound making it virtually impossible to 
determine the real incidence of identity-related crimes...”   
Currently, the commonly cited definitions (though some could not be cited without 
critics) of identity theft are as follows:  “An individual is considered to commit an act 
of identity theft when he or she “knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, 
a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, 
any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a 
felony under any applicable state or local law” (Federal Identity Theft and 
Assumption Deterrence Act USA, 1998, title 18 United States Code - Section 1028). 
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The UK Home Office defines identity theft as an act which “occurs when sufficient 
information about an identity is obtained to facilitate Identity Fraud irrespective of 
whether, in the case of an individual, the victim is alive or dead” (Home Office 
Identity Fraud Steering Committee, 2006). In more extensive approach, the UK Fraud 
Advisory Panel (2011, p.1) states that the 
‘Identity fraud’ is commonly used to describe the impersonation of another person 
for financial gain. Fraudsters steal your personal identity and/or financial 
information and use it to purchase goods and services or access facilities in your 
name…, it is the use of a false identity or another person’s identity to obtain goods, 
money or services by deception. This often involves the use of stolen, counterfeit or 
forged documents such as passports, driving licences and credit cards. 
In the Australasian Centre for Policing Research, James (2006, p.iii) defined identity 
theft as;  
“the theft or assumption of a pre-existing identity (or significant part thereof) with 
or without consent. It may involve an individual’s identity (whether a person is 
dead or alive), or the identity of a business” 
The OECD (2008) expresses the similarity in the definitions in the analysis that:  
‘Identity theft’ is a subset of identity fraud and that both ‘Identity fraud’ and ‘Identity 
theft’ are a subset of identity crimes. This analysis is depicted (see figure 3) by the 
Koops and Ronald (2006) framework in which they include identity fraud and identity 
crime in one umbrella term ‘identity related crime’. From the above elaborated 
discussed definitions, it is worth noting that identity theft related crime encompasses 
the unlawful use of the identity of both the non-existing and existing persons. Due to 
the logical analysis of these terms: ‘identity theft, ‘identity fraud’ and identity theft 
related crimes’, this proposed definition by both OECD (2008) and Koop et al., (2009) 
provides perhaps most widely cited reflection of the relationship between identity theft, 
identity fraud and related crimes. This definition is arguably considered by researchers 
as the most useful, since it encompasses additional elements of IIDTRC. 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Koops and Ronald, 2006) 
Identity Theft Related Crimes     Identity Fraud 
Figure 3: Identity Theft Related Crimes Definition Framework 
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The precise framework for defining identity theft related crimes which include both 
identity fraud and identity theft is based on the following suggestions by OECD (2008) 
and Koop et al., (2009) that: 
i. Identity theft related crimes concern all punishable activities that have 
identity as a target or a principal tool. 
ii. Identity fraud is unlawful activity where an identity of an existing 
person is used as a target or principal tool without that person’s consent. 
Moreover, the contextual range of identity theft related crimes are much broader, and 
they are certainly significant as the definition is unrestricted to any particular context. 
This definition buttresses the point made by Gerring (2001, p. 54) that,  
“A concept that applies broadly is more useful than a concept with only a narrow 
range of application’. A good concept stretches comfortably over many contexts; a 
poor concept, by contrast, is parochial – limited to a small linguistic turf”  
In the same vein, the IIDTRC definition framework developed by Newman and 
McNally (2005) describes identity theft related crimes’ in three phases.  The different 
phases are: T1, T2 and T3 which means the time (T1) of acquiring the personal identity 
information of the victim, the identity theft action (T2) and the outcome of the identity 
theft (T3) respectively. The above framework by Newman and McNally (2005) could 
help guide researchers on searching for the preventive strategies on identity theft and to 
establish a better definition. 
 
2.2.3 Summary of Concepts of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes: Definitions 
and Themes 
Though, there are other terms used by the researchers to describe identity theft related 
crimes such as ‘identity deception’ – which arguably is not widely recognised since the 
term ‘deception’ is negligence of the role of the victim whose identity is stolen (Wang, 
Chen and Atabakhsh, 2004). Nevertheless, the definition of IIDTRC in the context of 
this research is the ‘unlawful manipulation’ of technical systems as well as human 
beings by the dishonest or disgruntled employees to steal another person’s identity to 
commit criminal offences. This research would use this definition as the basic 
references for the subsequent sections.  
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In addition, the Australasia definition of identity theft cited by James (2006) is 
incorporated throughout identity theft related crimes references made in this study 
because it covers not only the concept of human identity but also the identity of 
business. The next section explores some of the research theories, which provide 
answers to the questions of the nature of IIDTRC as it is underpinned by the 
characteristics IIDTRC perpetrators. It discusses some vital theories that provide some 
interesting answers on ‘why’ motivations of the IIDTRC perpetrators based on ‘how’, 
‘when’ and ‘where’ these crimes are committed. The answers provided in the next 
section are in-line with the provisions of the first objective of this research: 
understanding of the nature of IIDTRC in online retail.  
 
2.3 Understanding Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes at the Workplace  
Several researchers (e.g. Cressey, 1973; Ditton, 1977; Mars, 1982; Mars 2006; Gill, 
2011) have used theories to provide comprehensive conceptual understanding of 
workplace crimes: how crimes are perpetrated at work place, how organisations adapt 
to the crimes and why the perpetrators act in certain ways. The theories discussed in 
this section provide this research with different ‘lenses’ through which to look at the 
complex problems of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC). For instance, 
some theories (e.g. Mars, 2006) focus attention on different aspects of the issues of 
occupational deviance: cheating, fiddles, pilferage, scams and sabotage in the 21
st
 
century and providing a framework within which to conduct their analysis in relation to 
IIDTRC. The analysis provides understanding of the nature of IIDTRC from the 
context of occupational crimes and related it to online retail companies. This section 
contributes to the understanding of nature of IIDTRC by providing answers to the 
question of ‘why internal identity theft related crimes’ in the online retail. Thus, 
contributes to meet the first objective of this research. 
 
2.3.1 Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes: Workplace Dishonesty  
The evolution of the digital economy and changes in the technology has direct impacts 
on the nature on workplace crimes. The computer-related crimes; the internal identity 
theft related crimes in this context are not the exception. Mars (2006) notes that the 
even though the extension of information technology has undoubtedly reduced 
employees’ controls in some jobs, it has radically increased their controls in others.  
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In his anthropological study of occupational crime, Mars (1974) applies Douglas’s 
(1970) concepts of ‘grid’ and ‘group’ to classify the occupational structures in relation 
to workplace deviance. He divides employees in four categories based on the structure 
of their occupations. The first category is ‘the Hawks’, the workers who manipulate 
organisational rules for their own advantage. The typical examples of such workers are 
‘the entrepreneurs, the innovative professionals and the small business owners’. 
Second category is ‘the Donkeys’. The Donkeys are highly constrained by rules. They 
respond to the systems that constrain them by breaking them, ‘to fiddle or to sabotage 
the systems’. The third category is ‘the wolves’. Mars (1974, p.2) expressed this 
category as ‘the dockwork gangs’, or ‘the work-and-pilfer’. They work in well 
organised and highly regulated packs.  
Fourth are ‘the vultures’. Examples are writers and traveling salesmen who commonly 
work supportive and corporative base. They are highly competitive and individualistic, 
fiddle in ways which, because of the nature of their jobs. These above categories which 
emerge from the Mars’ (1974) study shows ‘cheats’, ‘fiddles’ or ‘sabotages’ as being 
multifunctional. Mars (1974) suggests that workers under different respective 
categories engage in dishonesty or criminal acts to make ‘unequal reward systems as a 
bit more even’. He cited instances, ‘the fiddles’ justify their act: as being indicators of 
occupational success and status, as satisfying punitive measures against employers, as 
being antidotes for boredom, as ways of avoiding the delays and perceived injustices of 
clumsy bureaucratic systems, and ways of increased control at the workplace. 
Mars (1974) overall suggestion is that ‘the dishonesty’ at the workplace should be seen 
as being more than an index of employee dissatisfaction, that it should be seen as 
pointing to ways in which the criminal activities could be changed to bring employees 
into the centre of workplace control. Specifically, Mars (2001a) suggests that increases 
in the control over the ‘the Grid Donkey jobs’ – as in the call centres of the today’s 
online retail companies, for example, encourages dishonesty and deviance, particularly 
resentment fiddles. Information technology, paradoxically, increases the power of 
dishonest employees who if disruptive can be resentful and prone to indulging in 
sabotage. In his agreement to the above contentions by Mars (2001a), Hollinger (1997) 
points out that behaviours of the dishonest employees in this computer age represent 
merely a ‘re-tooling’ of deviant and criminal activity. In order words, sabotage as a 
form computer related crime is not necessarily a new form of sabotage but a ‘re-tooling 
of the status quo’, which can be IIDTRC, as it is in this context.  
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Mars (2006) suggests that a response to curb the behaviours of dishonest employees 
categorised above do not always prove to be effective. He noted that such behaviours 
need collective preventive action from workplace management in form of both 
‘coercive technology’ and ‘technical up-gridding’ (Mars, p. 289).  
The above analysis of Mars (1974, 2001a) shows the importance of employing broad 
interpretation in explaining the understanding of all workplace behaviours such as 
IIDTRC, and not to ignore the covert occupational institutions and systems. Mars 
(1974, p.204) argues that  
“any management who introduces or proposes a change to the workplace without 
considering covert reward systems are operating blindfold; examine and discuss 
‘the way fiddles produce their own set of social relationship in the workplace and 
gauge the effect that any planned change would have on them.”  
This suggestion, in particular, is important in this research. It underpins the rationale 
for exploring the theoretical analysis of the motivating factors that induce dishonest 
employees into internal identity theft related crimes.  
 
2.3.2 Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes: Perpetrators Motive  
Researchers (Clarke, 1999; Newman and Clarke, 2003; Gill, 2011) noted that there are 
three major factors that induce the dishonest employees to steal the personal 
identifiable information in online retail companies. These include: a) Perpetrators 
concealment; b) Financial gain and rewards; c) Business environment; d) Economic 
Climate – Recession 
Concealment of the Perpetrators: Some perpetrators of IIDTRC in the online retail 
companies have mind-sets that such environment avails them the opportunity to remain 
anonymous. Newman and Clarke (2003) noted that this environmental factor offers 
substantial opportunity for crime. How this factor attribute to the IIDTRC is 
summarised with the acronym SAREM: Stealth, Challenge, Anonymity, 
Reconnaissance, Escape and Multiplicity, shown in the table 1 below. 
SAREM Concealment Attributes 
Stealth The IIDTRC perpetrators are almost invisible on the internet, 
thus a perfect condition for committing identity theft related 
crimes (Denning and William, 2000). 
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                         Concealment Attributes 
Anonymity With the information system attributed with decentralised 
database system, anonymity abounds that allows the employees 
to act irresponsibly or criminally (Wortley, 1997). 
Reconnaissance This attribute is noted as perhaps the most important element 
that motivates criminals in most business organisations, as the 
information system makes it possible to scan thousands of 
database servers and even millions of personal computers that 
are connected, looking for the target victims. 
Escape This sums up other attributes owing to the crime-inducing 
aspects of the information system environment of anonymity, 
deception and stealth, thus making internal identity theft in the 
business organisation difficult to be detected. IIDTRC 
perpetrators perceive that it is easy to escape punishment 
(Ahuja, 1997). 
Multiplicity Unlike other traditional theft that is relatively finite in nature; 
internal identity theft related crimes could be multiplied 
exponentially since the perpetrator has access to a vast number 
of new opportunities to IIDTRC. 
Table 1: Concealment as a Motivation for Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes 
 
The Financial Gain and Rewards: It is a general idea that identity is a psychological 
construct used to identify particular individuals ‘uniquely’ (Cast, 2003). Identity is a 
construct which has invaluable attributes of every individual. This definition points 
that victims of identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) have lost something more than 
simply just money. If an identity of an individual could be conceived as a composition 
primarily of information that is unique, priceless and invaluable, then one perhaps 
begins to understand the motivation of IIDTRC perpetrators.  
Clarke (1999) has conceptualised that identity is a ‘hot product’ and that hot products 
attract theft. He demonstrated how personal identifiable information – ‘hot product’, 
can be more prone to theft than others using the acronym CRAVED: Concealable, 
Removable Available, Valuable, Enjoyable and Disposable, as described in the table 2. 
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CRAVED Financial Gain and Reward Attributes 
Concealable From the institutionalised information systems (document lockers, 
intranet, and internet), one can steal personal identifiable 
information secretly without possessing it completely, and can do 
so from any accessible and convenient place. 
Removable With the intangible nature of the information of individual 
identities, it is thus removable, movable and intrinsically 
vulnerable to interception and can be disguised to any desirable 
and intended forms by the criminals. 
Available The revolution of the Internet has made all information potentially 
available to everyone. Personal information and records are there 
for the taking. In fact, one does not even have to steal them. One 
can buy identification information as cheaply, breed other 
identification documents from them and then convert them into 
cash. 
Valuable  Personal Identifiable information details (e.g. credit cards, bank 
passwords) in this current information society (e.g. retail and 
banking industries) is conceptualised as money. These are such 
valuable items; thus the target of the criminals. 
Enjoyable For the internal identity thieves in a business organisation, there 
case of lure of pleasurable living and rewards whenever stolen 
identities of the innocent clients or customers are converted into 
cash. 
Disposable Sutton and Cherney and White (2013) notes that the availability of 
a fencing operation enhances the chances of particular items being 
stolen. Unlike the traditional stolen goods with the attribute of 
continued possession increases the risks of being caught, stolen 
identity and the disposal of the identity is not so apparently 
pressing. The criminal continues to savour the gains of the stolen 
identity in hidden until the crime is detected. 
   Table 2: Financial Gains as a Motivation for Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes 
 
The Business Environment: Motivations in a workplace may be perceived as 
predispositions to particular behaviours and outcomes, reflecting the things employees 
want and the strategies they may choose to achieve it (Thompson and Mchugh, 2009).  
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Researchers (e.g. Newman, 2004; Lacoste and Tremblay, 2003; Slosarik, 2002) have 
identified business environment, such as online business (online retailing) as the major 
source that provides opportunity for individuals indulging IIDTRC. They classified 
the sources into two: (1) The collection centres and (2) The application centres. The 
Collection Centres/Point in a business environment is where the criminals steal 
personal identifiable information while the Application Centres is the point of use. 
Examples of the collection centres include business office via company databases and 
paper or electronic documents, business transaction via workplace environment and 
personal computers, financial statements via credit/debit statement and internet, and 
data mining via abetted hacking. Moreover, other researchers (Davis, 2003; Morris II, 
2004; Newman, 2004) summarised categories of IIDTRC perpetrators in relation to 
the online business environment. They classify the criminal attributes of IIDTRC 
perpetrators based on their criminal activities as described in table 3. 
 
Category Characteristics 
Incidental These are the amateur IIDTRC perpetrators that take advantage of 
varied incidences – data leakages within the IS, without any specific 
task-based intention (Perl, 2003). 
Opportunistic Amateur criminals with intention, without taking any risk. These 
criminals are not professionals; though, they look for opportunity; if 
they get any, they would take it. In some cases they are referred as the 
circumstantial or secondary identity thieves. These criminal often 
advance to professional because of interest and financial gain from 
the initial act (Davis, 2003). 
Professional  These are criminals with learned techniques with an in-depth 
knowledge of various methods to perpetrate IIDTRC (Morris II, 
2004). 
Gang These are criminals in form of organised group, comprised of several 
experts from suitable fields (e.g. Computing, Psychology). This form 
of thieves is offensive with high level of commitment (Newman, 
2004). 
Seller These are IIDTRC perpetrators that sell identity information such as 
credit/debit cards, e-mail address, driver’s licence, home address, etc. 
Table 3: Features of Internal Identity Theft Criminals 
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Economic Climate – Recession 
Gill (2011) argues that there is some evidence that characteristics of an adverse 
economic climate can lead to either an increase or a decrease in crime. Gill suggests 
that since there is a possibility of the unavailability of credit due the recession, there is 
likelihood that such economic climate will create opportunities for fraud. Leslie and 
Hood (2009) agree with Gill (2011) and argue if dishonest employees have less 
disposable income during recessions due to redundancy during recessions they would 
motivated to indulge into IIDTRC. In contrast, Yeager (2007) argues that there should 
be caution in supporting the hypothesis that recession leads increase in crimes. Gill 
(2011) also cautions that care should be taken in generalising his suggestion since 
different crimes are influenced by different issues. 
Gill (2011) and Yeager (2007) agree that further research need to be done to assess the 
frauds patterns that may have a significant impact during the recession. They suggest 
there is need to look into other theories that discuss the criminal motive that influence 
the increase in crimes. Other researchers (e.g. Kantor, 1983; Black, 1987; Brooks and 
Kamp, 1991; Kardell, 2007; Clarke, 2009) have used theories to analyse other 
motivating factors and situation that could induce employees to perpetrate IIDTRC. 
The relevant concepts considered are; 
 Cressey’s Fraud Triangle;  
 Person Theory; 
 Workplace Theory.  
It is important to look into some of the theories that motivate crimes because they 
provide an analytical explanation of employee’s behaviour based on the key elements: 
environments, situations and time. These elements (environments, situations, and time) 
answer the key questions of where, when, why, and how as they relate to the nature of 
internal identity theft related crimes. 
Cressey’s Fraud Triangle Model 
Cressey (1973) in his theory of ‘the triggers’ that lead to crimes pointed out that each 
criminal have motives and opportunities that induce them to commit crimes. He 
models a ‘Fraud Triangle’ of which each side representing components of what causes 
the perpetrators to commit crimes. The three components are Rationalisation, 
Perceived Opportunities and Social Pressure facing the individuals.  
 Page 32 of 328 
 
Cressey (1973) explained that the rationalisation and social pressures are the key 
attributes motivates the employees attitudes towards crimes. Kardell (2007) also 
suggested that while perceived opportunities might be managed by the organisations, 
rationalisation and social pressures are generally beyond the control of the 
organisations. 
 
Person Theory 
 This theory uses the concepts of Opportunity, The Marginality Proposition, and 
Epidemic of Moral Laxity to explain why some employees may indulge in IIDTRC. 
This theory could be extended to the prevention of IIDTRC. The summary of the 
interpretation of these approaches is presented in table 4 below. 
Person 
Theory’s 
Components 
   
Explanation of the Pearson Theory in relation to concepts of 
Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes 
Opportunity Cressey (1973) and Kantor (1983) claim that opportunity correlates 
positively with IIDTRC. In agreement Kardell (2007) argues that 
minimised opportunity like constant surveillance over employees’ 
activities could be IIDTRC-deterrence. This theory pointed out that 
employees are naturally greedy. And this could be translated to 
crimes if there is an opportunity at the employees’ disposal. 
Marginality 
Proposition 
This approach holds that the employee’s degree of marginality could 
the cause identity theft related crimes within organisations (Clarke, 
2009).Social isolation, little opportunity for advancement, short 
tenure, low rank in the organisational hierarchy, low wages, 
expendability, little chance to develop relationships, etc. are 
characteristics of the marginal employees. Employees that fall in this 
category are more likely to indulge in IIDTRC (Barling, 1995). 
Epidemic of 
Moral 
Laxity 
This approach postulates that moral decadence in the society today 
leads to moral laxity in the organisations (Clarke, 1999). Newman 
and Clarke (2003) support this concept and suggest that employees of 
decades ago possess better trustworthy qualities than the employees 
of today. 
Table 4: Analysis of IIDTRC Motivating Factors with Persons Theory 
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Workplace Theory 
This theory contributes to explaining the reasons some businesses, the online retail 
companies in this case, suffer higher levels of internal identity theft related crimes. 
Hence, the analysis provided by the workplace theory, which is situation specific, 
could lead to the evaluation of different systematic strategies for controlling and 
preventing IIDTRC. Workplace theory explains the motivation of disgruntled 
employees that engage in IIDTRC based on the concept of Workplace theory shown in 
table 5 below.  
Workplace 
Theory 
Explanation of the Concepts of Workplace Theory in the context of 
Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes 
Perceived 
Fairness 
This model points to a relationship between employees and perceptions 
of organisational fairness. Tucker (1989) notes that IIDTRC can be 
better characterised as a mode of social counter-control rather than a 
crime. In this model context, the incidences of IIDTRC are seen as a 
response to the perceived deviant attitude of the employee (Black, 
1987). This theory argues that exploitative behaviour of an employer as 
the cause of the stealing. Hence, employees’ admissions of IIDTRC 
might be associated with job dissatisfaction. 
Climate 
and 
Structure 
This approach is suggested by Brooks and Kamp (1991). It argues that 
dishonest organisational climate encourages dishonest attitude (Johns, 
1987). Employees’ perceptions about the work climate, their co-
workers, attitudes of their supervisors and management; can send 
messages to them whether the crimes could be condoned or not. 
Shearman and Burrell (1988) note that structure of IT and information 
system security and IT affects the propensity of employees stealing the 
organisation data. The more complex is the security of the information 
storage, the less propensity of loss and incidences of IIDTRC. 
Deterrenc
e Doctrine 
This approach holds that IIDTRC will be more likely to be perpetrated 
in an organisation where there is low awareness of anti-crime policies. 
Kantor (1983) supports this approach that employees’ behaviours are 
influenced by threat of organisational sanctions. According to 
Greenberg and Barling (1996), the most effective variable of this 
approach in deterring IIDTRC is the perceived certainty of punishment 
among other variables: perceive severity and visibility of punishment. 
Table 5: Analysis of Motivations of IIDTRC with Work Place Theory 
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2.3.3 Summary of the Understanding of IIDTRC  
This section has provided the review of the related works on the theories and concepts 
of the nature of internal identity theft related crimes. It has identified the importance of 
these theories in understanding the motives of perpetrators of IIDTRC.  The above 
review provides answers to the question of ‘why internal identity theft related crimes in 
the online retail companies?’ in relation to the research question of the nature of 
IIDTRC. Thus, contributes partly towards understanding the first objectives of this 
study: to provide understanding of the nature of IIDTRC in online retail.  The next 
section will review studies on the perpetration of the IIDTRC. It provides 
understanding of: who; how and when IIDTRC are perpetrated, and who detect the 
crimes in relation to their prevention. 
 
2.4 Perpetration of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes  
With the growing the internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) in online retail, 
researchers and stakeholders continues to as ask: why are the IIDTRC a growing risk? 
To answer this question, it is important to reflect on the motivations for the activities of 
the IIDTRC perpetrators discussed in the section 2.3. Rationalisation, opportunity and 
social issues are the key motivating factors for perpetrating IIDTRC. A greedy (social 
issue) employee working in an unsecure IT infrastructure (opportunity) believes 
(rationalise) that s/he may not be caught for indulging in IIDTRC. The perpetrators 
would be motivated to act because of the nature of the online retail business operation 
which is carried out using the internet – activity behind the computers. 
Other motives include gambling lifestyle or pressing bankruptcy and debts. Having the 
opportunity to commit a crime prepares the fraudulent employee to look for the 
situations that would pay off.  For instance some of the perpetrators, irrespective of 
gender, either obtain temporary employment for the sole purpose of personal or 
business identity thefts or place organised criminals in the business organisations to 
gain knowledge of the firms’ information systems in order to commit their frauds. 
Hinds (2007) suggested that the structure of the firms’ Information Systems and Data 
Protection Policy are among the key enabling elements that may encourage IIDTRC.  
The elements are interrelated that one situation or an opportunity for the IIDTRC 
perpetration leads to the other. 
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2.4.1 Enabling Elements for Perpetrating of IIDTRC  
Researchers (e. g. Collins, 2006; Duffin et al., 2006) suggested that the perpetrators of 
internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) often target and exploit weaknesses in 
online businesses operation because of the structure of the information systems and the 
business policy. 
The structure of Information System: The modern information systems architecture of 
online retail is designed to store the customers’ data in one place which could be 
accessible to employees in a variety of departments. It is generally built with a 
structure of distributed information systems in which networked computers 
communicate and interact with each other to achieve the common goal of their 
business transactions. This design may result to a consolidation of diverse customers’ 
information that might be of easy access to the fraudsters (Duffin et al., 2006). It 
makes it easier and quicker for perpetrators to have the comprehensive information of 
the customers’ data at a glance. This structure also creates opportunities for the 
organised criminals to target employees in the information system department of the 
retail companies.  
Data Protection Policies: Collins (2003) cited the case of the U.S department of 
Justice which suggests that identity theft related crimes are escalating because of lack 
of definitive policy. Due to the definition problem discussed in 2.2 above, some law 
enforcement agencies could not record the identity theft related crimes as a separate 
crime. And because of the nature of the identity crimes as a cross-jurisdictional which 
may span or cover several geographical areas and business networks (Meulen, 2006). 
These suggestions might have led to confusion about who is responsible to investigate 
and prosecute the IIDTRC cases. In some cases, this leads to the victims of IIDTRC 
reporting the cases to wrong enforcement agencies. For instance in the cases of 
IIDTRC involving bank details, victims are likely to report the case to the financial 
crimes investigation agency rather than the police. Meulen (2006) in agreement with 
Collins (2003) suggests that the issue of undefined data protection policies and 
jurisdictional or management roles make the loss related IIDTRC more impactful. For 
instance, most outsourcing firms run into difficulty in offering an identity monitoring 
service for their customers because some employees within the retail companies thwart 
credit-monitoring processes based on the stipulations that the outsourcing firms (third 
party firms) are not part of their statutory data protection policy. Such circumstances 
contribute to the identity monitoring service arrives days after these crimes activity 
have transpired (Collins, 2006).   
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2.4.2 Mechanisms for Perpetration of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes  
Researchers (e.g. Mitnick and Simon; 2006; Endicott-Popovski and Lockwood, 2006; 
Hinds, 2007; Green-King, 2011) suggest  that infiltration, collusion, and coercion, and 
social engineering are the common mechanisms IIDTRC perpetrators use to carry out 
internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) in online retail companies. These 
mechanisms can be carried out independently or combined with other mechanisms. For 
instance, with collaboration and social engineering, combined, cyber criminals can 
generate the phishing web pages for nearly any online retail company at a click of a 
mouse or tap of a key (Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst, 2006). Financial Insights
3
 (2004) 
cited other IIDTRC perpetration mechanisms such as botnets, PID
4
 account fraud, and 
privacy counterfeiting. APWG
5
 (2014) suggests that botnets which involve networks of 
IS and machines with malicious programmes in the form of phishing attacks is one of 
the newest IIDTRC tactics that pose internal data security threats to online retail.  
APWG (2014) suggests that some of  the IIDTRC perpetrators succeeded in 
manipulating the IS by using various techniques which include unapproved 
hardware/devices, abuse of private knowledge, violation of e-mail/IM/web/internet 
policy of the victims, handling of data on unapproved devices/media, storage/transfer 
of unapproved content and use of unapproved services/software (APWG, 2014). The 
table 6 below summarises common mechanisms for perpetrating IIDTRC. 
Mechanisms Explanation of the IIDTRC Mechanisms 
Infiltration 
 
This is a mechanism whereby organised criminals plant the agents in 
the retail companies. The planted criminals (outsourcing agents, 
vendors, and partners) could gain employment to commit IIDTRC. 
The factor behind this mechanism could be linked to the commercial 
pressure or high employees’ turnover in the online retail (Green-
King, 2011). The pressure can open door for influx of the deliberate 
criminals in retail outlets and call centres. 
Green-King (2011) suggests that less stringent vetting and 
recruitment controls measures encourage infiltration. This situation is 
often difficult to detect. The perpetrators often resign before the 
detection. Some criminals lease or sell the compromised data. 
                                                     
3 Financial Insights, an International Data Corporation company is an independent market research and analysis firm 
specializing in IT media (www.financial-insights.com). 
4 Personal Identifiable Data 
5 Anti-Phishing Working Group founded in 2003 is an international consortium of organisations (includes BitDefender, 
 Symantec, McAfee, VeriSign, VISA, IronKey, Mastercard, Internet Identity, ING Group, etc.)  affected by phishing    
 attacks (http://www.antiphishing.org) 
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Mechanisms Explanation of the IIDTRC Mechanisms 
Collusion The organised criminals and dishonest collude with fellow employees 
(in some cases with dismissed employees or business partners) who 
have access to personal and business information systems – payroll, 
account details, business transactions and records, etc.  
It is common approach used by some criminals of the same cultural 
background (Hinds, 2007). The meeting point is often at lunchtimes, 
nightclubs, pubs and in social events.  
Coercion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organised criminals intimidate and threaten employees to partake in 
IIDTRC. In some cases call centres’ employees of the same company 
are being threatened by the top managers. Some employees who 
involved in this fraudulent activity often claimed that they did so 
under duress. Successful coercion often leads to activity of collusion 
with the collaborators. Hinds (2007) suggests that 45 per cent of the 
IIDTRC cases in UK are coerced of which 15 per cent of this 
percentage admitted to having been paid to compromise their 
customers details. Some of the innocent employees (e.g. cashiers and 
wait-staff) were often coerced to skim payment cards. There were 
reported cases of recruiting the IS/T administrator for the purpose to 
steal data, open IS/T holes and disable security systems. Verizon 
DBIR (2013) indicated that pretexting was one of the common 
elements of social engineering modes used in IIDTRC perpetration.  
Social 
Engineering 
 
Act of pulling a con job to get access information system that is 
normally accessible by the privileged users - employees. It is the 
human side of breaking into an online retail Information Systems. 
Several researchers (Duffin, et al., 2006; Savage, 2003) have noted 
that the perpetrators of this form of IIDTRC are often link with 
internal employee as an agent. This mode often involves social tactics 
– deception and manipulation, in exploitation of the roles of the 
human elements and end-users. These modes of IIDTC perpetration 
often linked both the technical and non-technical modes, alongside 
collusion of the perpetrators with external agent for successful 
exfiltration of victims’ PID/I assets. There were reported incidents 
carried out by payments and promises to employees to get them 
indulge in IIDTRC, because these external agents deemed the IIDTRC 
impossible without their aid (Checkpoint, 2013). 
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Mechanisms Explanation of the IIDTRC Mechanisms 
Social 
Engineering 
 
Check Point (2013) indicates that 42 per cent of the UK companies 
have been hit by social engineering attacks of which new employees 
(52 per cent), and the outsourcing agencies and contractors (44 per 
cent) are most vulnerable agents. 
Patchable 
Software 
Vulnerability 
(PSV) 
Verizon Data Breaches Investigation Report (DBIR) (2013) notes that 
PSV as one of the key mechanisms of IIDTRC perpetration. Verizon 
DBIR (2013) discusses the summary of the Verizon DBIR from 2008 
to 2013, which shows that web applications, remote access and 
desktop services are the commonest pathways or vectors through 
which above IIDTRC were perpetrated. This report emphasises the 
risks of the role of human errors when the privilege users manage 
these vectors in online retail companies. This evidence shows that 
remote access and desktop services combined with exploitation of 
default/stolen credentials in very rampant in retail companies.  
It can be concluded that opportunistic IIDTRC incidents (intrusions) 
are common with retail companies who often share same IS/T support 
with software vendors. With the IIDTRC perpetrators (system 
administrators) knowledge of vendor’s authentication methods and 
schema (e.g. TCP port 3389 for RDP; or TCP port 5631 and UDP port 
5632), they can exploit (without traces) across full range of the 
vendors/partners/outsourcing companies (Peretti, 2009). 
Table 6: Common Mechanisms of Perpetrating IIDTRC in Online Retail 
 
Other mechanisms for perpetrating IIDTRC are phishing, repairmen and elaborate 
yarns to hoodwink the human resources staff into providing companies identity assets. 
The key technical modes used by the outsiders/external agents who were abetted by 
malicious insiders include: malware, hacking, social engineering, and physical actions. 
Though some online retail companies may implement elaborate authentication process, 
firewalls, networking security monitoring technology and virus scan software, there IS 
may still be porous to incidents of IIDTRC due to collaborative and colluded practices 
of employees and external agents (Gaudin, 2002). In addition, with the aid of dishonest 
employee/insider in the target retail company, the external agents and dubious 
information security experts and their accomplices could equip themselves with 
evolving technical tools to manipulate the systems.  
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Due to the techie knowledge of the employees (software engineers, IS/T administrator), 
they often exploit the IS weakness related to configuration, functionality or application. 
In the CIFAS (2011) and Verizon Risk Team Survey Report (2012), they indicated with 
the used of phishing (via pretexting and solicitation) as IIDTRC vector of choice, 
external cybercriminals relied on the personal touch with more than 78 per cent of 
IIDTRC cases involving in-person contact. They noted that even in the high-tech 
business world, all facets of cyber-crimes would not get done without an in-person 
‘meet and greet’. For some of these modes (e.g. social engineering and patchable 
software vulnerability) of carrying out IIDTRC to be successful, Verizon’s Data Breach 
Investigations Report (DBIR) (2012) suggests that the nature of the modes have to 
depend on the insight provided by the insider who may have comprehensive knowledge 
of the targets retail companies.  
In some of the IIDTRC cases, these modes could lead to advanced persistent threats 
(APT) techniques such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Botnets and zombies, 
Social Network Attacks, Clickjacking /Exploit kits/Crimepacks, Infected Near-field 
communication (NFC), Scareware – fake security software warnings. CSO Magazine 
(2011) agrees that IIDTRC those were linked to APT were perpetrated through sending 
internal data information to the external site/entity, tempering of the command/control 
channel, disabling/interfering with security control, stealing of login details, Sequel 
Query Language (SQL) injection and key-logging procedures and abuse of system 
access/privilege. 
 
2.4.3 Targeted Assets by the Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes Perpetrators 
It is imperative to for this review to discuss losses associated with personal identifiable 
information/data (PII/D) stolen by IIDTRC perpetrator in relation to the quantification 
of online retail information Systems assets/data types. The review of the losses in the 
context of this research was almost impossible. There was almost no report that 
indicated categorically the number of PID/I records compromised or lost. There were 
always issues of concern in relation to privacy of identity owners, mostly in relation to 
records containing names, e-mail address, source codes, etc. CIFAS (2013) reports 
survey indicated that IIDTRC incidents those involve theft of payment card 
information (containing names, e-mail address, source codes, etc.) are more than 48 
per cent, followed by the authentication PID/I credentials with 42 per cent.  
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The IIDTRC do not include only the theft of customers and employees PID/I, the 
identity of the companies are also vulnerable. Dean et al., (2011) noted that some 
companies’ product patent and formulas are sold at the cheapest rate by the IIDTRC 
perpetrators. Some are sold at about 70 per cent lesser than the cost of the patented 
versions on the online black market. Table 7 shows the variety of compromised IS/T 
assets classified by those occurred in all the business (irrespective of the size) and in 
big business, and by PID/I name, incident and record. 
Variety of Compromised 
PID/I 
Label All Business Large Business 
Incidents 
(%) 
Records 
(%) 
Incident 
(%) 
Records 
(%) 
Payment card number CardData 48 3 33 1 
Authentication PID  PIDCredit 42 1 35 1 
PID (Name & Address) Personal 4 95 27 98 
Trademark, TradeSecret OrgData 4 1 37 1 
Bank Account Number BankData 2 1 10 1 
System Info. (Config &Svcs) SysInfo 2 1 15 1 
Unknown Unkown 44 1 2 1 
Table 7: Variety of Compromised PID/I vs IIDTRC Incidents in Business 
Adapted Verizon RISK Team Survey Report (2012) 
 
 
Figure 4: IIDTRC Incidents against Variety of Compromised PII/D 
Figure 4 deducted from the table 7 shows chart of the targeted personal identifiable 
information and assets which have highest records compromised in both all and large 
business cases – 95 per cent and 98 per cent, though these cases are associated with 4 
and 27 respectively. This indicated that the impact of IIDTRC incidents has no 
relationship with record compromised. In some IIDTRC cases, top business executives 
used their company’s name to secure the fraudulent transaction.  
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Sometimes these incidents bring dents and insults to the company, not only financial 
loss. The Lloyds Bank ex-head is a typical instance (see the IIDTRC cases analyses 
from the banking sector in Appendix 2). In June, 2012, the former head of Lloyds’ 
online security head (Jessica Harper) was jailed for five years for IIDTRC related to 
account-take-over and account withdrawals. Jessica Harper was convicted for 
submitting some 93 bogus invoices. 
 
2.4.4 IIDTRC Perpetrators: Who are they and where are they?  
Metropolitan Police Operation Sterling MPS (2009) reported that most employees who 
had been employed less than one year are more likely to collaborate with senior 
colleagues to commit internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC). CIFAS (2011) 
suggested that some employees use their management positions and responsibilities 
because of their authority and access to unlimited information systems operations. In 
CIFAS (2010) extensive report, it was suggested that the cases of IIDTRC can be 
categorised based on the operation units of some retail companies.  
From the table 8 below, Retail stores, Customer Contact Centre and Field Units are 
among the most targeted online retail business areas for IIDTRC perpetration. This 
report corresponds with the Fighting Retail Crime Report (2012) which suggests that 
among 40 per cent of the companies interviewed; more than 25 per cent of their total 
IIDTRC perpetrators were supervisors, security officers and senior administrators of 
which 56 per cent of the perpetrators held technical positions. 75 per cent of the 
perpetrators were current employees and 65 per cent of these perpetrators occupied 
other positions with other companies. 
Years (%) 
Business Areas 2008 2009 
Branch/Outlet/Store 36.62 59 
Customer Contact Centre 45.77 24.33 
Field Unit 10.56 8.33 
Finance - 1 
IT department 0.7 0.33 
Others 2.82 4.0 
Table 8: IIDTRC Incidents vs Operational Department (Adapted from CIFAS, 2010) 
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Table 9 below which was adapted from Verizon RISK Team Survey Report (2012) 
shows the distribution of IIDTRC perpetrators by per cent of incidents in relation to 
their employment position. It shows regular employees and end-users are categories of 
employees that are more likely to indulge to IIDTRC because of the job roles and 
operations.  Other examples of the regular employees include corporate end-users – 
call-centre employees, who take advantage of their IS access/user privileges and use 
them to seek cashable forms of personal identifiable data/information (PID/I) such as 
bank account numbers and payment card data. This report suggests that IIDTRC 
perpetrators need not be the super-users or most trusted of information systems users to 
manipulate information systems. 
Job Roles of IIDTRC Perpetrator Percentage of IIDTRC Incidents (%) 
Regular Employee/End-User 61 
Finance/Accounting 22 
Executive/Upper Management 11 
Helpdesk 4 
System/Network Administrator 2 
Unknown 1 
Others 1 
Table 9: IIDTRC Incidents vs Job Roles 
While the accounting/finance employees are noted to indulge in IIDTRC due to their 
position or their accessibility to personal accounts and financial forms and records, IS 
administrators/developers comprises of significant per cent of the perpetrators. 
‘Others’ in table 9 means incidents of IIDTRC indulged by business partners and 
outsourcing firms. Verizon RISK Team Survey Report (2012) also shows that in retail 
industry alone, 22 per cent of the IIDTRC are perpetrated by partners/remote, vendors, 
and outsourcing companies who are responsible for managing the point of sale (POS). 
ACFE (2014) agrees with this report suggest that most employees’ fraud schemes 
involve the accounting department or upper management. The ACFE (2014) indicates 
that more than 30 per cent of fraud cases are committed by accounting department and 
over 20 per cent of fraud case is committed by the upper management or executive 
level employees. The next commonly cited are employees from the digital marketing 
and sales departments. Forrsight Survey Report (2013) on the distribution of 
employees indulgent in IIDTRC (in relation to department) agrees with Verizon RISK 
Team Survey Report (2012). 
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The Forrsight Survey Report (2013) indicated that the current employees abetting the 
former employees in indulging IIDTRC are on the increase. Such perpetrators often 
sales the online retail companies’ IS/T credentials (access codes, authentication 
processes, de-provisioning of user accounts procedures, etc.) to the online ‘black 
market’. The Forrsight Survey Report (2013) categorised ‘likely IIDTRC perpetrators’ 
in business organisations into four groups: Rogue which comprises of 9 per cent, 
HERO – the Highly Empowered, Resourceful and Operative Employees comprising of 
16 per cent, Dis-enfranchised which comprises of 34 per cent and the Locked-down 
with 41 per cent. This Report suggests Rogue and the Locked-down which comprises 
of the 50 per cent of the total employees who pose the greatest IIDTRC risks.  
In addition, CIFAS Report (2013) suggests the following IIDTRC perpetrators 
attributes: male employees aged 25, fully employed, low paid, working in junior non-
management, possibly in financial difficulties and may have worked in the victim 
business organisation for less than a year. In the same vein, CIFAS (2011) indicated 
that the employees who are likely to pose major IIDTRC risks to the retail companies 
have common characteristics such as being male between 30 to 40 years. Table 10 
below shows the gender distribution of the IIDTRC perpetrator in percentage 
increment from 2008 to 2009. 
Age distribution 
(Total) 
Men Women 
Forms of IIDTRC 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Account Identity fraud 32 30 31 32 34 29 
Disclosure of business data 40 27 40 27 39 27 
Disclosure of Personal data 26 26 28 27 23 25 
Table 10: Age and Gender Distribution of IIDTRC Perpetrators 
 (Adapted from CIFAS, 2011) 
CIFAS (2013) agrees with CIFAS (11) and adds that theft of intellectual properties 
which comprise 78 per cent to 92 per cent of the overall IIDTRC cases/incidents were 
perpetrated by male employees. This report corresponds with FraudTrack (2012) report 
that IIDTRC cases are dominated by the male employees with women are being linked 
to 18 per cent of reported cases of theft of intellectual properties. Kroll Consulting 
Annual Global Report (2010) indicated that 48 per cent of companies in the UK are 
victims of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) with retail sector as one of 
the companies on high risk.   
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The impact of IIDTRC on businesses is summarised in the figure 11 below with 
retail sector, financial services, the professional services and telecoms topped the list. 
 
Table 11: Percentage of Reported IIDTRC within Industries  
(Kroll & Global Fraud Report, 2010) 
In addition, the CIFAS: The UK’s Fraud Prevention Service, (2013) noted that there is 
prevalent of the cases of IIDTRC in the busy cities in UK compared to less busy ones. 
This is perhaps because of the siting of most companies in the major cities; London 
and Glasgow top the chart as show in table 12 below. 
Business Area Cases of Internal employee fraud (%) 
London 22.91 
Glasgow 8.33 
Sheffied 6.25 
Leeds 4.17 
Ipswich 4.17 
Peterbourough 4.17 
Portsmouth 4.17 
Bradford 2.08 
Bolton 2.08 
Table 12: IIDTRC Cases across UK Cities (Adapted: CIFAS, 2013) 
2.4.5 Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes: The Resulting Practices 
In most the IIDTRC incidents, the perpetrators used the stolen assets for financial gain. 
In other cases, they use the stolen assets to create bank account or apply for the 
fraudulent loan or sell the data to the black market. CIFAS Report (2010), in 
comparing the trends of IIDTRC from 2008 and 2009, indicated that fraudulent 
account withdrawals, account disclosure have become common practices of the 
IIDTRC.  Figure 5 below shows an increase of incident of account withdrawal in the 
victim companies within two years 2008 and 2009. 
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Figure 5: Trends of Account Withdrawal Incidents between 2008 and 2009 
Adapted from CIFAS (2010) 
CIFAS Report (2012) indicated that there is almost 50 per cent rise in the number of 
cases of IIDTRC compared to the previous years; which account for as much as 80 per 
cent of all computer and internet related crimes. In line with CIFAS (2012), Dean et 
al., (2012) noted that IIDTRC increase approximately by 30 per cent from 2011 to 
2012; and CSO Magazine also indicated that IIDTRC rose from 55 per cent to 60 in a 
one-year period. 
Fraudulent Account Withdrawals:  The Fraudulent Account Withdrawals involve 
unauthorised access or manipulation on a customer account information details for 
personal benefit. CIFAS Report (2010) suggested that fraudulent account withdrawal 
has increased drastically from 2008 to 2009. Other practices linked with Fraudulent 
Account Withdrawals are fraudulent account transfer to the employee account and 
fraudulent account transfer to the third party. Table 13 below shows the increment in 
per cent of forms of fraudulent account withdrawals.  
2008 (%) 2009 (%) 
Account Withdrawals Cases Total  Cases  Total  Changes  
Fraudulent account transfer to 3rd party  5 38 14 31 180 
Fraudulent account transfer  5 38 9 20 80 
Fraudulent account withdrawal 3 23 22 47 633 
 
Table 13: Incidents of Fraudulent Account Withdrawal between 2008 and 2009 
(Adapted from CIFAS, 2010) 
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Disclosure of Commercial or Personal data: This involves the use of commercial or 
business identity’s data without the consent of the data owner. The use of these data for 
unauthorised purposes always places the victim companies and individuals at an 
operational risk and financial difficulties respectively. This is the case of the employee 
colluding with organised criminals into compromising the customer data and 
information. The criminals could use the data to plunder the victim’s account by 
making multiple applications in their names.  
CIFAS (2010) suggests that intelligence from law enforcement agencies noted 
infiltration of organised criminal groups in businesses are responsible for disclosure of 
commercial and personal data. Table 14 below shows the trends of the cases of the data 
disclosure practices between 2008 and 2009. 
2008 (%) 2009 (%) 
Data Disclosure Cases Total  Cases  Total  Change  
Disclosure to  third party 11 50 20 55.6 45 
Personal use of data 6 27.3 5 13.9 -20 
Alteration of data 1 4.6 2 5.6 50 
Change of payment rules 1 4.6 1 2.78 0 
Table 14:  Data Disclosure Incidents between 2008 and 2009 
(Adapted CIFAS: UK’s staff Fraud Landscape, 2010) 
 
In summary of the common forms of fraud practices related internal identity theft 
crimes, the UK Fraud Advisory Panel (2011) classified common types of identity theft 
related crimes into two categories Personal Identity Crime and Corporate Identity 
Crime.   
Table 15 below summarises the common respective types/schemes of the Personal 
Identity Crime and Corporate Identity Crimes. 
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Category of IIDTRC Common types and schemes 
Corporate identity theft 
related crimes 
The impersonation of another 
company for financial or 
commercial gain. Fraudsters 
steal a company’s identity 
and/or financial information 
and use it to purchase goods 
and services, obtain 
information or access facilities 
in your company’s name. 
Company hijacking: A fraudster submits false 
documents to a retail companies to change the 
registered address of their employer company and/or 
appoint ‘rogue’ directors. Goods and services are then 
purchased on credit, through a reactivated dormant 
supplier account, but they are never paid for. 
Company Impersonation: A fraudster impersonates a 
retail company (sometimes by purporting to be a 
director or key employee) to trick customers and 
suppliers into providing personal or sensitive 
information which is then used to defraud the retail 
company. In some cases, the retail companies may be 
impersonated using phishing emails, bogus websites 
and/or false invoices. 
‘Personal Identity Crime’ is 
commonly used to describe the 
impersonation of another 
person for financial gain. 
Personal identity criminals 
steal your personal identity 
and/or financial information 
and use it to purchase goods 
and services or access 
facilities in someone’s name. 
This scheme is use of a false 
identity or another person’s 
identity to obtain goods, 
money or services by 
deception. This often involves 
the use of stolen, counterfeit or 
forged documents such as 
passports, driving licences and 
credit cards. 
Application Fraud/Account Takeover: A fraudster 
applies for financial services (e.g. new credit cards or 
bank accounts) using individual’s name or changes the 
individual’s postal address. Impersonation of the 
deceased: A fraudster uses the identity of a deceased 
person to obtain goods and/or services. 
Phishing: A fraudster sends an email to an individual 
claiming to be from his or her bank or other legitimate 
online business (e.g. a shop or auction website) asking 
the individual to update or confirm his or her personal 
or financial information such as password and account 
details. This information is then used to impersonate the 
targeted individual and gain access to accounts. 
Present (Current) Address Fraud:  A fraudster living 
at your address (e.g. a family member) or nearby (e.g. a 
person living in the same block of flats) uses your name 
to purchase goods and/or services and intercepts the 
mail when it arrives. 
 
Table 15: Respective Types/Schemes of Personal and Corporate Identity Theft Related 
Crimes 
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The UK Fraud Advisory Panel (2011) suggests that the category and types of IIDTRC 
depend on the various intentions of the perpetrators. Some of the intentions are 
deliberate with malicious intent; inappropriate and not a malicious intent, and 
unintentional without malice. The Verizon DBIR (2013) agrees with the UK Fraud 
Advisory Panel (2011) and indicated that 93 per cent of IIDTRC were linked to 
deliberate malicious activity. This report noted that some inter-connected intentions 
drive ‘the inappropriate’ and not malicious intent, and unintentional without malice. 
Under the category of those perpetrators with malicious intention, three-quarters of 
them had authorised access to the information stolen, with approximately 19 per cent of 
the cases involved either collusion or collaboration with outside accomplices.  
In contrast, the CIFAS Report (2011) posits different intentions of the IIDTRC 
perpetrators. It suggests that 35 per cent of the IIDTRC perpetrators stole from their 
employers to gain new job, of which in 25 per cent of these perpetrators gave the stolen 
assets to the new companies. IdentityForce (2014) agrees with CIFAS Report (2011) 
and suggests that in every 25 per cent of the IIDTRC cases, the perpetrators were 
actively recruited by someone outside the targeted company, of which 65 per cent of 
these perpetrators were coerced at their workplace, 15 per cent are coerced remotely 
while accessing their employers’ networks from their homes or other location; while 
more than 25 per cent of the coercion location remained unknown.  
 
2.5 Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes Prevention 
This section discusses the strategies recommended by the renowned Information 
Systems or Techology (IS/T) Security consulting firms’ studies (e.g. Global 
Information Assurance and Data Security Essentials (GIA_DSE). The three firms 
discussed in this section includes but no limited to Global Information Assurance and 
Data Security Essentials (GIA_DSE) and Forrester Seeburger Security (FSS) 
Consortium for Cyber Security Action (CCA). These firms suggest practical solutions 
on how to mitigate internal identity theft related crimes in online retail.  
 
2.5.1 Recommendations for Prevention of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes 
Vulnerabilities and Patch Management is among the top five security strategies 
recommended by the IS security consulting firms, emphasizing the importance of 
vulnerability testing in the prevention of IIDTRC. It was ranked second in the column 
of the FSS, third in the GIA_DSE and fourth in the CCA.  
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These consulting firms recommend that retail companies should ensure that 
vulnerability and patch management of security software is maintained and updated. 
This suggests that vulnerabilities management is an essential data security tools and the 
maintenance should be the core statistic of a security metrics for any business IS 
security.  Along with the vulnerability management, code and configuration reviews 
were suggested as elements that need to be given priority in patch and vulnerability 
management. Other security strategies that are suggested by the firms are Application 
and Data Security, Threat Identification focused on Internal Human Threats Controlled 
Access Based on the Need to Know and User security Training and Awareness. This 
suggests that these strategies reduce IIDTRC risks across the retail business operation.  
However, The User security training and awareness (10) in  FSS, Threat Identification 
focused on Internal Human Threats (2) in CCA, and Controlled Access Based on the 
Need to Know (15) in GIA_DSE, shows disparity in the level of priority given to the 
end-user and human roles by these firms.  Critical analysis of the security strategies 
recommended by the FSS and GIA_DSE shows that they integrated both the 
situational-based and offender-based approach, while CCA focuses more on 
situational-based IIDTRC mitigation. 
In addition, the CCA recommendation is similar to Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation 
Experience Toolkit (EMET) which focuses on finding specific IIDTRC vulnerabilities 
and blocks potential security exploits (TechNet Blogs, 2013). SANS Critical Security 
Controls (2008) suggests that conventional IIDTRC prevention based on data security 
certainly have their place, although the success of the IIDTRC prevention strategies 
depends mostly on how the IS security management implement them.  
Other recommendation such as Kill-chain approach (KCA) by Lockheed and Hutchin 
(2010) essentially requires the integration of both technology and human roles 
mitigation approaches, with much emphasis on the implementation for KCA success. 
Table 16 and table 17 summarises the list of the internal identity theft related crimes 
(IIDTRC) prevention strategies recommended by the top IS/T Security companies.  
Forrester Seeburger (2013) suggests that the following initiatives are recommended to 
be the companies’ top IT security priority in the prevention of IIDTRC. They are 
arranged in the decreasing order of how the priority should be given by the companies.  
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Priority  FSS CCA GIA_DSE 
1 Data Security Inventory of Authorised 
and Unauthorised Devices 
System Characterisation 
and defining the scope 
and boundaries IS 
2 Managing 
Vulnerability and 
threats 
Inventory of Authorised 
and Unauthorised Software 
Threat Identification 
focused on Internal 
Human Threats 
3 Business 
continuity/disaster 
recovery 
Secure Configurations for 
Hardware and Software on 
Laptops, Workstations, and 
Servers  
Vulnerability 
Identification in 
Information Systems 
4 Managing 
information risk 
Continuous Vulnerability 
Assessment and 
Remediation 
Control Analysis and 
Review of Data Security 
Controls  
5 Application 
security 
 Malware Defences Likelihood Determination 
of possible 
Exploit/Vulnerability  
6 Aligning IT 
Security with the 
business 
Application Software 
Security 
Impact Analysis 
7 Regulatory 
Compliance 
Wireless Device Control  Risk Determination of 
Exposure to IIDTRC 
(low, medium, high) 
8 Cutting Costs and 
/or increasing 
efficiency 
Data Recovery Capability  Results Documentation 
and Process Presentation  
9 Identity and access 
management 
Security Skills Assessment 
and Appropriate Training 
to Fill Gaps  
Data Security Control 
Recommendations 
10 User security 
training and 
awareness 
Secure Configurations for 
Network Devices such as 
Firewalls, Routers, and 
Switches 
 
 
Table 16: Recommended IDTRC Prevention Strategies by GIA_DSE and FSS 
Adapted from Global Information Assurance and Data Security Essentials (GIA_DSE), 
(2012) and Forrester Seeburger Security (FSS), 2013)  
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Priority FFS CCA 
11 Complying with security requirement 
placed upon business by their partners 
 Limitations and Control of 
Network Ports, Protocols, and 
Services 
12 Complementing the business security 
required with business partners/third 
parties 
Controlled Use of 
Administrative Privileges 
13 Integrate physical and logical security Boundary Defence 
14 e-Discovery Maintenance, Monitoring, and 
Analysis of Security Audit Logs 
15 Security outsourcing Controlled Access Based on the 
Need to Know 
16 Engaging the law enforcement 
agencies 
Account Monitoring and 
Control: 
17  Data Loss Prevention 
18  Incident Response and 
Management  
19  Secure Network Engineering 
20  Penetration Test  
Table 17: Recommended Identity Theft Related Crimes Prevention Strategies by CCA 
and FSS (Adapted from Consortium for Cybersecurity Action (2012) and Forrester 
Seeburger Security (2013)) 
 
2.5.2. Practices of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes Prevention 
Wang, Yuan and Archer, (2006) and Adams (2008) agree that there is a need for 
research to look into the internal identity theft prevention practices in a particular 
business sector.  A few studies (e.g. Schulze and Shah, 2009; Elliot and Willingham, 
2001; Calder and Watkins, 2005) adhere to this suggestion. Schulze and Shah (2009) 
suggest that conducting information process risk assessment and training of employees 
to recognise bogus online applications (credit card, bank account) in the online 
retailing have proven to be good security strategies in preventing IIDTRC. Elliot and 
Willingham (2001) also agree that companies that adhere to the practices effective data 
protection and compliance management often succeed in preventing IIDTRC cases in 
their organisations. 
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UK Data Protection Act 1984 and 1998 provides the guidelines for the IIDTRC 
prevention which include effective protection of customer’s data, employees’ 
recruitment process and secure record management, effective monitoring of the 
employees and structured training of employees on IIDTRC awareness.  However, 
Gayer (2003) and Calder and Watkins (2005) argue that any guidelines for prevention 
of IIDTRC is reliant on the readiness of retail management to effectively implement 
the suggestions. The following sections summarises IIDTRC prevention practices, 
although not the exhaustive lists of the practices. 
 
2.5.2.1 Collins Key Business Asset Security 
Collins (2003) suggests that an effective security of the key business assets: people, 
processes, property and proprietary information, enhances effective prevention of 
internal identity theft-related crimes in business organisations. 
People: Security of Employees 
CIFAS (2013) agrees with Collins (2013) and suggests that employees’ awareness of 
IIDTRC perpetration mechanisms – collusion, coercion and collaboration, as one of the 
most effective practices for prevention of IIDTRC. Hinds (2007) noted that good 
reporting procedure for IIDTRC incidents re-builds employees confident that the 
IIDTRC cases would be handled according to the business ethics of their organisation. 
CIFAS (2011; 2013) and Hinds (2007) agree that Vetting and Screening of Employees, 
Staff Monitoring, and Staff Profiling are the three proven IIDTRC prevention 
practices. 
Vetting and Screening of Employees: - Hinds (2007) suggests that background 
screening is a first line of security in the prevention of IIDTRC. Effective screening 
reduces the risks associated with business organisations employing potential fraudulent 
employees. CIFAS (2011) – ‘Enemy Within’ suggests that lack of checks and controls 
of employee recruitments increases the risks of employing dishonest employees that 
may pose IIDTRC risks. The CIFAS (2013) argues that the recruitments checks and 
controls do not only identify the fraudulent staff vulnerable to internal identity frauds 
but also prevent the infiltration of the employees alike. Fraud Advisory Panel (2011) 
reports that the majority of potential employees lie in their job applications.In their 
report, it was indicated that 25 per cent of the curriculum vitae of the applicants 
examined were falsified with information related to academic qualifications and 
employment histories to secure their potential employment.  
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This report also recorded that 34 per cent of managers failed to check the background 
of their prospective employees. Of all companies that were surveyed by the Chartered 
Institute of Personnel Development (CIPD) cited in Hinds (2007), only 77 per cent of 
the companies cross check their potential candidate references.  One may argue that the 
remaining 23 per cent is smaller compared to the 77 per cent, but this could do much 
more damage to any organisation considering the impact of IIDTRC. These findings 
suggest the relented effort of personnel managers in vetting processes in many retail 
companies. If the fight against internal identity fraud related crimes is ever going to 
succeed, there is a need for prospective employers to ensure the credible vetting of all 
new employees.  
Staff Monitoring: This involves the monitoring of employees through human 
resources (HR) and promotion of the internal corporate culture of employees. Hinds 
(2007) suggested that companies with a good tradition of internal HR management 
have lesser cases of internal frauds compared to those without. Many companies invest 
a lot of resources to secure their IT infrastructure from external attack sources like 
hackers but neglect the threat posed by the dishonest employees. Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BSBS) (2012) agrees with Hinds (2007) and suggests that HR 
management promotes effective monitoring of the employees who are living a 
suspicious lifestyle that may pose potential threats to the business. Dean et al., (2012) 
agree with BSBS (2012) and suggest that HR managers could create a desired culture 
in every organisation by promoting: fraud management policy, employee fraud 
prevention policy, code of conduct or business ethics, disciplinary policy, fraud 
reporting policy, whistle blowing policy, staff assistance policy and fraud specialist 
policy. ACAS (2008) also advised business organisations to set standards of 
performance and conducts which should be monitored by company rules. Although, 
legal action against the fraudster based on the business policy might be expensive, but 
it still serves as deterrence for susceptible IIDTRC perpetrators and their collaborators. 
Staff Profiling: This is a technique of developing a behavioural pattern of IIDTRC 
suspect who has not been caught yet. Hurst (2010) suggests that profiling often 
encourages thorough investigation, effective risk analysis and paves a way for a 
possible change of information security strategies and amendment of policies to 
discourage crimes within organisations. Profiling helps businesses to establish which 
job roles or business areas pose the greatest threats and are most vulnerable to the risks 
of IIDTRC. In addition, profiling helps to find out geographical hot spots of IIDTRC 
and enable the intelligence services to design predictive modelling to prevent potential 
IIDTRC. 
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Security of Process, Property and Proprietary Information Security 
Financial Crime and Service Authority (FCSA) (2009) suggests that online retail 
companies should invest more in security systems and internal data controls to avoid 
being targeted as the weakest link. The advancement of the information technology has 
enabled the IIDTRC perpetrators to continue to refine and update their techniques. For 
instance, the recent 2011 Sony PlayStation Network (PSN) attack remained a lesson 
for the business organisation that thorough and updated proprietary information 
security is indispensable for internal data security. If PSN was thoroughly subjected to 
internal data and proprietary security and other rigorous intrusion detection control 
tests, perhaps, the compromise of the about 70 million user’s personal identifiable 
information would have been averted. Though, there is still no tip for the cause of the 
PSN attack linked to the dishonest act within the company, the message for the need of 
effective internal data proprietary security monitoring remains obvious. Dean et al., 
(2011) reported in Ponemon Institute Research that 28 per cent of the IIDTRC cases in 
583 US companies occurred among the mobile workforce, of which 44 per cent of the 
companies surveyed still view their IT infrastructure as relatively insecure, while 90 
per cent have had cases of IIDTRC at least once in prior 12 months.  This report shows 
that some of the online business organisations including retail companies allow their 
employees to store valuable customer’s personal identifiable information on online 
applications such as Google Dropbox and Docs.  
Verizon DBIR (2012) agrees with Dean et al., (2011) and indicates that out of 447 
business organisations that participated in their survey of how employers use social 
media in their business, 52 per cent of small businesses depend on social networking 
sites, with only 8 per cent of the small businesses monitor what staff posted on those 
sites.  These business practices expose the data to theft and make the customer’s PID/I 
vulnerable to IIDTRC. In some cases the use of the social networking sites – LinkedIn, 
Twitter, Facebook, leaves the digital trails that make online companies susceptible to 
social engineering. These related crimes are still rampant because of the security 
loopholes of the IT/IS infrastructures and proprietary systems. However, some of the 
new complex technologies that have been noted to have proven security for process, 
property and proprietary information security are biometric technologies, 
cryptography, authentication and certification and single-sign-on technologies 
(Schneier, 2004). Though, some of these leading data security technology solutions – 
IBM AppScan, forensic data warehousing, Vontu by Symantec, exist, companies might 
not make much out of these security tools if there is no effective security audit and 
compliance management (IBM Software, 2012).  
 Page 55 of 328 
 
2.5.2.2 The US National Strategy for Identity Theft Prevention 
This strategy was developed to support federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies for prevention of identity theft crimes and was recommended to be adopted in 
the U.S business organisations. The main seven components of the US national 
strategy are information protection, legislation, partnerships and collaboration, public 
awareness, reporting procedures, training, and victim assistance.  It is vital to 
emphasise on the three key components: Legislation, Partnership and Collaboration 
and Training, because they extend the understanding of the IIDTRC prevention 
suggested by Collins (2003) and because of the suggested impacts these practices have 
on IIDTRC prevention (McDonald et al., 2006). Table 18 summarises the four 
components US National Strategy for Identity Theft Prevention. 
Strategy Features and Impact on IIDTRC prevention 
Partnership 
and 
Collaboration 
Strategy for effective IIDTRC prevention has been adopted in many 
business organisations in the following instances; Indiana State 
Police for the US Strategic Alliances, Computer and IT and National 
White Collar Crime Centre (NW3C), ‘Tiered Approach’ among 
students and IS/T security experts, Scientific Working Group on 
Digital Evidence (SWDGE), the Nigeria’s Police Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (“EFCC”),  the UK’s Central Sponsor 
of Information Assurance and Office of Cyber Security Office and 
Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OSCIA), the UK’s anti-
fraud scheme – TRADE (Transactis Risk Assessment Data 
Exchange) which shares transactional data to enable the detection of 
potential IIDTRC and computer related criminals and fraudsters in 
business organisations, the Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA).These collaborated bodies work with an aim to 
establish standards practices to guide professionals in investigating 
identity theft crimes and other computer related crimes. They work 
together, sharing their expertise, both in areas of provision of digital 
investigatory strategies and evidence, to foster the security threats of 
businesses. Rosenberg (2010) suggests that partnership approach 
which is used in biological and nuclear arm controls treaties could 
help prevent identity theft crimes and encourage robust practices in 
investigating these crimes across nations, business organisations, 
industries and sectors. 
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Strategy Features and Impact on IIDTRC prevention 
Legislation The harmonisation of the data privacy and security legislations across 
businesses can reduce the bottlenecks during IIDTRC reporting. 
Bringing together of various cross-border data protection policies 
provide the opportunity for thorough investigation of IIDTRC in the 
emerging business networking and outsourcing. Sommer (2012) 
suggests that harmonised policy approaches in IIDTRC prevention at 
an international level is an indispensable practice that have been 
pioneered by US governments.  
Legislation Sommer (2012) further suggests that comprehensive legislation on 
identity theft prevention would help to tackle the challenges related to 
‘the admissibility’ of electronic evidence and other related legal 
hurdles. Breyer (2012) agrees with Sommer (2012) and suggests (in 
the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence) that law seeks 
decisions that fall within the boundaries of scientifically sound 
knowledge, but it is sometimes difficult to achieve in practice if there 
is no existing policy on crimes prevention to support provision of the 
scientific evidence. 
Training A continuous training for the online retail staffers helps to match the 
evolution of the Information Systems. An anonymous New Jersey 
Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (NJRCFL) director and 
FBI supervisory special agent noted the importance of staff training. 
He said that being an IT/S security expert in IIDTRC prevention is 
‘not only what I know, but what I know that is not so’ (Mercuri, 
2005). Wilkinson and Haagman (2011) suggest that the computer 
security experts have overall responsibility to be updated with 
practices of the IIDTRC prevention. The G8 on standards for the 
Exchange of Digital Evidence also emphasised the need for training 
in prevention of IIDTRC. Researchers (e.g. Walker, 2006; Meyers 
and Rogers, 2004) agrees with G8 and  suggest that since there are 
certification for fraud investigators in other fields (accounting, 
finance, and banking), the needs for the certified professional 
examinations for identity theft crimes in computer crimes should be 
given a due consideration. 
 
Table 18: US National Strategies for Identity Theft Related Crimes Prevention 
 
 Page 57 of 328 
 
2.5.2.3 Use of Information System Governance and Security Intelligence 
Conte (2003) in the ‘Global Information Assurance Certification’ suggests the 
following IIDTRC prevention practices: IS/T monitoring and CCTV and Network 
Intrusion Detection Systems; System Characterisation; and IIDTRC Incidents Results 
Documentation. These steps, he noted, could improve the control analysis to address 
the identified IIDTRC and detect the likelihood that a privilege user or a dishonest 
employee may exploit a known vulnerability. Conte suggests that an application of the 
control analyses reduces the risk of the insider threat to system vulnerability and that 
the control tools such as DirectoryAlert and ServerAlert by NetVision can reduce 
potential IIDTRC threats.  
Forrester and Seeburger (2013) agree with Conte (2003) and suggest three key 
elements: Define Your Data, Dissect Your Data, and Defend Your Data, for effective 
internal data security intelligence against IIDTRC. Dissection of the data is the 
processes of critical data analytics for security intelligence. It can be defined with an 
acronym: INTEL – Information, Notification, Threats, Evaluation and Leadership. 
With an efficient data definition and data dissection in place, these principles would 
enhance the security against IIDTRC.  
In addition, efficient implementation of these practical elements could reduce data 
leakages by encouraging the principle of least privilege – strictly enforce access 
control, inspect data usage patterns to identify abuse, dispose of data when no longer 
needed and encrypt data to limit the access. Forrester and Seeburger (2013) further 
suggest that data with defined location and index would facilitate the development of a 
life cycle for data classification, cataloguing and data discovery to reduce the risks of 
the IIDTRC.  
 
2.5.2.4 The Use of the Information Security Audit (ISA) 
Dean et al., (2012) suggest that companies should utilise three lines of defence – data 
security, privacy controls and practices, with IS security audit playing the critical role 
in implementing these lines of defence. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) (2014) Report on the Nations Occupational Fraud and Abuse agree with Dean 
et al., (2012) and suggests that since 2002 IS security audit has consistently proven to 
be more likely to prevent identity theft related crimes than other prevention practices.  
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Several researchers (e.g. Hooks and Kaplan and Schultz, 1994; Steinnon, 2006) agree 
that information security audit plays a substantial role in IS security (ISA) 
management.  Dooley (2009) suggested that business owners must make a substantial 
investment on ISA to protect consumer’s PII/D from the emerging social and 
technological oriented IIDTRC threats. Wells (2010) agrees with Dooley (2009) and 
remarked that half the combined cost of IIDTRC and detection could be the cost of 
their prevention through effective ISA.  Hua and Bapna (2012) has suggested that 
countries should prioritise practical and strategic IS security checks to avert data 
leakages which originate from the inside business organisations.  
Some companies have adhered to the suggestions on the importance of ISA in the 
prevention of IIDTRC. Dean et al., (2012) noted that the International Data 
Corporation (IDC) survey conducted in 2007 found that companies across industries 
spent more than 19 per cent of their IT budgets on ISA. The PWC’s ISBS (2014) 
reports that 50 per cent of UK companies plan to spend more on IT security with an 
increase of 9 per cent more in 2012 than the previous year. This report also indicated 
that the UK Cyber security Operations Centre spends more than £5 million annually on 
information security issues while the US federal agencies budgeted about $6.5 billion 
on data security assurance alone for the fiscal year 2012. In agreement with Dean et 
al., (2012), the PWC
6’s ISBS7 Report (2014) on the strategies for identifying IIDTRC 
risks in the  business organisations noted that ISA was rated at 75 per cent while other 
strategies such as IS break-down and loss of company assets account for 25 per cent. In 
addition, ACFE
8
 (2014) suggested that more than 43 per cent of IIDTRC incidents 
were detected by use of the ISA of which 7 per cent was detected by the independent 
external security auditing. This report shows that more than 50 per cent of such crimes 
could be detected by effective Information Systems security audit. 
 
 2.5.2.5 Detection Mechanisms as Identity Theft Prevention Practice  
Understanding some of the key detection mechanisms available at the disposal of the 
internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) victim would guide the understanding 
of some elements required for designing effective IIDTRC prevention framework. It 
would enable the victim to make a decision on resource allocation and the 
implementation-know-how in applying them and when to.  
                                                     
6 PricewaterhouseCoopers: A multinational professional services firm. 
7 Information Security Breaches Survey 
8 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
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Several Research reports (e.g. ISACA, 2010; British Retail Consortium (BRC) Crime 
and Loss Prevention, 2011; Cichonski et al., 2012 and Verizon DBIR, 2013) have 
agreed that detecting internal identity theft related crimes incidents at the earlier 
moment of the incidents was escalated have least amount of repercussion, though, not 
lesser than if they were prevented. These reports noted that IS/T security controls are 
neither absolute detection mechanism as they have their downsides – cost, complexity 
and implementation. In addition, these reports emphases the importance of 
understanding the timeline of the IIDTRC incident in relation to the detection. 
Understanding the time frame for IIDTRC incident could increase the ability to 
provide comprehensive framework and capability evaluation. The timespan/line for 
IIDTRC incidents depends on a variety of factors and incidents detection processes.  
The Verizon’s (2014) Data Breach Investigation Report (DBIR) categorised the 
timeline analysis of IIDTRC incidents into 3 phases: pre-IIDTRC incident, active-
IIDTRC incident and post-IIDTRC incident, which are aligned with IIDTRC incident 
detection process. The pre-IIDTRC incident is the initial phase of an incident which 
depicts time from the first action taken against the victim by the perpetrator until the 
time IS/T property is affected. This is common with network resources intrusions and 
point of sale (POS) abetted hacks. According to the Verizon’s (2013) DBIR Report, 85 
per cent of the IIDTRC incidents under this phase occurred within minutes or less.  
The time for the pre-incident depends on the complexity of security platform of the 
victim companies. BRC Crime and Loss Prevention Report (2011) indicates that large 
retail companies have lesser pre-IIDTRC incident time than smaller companies 
because of the complexities associated with managing large IS/T infrastructure and 
detecting crimes in large retail companies.Active-IIDTRC incident phase covers the 
timespan from the pre-IIDTRC incident phase to the time when PID/I is first removed 
from the victims’ IS/T control environment. In average, the time for this incident phase 
is longer – the time it takes the perpetrator to explore the network, locate and exploit 
the relevant IS/T platforms and then exfiltrate/collect the asset.  
Cichonski et al., (2012) suggest in the Computer Security Incident Handling Guide 
(CSIHG) that abetted SQL injection-related incidents fall into active-IIDTRC incident 
phase and that are common in both small and bigger retail companies.  
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Figure 6: Trends of Undiscovered IIDTRC Incidents 
(Adapted from Cichonski et al., 2012 cit. Computer Security Incident Handling Guide) 
Post-IIDTRC phase describes the time from the active-incident phase to the time the 
victim discovers the incident. Figure 6 shows the distribution of IIDTRC incidents that 
remain undiscovered for months from 2008 to 2012. The post-IIDTRC phase may 
cover as much as months. Some cases took up to years since the perpetrators often 
cover their trails especially the incidents that are perpetrated by software 
engineer/administrators. This phase could extend to as much the time it takes the victim 
to detect or to discover the security breach, which sometimes prove impossible. ISACA 
(2010) indicated that 70 per cent of the post-IIDTRC phase incidents were discovered 
by the external parties (e.g. notification by an informant/customer, law enforcement, 
competing organisations, Internet Service Providers). This report suggests that the 
internal detection capability is lacking in most victim companies, with a few of non-
technical employees discovering only 11 per cent of the incidents. Though, this analysis 
could be somewhat based on the size of the retail companies.   
 
Figure 7: Detection Methods for IIDTRC in Business Organisations 
(Adapted from Verizon DBIR, 2012) 
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Verizon DBIR (2012) agrees with ISACA (2010) and indicates, as shown in the figure 
8 that from 2009 to 2011 more than 50 per cent of the IIDTRC incidents experienced 
by the larger companies were detected by the external party; while in aggregate, 
irrespective of the size, 92 per cent of these known incidents were detected by the same 
external party. The larger companies recorded only 16 per cent of the active detection 
by the internal party and only 2 per cent of internal detection was recorded in all the 
organisations studied. But in all, the external party still maintains the larger chunk as 
the source of the IIDTRC incidents detection. 
In line with the Verizon DBIR (2012) Report, Verizon DBIR (2013) as shown in figure 
8 suggests that few technical methods could be used to detect IIDTRC incidents. The 
reports agrees that end-users activities as the most effective mean of detecting IIDTRC 
incidents. The end-users detects and IIDTRC incidents such suspicious e-mail and slow 
system performance in the course of their daily responsibilities. Other common internal 
methods include fraud financial audit, log review, IT audit, and incident response. 
 
Figure 8: Methods of Detecting Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes (Percentages) 
 (Adapted from Verizon’s DBIR, 2013) 
Figure 9 below shows the table matrix plots of IIDTRC detection methods against 
timespans observed in 2012 by Cichonski et al., (2012) in Computer Security Incident 
Handling Guide (CSIHG). It shows that it takes 15 months for the fraud detection and 
9 months for the law enforcement compared to less than 6 months recorded for the 
same incidents to have been detected by the internal party. There could various reasons 
attributed to these delays in detecting the IIDTRC cases. In some cases, depending on 
the nature of the business operation, the victim companies might have contingency 
plans in place to manage the disruption while the investigation would be carried out. 
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Another reason attributed to the delays associated with detecting the IIDTRC 
incidents is that more than 78 per cent of the incidents committed during the 
working hours. In some cases, more than 50 per cent of IIDTRC were detected 
months after the departure of the perpetrators from the victim companies.  
 
Figure 9: IIDTRC Detection Methods (Time Span) 
 
In summary of the answers to the research questions this section has provided, table19 
depicts the key IIDTRC perpetration modes in relation to their respective prevention 
and detection strategies. The IIDTRC prevention recommendations in section 2.5.2 
indicate that retail companies should implement the recommendations which might be 
practicable in relation their various sizes and business processes. Even with a well-
modelled IIDTRC prevention framework established by a consortium of security 
professionals, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. The application and implementation 
of the framework across business operation will differ depending on budget, business 
need, and process and size.  
In search of the evidence-based IIDTRC prevention framework, next section explores 
framework available for prevention of IIDTRC in the retail companies, to investigate 
how these IIDTRC prevention controls at their disposal fit the business operations and 
processes. In addition, next section extends to answer the questions related to potential 
IIDTRC prevention practices and data security implementation issues that face the 
Information Systems management. 
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Mechanisms IIDTRC Detection IIDTRC Prevention 
Infiltrated 
hacking: access 
to protect IS with 
stolen credential. 
Monitoring of 
administrative/privilege 
activity: logon time, 
anomalies, malware on the 
system 
Controlled authentication: two 
faction, internet protocol 
blacklisting, internal restricted 
administrative connection. 
Abetted botnet 
and infiltration. 
Registry monitoring and 
examination of the active 
system processes. 
Integrity control mechanisms, 
Egress filtering via ports and 
protocols, host intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), updating firewalls 
and software security. 
Tampering and 
copying of PID/I  
Some scratches on the IS 
device, Bluetooth signals. 
Employees training, Consistent 
inspection, policy implementation, 
anti-tampering tools – tamper 
switch, epoxy electronics. 
Social 
engineering and 
manipulation 
Call logs, e-mail logs, 
unusual communication, 
bypass of technological 
alerting mechanisms, 
visitors’ log. 
Clearly defined policies and 
procedures, general security 
awareness training. 
Collusion and 
employees 
abetted 
cybercrimes 
Routine monitoring of the 
databases, webserver, IDS 
and intrusion prevention 
systems (IPS) 
Principles of least privilege account 
management, input validation and 
whitelisting techniques 
Collaboration 
with external 
agents 
Last logon banner, end-
user behavioural analysis, 
logon source location 
analysis 
Disabling default account, scanning 
of passwords, password-change 
rotation principle, sharing of the 
administrative duties. 
SQL via back-
end databases 
Desk calls for account 
lockouts, sequential 
guessing and log in 
attempts failures. 
Password policy, password 
throttling and effective access 
control mechanisms. 
 
Table 19: IIDTRC Mode_Detection_Prevention 
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2.5.3 Lessons from the IIDTRC Prevention Practices  
The internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) prevention practices discussed 
above encompass the detailed guidance on protection of customer’s data, recruiting 
employees, managing records, and monitoring the employees. PriceWaterCoopers’ 
(PWC) (2014) suggests that even though more than 50 per cent of UK companies have 
adopted these practices and plan to spend more on IT security, 67 per cent of the 
companies expect a rise of the IIDTRC incidents. One might be deemed to ask why are 
the IIDTRC prevention practices discussed above arguably do not contribute to 
effective prevention of the crimes incidents.  Vaca (2003) argues that some online 
retail companies that seem to comply with the IIDTRC prevention practices do have 
the capacity to provide effective and efficient strategies that ensure quality 
requirements and cost reduction. Several studies (e.g. Popa and Doinea, 2007; Dean et 
al., 2012; Forrester and Seeburger, 2013; PriceWaterCoopers’ (PWC), 2014) agree that 
many online retail companies attributed their failure to the lack of resources, or that 
their company is apparently not big enough to accommodate an IS security 
departments and maintenance routine costs. 
In addition to these reasons, majority of the businesses cannot answer fundamental IS 
security issue questions related to; 
 Performance measurement (how well is the IS security enhancing 
business requirement?) 
 Security control profiling (what IS security processes are important, and 
the critical success factors for control?) 
 IS security awareness (what are the risks of not achieving the internal 
data security objectives?) 
 Benchmarking (what do other businesses do, and how can their results 
be compared and measured?). 
Table 20 in the next page provides answers to these questions and summarises the 
common reasons for the failure of the IIDTRC prevention practices cited in the 
literature. The challenges of tackling these reasons have been, in some cases, attributed 
to reason some IIDTRC prevention practices have failed. The failure of the IIDTRC 
prevention practices have left the business management with little or no better option 
than to resort to available coercive security strategies (software security). But with this 
option, yet another question is whether the choice would better off?  
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If yes, the unavoidable question still comes: why have these available software-based 
IIDTRC prevention frameworks failed to prevent IIDTRC? Next section provides an 
answer to this question by discussing the strength and weaknesses of the available 
identity theft prevention frameworks. 
Why Prevention 
Practices Fail? 
Explanation of the Reasons for the Failure of Internal 
Identity Theft Prevention Practices 
The perception that 
adequate and 
advanced IS security 
tools are already in 
place. 
Company managers sometimes believe that having security 
software and firewalls, and being Sarbenes-Oxley (SOX), 
PCI and ISO related compliant are enough. They fail to 
know that unless these controls and regulations are 
consistently checked, the effectiveness of their security 
might not be assured. Dean et al., (2012) suggest that it 
took more than 5000 companies until 2008 to join the 
International Association of Data Privacy that has been 
founded since 2000.  
The PriceWaterCoopers’ (PWC) (2014) indicated that 80 
per cent of companies fail to evaluate their spending on IS 
security resources or review if they are properly 
implemented and regulated. PWC (2014) suggests that most 
companies only struggle to evaluate their data security tools 
and regulations at the aftermath of the IIDTRC incidents. 
This suggestion agrees with Bielski (2005) that a few 
companies make strategic investment for their IT security. 
Fragmented roles 
between the IS 
security management 
team 
Shah and Okeke (2011) noted that some businesses lacks 
integrated data security approaches between the external 
and internal security auditors.  In some cases, there is 
segregation in the roles of the sourcing and outsourcing 
security companies between the business and law 
enforcement agencies. 
For an effective proactive measure in the fight against 
IIDTRC, they suggested the business IS management and 
security audit team have to work in unison and jettison the 
perception of role segregation. 
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Why Prevention 
Practices Fail? 
Explanation of the Reasons for the Failure of Internal 
Identity Theft Prevention Practices 
Management 
Negligence 
The evolving IIDTRC threats that might demand new tools 
and procedures are often treated with laxity by business 
owners and their management.  At times, some of the 
security tools and regulations are not applied effectively.  
In the PriceWaterCoopers’ (PWC) (2014) Survey, 56 per 
cent of businesses did not carry out any security checks of 
their external providers; instead they only rely on contracts 
and contingency plans. IS security-resource 
implementations could only be effective if they are well 
reviewed, regulated and properly applied.  
Many companies have fallen into this bandwagon of 
aftermath effect. The PriceWaterCoopers’ (PWC) (2014) 
survey tracking of the past 3 years shows the degrading 
capabilities of IS security management across business 
organisations. In 2011, only 41 per cent of approximately 
10, 000 executives across business organisations in 138 
countries acknowledged that they have data security 
compliance and identity management strategy compared to 
48 per cent in 2009.  
While only 39 per cent of these executives acknowledged 
that they reviewed their data security policies and 
regulations annually in 2011, more than 52 per cent did in 
2009. 
The huge demand on 
companies to 
maintain the 
increasing PID/I used 
by the consumers via 
e-tailing and e-
commerce. 
An average business organisation today handles at least 5 
million customer’s PID/I which encourages decentralisation 
of the data storage.  
This practice leads to vulnerabilities related to file transfer 
protocols (FTP), network shares and e-mail; which in turn 
pose many challenges of large file management, FTP 
software process, audit trails and version control, etc. 
(Forrester and Seeburger, 2013).  
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Why Prevention 
Practices Fail? 
Explanation of the Reasons for the Failure of 
Internal Identity Theft Prevention Practices 
The cost of 
Information 
System/Technology 
(IS/T) security 
management. 
The ACFE (2014) survey suggests that some of the 
companies apparently consider themselves too small to bear 
the cost of applying security auditing for IIDTRC 
prevention. The failure of the business executives to 
conduct a cost and benefit analysis of IS security 
investments often lead them to believe that security cost 
outweighs the benefit. The PriceWaterCoopers’ (PWC) 
(2014) survey indicated that 12 per cent of senior 
management give less priority to the data compliance 
management. 
The perception of 
low expectations 
from the IS security 
and compliance 
management by the 
business managers 
Popa and Doinea (2007) noted that many businesses 
managers often do not trust the capabilities of their security 
audit and compliance management. In some cases 
companies perceive data security audit as a complex 
practice and got intimidated by the daunting and demanding 
tasks of data security management.  
Table 20: Why IIDTRC Prevention Practices Fail? 
 
2.6 Identity Theft-Related Crimes Prevention Frameworks  
As already discussed in chapter one (Section 1.4), there are few frameworks identified 
in the literature that are designed to prevent internal identity theft related crimes 
(IIDTRC). This is because the few frameworks aimed to generate general identity theft 
prevention across institutions. To justify the need for providing an independent 
framework for prevention of IIDTRC, the existing frameworks need to be reviewed to 
identify their limitations and establish the gaps to be bridged by a new framework. 
There are several models that appear in the literature concerning prevention of identity 
theft related crimes.  The prevention of IIDTRC relies both on the human aspects of 
security management and on the computer systems security (Cappelli et al., 2006). 
This distinctive characteristic of IIDTRC prevention underpins the reasons for 
available frameworks that have been designed in with generic IIDTRC prevention to 
cover all the two aspects.  
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As defined by the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, a framework is a system 
of rules, ideas, beliefs or a supporting structure around which something can be built 
that is used to plan or decide something. This definition lays the concept of the 
available frameworks. However, little or none of the existing frameworks focus on a 
specific nature of crime and business sector to adjust the prevention for the specific 
requirement. The examination of the available framework is intended to provide the 
understanding and background for designing and extending proposed Role-based 
framework. The literature shows that the majority of available identity theft related 
crimes frameworks are designed based on the concepts (e.g. devices structure, systems 
designs, technology architecture and nature of crimes) of their predecessors. These on 
concepts on which available framework are underpinned are justifiable by the 
researcher’s intentions.  
However, in this case, it is important look at the suggestions made by other researchers 
on the IIDTRC prevention. Burkhalter and Crittenden (2010) points that the 
understanding of available frameworks would enable the researcher to understand and 
identify the research gaps needed for the recommendation of IIDTRC prevention 
framework. The critical consideration of their applicability is highlighted to evaluate 
their strengths and weaknesses. Hence, the commonly cited frameworks as they appear 
in the literature are discussed below. 
 
2.6.1 Generic Internal Identity Theft-Related Crimes Prevention Frameworks 
Several studies (e.g. Kardell, 2007; ACFE, 2014) agree that a less attention has been 
given to the studies of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) prevention in the 
context of a particular business organisation like online retail. Yang and Wang (2011) 
agree that generic IIDTRC prevention frameworks might be complex to be adapted in 
some business sectors because of differences in business operations, processes, 
organisational culture and technology.  
ACFE (2014) noted there is a need for more research to be conducted in a particular 
business sector with critical emphasis on the roles of managing these differences in 
prevention of IIDTRC. In his research paper, Adams (2008) also noted that though 
identity theft related crime are omnipresent, their study has to be constrained to the key 
policy makers  in a particular business sector or location to provide an effective result.  
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Cappelli et al., (2006) agree that the need to align business requirements with roles of 
management is indispensable for prevention of IIDTRC. They opined that the effective 
synergy of efforts interplayed with IT executives, managers, technical employee, 
human resources, and security officers could be a practicable tool in the prevention of 
IIDTRC. The testimony of the US successful implementation of Department of 
Homeland Security and Cyber Security Project confirmed that the need for the 
deployment of the effective management roles in preventing identity theft-related 
crimes in business sectors. In their research project, Cappelli et al., (2006) and Moore 
et al., (2008) agree that since IIDTRC involve majorly human elements manipulating 
IS, it would take the comprehensive and strategic inputs of the human roles to counter 
the crimes. Savirimuthu and Savirimuthu (2007) suggest that a deeper understanding of 
roles implications of managing complex systems like customers’ data management is 
an important prerequisite to applicable IIDTRC prevention frameworks. They further 
suggested that the integration of complementary management with IT security 
management would be suitable strategy for mitigation of IIDTRC since these crimes 
are not only technologically motivated but mostly socially. In line with Savirimuthu 
and Savirimuthu’s suggestion, Wang, Yuan and Archer (2006) acknowledge that more 
research needs to be done in the development of a framework for prevention of 
IIDTRC from the perspective of roles of the management. 
In addition, Lacey and Cuganesan (2005) suggested that the collaborative effort of 
‘human resource security’ – IT management, complementary data security and crimes 
prevention team are often overlooked in formulation of IIDTRC prevention strategies 
in the existing frameworks. Shah and Okeke (2011) agrees with Lacey, and pointed out 
that available frameworks fail to prevent these crimes because the strategies do not 
incorporate the roles of the complementary management teams (auditing, outsourcing 
firms, credit monitoring firms, law enforcement agency, etc.). Other researchers (e.g. 
Jamieson et al., 2009, Pawson and Tilley, 1995, Stake, 1967) agree with Lacey (2005) 
and Kardell (2007) and suggest that development of robust IIDTRC prevention 
frameworks should be done from the perspective of a particular business. The study of 
IIDTRC prevention in the selected cases in online retail (a unique and distinct system) 
would help to simplify and understand the complexity of these crimes, and provides 
the background for effective implementation of the framework.  
Table 21 on page 70 and page 71 summarises the collated literature on identity theft 
prevention frameworks. This review suggests that a few attentions have given on the 
roles of management in the prevention of IIDTRC. 
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Authors Research focus Key concepts Research contribution 
Shah and 
Okeke 
(2012). 
Examination of the 
roles of management 
in IIDTRC prevention 
and internal data 
security. 
Role-based 
framework for 
analysing 
prevention of 
Internal Identity 
Theft Related 
Crimes: Case 
Study in UK Retail 
Industry. 
A systematic and integrated 
approach where the key 
components of management 
work in unison is required to 
prevent IIDTRC and maximise 
internal data security. 
Steinbart 
et al., 
(2012). 
Exploratory 
investigation of the 
relationship between 
internal audit and IS 
security.  
An exploratory 
model of the 
factors that 
influence the 
nature of 
relationship 
between ISA and 
IS security 
functions 
The proficiency of the IS 
security auditors affects the 
quality of the ISA practices 
and could contribute to 
prevention of internal 
information theft. 
 Shah 
and 
Okeke 
(2011) 
Exploration of 
existing literature on 
the propagation of 
IIDTRC, and the 
conceptualisation of 
these crimes in the 
retail industry. 
The synthesis of 
Role-based 
framework for 
prevention of 
IIDTRC in retail 
industry. 
 
IIDTRC prevention strategy 
should incorporate a 
collaboration of external and 
internal crime prevention 
actors, and all levels of an 
organisation should be given 
clear and specific 
responsibilities regarding 
internal data security. 
Sharariri 
and 
Lababidi 
(2011) 
Examination of the 
factors affecting 
internal auditors in the 
protection of 
computerised 
accounting IS from 
electronic penetration 
in banking operation  
Enhancement of 
the factors that 
would contribute to 
the effective 
utilisation of ISA 
in protecting 
computerised 
accounting IS. 
IS auditors should be fully 
aware of the operations of the 
business organisations, the 
activities of the e-fraud 
prevention team to be able to 
proffer IS security against 
internal data breaches and 
attacks 
Moorthy 
et al., 
(2011). 
Evaluation of the 
impact of the role of 
IT on ISA in business 
organisation 
Impact of the 
information 
technology on 
internal data 
security auditing. 
Information Systems auditor 
has the responsibility of 
ensuring that the management 
and board of directors 
understand the liability of 
potential data security risks. 
Schulze 
and 
Shah, 
(2009) 
Investigation of 
communication 
strategies used by the e-
commerce 
organisations (via 
websites) to battle 
identity theft related 
crimes. 
Development of the 
Support – Trust – 
Empowerment – 
Prevention (STEP) 
Method for battling 
identity theft related 
crimes. 
Few e-commerce organisations 
proactively prevent identity 
theft, provide supporting actions 
and inform consumers on how to 
protect their data against such 
crimes. 
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Authors Research focus Key concepts Research contribution 
Ji, 
Smith-
Chao 
and Min 
(2008) 
 
The examination of a 
theoretical view of 
identity theft crimes as 
the basis for business 
organisational 
information system 
designs (from system 
planner’s perspective). 
Systems Plan for 
Combating Identity 
Theft – A 
Theoretical 
Framework. 
 
 
 
 
Various roles and the 
relationship of the identity 
chain should be coordinated in 
designing in a collaborated 
systems for combating identity 
theft crimes in business  
Jamieson
, 
Winches
ter, 
Stephens 
and 
Smith 
(2008) 
The study of 
formation of identity 
fraud profiling 
definition, 
construction of a 
profiling 
classification; and 
identification of the 
barriers to the use of 
profiling by business 
organisations. 
  
 
Development of a 
conceptual 
framework for 
identity fraud 
profiling and 
provision of 
frameworks main 
elements, their 
relationships. 
 
Organisational identity fraud 
based profiling methodologies 
have information processing 
techniques applicable to 
developing fraud profiling 
models in the IS in business 
organisations; and that 
integration of these techniques 
reduce the 
incidents of 
identity crimes. 
Vasiu 
(2004) 
Examination of the 
risks of e-fraud in an 
integrated supply 
chain, and overview of 
significant adverse 
effect of e-fraud as a 
hindrance towards 
achievement of 
business 
organisational IS 
strategic objectives. 
Development of a 
conceptual 
framework for E-
fraud Control in 
Integrated Supply 
Chain of business 
organisations. 
E-fraud prevention should be 
integrated to corporate board-
level organisations’ practices 
and business plans; and that 
management should be 
responsible for implementation 
and coordination of the human, 
technological, and financial 
resources necessary for 
controlling e-fraud in business 
organisations. 
Wright 
(1998) 
The exploration of the 
need for IS education 
among business 
organisations’ 
employees 
Development of 
framework for IS 
security training 
for employees. 
To improve the IS security 
against IIDTRC, IS education 
must be integrated into the 
business organisations’ 
practices and their data 
protection policies. 
Table 21: Studies on Identity Theft Related Crimes Prevention 
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2.6.2 Software-based Identity Theft-Related Crimes Prevention Frameworks 
British Retail Consortium (BRC) (2011) suggests that some of the existing internal 
identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) prevention frameworks have focused on the 
implementation of software security. This suggestion is confirmed by some researchers 
(e.g.  McCormick, 2008; Jabbour and Menasce, 2009) that focus on the software-based 
security related studies for the prevention of IIDTRC. While others (e.g. Bishop and 
Gates, 2008; Niekerk and Solms, 2010) focus on the combination of technology and 
process; while a few (e.g. Collins, 2003; Moore et al., 2008) attempt to combine 
technology, process and people. The resulting frameworks from software-based studies 
are the scientific approaches that are only implementable in computer systems 
(Jamieson et al., 2009). For instance, Le Lievre and Jamieson (2005) pre-conception 
Model of Identity Fraud Profiling was built based on the information processing which 
uses the trails from the computer systems to analyse the behaviour of the perpetrators. 
This frameworks application relies more on the use of computer systems than on the 
contribution of the IS management roles and end-users. This negligence of the 
contribution of these roles is one of the gaps in a body of literature this research tends 
to fill. 
The review of the literature shows that many studies have neglected a crucial element 
of people: management roles. From the above table, software-based frameworks built 
with the concept of technology dominated the IIDTRC mitigation studies. 10 out of the 
16 reviewed IIDTRC prevention model were based on technology. For instance, 
Nelliker (2010) and Park and Giordano (2006) applied the role-based access control 
techniques for analyses of the identity theft criminals’ behaviours and profiles.  
While Jabbour and Menasce (2009) presents Insider Threat Security Architecture 
(ITSA) framework to analyse the security scenario of the compromised IS by the 
privilege users, Ha et al., (2007) applied the capability acquisition graph to 
demonstrate the criminal threats. These techniques are only implementable on the 
computer systems. The two models that are based on the concepts of the process by 
Niekerk and Solms (2010) and Bishop and Gates (2008) present the conceptual model 
to facilitate the argumentation of the organisational culture in information security 
systems.Only the system dynamics model and MERIT model by Moore et al., (2008) 
and Greitzer et al., (2008), Cappelli et al., (2006) with Keeney et al., (2005) integrated 
these key elements: people, process and technology to proffer IIDTRC prevention 
framework.  
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While these contributions to IS systems security practices are theoretically possible to 
reduce internal data security vulnerabilities and IIDTRC incidents, researchers (e.g. 
Hofmeyr, and Forrest and Somayaji, 1998; Allen et al., 1999) suggest that it is 
practically infeasible unless the roles of human are central to the IIDTRC prevention 
strategies and practices.  Table 22 summaries the review of some studies on IIDTRC 
prevention frameworks underpinned with technology, process and people.  
Prevention 
Concepts 
Researchers Focus of the Model No of 
Studies 
Process Niekerk and Solms 
(2010) 
Conceptual model 2 
Bishop and Gates 
(2008) 
Analyses of the 
IIDTRC threats 
Technology Nellikar S (2010) Scalable Simulation Framework 10 
Jabbour and Menasce 
(2009) 
Insider Threat Security Architecture 
McCormick (2008) EDLP Programme 
Ha et al. (2007) ICMAP 
Park and Giordan 
(2006) 
Role-based Access Control 
Butts (2006) SPM-IT / MAMIT approach 
Chinchani and Iyer 
and Ngo and   
Upadhyaya  (2005) 
End user security behaviours 
Symonenko et al., 
(2004) 
Natural Language Processing 
Systems (NLPS)  
Schultz (2002) 6 indicator framework 
Anderson (2000) 8 general approaches 
People, 
Process and 
Technology 
Moore et al., (2008); 
Band et al., (2006) 
System dynamics 4 
Greitzer et al., 
(2008); Cappelli et 
al., (2006); Keeney 
et al., (2005) 
MERIT 
 
Table 22: Studies of IIDTRC prevention based on technology, process and people 
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2.6.3 Lessons from the Reviewed IIDTRC Prevention Frameworks  
This chapter has explored within the scope of this research the available IIDTRC 
prevention frameworks and their contextual implementation issues. Researchers (Shah 
and Okeke, 2011; Prosch, 2009; Swartz, 2008) have attributed the failure for these 
frameworks’ unsuccessful implementation to the issues of lack of clear roles and 
responsibilities given to the security managers and administrators, which in turn might 
lead to the following issues; 
 Poor understanding of the nature of IIDTRC by IS security management 
(Newman and McNally, 2005; Schreft, 2007);  
 Lack of effective internal investigation on methods used by the perpetrators 
of IIDTRC (Calvasina, Calvasina and Calvasina, 2006); 
 Absence of comprehensive frameworks, strategy and data security tools 
(Jakobsson and Myers, 2007; Abagnale, 2007); if exist, these frameworks 
for prevention IIDTRC were developed in the context of generic business 
organisation which might be inapplicable to particular business like retail 
industry (CIFAS
9
, 2010; BRC, 2011); 
 Over-dependence on software security which may lead to inadequate and 
incapable monitoring of privileged users on information systems (Mills, 
2007; Acoca, 2008). 
 Lack of understanding of the role of people in integrating people, process 
and technology (Moore et al., 2008, Keeney et al., 2005; Cappelli et al., 
2006). 
These issues provide background to provide a comprehensive IIDTRC prevention 
framework that would tackle these issues. In addition, the issues provide insight on the 
imperative for evaluative research to assess how these requirements are met for 
successful implementation of any proposed framework for prevention of IIDTRC in 
online retail companies. Ekblom and Pease (1995) suggest that an applicability of any 
crime prevention framework would be limited if it is designed with the concepts of a 
technological-oriented approach of preventing crimes (that neglect the holistic 
approach that encompasses the human behaviour).  
                                                     
9 Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System is the UK Fraud Prevention Service which operates two  databases: National 
 Fraud    Database (NFD) and Staff Fraud Database (SFD) 
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Ha et al., (2007) agree with Ekblom and Tilley (2000) and argues that software 
technologies can foil data breaches, but cannot match analytic capabilities and 
creativity of human behaviour which is paramount in data security strategies, 
particularly in IIDTRC prevention. Hence, the next section discusses the theories in the 
literature that provide understanding of human behaviour.  
 
2.7 Identity Theft Related Crimes Prevention Theories 
Many criminology theorists (e.g. Quinney, 1970; Clarke, 1980; Ekblom, 1992; 
Cornish, 1994; Aker, 2000; Walker, 2006; Kramer, 2009; Wright, 2010) have studied 
crime prevention in various fields of human endeavour. As identity theft related crimes 
is one of the most prevent criminal activities, many theories (e.g. situational 
prevention, deterrence, rational) have focused on how they proffer prevention on 
identity theft related crimes by understanding why people commit crimes. The next 
section discusses situational crime prevention and deterrence theories in the context of 
internal identity theft related crimes prevention (IIDTRC). These theories are selected 
because of the attention they have attracted in the recent years in academic and security 
studies. 
 
2.7.1 Clarke’s 25 Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention 
Clarke (1980) argues that there is a need to address the factors that creates crimes 
‘hotspot’ (a location with high risks of crimes) and the characteristics that make people 
more vulnerable to victimisation than other. In other words, Clarke (1980) suggests 
that crime prevention measures need to concentrate on preventing crime from 
occurring and victimisation. These arguments form the basis for the concept of 
situational crime measures that constitutes the 25 techniques of the Clarke’s 
Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention. The 25 techniques are built upon the five 
main measures:  
 Increase the effort. 
 Increase the risks.  
 Reduce the rewards. 
 Reduce provocations. 
 Remove the excuse.  
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The five key measures that form the basis for the Clarke’s 25 Techniques of Situational 
Crime Prevention is summarised in the table 23 below; 
 
Increase the 
effort 
Increase the 
risks 
Reduce the 
rewards 
Reduce provocations Remove the 
excuses 
1. Harden 
Targets: 
Anti-robbery 
system; 
quality locks 
6. Extend 
Guardianship: 
Neighbourhoo
d watch 
11. Conceal 
Targets: Do not 
keep valuables 
off sight office 
environment 
16. Reduce 
frustration and 
stress: Efficient 
queuing; soothing 
lighting 
21. Set Rules: 
Agreements 
Registration 
2.Control 
access to 
facilities 
:secure entries 
7. Assist 
natural 
surveillance: 
street lighting: 
police hotlines 
12. Remove 
Targets: 
Removable car 
radios; Pre-paid 
phone cards 
17. Avoid Disputes 
Reduce crowding in 
pubs 
22. Post 
Instructions 
‘No parking’ 
‘Private 
property’ 
3. Screen 
Exits 
Tickets 
needed, 
electronic 
tags for floor 
stock 
8. Reduce 
Anonymity 
Taxi driver 
IDs‘ 
How’s my 
driving signs 
13. Identify 
Property 
Property 
marking 
Vehicle 
licensing 
18. Reduce 
Emotional Arousal 
Control violent 
pornography 
Prohibit paedophiles 
working with 
children 
23. Alert 
Conscience 
Roadside speed 
display signs‘ 
Shoplifting is 
stealing’ 
4.Deflect 
Offenders 
Street 
closures in 
red light 
district 
Separate 
toilets for 
women 
9. Utilise 
Place 
Managers 
Train 
employees to 
prevent crime 
Support 
whistle 
blowers 
14. Disrupt 
Markets 
Checks on pawn 
brokers 
Licensed street 
vendors 
19. Neutralise Peer 
Pressure: Campaigns 
depicting what 
friends think of risk-
taking behaviour (e.g. 
speeding and drug 
campaigns) “It’s ok 
to say no” 
24. Assist 
Compliance 
Litter bins 
Public lavatories 
5. Control 
Tools/ 
Weapons: 
Tougher 
beer glasses; 
Photos on 
credit cards 
10. 
Strengthen 
Formal 
Surveillance 
Speed cameras 
Security 
guards 
15. Deny 
benefits: Ink 
merchandise 
tags, Graffiti 
cleaning 
20. Discourage 
Imitation: Rapid 
vandalism repair 
25. Control 
Drugs/Alcohol 
Breathalysers in 
pubs, Alcohol-
free events 
Table 23: Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention (Source: Clarke, 1980) 
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Situational crime prevention is underpinned by several theories including, 
Environmental Criminology, Rational Choice and Routine Activity.  The application of 
these theories and their contribution in the prevention of crimes can be extended to the 
prevention of internal identity theft-related crimes (IIDTRC) in online retail 
companies. This can be done by adapting the twenty-five Techniques of Situational 
Crime Prevention by the Clarke (1980).   
The summary of how other measures of the situational crime prevention can be 
extended to the context of prevention of IIDTRC in online retail companies is provided 
in table 24 below. In addition, the instances in the literature where the use of the 
situational crime prevention measures has been applied are discussed. 
Target-hardening: This measure can be an effective way of reducing IIDTRC 
perpetrators opportunities by obstructing the access of the employees through installing 
anti-copying computer screens applications in the call centres, and tamper-proof 
lockers for servers and routers.  
Ekblom (1992) suggests that target-hardening approach which was used in the strategy 
of the anti-bandit screens on post office counters in London in the 1980s have cut 
robberies by more than 40 per cent.  Clarke (1999) agrees with Ekblom (1992) and 
suggests that target hardening was also used in the ticket machines of the London 
Underground which has a significant impact in the reduction of losses of ticket sales.  
Access control: Clarke (1999) suggests that this measure exclude potential offenders 
from places such as apartments, departments, stores and offices. Cornish and Clarke, 
(1989) suggests that the use of access control in a South London public housing estate 
and entry phones have a significant impact in reducing vandalism and theft. In the 
context of online retail companies, the use of effective personal identification numbers 
can be implemented to gain access to computer systems, servers, and customers 
shopping accounts.  
Entry/Exit Screening: This is similar to access control but for the purpose to increase 
the likelihood for potential criminals to be caught if they fail to meet exit/entry 
requirements. Cornish and Clarke, (1989) suggest that this measure has reduced the 
books theft in the University of Wisconsin library by 80 per cent. In the context of 
prevention of IIDTRC, the use of fob has been introduced in many retail shops and call 
centres to regulate and monitor the staff movements. 
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Increase the 
Effort 
Increase the 
Risks 
Reduce the 
Rewards 
Reduce 
Provocation 
Remove 
Excuses 
1. Target 
hardening: 
Physical locks 
for PCs, 
Anti-copying 
computer 
screens in the 
call centres; 
Tamper-proof 
lockers for 
servers and 
routers 
6. Extend 
guardianship 
watch 
Staff watching 
of visitors; 
Leave signs of 
occupancy, 
Disallow 
exchange of 
access 
privileges 
11. Conceal 
targets; Gender-
neutral phone 
directories; 
Minimise ID 
access of offices 
where sensitive 
information are 
kept. 
16. Reduce 
frustrations and 
stress: Efficient 
queues and 
polite service 
21. Set rules: 
Harassment 
codes; 
Information 
security 
policies 
2. Control 
access to 
facilities: 
Entry phones; 
Swipe cards for 
office access 
7. Assist natural 
surveillance: 
Improved office  
lighting; Open 
plan offices 
12. Remove 
targets: 
Removable data 
storages; Clear 
desk and 
computer screen 
17. Avoid Over 
rowed office 
space: Reduce 
crowding in a 
call centres 
22. Post 
instructions: 
No pen, paper 
and pencil. 
3. Screen exits: 
Reception desks 
8. Reduce 
anonymity: 
ID tags for staff 
13. Identify 
property: 
Property marking 
of PCs, Laptops 
and Sever 
Systems 
18. Reduce 
emotional 
arousal: 
Restrict access 
to how much 
money available 
in customers 
account  
23. Alert 
conscience: 
Create staff 
awareness to 
secure 
computers.  
4. Deflect 
offenders: 
Server and 
Routers Rooms 
closures;  
Segregation of 
duties 
9. Utilise place 
managers: Two 
clerks for 
convenience 
Stores; 
Management 
supervision 
14. Disrupt 
markets: 
Monitor pawn 
shops 
19. Neutralise 
peer pressure: 
Disperse 
troublemakers at 
school 
24. Assist 
compliance: 
Regulated 
office 
checkout and 
regular 
holiday for 
staff; IT 
Security 
education for 
staff 
5. Control 
tools/weapons: 
Disabling stolen 
cell 
Phones;  
Deletion of 
access rights for 
ex-employees 
10. Strengthen 
Formal 
surveillance: 
Security guards; 
Intrusion 
detection 
systems 
15. Deny 
benefits: Ink 
merchandise tags; 
Encryption 
20. Discourage 
imitation:  
Censor details 
of modus 
Operandi;  
Prompt software 
patching 
25. Control 
drugs and 
Alcohol: 
Alcohol-free 
events – end 
of year parties 
and get-
togethers.  
 
Table 24: Adaptation of Situational Crime Prevention Approach for IIDTRC 
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These measures could be adapted by online retail companies as summarised in table 24 
above to fit into the context of reducing the risks of IIDTRC. However, several 
researchers (e.g. Lewis and Sullivan, 1979; Clarke, 1999; Parker, 1998; Willison, 
2006) have criticised the extension of the used of situational prevention. Clarke (1999) 
suggests that the measures may not be one hundred per cent effective due to the some 
issues such as: 
 Technical or administrative ineptitude (Clarke, 1999) 
 Measures being defeated by offenders or careless of victims (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003) 
 Too much vigilance reduces security consciousness (Clarke and Harris, 1992b) 
 Measures may provoke offenders to unacceptable escalation (Hunter  and Ray, 
1997) 
 Some measures facilitate rather than frustrate crimes (Ekblom,1992) 
 Lack of proper analysis (user’s needs) before introducing some measures 
(Clarke and Harris, 1992b). 
 The detrimental effect of some measures on the environment (Akers, 1990; 
Willison and Backhouse, 2006). 
Collectively, these issues summarised above suggest reasons for some situational crime 
prevention measures like generic and software-based framework (discussed in the 
section in 2.6. 1 and 2.6.2) may not work in intended ways. This is because measures 
what works in one setting may not do so in other settings due to organisational and 
management issues. Clarke (1999) suggest the need to be aware of these challenges 
and know which measures work best, in which combination, deployed against what 
kinds of crimes and under what conditions. He specifically noted that financial costs of 
particular crime prevention need to be assessed by businesses through developing a 
permanent in-house capability of their organisations. Hence, there is a need to explore 
more on other aspects of crime preventions that may contribute to the holistic view 
approach of internal identity theft related crimes in online retail companies. Next 
section discusses deterrence theory and its attributes in the IIDTRC prevention.  
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2.7.2 Deterrence Theory and its Attribute on IIDTRC 
Quinney (1970) suggests that deterrence theory can be traced to the works of classical 
philosophers (e.g. Thomas Hobbes, Cesare and Beccaria, and Jeremy Bentham). These 
philosophers provide the foundation for modern deterrence theory in criminology that 
is classified into two: general and specific (Aker, 2000). General deterrence as the 
name posits is designed for prevention of crime in the general population, while 
specific is designed based on the nature of the proscribed sanctions to deter potential 
crime offenders from committing crimes in the future (Quinney, 1970). Typical 
instances where application the deterrence theory have been applied include the capital 
punishment – death penalty, and the used of corporal punishment – Shari’a/Islamic law 
in Nigeria which was introduced in 2001. The deterrence approach to crime prevention 
deters those who witness the infliction of pains upon the convicted fraudster from 
committing the crimes themselves (Morgan, 2010). Dobb and Webster (2003) and 
Wright (2010) argue that punishment as an element of a deterrence theory may be 
expected to affect conceptualisation of deterrence of criminals in two ways.   
i. Increasing the certainty of punishment: This involves deterrent of potential 
offenders by the risk of apprehension. For instance, if there is an increase in 
the number of security guards monitoring online retail call centres, some 
employees may reduce their dishonest activities in order to avoid being caught.  
ii. The severity of punishment: This may influence the potential criminal 
behaviour if he or she weighs that the consequences of their actions are too 
severe (Golden, 2002).  
Wright (2010) suggests that these elements of punishment underpin the rationale 
behind ‘truth in sentencing policies’, to utilise severe sentences to deter some persons 
from indulging in criminal behaviour.  Some critics (e.g. Willson and Herrnstein, 1985, 
Moyer, 2001) argue that it is difficult to prove the effectiveness of deterrence since 
only the offenders that have not been deterred come to the notice of law enforcement. 
Otherwise, the law enforcement may never know why others employees do not offend.  
Wright (2010) argues that another reason for deterrence theory’s limited application in 
prevention of crimes “can be seen by considering the dynamics of the criminal justice 
system” (Wright, 2010, p.3). If there is 100 per cent certainty of apprehending 
offender, there would be few potential offender.  
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For instance, as cited by the Wright (2010), since most crimes (identity theft related 
crimes as in this research) do not result in an arrest and conviction because of their 
complexity, the overall deterrent effect of the certainty of punishment might be 
substantially reduced. Other critics deterrence theory (e.g. Williams, Gibbs and 
Erickson, 1980; Sherdin, 1986; Hirsch et al., 1999; Tonry, 2008) agree that the absence 
of data on awareness of punishment risks makes it difficult to draw conclusions 
regarding the deterrent impact of the of deterrence theory. Hence, it may be difficult to 
measure the impact of severity of punishment as deterrence measure against identity 
theft related crimes on potential offenders who do not believe they will be apprehended 
for their dishonest actions. 
However, Kramer (2009) argues that deterrence theory can be extended as a traditional 
security theory and superimpose on the prevention of identity theft-related crimes. 
Haley (2013) agrees with Kramer (2009) and argues that a strategic application of 
deterrence theory in businesses could reduce the costs of cases of internal identity theft 
related crimes. Goodman, (2010) argues that many studies on information systems 
security have not done more to apply tools of deterrence to the prevention of computer 
crimes. In particular, the deterrence theory argues to eliminate activities of the 
criminals by making costs and consequences to outweigh benefits that may be accrued 
from the criminal acts. Proponents (e.g. Gibbs, 1968; Quinney, 1970; Akers, 2000) of 
deterrence theory in the context of employee crimes believe that employees may 
choose to obey or violate the employee business policy after calculating the 
consequences and gains of their actions.  
Instances in the literature have suggested the uses of legislation/law enforcement 
system and digital forensic investigation have proven to be great tools for deterrence of 
internal identity theft-related crimes in various business sectors. 
 
2.7.2.1 Legislations/Law Enforcement: A Deterrence to the IIDTRC   
While there is no silver bullet for effective prevention of internal identity theft related 
crimes (IIDTRC), the criminal justice system and law enforcement departments can 
make significant impacts on employees indulging in the crimes (Wright, 2010). Several 
researchers (e.g. Levin, 1971; Orsagh and Chen, 1988; Doob and Webster, 2003; Bavis 
and Parent, 2007) agree that criminal justice system increases in the certainty of 
punishment, as opposed to the severity of punishment, and it is more likely to produce 
deterrent benefits.  
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Many countries (e.g. UK, US, Austrian, Denmark, France, Germany) across the globe 
have continued to enact laws and legislations to match the advancement of the 
computer crimes from outside and within business sectors. The common legislations 
cited in the literature that have been enacted in different countries as discussed as 
follows; 
Privacy Laws and Legislation: This has been used to protect the theft of personal 
identifiable information of individuals, especially customers of online retail companies. 
Since 1970, the US has used the Fair Credit and Reporting Act and Privacy Act to 
govern the processing, access, and disclosure of credit information. The same 
protection of individual privacy was aimed by the Canadian Privacy Act of 1975. The 
same data privacy protection and governance have been legislated across European 
countries – the Austrian Federal Data Protection Act of 1978, the Danish Acts on 
Private Registers, the French Act on Data Processing of 1978, the German Federal 
Data Protection Act of 1977 and the Swedish Data Act of 1973.Other Intellectual 
Property Laws have been cited in the literature (e.g. Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2013) which been introduced as a deterrence 
for the prevention of corporate identity-related crimes. These include; 
 Intellectual Property and Copyright Law (e.g. Copyright Act of 1976): To 
deter the theft of trade names, ideas, secrets, computer programmes, personal 
knowledge, etc. that may be vulnerable to internal identity theft related crimes.  
 Trade Secrets Law and Trademark Law: To deter the theft of ideas and 
trademarks of software and hardware of businesses and organisations. 
 Patent Law: To deter theft software concepts and established products.  
To ensure that the deterrence influence of legislation is extend to international regions 
where jurisdictions of privacy laws may differ from the originating venue, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2013) has 
introduced the OECD Trans-border Data Flow Guidelines to promote identity theft 
related crimes prevention. The guidelines are designed to prosecute and deter criminal 
for indulging in identity theft related crimes. For instance, in the US any employee that 
is convicted of trafficking or trading passwords or credit cards will be liable to 
Penalties of the Title 18, USC 1029 which is 15 years in prison for the first offence 
(Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 1998).  
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In the UK, violation of the Section 55 – unlawful obtaining of personal data, makes it 
an offence for perpetrators of internal identity theft related crimes and hackers outside 
the organisation to obtain unauthorised access to the personal data (Data Protection Act 
1998, Section IV). 
 
2.7.2.2 The Use of Digital Forensic as the IIDTRC Deterrence Measure 
Several researchers (e.g. Farrington and Petrosino, 2000; Clarke, 1999) agree that an 
effective use of digital forensic as the internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) 
has a deterrence effect on potential perpetrators. Clarke (1999) argues that increasing 
the perceived risks of committing crimes could deter the potential IIDTRC 
perpetrators. He further explained that this ‘situational approach’ of crimes prevention 
can deter an intended or potential IIDTRC criminal if the criminal knows that there is a 
certainty of being caught. Farrington and Petrosino (2000) agree with Clarke (1999) 
that digital forensic analysis play vital role for identity theft crimes under investigation, 
suggesting that fewer crimes would be committed in a business environment where 
there are such measures.  
Other researchers (Sermon et al., 2012; Walker, 2006; Rowlingson, 2005) have 
emphasised the importance of digital forensic as deterrence measure for IDTRC.  
Rowlingson (2005) suggests being digital forensic ready deters potential offenders 
because of the high risks that the criminal will be caught. If dishonest staffers know 
that the victim organisation is policing their corporate IS property with forensic 
technology, it rings the bell to the staffers that their organisation will ‘always catch and 
prosecute thieves’. It may as well act as a psychological deterrent to potential computer 
related criminals (Walker, 2006; Gottfredson and Taylor, 1986). 
Moreover, digital forensic investigation practice may encourage and intensify the 
mindset of natural surveillance to potential IIDTRC perpetrators (Sermon et al., 2012). 
It provides demonstrative evidence during the courtroom prosecution of the suspect. 
Welch (1997) argues that evidence generated through digital forensic investigation 
convinces the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender is guilty of the offence. 
Bhati (2010) study suggests that there is no doubt that digital forensic evidence 
immensely deters IIDTRC. In his study, ‘Quantifying the Specific Deterrent Effects of 
DNA Databases’, Bhati (2010) tested the specific deterrent effect of digital forensic 
DNA evidence on crimes. He concluded that deterrence of digital evidence has 
probative effect ranges from 20 per cent to 30 per cent.  
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Bhati’s (2010) finding agrees with the UK Home Office (2004) research that has 
similar deterrence effect of 20 per cent of the crimes committed. Taylor et al., (2007) 
agree with Bhati (2010) in their arguments of impact of the deterrence theory and 
suggest that the knowledge of the fact that digital forensic evidence would be used in 
the IIDTRC investigation would deter potential offenders.  
 
2.7.3 Lessons from the IIDTRC Prevention Theories  
The evidence from the literature provides the understanding that the deterrent effect of 
criminal justice system and digital forensic investigation may substantially reduce the 
incidents of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC). However, the impact of the 
deterrent on the prevention of IIDTRC might be dependent on the extent of awareness 
potential offenders have in relation to the deterrence measures. Though the critical 
impact of deterrence on prevention of IIDTRC could not be measure, deterrence has a 
significant impact on identity theft related crimes prevention. Based on the existing 
evidence in reviewed literature, there is a need to consider understanding of 
management roles in implementing the deterrence theories and the certainty that 
punishment would improve the likelihood that criminal behaviour would be detected.  
 
2.8 Summary of the Literature Review 
This chapter aimed to provide the understanding on: the Concepts of Internal Identity 
Theft Related Crimes (IIDTRC), Understanding of IIDTRC at the Workplace, the 
perpetration of IIDTRC, and IIDTRC prevention – practices, frameworks and theories. 
It has defined important terms that would contribute in understanding this current 
research and then reviewed IIDTRC in the context of the online retail sector. The last 
part of this chapter review existing practices, frameworks and theories in order to 
identify the properties that the extended framework in this study needs to include.  
The key findings of the literature review are summarised as follows; 
i. Internal identity theft-related crimes (IIDTRC) ruin the reputation of the 
victims – companies and the consumers: IIDTRC disrupt the operations of the 
online retail businesses and causes long-term problems (harassment from debt 
collectors, loan rejections, psychological and brands name damage) to the 
victims.  
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ii. Few online retail companies endeavour to prevent IIDTRC: There are 
instances in the literature that noted that ineffective prevention of IIDTRC is 
linked to issues which include insufficient clear policy that educates 
employees to be aware of the IIDTRC issues, neglect by management to 
ensure that their employees properly destroy unwanted information when 
deposing computers and papers. Many IS security managers are lax to update 
the online retail companies security technology tools such as servers, firewalls 
and antivirus.  
iii. Sparse studies on the prevention of IIDTRC, with a few studies on the IIDTRC 
prevention, are grounded with empirical studies: The existing empirical 
studies present findings which are not applicable in IIDTRC prevention 
because of their poor research designs and generic nature of their IIDTRC 
prevention approach.   
iv. IIDTRC prevention face the following implementation challenges: lack of 
effective internal investigation on methods used by the dishonest employees in 
stealing the identity information, inadequate monitoring of insider activities on 
the networks, insufficient control mechanisms for protecting paper documents, 
misappropriation of the information assets, inadequate protection of the 
personal information of the customers by the third parties service providers, 
and absence of comprehensive frameworks, strategy and data security tools.  
Some studies focused more on the socio-economic impact of IIDTRC than on the 
prevention. Others focus on the scientific approaches that are implementable only on 
computer systems. Based on these findings, the researcher concludes and recommends 
that: 
 a defined focus is required to identify a comprehensive strategy and data 
security tools for prevention of IIDTRC in online retail companies; 
 the IS security management should be given a clear role and a well-define 
responsibility regarding internal data security;  
 there is a need for internal collaboration of IS security management on 
prevention of IIDTRC.  
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 integration of both the external and internal environment for any adoption of 
IIDTRC preventive strategy, strengthening of strategic management and other 
forms of collaborations;  
 adoption of strategies to consult, engage and communicate with stakeholders 
and employees in IIDTRC preventive frameworks; and  
 ensuring proper education and awareness on the part of employees towards 
prevention of IIDTRC within online companies. 
These recommendations form the basis of the role-based framework (RBF) for the 
prevention of IIDTRC. The recommendations re-enforce the need for the collaborative 
effort of IS security management in the prevention of IIDTRC. It can be drawn from 
the reviewed literature that the IIDTRC prevention may benefit from the 
suggestions/recommendations that aligning management roles would impact efficient 
and effective implementation of the IIDTRC prevention. These suggestions emphasise 
the need for the business management in the specific business context to integrate their 
overall management roles, processes and technology.  
In addition, the suggestions in the reviewed literature provide the background on how 
this research would bridge these gaps in a body of literature. Thus, an effective 
IIDTRC prevention framework should have both theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings from the perspectives of the organisations and management under study. 
To bridge these research gaps, the concept of a role-based framework is discussed in 
the next chapter to addresses the arguments surrounding RBF concept – the theoretical 
and empirical grounding. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction to the Concept of Role-Based Framework 
Role-based framework (RBF) is designed based on the idea that the effectiveness of a 
framework for prevention of internal identity theft-related crimes (IIDTRC) in a 
business organisation is dependent on the clarity of the shared roles of management. 
Therefore, effectiveness is dependent on clarity of integrated roles the management 
uphold (Shah and Okeke, 2011; Biegelman, 2009; Zhu, 2006). It focuses on the 
analyses of management on sharing roles and responsibilities in organisational setting 
where both the situational-based and offender-based IIDTRC prevention prevails 
(Ekblom and Pease, 1995). Thus, RBF assumes a basis of a paradigm that devolves the 
collaboration of shared roles to management involve in the prevention of IIDTRC.  
The analysis of role-based framework is guided by organisational role theory (ORT). 
Chen (1990) suggests that building an empirically grounded theory as it is in this study 
requires a reciprocal relationship between theory and empirical data. He argues that 
understanding the theory underpinning particular crime prevention is essential for 
identifying the important attributes that ought to be used in an evaluation of the 
intended framework, as well as in articulating the assumed causal mechanisms for the 
development of appropriated outcome measurement (Chen, 1990). The RBF as a 
conceptual framework is proposed by synthesis of IIDTRC prevention practices and 
then used organisational role theory (ORT) as a theoretical lens to guide the study.  
The analysis of the framework focuses on knowledge of recommended IIDTRC 
prevention practices, frameworks and theories reviewed in chapter 2 – 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. 
The use of ORT in the examination of the concept of RBF guides the theoretical 
assumptions on which arguments of the study begins to emerge: can the effective 
sharing of management roles in relation to the IIDTRC practices be a likely key 
element of an IIDTRC prevention framework in retail industry? This question draws 
out the inherent arguments on how strategically can management worked in practices 
of preventing IIDTRC, whether their interactive management roles in the prevention of 
the crimes are characterised by conflict or consensus.  Ekblom (2010) suggests that 
though know-how-knowledge of the process of the crime prevention plays a central 
role in the implementation of framework for any sort of crimes, the success depends on 
understanding the organisational management of the business under study.  
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Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2009) agree that the analysis of interaction between the 
crime prevention management and their immediate environment starts with 
understanding both entities as organisational configuration in the same socioeconomic 
setting with utmost aim of greater efficiency and productivity.  
Hodgson (2006) agrees with Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2009) and suggests that it 
is not possible to carry out any theoretical analysis of how management in an 
organisation works without having adequate conception of what it is, and how it 
interrelates with its business environment. Hence, this study adopts organisational role 
theory (ORT) to explore these relationships, since roles in the context of hierarchical 
management system like retail business organisation are not defined in isolation but in 
a ‘social or organisational net of role relationships’ (Elliot, 1976; Cabri et al., 2006). 
Hence, ORT is premised on the notion that the manner in which management enact the 
arrays of roles (shared roles) in the task oriented hierarchical systems (retail industry) 
focuses on effective functioning of the roles within the organisation, and the interaction 
between roles and the impact this has on achieving organisational goals (Katz and 
Kahn, 1966; Biddle, 1986; Madsen, 2002).  
 
3.1.1 Organisational Role Theory  
The concept of organisational role theory (ORT) is one of the five major models of role 
theory developed by Biddle (1986) to examine role development in organisations. The 
concept of ORT describes and provides insight into the purposive actions of individual 
employees, management and organisations, as they relate to the field in which they 
operate (Kahn and Katz, 1978; Biddle and Thomas, 1979a; Lawrence, Suddaby and 
Leca, 2009). ORT concept has been applied by researchers in behavioural science, 
management, sociology, and psychology; for modelling authority, responsibility, 
functions, and interactions associated with management positions (Shah and Clarke, 
2009; Zhang and Yin, 2006). In the study of how organisations can prevent crimes in 
their respective business domain, Ekblom (2010) and Sarnecki (2005) looked into the 
concepts of ORT and suggested that management in the organisations should in some 
way complement the shared roles and responsibilities; support each other in the 
environment where they operate. Ekblom (2010) argues that it might be helpful to 
conceptualise role-based crime prevention as an approach in order to provide 
integration of the software-based technology, process and people in IIDTRC 
prevention because it focuses the ‘root causes’ – lack of clarity of integrated IIDTRC 
prevention practices. 
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Biegelman (2009) agrees with Ekblom (2010) and suggests a need for interdependency 
of roles of the complementary management team for them to thrive in crime prevention 
in business organisations. Savirimuthu and Savirimuthu (2007) and Luhmann (2004) 
agree with these suggestions and argue that a deeper understanding of interdependency 
of management roles in business organisation is an important prerequisite for 
development of a strategic and coherent crime prevention framework.  
The interdependency of management roles as articulated by Ekblom (2010), Biegelman 
(2009) and Sarnecki (2005), creates the basis for analysis of ‘shared roles’ among the 
crime prevention management in this study. The interaction of management becomes a 
role-based process where each party begins to share roles of each other, with clarity of 
valued interest of effective IIDTRC prevention (King, 2006). The interaction of 
various roles of human resources involve in crime prevention management underpins 
the analysis of the structure of the role-based framework. Based on the assumptions of 
the Ekblom (2010), Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2009), Zhang and Yin (2006), 
Sarnecki (2005), and Kahn and Katz (1978), an applications of the ORT in analysis of 
the roles of management can be derived. The ORT is thus applied in this study:- 
 to help explain the crime prevention management roles and the implication of 
their relationship with other management (IT security, data compliance, law 
enforcement agencies, etc.) and how it can help to minimise employees 
indulgent in IIDTRC; and 
 to help explain the impact of the clarity of crime prevention management 
roles/responsibilities and how it can help to maximise management 
performance in providing effective internal data security. 
 
3.1.2 Understanding the Role of People in IIDTRC 
Literature review in 2.5 of the Chapter 2 suggests there is research gap in a body of 
literature that internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) prevention frameworks 
are not designed based on the people-oriented security, or rather integration of the both 
software security and human contribution. In addition, it was evidenced by the 
literature that the management of companies have depended solely on the 
implementation of software-based security in the prevention of IIDTRC that they 
neglect to consider integrating people, process, and technology.  
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The literature discussed above suggests that some of the IIDTRC prevention 
frameworks fail due to over-dependence of IS/T management on software-based 
security. This issue demands the need to provide IIDTRC prevention framework that 
encompasses integrating process and technology with people as the centre focus.  In 
doing so, the discussion of the organisational role theory above has clarified that 
understanding the role of people can provide insights on the concept of RBF attributes 
of roles sharing. IS security management centred on people role in integrating process 
and technology is essential to achieve and maintain a secure IS in online retail. 
Software-based security grounded in technology, can be the most reliable in providing 
IS availability, confidentiality and integrity, but cannot be a substitute for people-
oriented security. The need for people is indispensable, as IS owners, custodians, 
clients or users.  
It has been understood from the outset of the review that it is the people aspect of IS 
security that gets online retail into the most trouble. Thus, there is need to equip the 
people by building their intelligence and decision-making capabilities to achieve the 
goal of IIDTRC prevention. Online retail companies can invest in the physical and 
technical measures such as authentication mechanisms, firewalls, and penetration and 
intrusion detection systems to defend external cyber-attacks. However, the insiders that 
have authorisation can bypass those measures to commit IIDTRC. The insiders are 
familiar with internal policies, process and procedures, which could be bypassed and 
exploited to carry out IIDTRC.   
Anderson et al., (2005) suggest that IIDTRC risk management should involve a 
comprehensive combination of behavioural, organisational and technical issues.  Since 
internal identity theft related criminals utilise both technology and human techniques to 
perpetrate their threats, it is important to consider a combination of behavioural, 
organisational process and technical issues to prevent them. In the statement from 
Anderson et al., (2005, p.8) that worked on Preliminary System Dynamics Maps of the 
Insider Cyber-threat Problem, they reaffirmed that;  
“…because insiders are legitimate users of their organisation’s networks and 
systems, a sophisticated technical capability is not necessarily required to carry out 
an insider attack. On the other hand, technically capable insiders are able, and 
have, carried out more sophisticated attacks, that can have more immediate, 
widespread impact, ….these technical insiders also sometimes have the capability 
to “cover their tracks” so that identification of the perpetrator is more difficult…” 
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Figure 10: People as a Centre of Role-Based Framework Attributes 
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This statement suggests that it is important to understanding the people’s role in the 
security of information systems in the online retail processes in order to mitigate 
IIDTRC risks – accidental or malicious. That is, it is important to understand the roles 
of the offender and users to regulate the way process and technology interacts. Since 
the IS security management is processed by the use of procedure driven by people, the 
major focus of IIDTRC prevention framework should be on people.  
The procedure described in the ISO 9001:2000 is a way in which people – the IS 
security management, works to accomplish a task. The task here, as shown in figure 
10, is the sequence of steps and actions required for prevention of IIDTRC in online 
retail. It is designed to function as a continuous process which shows how the IS 
security management can implement the recommended practices to reduce IIDTRC 
risks. The recommended practices are synthesised from the suggested IIDTRC 
prevention practices recommended in chapter 2. The practices synthesised in this 
section are not a comprehensive lists of all the applicable IIDTRC prevention practices. 
However, the practices are summarised to meet the scope of this research which is to 
provide IIDTRC prevention framework. This aim extends to clarify the task of IIDTRC 
prevention and identify how the roles of management can be aligned to meet the goal 
of preventing IIDTRC in online retail. 
This task of getting people, process and technology to interact and cooperate is 
difficult to achieve (Hofmeyr and Forrest and Somayaji, 1998). This is why the human 
vector – the people has remained the weakest link in maintaining strategic IS/T 
security. This is the reason most IIDTRC modus operandi – social engineering, abetted 
collusion and collaboration build their attack strategies on human foibles. Human 
vector with the lack of awareness and desire for money or ‘just wanting to help out’ 
would always be a first target, or rather the criminal. 
The figure 10 above is used to explain the direct and indirect relationship that should 
exist with each management role. Each of the separate boxes linked with thin arrows 
are indirectly related, which the thick arrows are directly related. These links depict the 
level of priority given to the labelled boxes: ‘box 1’ and ‘box 2’; if those roles in 
relation to the responsibilities under the process, fails, and then ‘box 3’ would be 
required. For instance, the ‘box 1’ that is linked to ‘people’ (with thick arrow) 
comprises IT security, Data Compliance, Security Guards and HR. It contains IS 
security management roles that have possibility of sharing similar roles with each 
other.  
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3.1.2.1 Management Roles in the Prevention of IIDTRC 
Several researchers (e.g. Kahn and Katz, 1977; Mitzberg, 1997) have used three 
specific categories of schemes to explain three categories of what management does: 
roles, functions and skills. Though, these categories are directly or indirectly related, 
this study focuses on the first: roles. Mitzberg (1997) refers to management roles as 
specific categories of managerial behaviour. Management roles are described based on 
different interrelated categories: decision-making, interpersonal relationship, transfer 
of information, reflection and taking actions.  
The combination of these categories has a direct influence on the responsibility of IS 
security management in relation to the tasks of the IIDTRC prevention. In 
implementing the task of IIDTRC prevention, as noted above, it is important for every 
IS security management have a clear role for the management to collaborate (Oltsik, 
2012). Collins (2003) and Udo (2001) agree that these roles are vital for a 
comprehensive IIDTRC prevention framework since the tasks and roles are the basic 
instruments for the security of the IS operations. So it is important that management 
roles interact and work together to support other cross-functional management.  
The table 25 below summarises the descriptions of the key management roles common 
in online retail companies. 
The interrelated steps shown in figure 5 above describe how the processes and 
technology centred on these management roles summarised in table 25. It provides 
holistic interaction of the concept that encompasses both the use of offender-oriented 
(people) and situational-oriented (technology) approaches in IIDTRC prevention. This 
concept would improve online retail IS security management posture. It provides 
capacity to control and monitor the technological aspects of security, as well as 
management adherence to established processes and procedures.  
In addition, it enhances the IS security governance needs to leverage the human factors 
by regulating their interactions with technology. It would promote the intelligent 
workflows and process IS security management against potential IIDTRC risks. In 
addition, it is structured to provide the synopsis of the practical concept on which the 
structure of RBF attempts to depict. 
 
 
 Page 94 of 328 
 
Management 
Roles 
Description of the Roles in relation to Internal Identity Theft 
Prevention Practices 
Operational 
Management 
Those that work in retail call centres and uses screening techniques to 
process customers’ order for possible abnormality or mismatch of 
identity attributes – name, date of birth, account detail, etc. It requires 
the management to ensure that identity documents – customer and 
business, are cross-shredded before their disposal. For effective 
operation of this management, it is the role of HR to ensure that 
proper and essential training is provided (Hurst, 2010; Collins, 2003). 
Technical 
management 
These are the software engineers, web designers and data miners that 
use software security tools such as authentication kits, address 
verification system, digital signature, and encryption. This 
management depends on IS/T support to protect the IS security 
infrastructure from potential IIDTRC risks (Valrie and Rabih, 2013; 
Udo, 2001). 
Managerial 
and Policy 
 
This is role of the management that ensures the development of 
explicit policy regarding protection of security and privacy of 
business and customers. This involves implementation of policy 
strategy for safe preservation of business and consumers’ data (Mills, 
2007).This should emphasise the ethic of the company and reinforce 
on rewarding of employee. This would encourage and promote 
honesty in the workplace (Collins, 2001). 
Risk 
Management 
This role involves use of intelligent and strategic techniques to 
identify IIDTRC risks such as inconsistent in the transaction or 
customers order pattern. It also compares past and present history of 
consumer for inconsistencies, such as case of irregularity in use of 
credit card within short period of time (Duffin et al., 2006; Fichtman, 
2001)  
Resource 
and Control 
Management 
This role demands the contribution of HR in counselling and training 
of employees. Since employees are the prime vector of IIDTRC, 
researcher (Collins, 2003; Newman and Clarke, 2004) have suggested 
that there should be effective employee control. In addition, this role 
manages vetting and screening of the employees. 
Table 25: Key Management Roles in Online Retail 
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3.1.2.2 Role-based Framework: Relevance in Information Systems Security  
Role-based framework (RBF) is designed to adapt, scale and provide necessary 
attributes – modules and tools. The attributes are modelled to build, orchestrate and 
plan IS security strategies, to integrate with cross-functional IS management and their 
tasks and workflows. It tends to streamline the IS security procedures by dynamically 
creating the necessary roles to eliminate potential management conflicts.  
RBF is structured as a horizontal-wide model as opposed to the technical-vertical 
model. The structure is designed to enhance management workflows and IS security 
process platforms to improve agility, interoperability and vigilance (shown in table 26). 
Key IS Security 
Attributes 
RBF Descriptions of IS Security Attributes in relation  to 
Prevention of IIDTRC 
Agility This is a key attribute of RBF. It tends to enable adaptive planning 
and delivery of IS/T security roles. This attribute would encourage 
evolutionary, flexible and rapid response to change in evolving 
IIDTRC trends in online retail. It would enable IS security 
management to prevent known IIDTRC risks. It would also provide 
foundation for effective responses to potential IIDTRC. 
Vigilance RBF is designed to provide management with the capability to 
integrate security intelligence to anticipate data security threats. It 
provides the attributes that would enable the management to 
evaluate risks and make informed decisions. It would enhance the 
adoption and collaboration of role sharing concepts in IS security 
management. This would enable the management to balance the 
technical controls with process for applying security to employees, 
partners and third parties that contributes to IIDTRC mitigation. 
Interoperability By adoption of integration of the people, process and technology 
(PPT) approach, IS security management becomes a single system 
with unified goal of IIDTRC prevention. The single system allows 
for easier monitoring and measurements. Importantly, it would 
enable the management to control that would minimise the impact 
of benign mistakes from employees’ actions and processes related 
IIDTRC risks. 
 
Table 26: Key IS Security Attributes and RBF Descriptions 
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3.2 Structure of Role-based Framework 
Role-based framework (RBF) incorporates IIDTRC prevention practices recommended 
by IS security management from various business contexts. The IIDTRC prevention 
practices in this context is a set of documents, frameworks, ideas, information, 
languages, stories, styles and tools, that IS security management share. As defined by 
Wenger, McDermott and Snyder (2002), practice refers to the knowledge and the 
competencies of members, as well as to the specific things that they do. ‘Members’ 
refers to the IS security management. Surprisingly, there is little research on the ‘actual 
practice’ of identity theft prevention. The ‘practice’ of identity management is a 
contested terrain, unsettled in the minds of IS security management themselves, 
academics and policy makers (Wenger, 1998).  
This section will, as far as is possible within the confines of this study, put together the 
‘best practices’ of identity theft prevention in online retail. In so doing, this section 
draws conclusions on the recommended practices for preventing IIDTRC. 
 
3.2.1 Role-based Framework Design Principles 
Gercke et al., (2011) suggest that the cross-functional partnership that incorporates 
inter-dependent coordination of roles with skills sharing is one the most effective 
prevention practices in any areas of identity theft-related crimes. This suggestion could 
only be practicable in a defined business operation, online retail in this context, which 
may provide enable understanding of issues of internal identity theft related crimes 
(IIDTRC). Sharing of roles in relation to the prevention of IIDTRC is required in order 
to encourage leveraging, expanding of skills as appropriate, and support external 
relationship with agencies. Role sharing brings together expertise from diverse 
management backgrounds, HR, law enforcement, and IS security. Each management 
background holds information linked to IS security which, if shared, can provide 
comprehensive prevention views of criminal activity. This, in most cases, can be 
evidence-based practice. When these practices are based on equal sharing, equal level 
of power, mutual respect and understanding, then the IIDTRC prevention strategies 
would be implementable. The application and implementation of these practices have 
drawn from the suggestions of the researchers from these fields. This approach 
assumed that IIDTRC prevention should not be mere technological fixes but integrated 
IS/T security strategies – which explicitly or implicitly held by practitioners.  
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The purpose of the outlining common strategies of IIDTRC prevention found in the 
business organisation’s literature is, primarily, to reduce the complexity in their 
analysis and application (as discussed in chapter 5 and chapter 6). 
Although the IIDTRC prevention practices approaches have attempted to clarify their 
contextual analysis, as reviewed in 2.5; the use of concept of RBF has sought to 
provide clear role-based concepts over what could and should be implemented as 
IIDTRC prevention. This concept of RBF underpins the suggestions of scholars and 
more importantly of practitioners’ need to increasingly work in IIDTRC prevention. 
Proponents of the intra-organisational management collaboration on which RBF 
analysis depends on, Ekblom (2010) and Sarnecki (2005), did not view their 
suggestions as being solely about improving the management roles interaction in their 
business environments in relation to crimes prevention. They believe that numerous 
conceptualisations of the crime prevention practices and theories delineate degree to 
which it might be applied to the management.  
The research gap on the need for change in paradigm of IIDTRC prevention alluded to 
have been identified in the 2.6 chapter 2 – the shift from software-based and generic 
models of IIDTRC prevention to analysis of the integration of shared management 
roles, is attempted to be bridged with the concept of role-based framework .This 
analysis of the role integration approach is important in this context as it is through it 
that a new framework could be conceptualised. Because it is within the understanding 
of RBF attributes that IIDTRC prevention would be underpinned. Thus, understanding 
of the attributes of RBF and the diffusion of the responsibility for IIDTRC prevention 
beyond the either software-based or generic models is an explicit critic to the very idea 
of these concepts. 
The 4 key attributes of the RBF are described in the table 27 below. These integrated 
attributes and elements are synthesised to ascertain this research aim and objectives. 
Collaboration of management in this context allows the IS security management team 
that implements IIDTRC prevention strategies to create structure that can help to 
effectively deliver organisations objectives which include and not limited to; 
 IIDTRC prevention policy design and implementation,  
 Encourage best practice to minimise IIDTRC risks, 
 Maximise internal security performance, and 
 Integrate management roles and responsibilities. 
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RBF 
Attributes 
Descriptions of Role-based Attributes in Prevention of IIDTRC 
Collaborative 
role-based 
monitoring 
It would provide continuum and optimum roles/responsibilities across 
functional management team from foundation, proactive to preventive 
IIDTRC risks;  
Foundation: IS/T security warranty and remote support to law enforcements 
and outsourcing companies, and establishes their requirements with respect to 
service line agreements; 
Preventive: multi-management IS/T security support, clearly defined roles at 
the respective management level, dynamic and available management support. 
Support 
capabilities 
It tends to improve both the effectiveness and efficiency of IT/S maintenance 
and support. It provides opportunities for the Information security 
management systems (ISMS) to leverage on the competency and best results 
which may come from out-tasking the cross-functions to strengthen IS/T 
security strategy. It makes it possible for an informed, effective maintenance 
and technical expertise to be shared in a dynamic process. 
Service-level 
agreements 
RBF is customisable schema at hierarchical management levels to meet 
business information security management systems budgets, needs and 
strategies. This means that service-level agreements (SLAs) can now be linked 
dynamically to shifting roles, responsibilities and the workloads. Rather than 
being defined by static roles that does not reflect changing internal 
information security demand; the internal information theft prevention service 
level can fluctuate in response to IITRC risks; meets business’ expectations 
for real-time role-oriented information security management; assures data 
security processes and business continuity through clear management roles. 
Flexible 
support 
It would help (information security management systems) ISMS to 
accomplish complex internal security tasks, manage or out-task IS/T security 
and IITRC. It provides flexible knowledge transfer to address range of IITRC 
prevention support complexities that might be beyond the expertise 
management support. It avails the option to choose management roles and 
services that better suits the business data security operation and structure; 
creates an information security optimised maintenance and dynamic IITRC 
prevention; minimises the ISMS service and roles  that seem to clashes;  
provides integrated information security service management, optimisation, 
and flexible delivery choices and leverages on the expertise of cross functional 
management to reduce cost of IS platform as a service (PaaS) and 
infrastructure as a service (IaaS). 
Table 27: Descriptions of the Role-Based Framework Attributes 
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Drawing from the analysis presented in the table 27 above, the concept of RBF is 
designed to draw from these attributes to conceptualise integrated management 
approach. It is proposed such that it would be grounded by the empirical study (via 
qualitative case study design discussed in subsequent sections). As a role clarification 
framework, RBF is designed to assist crime prevention management to improve their 
performance by assisting them to select and replicate practices appropriate to their 
needs and circumstances in the prevention of IIDTRC. 
 
3.2.2 Role-based Framework: Sharing of Management Roles 
RBF conceptualises IIDTRC prevention management as the body that encompasses 
complementary management team members – crime prevention, IT security, human 
resources and law enforcement agency. It classifies management roles in the form of a 
hierarchical level from the top management to the front line management. It follows 
the stages of crime prevention processes which include intervention, intelligence, 
implementation, collaboration and remediation measures. Intervention in this context 
refers to a combination of IIDTRC prevention strategies designed to change or 
improve the employees’ behaviour or perception towards IIDTRC (Ekblom, 2010). 
The elements of intervention include but not limited to IIDTRC prevention awareness 
training, data protection training, IIDTRC incident reporting and whistle blowing. 
These elements can contribute immensely by promoting employees support, 
influencing the IS security knowledge and skills, and create a supportive working 
environment, policies and resources. Intelligence in this context refers to operations 
undertaken by IS security management to gather information that provide better 
understanding of the IIDTRC nature – cause and methods of propagation (Karn, 2013). 
Remediation measure in relation to IIDTRC prevention is the action that management 
takes to correct the damage done by IIDTRC perpetrators. 
In this context, it is effective implementation and efficient collaboration by the 
management that can minimise the chance for the remediation process. While 
implementation is the translation of the chosen IS security strategy in action to achieve 
IIDTRC prevention goals and objectives, collaboration is the key that the management 
need to achieve this. The collaboration defines the IS security management working 
together towards a goal of mitigating IIDTRC (Gercke et al., 2011). It can be inter 
where the external agents (e.g. law enforcements, partners, outsourcing companies), or 
intra where the roles of manager are shared in the organisation.  
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These two last IIDTRC preventive processes (efficient collaboration and effective 
implementation of IS security strategies) forms the basic attributes of RBF. These 
attributes influences the impact of key components of the IIDTRC prevention 
strategies – policy, employees IIDTRC vigilance and awareness programmes, 
consumers’ data protection, identity management, law enforcement, training, reporting 
procedures, and victims support. RBF is organised as a sequence of management level 
which emphasis the clarification of roles – IS/T security, IS audit, crime prevention, 
HR and law enforcement. The arrows, as shown in figure 11 below, depicts the 
interdependency of shared roles through monitoring, reporting, and collaboration 
between management levels  
Based suggestion of IIDTRC preventions discussed in the chapter 2 above, an initial 
RBF for prevention of IIDTRC is proposed, which conceptualises the prevention of 
these crimes from a business organisation perspective; thus proposes following steps 
and measures. The measures identified in this context have their foundations in 
criminology (crime deterrence theory, Pearson theory and Cressey’s fraud triangle 
theory), IS and management perspective (policy and risk management), and sociology 
(staff fraud, and white collar crimes, corporate frauds). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
Human Resource 
Management Roles: 
Counselling 
Human Resource 
Management Roles: Training 
Low level / Supervisory / Operative / First-
line managers Roles: Detection and 
Investigation. 
Figure 11: Role-based Framework 
Top Level/ Administrative Management 
Roles: Preventive and Deterrence Policy Making, 
Awareness Campaign, Risk Assessment and 
Management, Disciplinary Actions, etc. 
Collective Role: 
Recovery, Restoration, 
Victim Assistance, CSR 
Law Enforcement Agencies Roles: Collaboration in Investigation/Prosecution of criminals 
Middle level / Operational Management 
Roles: Training, Incident Management and 
Analysis, Information Protection. 
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Management Roles 
Top Management: The role of the top level management for prevention of IIDTRC 
include: making of preventive and deterrent policies; risk assessment and management 
and disciplinary actions, etc. An effective internal identity theft policy within any 
business organisation is a necessary first step towards the development of an integrated 
strategy of identity theft prevention. The policy should also include other components 
such as definitive objectives, assumptions and directives which could increase the 
possibilities of discovery or decrease the probability of commission in internal identity 
theft related crimes in the organisation. There should be policy guides, clear 
procedures and internal rules for reporting and investigating cases of identity theft. 
Good policy statements are the basis for the scope of other steps to be built upon. 
Without prudent policy from the management of the organisation, other steps like risk 
assessment and management would not be effective. They should play hands-on role in 
ensuring information protection, detection of frauds, investigations and incident 
management so that prevention policies are taken seriously by all levels of an 
organisation. In doing so, their front-line experience would help them to develop more 
effective policies.  
Middle-Management: The middle-level management in organisations comprises 
departmental heads and regional managers, etc. They are answerable to the top level 
management for functioning of their departments/teams while ensuring organising and 
directing roles which include: training, incident management and analysis and 
information protection. They implement the organisational goals, objectives and plans 
according to the directions/policies of the top management. They should be able to 
clarify and explain IIDTRC deterrent policies and guidelines from the top management 
to lower level management thus acting as a mediator between the two levels. The 
governing policies discussed above is supported by the technical policies, thus cover 
most rules and regulations in more details by adding to these rules that areas that 
relevant to the technology. These policies are meant for the technical custodians as 
they carry out routine security responsibility within the business.  
The system and database administrators need to be kept abreast of the current technical 
policies within and outside the retail domain. As internal frauds threats are becoming 
more dynamic with fraudsters continuing to devise new techniques to exploit the 
easiest target, crime specialists suggested that retail industry should continue to invest 
in systems and controls to avoid being targeted as the weakest link (Financial Crime 
and Service Authority, 2009).  
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The advancement in the use of the information technology has enabled the criminals to 
continuing to refine and update their techniques. However, some of the new complex 
technologies that have been noted to have proven data and information security are 
biometric technologies, cryptography, authentication and certification and single-sign-
on technologies. It has been proven that a right combination of these technologies built 
on well designed and enforced set of security rules and regulation always deter internal 
criminals from frauds (Schneier, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the technical employees should know the technical guidelines and 
policies along with the effective application of the security software to increase their 
likelihood to prevent the cases of IIDTRC in online retail. Guidelines are procedural 
document lists and strategies adopted by business organisations. In most retail 
companies, the guidelines are developed based on the policy of the individual 
department. Employees pay lesser attention to these guidelines perhaps because of 
‘light-weight’ of the consequences of their violations. There should be much attention 
given to the preventive guidelines to IIDTRC other the common data recovery plan 
guidelines, and the likes. The management at this level should be responsible for the 
coordination of different aspects such as the trainings of staff, incident management 
and rules enforcement policies and guideline.  
The training of the employees in areas of information protection and data security 
should be their priority. They can organise seminars for the training of employees 
while ensuring effective incident management and analysis. This involves the 
management and analysis of the aftermath of identity fraud occurrences. The ability of 
the companies to implement rigorous incident management procedures relies heavily 
on the effectiveness of the middle management. Without such cooperation of the 
middle management and top management, IIDTRC would be difficult to manage. 
Supervisory Management: - Also known as the first line management and usually 
comprises of store managers, shift supervisors, foreperson and the team leaders. Their 
basic role is the supervision of everyday business operations. Since first line managers 
have a strong influence on the employees and interact with them on a daily basis, they 
can play a vital role in the detection and investigation of identity theft related crimes. 
The major problem facing investigation of these crimes still boil down to lack of 
clarity of responsibility and less interaction or flow of communication between 
management and employees, thus making the cases of IIDTRC difficult to be proven 
when the perpetrators are caught. Supervisors can help address this problem by 
facilitating constant communication with the employees. 
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Roles of Human Resource Management: One of the most effective ways to mitigate 
the threat of IIDTRC such as collusion and coercion is to raise the awareness levels 
among all employees by the human resource managers. It is importance to let all the 
employees know the consequences of colluding or involving themselves in any form of 
internal identity related crimes. Organisations through human resources need to ensure 
that the members of staff are aware of whom to report the cases of fraudulent activities 
within the organisations. There should also be the provision for the employees to feel 
confident that the matter would be treated professionally. Base on this consideration 
that role of human resource management is very vital in prevention of IIDTRC; the 
structure of RBF depicts two loops on which the top and the middle-level management 
roles and responsibilities are hinged.  
Roles of Law Enforcement Agencies: These are agencies that have a vital role to play 
in the IIDTRC as they mainly have the necessary power and skills to take IIDTRC 
cases beyond the reporting of incidents. Outsourcing the specialist teams to deal with 
these crimes is recommendable. They can also play a major role in educating 
businesses on the IIDTRC prevention measures. Assisting law enforcement and 
regulatory authorities in the fight against internal employees’ frauds is vital for any 
business organisation, since taking legal action against the fraudster might be 
expensive and also an effective deterrent to others (ACAS, 2008). It is the roles of 
retail management to create awareness for the policies of data protection and the role 
of the law enforcement agencies to enforce the policies. The policy for prevention of 
internal identity theft-related crimes in retail industry encompasses many purposes:  
 protection of stakeholders and information;  
 set of rules for expected behaviour by employees, management, system 
administrators, security personnel, and users;  
 authorise and define the consequences of violation of rules, authorise security 
personnel to investigate, monitor and probe; 
 help to minimise security risks, define industry consensus stance on 
information and data security; 
These policies and legislations discussed in chapter 2 above can be adapted in the 
context of online retail and created to be known across management, technical and 
employees’ levels. In addition, other governing policy, technical policy and guidelines 
should be adapted to cover information and related identity proprietary data security. In 
doing so, the government data protection data and other important legislations are 
incorporated into the overall company’s security policy.  
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Some of the online retail companies still neglect the integration of the government’s 
data protection act such as Data Protection Act (1998), Freedom of Information 2000, 
and Computer Misuse Act 1990.  Raising awareness among all employees about this 
relevant legislation relating to data security has been proven as one of the effective 
ways to mitigate the threat of the IIDTRC (Sommer, 2012). 
Collective Roles: The employees and stakeholders in the online retail are expected to 
make more than just economic contributions. Both parties need to see and begin to 
recognise their responsibility to secure and promote information management in their 
companies (Listermann and Romesberg, 2009). This responsibility should not be 
limited to or beyond the level required by law, but extend to protection of identity 
proprietary information in order to achieve secure retail business operations. The 
application of concepts of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the context of 
prevention of internal identity theft in retail information systems security is, still, scare 
in both practice and theory. Although CSR have been applied extensively in many 
business sectors, it is still sparse in the context of retail information security 
management (Tsiakis, 2009).  
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision encourages senior management to promote 
their organisation culture by exemplary life through integrity. There is the need for the 
online retail companies to stress the need for trust between the managers and 
employees. This would assist in monitoring employees’ suspicious lifestyle that may 
pose potential detrimental effects to both the employee and employer.  
Intelligence agencies and top human resource managers have listed various policies 
which could create a desired culture in every organisation. Some of these include: 
fraud management policy, employee fraud prevention policy, code of conduct or 
business ethics, disciplinary policy, fraud reporting policy whistle blowing policy, staff 
assistance policy and fraud specialist policy, etc. 
Prevention of IIDTRC in online retail can also be provided through company CSR – a 
voluntary commitment to internalise in corporate pivotal decisions and strategy 
practices that contribute to social development. There is the need for the security 
managers to incorporate CSR activities in the corporate strategy of information 
security practices. Incorporation of motivational practices in the workplace by 
recognising/rewarding employees who promote honesty contributes to the 
development of ethical company cultures which in turn could reduce the cases of 
IIDTRC in online retail (Lewis, 2006).  
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3.3 Role-based Framework and its Propositions 
Role-based framework (RBF) assumes that the integration of management roles 
sharing in a collaborative approach would be beneficial in implementing IIDTRC 
prevention practices. In practice, however, the literature review has shown that 
management role sharing is affected by number of attributes including people, 
operations, processes, organisational roles, and technology and management 
characteristics.  These factors have been shown to be relevant to the success of 
information systems (IS) security in organisations. If an effectiveness of IS security is 
subject to the clarity of integrated shared roles the management uphold; then it is 
pertinent and important to argue that the applicability of RBF should be considered. As 
suggested by Chan (2002) that the ways of improving the application of information 
systems strategies can be found by asking three key questions:  
i. What are key roles of integrated information systems that can clearly impact 
security management performance in the prevention of IIDTRC?  
ii. What aspects of information systems security implementation are less likely 
understood in the prevention of IIDTRC?  
iii. And what managerial practices improve the likelihood of information systems 
security integration in the prevention of IIDTRC?  
Attempts to answer these questions would provide insights to the propositions on 
which RBF evaluation would be based: attributes those help or hinder integrated 
management in sharing roles and responsibilities in relation to IIDTRC prevention. 
Hence, the following propositions are deducted from the RBF:  
P1: Organisations with greater integration of the management are more likely to have 
effective collaboration between management roles (IS/T and crime prevention team) in 
prevention of IIDTRC (Zhu, 2006; Biegelman, 2009; Shah and Okeke, 2011);  
P2: Organisations with greater collaboration of management roles are more likely to 
have effective implementation of IS security strategies required for the prevention of 
IIDTRC; Management with greater interaction implementing data security roles are 
likely to achieve organisational goal on IIDTRC prevention (Katz and Kahn, 1966; 
Elliot, 1976; Biddle, 1986; Madsen, 2002; Cabri et al., 2006); 
P3: Management with shared understanding of data security operations are more 
likely to achieve better security strategy in preventing IIDTRC. Management role 
sharing is likely to affect the level of performance management in preventing IIDTRC.  
 Page 106 of 328 
 
The clearly defined scope of the IIDTRC prevention practices is likely to result in more 
collaboration and improve performance by the IS security management roles. 
(Sarnecki, 2005; Hodgson, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2009; Ekblom, 2010);  
P4: The greater the inter-dependency of management in carrying out IIDTRC 
prevention roles, the greater the efficiency in IIDTRC prevention. A collaborative 
relationship between the management and employees is likely to improve the 
employees compliance with organisation’s IS security policies. The collaborative 
relationship is likely to improve the effectives of internal data security by directing 
attention to the IIDTRC risks (Biegelman, 2009). 
As the RBF conceptualises these propositions, empirical research are needed to 
investigate which of these deductions are more perceived in the organisation. To 
provide these intended outcomes, the notion of the RBF evaluation is deemed 
imperative for the basis of its applicability in businesses. The evaluation would help to 
validate the propositions, which are summarised as follows:  
 The collaboration of management roles has an impact on the implementation 
of tools required for the prevention of IIDTRC (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 
2009; Madsen, 2002); and 
 Integration of the management has an impact on the realisation of the 
collaboration between management roles (IS/T and crime prevention team) in 
prevention of IIDTRC (Biegelman, 2009; Biddle, 1986; Katz and Kahn, 1966).  
For instance, investigating the hands-on IIDTRC prevention awareness involving 
management has an impact on the prevention of IIDTRC. These proposition and 
potential results would direct the implementation of the RBF on how best to 
communicate, consult, support and engage employees, management and other 
stakeholders through the transition of the frameworks. In addition, the evaluation of the 
framework would identify: 
 the steps of developing an effective performance management;  
 the processes of assessing the key factors that may have an effective impact on 
the creation of secured information systems in business organisations with the 
collaboration of employees; and 
 the training, technical know-how and skill sets required to implement and 
apply the guides and IS security practices. 
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3.4 Role-based Framework Evaluation: The Relevance in this research 
Researchers (e.g. Newman and Clarke, 2003; Lacoste and Tremblay 2003; Newman 
and McNally, 2005) suggest that research should not only recommend practices for 
IIDTRC prevention, but should also evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies and 
practices. They suggested need to investigate how data security and crime prevention 
management adapt to IIDTRC prevention practices. They noted that the system of 
accessing, maintaining, and preserving information systems depends on the individuals 
who manage them for its security in the long run. Bressler (2009) and Bressler and 
Bressler (2007) also suggest that the models for the analyses of the complex inter-
relationship between businesses and roles of management afforded to prevent the 
IIDTRC can be applicable through evaluative approaches. Ekblom (2010) and Sarnecki 
(2005) agree with Bressler (2009) and suggest the need to explore functional 
interaction between IS/T security management and crime prevention reference groups, 
and evaluate the extents of their roles in the crimes intervention and prevention 
implementation.  
Newman and Clarke (2003) suggest that imbalance of the studies in a body of literature 
on crime prevention that has focused on theoretical recommendations of the crimes 
prevention policies should be corrected by investigating  how to align the roles of 
management with relevant practices. Researchers (e.g. Anderson and Tresidder, 2008; 
Homel, 2010) suggested that evaluation of roles of management in implementing crime 
prevention strategies will help to identify and to prioritise the key concepts. Ekblom 
(2010) noted that evaluation of crime prevention framework enhances its applicability 
and plans to address resource constraints. English and Cummings and Straton (2002) 
suggest that an evaluation of the crime prevention framework can provide valuable 
information to enable security managers to plan improvements for future.  Adhering to 
these suggestions, the key objectives of evaluations need to be identified for the Role-
base framework. Thus, the next section overviews the concepts of RBF evaluation 
approach. It outlines various considerations made for the selected evaluation 
approaches. 
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3.5 Role-based Framework Evaluation Approach 
The aim of evaluating the role-based framework (RBF), first, is to delineate, obtain and 
provide information which would be essential for describing and understanding RBF; 
and in making judgments and decisions related to its application. Secondly, to provide 
information on the functioning and outcome of RBF, the evaluation would provide 
description of the context in which the RBF would be operational, as well as the nature 
of its elements – human resource input, and the intervention processes to be used in its 
implementation. In the processes of the RBF evaluation through an empirical 
investigation discussed in chapter 4 and chapter 5, the underlying mechanisms or 
causal processes and outcomes of the framework would be achieved – that contributes 
to an understanding of the ‘why’ of the outcomes, as suggested by Pawson and Tilley 
(1995).  For instance, empirical evaluation of RBF in the online retail company is done 
through case studies. It was done to investigate how RBF fits in the companies and to 
explore the challenges of managing IIDTRC prevention issues. The findings of the 
investigation form the basis for an analysis on how RBF attributes fits into online retail 
information security management. The findings guide the understanding of reasons for 
modification of RBF or what circumstances it might be expected to be applicable in 
other business settings.   
Researchers (e.g. Mayne and Hudson, 1992; Obergfell-Fuchs and Kury, 2003) suggest 
two approaches commonly used in crime evaluation models: action-oriented evaluation 
and research-oriented evaluation. This research applied both approaches. The former 
leads to the priority given to information which is primarily useful for the RBF 
modification within a relatively short time frame and this is the rationale for the case 
studies discussed in chapter 4.  Research-oriented evaluation, on the other hand, allows 
a high premium on the methodological rigour (Patton, 1990). Rather than being 
applicable for modifying crime prevention framework, Sherman (1997) suggests that 
research-oriented evaluation is suitable for longer-term application of the crimes 
prevention framework. And this is one of the rationales for further investigation of the 
application of the RBF attributes through participant observation case studies. This 
research, while applies action-oriented evaluation, incorporates other elements of 
crimes prevention model evaluation suggested by Owen and Rogers (1999): 
clarificative, impact, monitoring, interactive, and proactive. The element of a 
clarificative evaluation dictates the rationale of archival analysis which is introduced in 
chapter 4, discussed in chapter 5 and applied in chapter 6.  
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Archival analysis approach, as a clarificative tool for RBF evaluation, complements the 
review that has been used for the conceptualization of RBF. These research methods 
are adopted to clarify the underlying rationale and assumptions about how the 
components of RBF might be linked to produce the desired outcome.  
In addition, the elements of an interactive, monitoring and proactive are applied in the 
action-oriented of all empirical investigations of case studies. These elements, in the 
respective cases, direct the evaluation of the actual need for the RBF framework. It 
directs the monitoring of its delivery for management decision making and 
accountability purposes. This element would guide the application of RBF. It would 
help to determine to what degree or extent the RBF objectives have been met based on 
the assessment of the intended/unintended outcomes, and to justify whether RBF 
should continue to be implemented in its context of its applications or in other settings, 
and if so, whether, modifications are required.   
 
3.6 Summary of the Theoretical Framework 
This chapter has synthesised lessons learnt from the literature review in Chapter 2 to 
conceptualise Role-based framework. It has used the organisation role theory to 
analyse; 
 the concept of integrating both the external and internal environment for any 
adoption of internal identity theft preventive strategy;  
 that creation of clear roles and shared responsibilities are necessary to prevent 
IIDTRC; 
 the adoption of strategies to consult, engage and communicate with 
stakeholders – the cross-functional management and employees in IIDTRC. 
Based on these concepts, the principles of identity theft-related crimes practices and 
role sharing has been extended to design the role-based framework which distinguishes 
this research from other studies that have provided the generic frameworks. Then the 
concepts were summarised in research propositions. This approach to the IIDTRC 
prevention framework aims to provide evidence-based results prevention of an 
IIDTRC incident. This chapter concludes with the summary of the rationale and 
research approaches for evaluation of the role-based framework. The discussion of the 
rationale and research approaches is provided in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
In social sciences, business information systems, in particular, the choice of different 
research methodologies used by researchers always dictates the research paradigm 
(Hatt, 1985; Smith, 2000). Several researchers (e.g. Mitroff and Mason, 1973; Davis 
and Hamilton and Ives, 1980; Hirschheim and Klein and Lyytinen, 1996) argue that 
there is no clear suggestion for the best research methodology to be used in the study 
of Information Systems (IS) security. Various research methodologies differ in 
underlying paradigms and philosophies of which many may or may not be compatible 
(Lyytinen, 1987b; Smith, 1998). It is then left to the volition of the researcher to 
choose the research paradigm that provides the better analysis of the research problem 
under investigation (Smith, 1998).  As defined by Kuhn (1970) in The Nature of 
Science Revolution, a paradigm is the underlying assumptions and intellectual 
structure upon which research and development in a field of inquiry are based.  
By examining a variety of research philosophy available in the domain of Information 
Systems (IS) security, this section provides an analysis of the underlying assumptions 
and intellectual structures upon which this research is based. It attempts to answer the 
questions: which research paradigm builds the knowledge of IS security (Ramiller and 
Swanson, 1993)?  In doing so, this chapter has two aims. First, it contributes to the 
understanding of the place of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) prevention 
in the philosophy of Information Systems security research. Secondly, it examines an 
appropriate research method for examining the roles of IS security management in 
relation to their practices in online retail companies.  
 
4.1.1 The Philosophy of this Research 
Selecting a suitable research methodology that best answers the research questions in 
this study was not methodologically led,  it was based on the philosophical stance of 
this research background, the research problem and research questions. This section 
provides an answer to some of the epistemological question of this research problem 
by exploring the ontological view of this research. Having explored several research 
paradigms, constructivism and interpretivism are adopted based on the following 
rationales.   
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Constructivism: Since this study aims to explore the management roles that are based 
on the behaviour and interaction of individuals, the concept of constructivism is 
deemed appropriated by the researcher. Constructivism claims that truth is relative and 
it is dependent on one’s perspective. It is dependent on the theory of knowledge which 
influences the interaction between the researcher and the participants throughout the 
research design (Little and Carter, 2007). Constructivism as a research paradigm 
recognises the importance of the meaning of subjective human creation (Charmaz, 
2000). Searle (1979) suggests that constructivism is built on the concept of a social 
construction of reality which enables the participants to tell their stories and at the 
same time enhances the collaboration between the researcher and participants. As the 
case is in this research, it has set out to explore reality – what the nature of the IIDTRC 
is, by investigating roles of management in preventing IIDTRC. The subject ‘nature of 
the IIDTRC’ describes reality (research problems) and the researcher need to explore 
research problem to provide the better explanation of the reality (Lather, 1992).  
Interpretivism: This paradigm allows close collaboration between the researcher and 
participants – information systems security management in the selected online retail 
companies. Huberman and Miles (1994) argues that research which involves 
collaboration between researcher and management, that focuses on an issue identified 
as significant by the participants and which is carried in the organisation is more likely 
to have impact on practice. Hence, there is a more pronounced impact of research 
findings on practice if the researcher-participant relationship involves interaction over 
a length of time (Crotty, 1998). And this is the case in this study where the researcher 
and participants interact before and during the data analysis and write-up phases.  
Another reason for using an interpretivist concept was that it allows the researcher to 
acknowledge and explore the complexities of different organisational issues (in this 
case, online retail companies in relation to IIDTRC prevention).  
In addition, interpretivist status enables the researcher to connect the findings and 
determine the context and then imagine whether the measurement procedures would 
yield the same data if replicated in the context of this research (Brooke, 2002). 
Throughout the three years of this research project data were gathered from a number 
of different online retail companies, each with the potential for differing IIDTRC 
prevention practices and management roles and where employers worked together and 
defined their relationships in a multiple of ways.  
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Constructivism/Interpretivism: In terms of this epistemological analysis, 
interpretivism is closely linked to constructivism. Thus, this close link underpins the 
rationale of the researcher to adopt the status of these paradigms in this research. 
Interpretivism asserts that social reality and laws of science (natural laws) are different 
and, therefore, require different kinds of methods (Fay, 1996).  While the natural laws 
seek to clarify consistencies in the data to deduce laws  
(which is excluded from the scope of this research), the social reality deals with the 
actions of the individual which is contextualised of this research. The interest of this 
research focuses on exactly those aspects that are unique, individual and qualitative, 
which is relative and dependent on one’s perspective. And this interest is exactly a 
major stance of constructivism. The researcher’s status on the interpretivist and 
constructivist paradigm which encourages that there is no absolute reality; that truth is 
not singular; and knowledge is created by the knowers, and there are multiple realities 
and they are created by our lived experiences. This status geared the researcher’s view 
on the attempt to generate ‘unknown’ realities through individual business operational 
experiences. And this is really important in this study; to be able to give voice to the 
participants and to also give the right to the researcher to interpret and to be able to tell 
a story about this research in the end. Since interpretivist stance is a major anti-
positivist, it looks for ‘culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the 
social life-world’ (Crotty, 1998, p.67). The world (of information systems security 
issues in retail companies) can be interpreted through the classification schemas of the 
human mind (perceptions and experiences of research participants from retail 
companies) (Williams and May, 1996). 
Phenomenology: Based on the aim of this research, a phenomenological concept of 
interpretivism was adopted to complement the constructivist/interpretivist status of the 
researcher. Phenomenology holds that attempt to understand social reality (research 
problem in this case) has to be grounded in participants’ experiences of that research 
problem (Tesch, 1994). Hence, phenomenology requires that researcher and 
participants must lay aside their prevailing understanding of the phenomena (research 
problem in this case) and revisit the problem in order that new meanings may emerge 
(Remenyi and Williams, 1995). In other words, this is gaining the subjective 
experience of the research problem by the researcher through ‘assuming’ the place of 
the subject (Chen, Shek and Bu, 2011). Hence, phenomenology becomes an 
exploration, via prevailing cultural understanding and personal experience. In doing 
these, the research ascribed values not only to the subjects, but also to the 
interpretations of the research (Paul, 2004).  
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Since this logic of phenomenology seeks to find the internal logic of the subject which 
is far from using a theoretical model that impose an external logic, it supports the 
stance of this research which tends to extends the application of the Role-based 
framework.  
Phenomenology/Ethnography: Though, Tesch (1994) and Carter and Little (2007) 
distinguish between phenomenological research and ethnography, the researcher 
adopted the epistemological stance of both approaches in this research. While 
phenomenological research and ethnography are based upon interpretation and 
description, ethnographic research is focused more on culture and phenomenology 
focuses on the human experience of the ‘life-world’ (Tesch, 1994). While the unit of 
analysis of ethnography is often ‘sites’, phenomenological researchers make use of 
‘individuals’. Phenomenology makes use of interviews, while ethnography’ prime 
mode of data collection is observation – either as participant/outside observer, which is 
sometimes supplemented by interview data for clarification (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). These suggestions were applied in this research design. For instance, the first 
case study of RetailGroup involved semi-structured interview and the investigation of 
security audit practices were conducted in the ‘sites’ of the selected companies. 
 
4.1.2 The Choice of the Research Methodology 
To explore this research problem, a qualitative case study is adopted based on the 
philosophy of constructivism and interpretivism (Yin, 2003; Stake, 2000). Hence, the 
choice of the qualitative case study in this research was determined by the theoretical 
paradigm (Baroudi and Orlikowski, 1991; Layder 1993; Guba and Lincoln, 1994) and 
the circumstances of the reality to be researched (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 1994). This research adopts qualitative case study to ensure methodological 
rigour due to the nature of research problem (Stake, 1994) – understanding human 
behaviour, and to contribute to the debate on the application of qualitative study in the 
IS security research. The choice of qualitative case study is also based on the research 
paradigm – “basic set of beliefs that guides action (Guba, 1990, p.17)”, which is 
premised on the combine beliefs of ontology, epistemology and methodology. Since 
this research aims to develop of IIDTRC prevention framework, which constitutes 
management actions and roles – IS  security rules and policies, the constituent 
elements of the qualitative case study: archival study, semi-structured interview and 
participant observation, are required to investigate the actions and roles.  
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These chosen research methods enabled the researcher to build, from ontological 
stance, how the research relates their existence or nature of social entities, their 
interaction and behaviour. Based on the concepts of ontology, the researcher sees the 
research problem from both constructivist and interpretivist point of views. The 
research problem is constructed based on perspective at a given place and time, and at 
the same time interpreted as a series of established elements whose behaviour and 
existence ultimately can be explained by underlying rules.  
The motive of the researcher for using qualitative research builds on the suggestion by 
Myers (1997) that the ability of human beings to talk is what distinguishes them from 
the world around them. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) agree with Myers (1997) and 
suggest that qualitative research is an activity that locates the researchers in the world 
around them, of which they attempt to study things in the natural setting, make sense 
of, and interpret phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them. Smircich 
and Morgan (1980) add that qualitative research is an approach rather than a particular 
set of techniques and that its appropriateness is usually derived from the nature of the 
social phenomena to be explored. Thus, qualitative research is chosen to help the 
researcher understand the socio-cultural context (online retail companies) and the 
people (management) within which they operate. The researcher also buys in the 
suggestion of Algozzine and Hancock (2006) that qualitative research methodology ‘is 
such’, an intermediate research approach which allows the researcher to match 
philosophy, methodology, and the research problem.  
Saunders et al., (2007) supported this point by expressing methodology as a theory and 
analysis of how research should start; it provides justification for the methods of a 
research project and not the project themselves. Saunders et al., (2007) emphasise 
more about the term ‘theory’ by referring methodology as the theory of how research 
should be undertaken. In agreements with the above notions, Bryman (2008), Hakim 
(1994) and Outhwaite (1983) concur that the theory of research methodology, at its 
best, is a catalyst for change, it is not an end itself; rather, its insight introduces a 
critical moment into status quo which optimally leads to the corrective changes of the 
repressive reifications in existing conditions. Hence, as noted earlier, the researcher 
believes that interpretive qualitative research grounded in constructivism would be ‘a 
catalyst for change’ in understanding the nature of IIDTRC preventions. It is an 
instrument that would be used to shed lights on the dark areas of IS security research as 
it relates to IIDTRC prevention. 
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Philosophical 
concept 
 Related research questions Qualitative 
Ontological What is the nature of reality: 
what is the nature of IIDTRC in 
online retail? 
Interpretivist: Reality is subjective 
and multiple as would be seen in 
this study (multiple case study 
with many participants) 
Epistemological What is the relationship of the 
researcher to the researched? 
Axiological: What is the role of 
values? 
Rhetorical: What is the language 
of research? 
Researcher interacts with ‘being 
researched’ 
Axiological: Value laden and 
biased 
Rhetorical: Accepted qualitative 
words / Informal evolving 
decisions/personal voice 
Methodological What is the process of the 
research 
Accurate via verification; Context 
bound; emerging design-
categories identified during 
research; inductive process; 
pattern, theories developed for 
understanding 
Table 28: Concept of Qualitative Research Paradigms 
 (Adapted from Creswell, 1994) 
Based on the above arguments and suggestions summarised in table 28, the place of 
quantitative research methodology in this research was not considered. This is because 
of the ‘strictly’ positivist concept of the quantitative research which emphasises the 
measurement and analysis of causal relationship between variables; carried out in a 
‘value-free framework’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). 
 Besides, due to the concepts of quantitative research having been originated from 
natural sciences, it is deemed to be more relevance to defined relationship, numerical 
methods and surveys. And this is not the case in this research. Hence, the relevance of 
qualitative research in this study is considered. 
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4.2 The Relevance of Qualitative Research in this Research 
The question this section answers is what qualitative research method is relevant to 
this research? The researcher views that the quantitative based positivistic concepts of 
‘value free’ and ‘one world’ would not be helpful (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Thus, 
both the qualitative-based research approaches fit well with the scope and aim of this 
research. Since information systems management research is transdisciplinary, Gibbon 
et al., (1994) suggest, it is perhaps qualitative research methods that can largely 
accommodate the transdisciplinary nature of information systems management 
research for reliable research results. Madan and Starkey (2001) suggested that 
qualitative research methods encourage researcher and participants to engage 
passionately in research activities. It is in such research endeavour that the findings of 
the information systems management research would be relevance to business 
organisations.   
 
4.2.1 The Relevance of Case Study in this Research 
Case study research enables researchers to develop an inquiry that may lead to a more 
informed background for theory development (Yin, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989). As noted 
by Glasser and Strauss (1967), a qualitative case study with qualitative research design 
is a suitable research instrument to provide an empirical data for theory building. It 
allows for analysis of the data from the participant’s perspectives that contributes to 
building a grounded knowledge. Several researchers (Yin, 1989; Stake, 1995) suggest 
that a qualitative case study should be chosen in typical research context; first, when 
the research problem requires the researcher to seek the contextual meaning within a 
bounded and intricate system. And this study is the similar context since the researcher 
seeks to examine the nature of IIDTRC prevention in the online retail companies as a 
bounded organisation setting. It provides the researcher an advantage and a way to 
explore and understand the phenomenon and context when the boundaries between 
them are not clear (Yin, 1981). 
As noted by Cooper and Emory (1991), case study establishes greater insight into 
boundaries and phenomenon under study. In this study, the focus is on the roles of the 
management in the prevention of IIDTRC. The emphasis is on studying IIDTRC issues 
from the boundary of the peculiar nature of the online retail management.  
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The use of case study would enable the researcher to deal with management intricacies, 
process and roles. It would also help the researcher to focus on the relationship 
between participants and the organisational setting (Foster, 1991).  Second, Hirschman 
(1986) and Merriam (1988) suggest that qualitative case study research is suitable 
when the research activity is an inductive theory building. And this is similar to this 
research’s case study design. The case study provided a greater analysis of the 
dynamics of management roles in the prevention of IIDTRC. It also helps the 
researcher to establish a rich understanding of the management situations as they relate 
to the data (inductive) that emerges from the research. The results of the analysis 
contribute to theory building based on a prior theory.   
Figure 12 shows research activity of this study with emphasis on the relevance of a 
prior theory to the research design (Yin, 1993; Huberman and Miles, 1994). It starts 
with the initial identification of the research problem and the building of a priori 
theory via review of the literature. It continues with the collection and collation of the 
data. And finally to the analyses of the data that produces final theory development and 
generalisation (Coote, 1994).  
 
Figure 12: Research Development Stage 
 
The third is when the research activities are focused on context that has specificity 
(Merriam 1988; Eisenhardt 1989). Also, the case of this research is a similar example 
as the nature and the prevention of IIDTRC are being studied in defined context of 
retail companies with IS security/crimes prevention managers as the target population. 
Research Proposal, 
problems & Questions; 
Review of Literature & 
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•Review of A Priori Models, 
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In general several researchers (e.g. Yin, 1989; Hakim, 1994) suggest that the 
application of case study in research should be considered when: ‘situation of theory 
development’, ‘research where boundary between phenomena and context are not 
clearly defined’, qualitative and exploratory and explanatory’, ‘empirical enquiry’, 
‘research where multiple sources of evidence are used’, embedded case studies were 
sub-units of analysis.  
For instance, a case study in IS security of disaster at a University by Ayyagari and 
Tyks (2012) sought to address the: cause of the disaster that leads to data breaches and 
security management functions in handling the security laxities. A case study was 
chosen because the case was security functioning of university management, but the 
case could not be considered without understanding the context of the management of 
the University; and more specifically, the IS management and management structure 
and setting. It was in these structures and settings that the functional roles were 
developed and utilised. It would have been impossible for the researchers to have had a 
true picture of the University’s IS security breaches without considering the context 
within which the circumstances that led to the occurrence of the disaster.  
Similarly, this research adopts the case study as well-defined research approaches to 
empirically provide answers to the research questions. The a priori theory analysis at 
the outset of this research provided a background to define the conceptual framework 
(as suggested by Guba and Lincoln, 1985). The a priori theory analysis refined the 
focus of the reviewed literature and helped the researcher to develop a suitable research 
design for the data collection (Yin, 1993).  
Figure 12 above shows the developmental chart of this research design with case study 
design linking the initial and final stage. The arrows show phases from 1 to 3, as they 
were spread out from MPhil to the PhD.   
The case study as suggested by (Eisenhardt, 1989), is used in this research to study the 
practices, roles and workings of management in the prevention of IIDTRC. Neuman 
(1994) and Yin (1994) suggest that case study design enables the researcher to 
recognise the prior theory that would be vital to the research design. It enables the 
researcher to carry out the study in a methodically sound way.  Through the review of 
the literature, this research has identified and confirmed the statements of the research 
problems and research questions which were re-define through the pilot study to 
provide a background for the archival analysis.  
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4.2.2 The Relevance of Archival Analysis in this Research 
The emphasis of the importance of the archival analysis in social science research has 
spanned across the emerging research domains including but not limited to IS security 
management. In analysing history of the archival thought, Cook (1997) notes that the 
role of archival analysis in IS security management research has changed from being 
supplementary references to becoming a reliable research approach for research 
knowledge enthusiasts. Archival records have become a potential research value for 
micro-analyses of the creator’s key functions, activities, programmes and interactions 
with the business environments. Archival analysis can be used to get a holistic picture 
of an on-going phenomenon, and could be used to address research issues of change 
over time. Hadfield (2010) suggest that archival research provides multiple levels of 
evidence – individual, community, organisation and social, to any given research 
problem. It provides detailed, objective, and subjective description of events from 
multiple viewpoints. These attributes of archival analysis make it possible for 
researchers to provide more complete evidence than other forms of data collection.  
Archival analysis enables the researcher to make use of the archival data that have 
been processed by statistical expertise. It reduces the chances of flaws in the data 
analysis and increases the validity of the collated data (Gabriel, 1990). For instance, 
Durkheim’s (1966) study on ‘change on women’s status; he compared the 
institutionalisation and suicide rates’ by using the United Nations data collected from 
45 nations. As it used in this research, majority of the data collated for the analysis 
were garnered from the libraries and internet archives of British Retail Consortium 
(BRC), UK police records, financial service authority, security exchange commission 
and other business regulators.  Archival analysis availed the researcher opportunity to 
establish a timely and sequential historical records that answer research questions of 
the cases under study. It saves the researcher the resources. Archival analysis enables 
the research to gather reliable data on what participant might not be comfortable with 
in some critical line of inquiry (Holt, and Fawcett and Rabinowitz, 2012); as it is in 
this research that deals with the information security issues. 
 
4.2.3 The Relevance of Participant Observation in this Research 
As defined by Bradbury and Reasons (2001) participant observation is the whole 
family of approaches to the inquiry which includes action-oriented, grounded in 
experience and participative. Participant observation requires the researcher to be into 
research situation, bring about change while monitoring the ensuing research results.  
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Kemmis and McTaggart (2000) note that participant observation centres on a ‘spiral of 
reflective cycles’ of planning a change, acting and observing the process and 
consequences of change, reflecting on the emerging processes, and then re-planning. 
They describe participant observation research with seven features as; a social 
processes critical, emancipatory, practical and collaborative, participatory, aims to 
transform both theory and practice. Galliers and Land (1987) and Galliers (1990) agree 
that participant observation is a suitable qualitative research which can be used in the 
field of IS security for studying complex, multivariate, and real world phenomena. 
Bakerville and Pries-Heje (1999) agree with Galliers and Land that participant 
observation is vital for the study of information system development issues like 
security because of its orientation toward change. This issue of change forms the basis 
for the use of participant in this study a relevant tool of inquiry for a ‘technological 
shift’ as business operations in the online retail migrates into the digital realm. This 
relevance of participant observation in this study was suggested by Davenport and 
Short (1990) and Klein and Hirschheim (1989). They suggest that participant 
observation can be viewed as an enabling facilitator of change and result of a change, 
which is both the business organisation imperative an emergent perspective.  
Although there is relevance for the use of participant observation in the information 
systems security research, few researchers have used it as a research method. Several 
researchers (e.g. Mathiassen et al., 1991; Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010) argue that 
sparse literature on the use of participant observation in the information systems 
security research has been attributed to the reason that it is often eclipsed by traditional 
social science research methodologies like case studies and sampling.  Galliers (1990) 
and Orlikowski and Baroudi, (1991) agree with this argument and suggest that few of 
the top quality IS security research published is conducted with participant 
observation.  Bakersville and Pries-Heje (1999) studied the use of participant 
observation in the context of the IS security research; and asked why few researchers 
have adopted the approach? In answering this question, they attributed the reason to 
common assumption by researchers that theory evolution of research would occur as 
result of rigorous problem formulation, not of the research approach.  
Bakersville and Pries-Heje study agrees with Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggestions 
that participant observation can be adopted for rigorous theory formulation and that the 
use of theory formulation steps in participant observation improve research rigour 
which involves merging some of the techniques of grounded theory.  
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This research adheres to the suggestions of Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Bakersville 
and Pries-Heje (1999) and adopted participant observation to evaluate the application 
of the role-based framework as an extended theory of preventing IIDTRC. Since the 
key aspect of participant observation is the role it plays in the theory formulation, this 
research provides a framework as a theory that based its formulation on research 
results from participant observation cycles. Following the ensuing evaluation of the 
outcomes of each cycle, the researcher reinforced the theoretical framework, modify or 
withdraw to reflect the realities of the action-taking. Hence, participatory observation 
is chosen as a viable option for this research to achieve the research aim. 
 
4.2.4 The Relevance of Moderate and Active Participant Observation 
In the context of achieving this research aim and considering that a participant 
observation is a complex qualitative research approach with many components, 
moderate participation and active participant observation were chosen. This is in 
adherence to the suggestion of Spradley (1980) that the first thing a researcher must do 
after deciding to conduct participant observation is to decide what kind of observer to 
be. Moderate participant observation and active participant observation are among the 
other four components of participant observation:  Non-Participatory, Passive 
Participation, Moderate Participation, Active Participation and Complete Participation; 
suggested by Dewalt and Dewalt and Waylant (1998) and Spradley (1980).  They 
explained that moderate participant observation enables the researcher to maintain a 
balance between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ roles.  As this is envisaged in this researcher, 
assuming the role of moderate participant would allow the researcher to be involved as 
well to be detached in order to remain objective in monitoring the IIDTRC prevention 
practices of retail management.   
Similarly, assuming the role of an active participant will enable the researcher to be 
more involved in the population. Though Dewalt, Dewalt and Waylant (1998) suggest 
that there might be the risk of ‘going native’ as the observer strives for an in-depth 
understanding of the population studied, this approach would enable the researcher to 
fully embrace the skills and customs for the sake of complete comprehension of the 
research problem (Emerson and Fretz and Shaw, 2001).  And this strategy and 
approach are necessary for this current research which requires the understanding of 
the complex issues of IIDTRC and peculiar practices of management in the online 
retail business environment.  
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4.2.5 The Relevance of Triangulation in this Research 
As described by Stake (2000), triangulation is a process of using multiple perceptions 
to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation. 
Triangulation is employed in this research to improve the validity and reduce the 
likelihood of misinterpretation of empirical data (Nair and Riege, 1996). Kaplan and 
Duchon (1988) suggest that triangulation of qualitative data in IS research increases 
validity. In agreement with Kaplan and Duchon (1988), Carson and Gilmore (1996) 
argue that collecting different kinds of data by different methods from different sources 
provides a wider range of coverage that may result in a fuller picture of the systems 
units under study. This argument forms the basis for the relevance of triangulation in 
this study – to allow the use of multiple methods that would increase the robustness of 
results which can be strengthened through the cross-validation achieved when different 
kinds and sources of data converge and are found congruent.  
Denzin and Lincoln (2005) described topologies of triangulation which include data, 
between methods, investigator, methodological, multiple and within-methods. Kelle 
(2001) described triangulation into complementarity and trigonometrical; Deacon, 
Bryman and Fenton (1998) expressed it into planned and unplanned; whereas Morse 
(1991) categorised triangulation as simultaneous and sequential triangulation. This 
research employed these topologies of triangulations. For instance, the evaluation case 
study provides the between methods triangulation – semi-structured and participant 
observation; whereas analysis of this case studies involve simultaneous triangulation – 
the content analysis and coding.  
For the overall analysis, the research uses both theoretical and methodological 
triangulation. As suggested by Danziger and Kraemer (1991), the IS research project 
that involves fieldwork such as qualitative case study, as it is in this research has 
always provided complementary sources of sound evidence. With both approaches 
providing valid research findings, the case study is noted for its high discoverability 
attributes in research. 
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4.3 Summary of the Research Philosophy and Methodology 
This chapter has provided the concepts of the research activities – the philosophy of 
the research, the research methodology and research designs. These analyses were 
done to provide the overview of the case study protocols and how the research 
questions and objectives dictate the research approaches. 
In summary, this section has provided the background of how this research project is 
framed by a constructivist and interpretivist paradigms so that the selected research 
methodology had to be compatible with and reflect these philosophical views. While 
the interpretivist concept enabled the researcher to affirm the significance of the 
participants’ knowledge of internal identity theft-related crimes in the online retail, the 
constructivist concept enabled the researcher to make assumption about much complex 
behaviour of the subjects being studied. And that this knowledge ‘subjects’ possess has 
important consequences for how behaviour or actions are interpreted.  
This study required that all participants shared not only in the construction of 
developing knowledge but also had an understanding of each other’s objectives of 
participation and underlying reasons for participation so that these could be taken into 
account in the data analysis and interpretation. Hence, the interpretivist paradigm 
adopted in this study has provided the researcher with deeper shared understanding 
through its perspectives of embedded process of reporting and discussion at all stages 
of the research design, research finding and research story.  
 This chapter has laid the foundation for the data collation and the analyses that would 
be discussed in chapter 5 and chapter 6 respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page 124 of 328 
 
CHAPTER 5 
DATA COLLECTION 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed the chapter 4, the archival analysis, semi-structured interview and 
participatory observation were chosen for the data collection in the selected retail 
companies. Yin (1994) suggests that archival analysis, semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation are main sources of evidence in case study research design. 
These methods were designed as discussed in this chapter to provide answers to this 
research questions. This chapter provides details of selected case background, the case 
selections, the data collection protocols, the practicalities and dilemmas encountered. 
In addition, the practicalities of these methods provide a comprehensive view of the 
collected data that inform findings derived from this study that will be discussed in 
chapter 6. 
 
5.2 Background of Case Study: UK Online Retail  
The UK retail sector is chosen for two major reasons. First, the UK Online Retailing is 
a £9.4 billion industry, accounting for approximately 5 per cent of Gross Domestic 
Product, with more than 10 per cent of all employment (Gambin et al., 2012). UK 
Online Retailing comprises Beauty and Personal Care Internet Retailing, Consumer 
Electronics, Consumer Healthcare Internet Retailing, Media Products Internet 
Retailing, and Other Internet Retailing. According to Centre for Retail Research, 2008-
2012, the UK Online retailing combine with Germany and France accounted for 71 per 
cent of European online sales (Nicklin et al., 2013). Thus, the experience of UK’s 
retail sector can be taken as an important indicator of experiences of other Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.  
Second, long before the Internet, the UK Online Retailing has been one of the early 
adopters of electronic trading operations. The UK online retailing has a long tradition 
of Internet-based focus. The trend for the digitisation of the online retail operation and 
their business transaction using credit/debit cards necessitates sharing of the 
consumers’ sensitive personal identifiable data. However, Internet offers the UK 
retailers opportunities to match this trend but not without the problems of internal 
identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) to contend with.  
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In socio-economic terms, this industry shapes the livelihood of UK consumers and 
affects online consumers’ ability to respond to e-commerce challenges like identity 
theft.  The UK retail sector has been characterised as one of the sectors where most of 
the consumers are vulnerable to IIDTRC with less investment in the prevention 
(National Fraud Authority Report, 2013; Forrester and Seeburger, 2013) 
Therefore, the UK retail sector therefore provides a unique setting to understand nature 
of internal identity theft related crimes prevention in e-business.  
 
5.3 Case Selection and Design 
This study took open consultations with a number of retail companies since the choice 
of organisations is vital to case study design. In total, four retail companies 
(RetailGroup, Xtail, Ytail and Ztail for anonymity) were selected; RetailGroup was 
selected for a semi-structured interview while Xtail, Ytail and Ztail for the participant 
observation. The selection is based on three factors. First, gathering data from the case 
study with multiple firms allowed the research to use a “case-replication” methodology 
to test the applicability of the ﬁndings across cases (Yin 1984).  
Second, the companies’ business culture, size (medium to large) and ethics, and their 
experiences in the ﬁeld of e-commerce and e-tailing are recognised as the most 
common business strategies the retail industry across globe adopts.  Third, the retail 
companies were willing facilitators and participants in this research endeavour and 
have ensured the researcher that they will be open to provide the data required and also 
interested in the feedback from the research—a key practical consideration when 
embarking on ﬁeld-based research (Pettigrew, 1990).  
In addition, to the above factors, Denzin and Lincoln (2005) noted that it is vital to 
choose research cases on the basis of opportunities to gain accessibility and to learn. 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) also suggest the need for a rich mix of people, 
processes, interactions and structures of interest to be present in a choice of cases under 
study. The selected companies possessing the distinctive and well-structured business 
culture and practices provide the researcher great opportunity to gain access to these 
firms by getting in contacts with the top management (Wilson, 2010). The companies 
engage in series of 21
st
 century modern methods of retailing business operation. The 
companies are renowned retail corporations in the United Kingdom. Most of them 
were established in the 2000s and has acquired many corporate retail brands.  
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Therefore, based on the chosen retail companies meeting these three criteria, their 
branch offices situated in the north-west of UK were selected. The location of these 
offices suited the choice of researcher’s research strategy as regards to the base 
university
10
. This enables the researcher to get access to the research participants with 
ease on time and at reduced costs (Hakim, 2000). It enabled the researcher to have 
access to more data; as it is conventional research, the more data, the better. It also 
allowed the researcher time for conducting interview and analysis of collated data. 
 
5.3.1 Archival Analysis Case Design  
For the archival analysis, the retail companies selected comprise the business 
organisations which allow consumers to directly buy goods or services from a seller 
over the Internet using a web browser. These include retail corporations which use 
business-to-business (B2B) online shopping and processing of services. The cases 
analyses were extended to the banking sectors because of the direct link to the online 
retail companies operations with the online banking. The retail companies collaborate 
with banking sectors in processing of the consumers identities and authorisation of the 
payment for the complete online shopping operation. To answer the research question 
of the nature of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) in the online retail, an 
analysis was based on the UK archival resources from 2007 to 2013.  
The analysis includes IIDTRC empirical research reports from the website portals, 
digital libraries, newspapers, magazines and/or organisation’s archived newsletters, 
annual reports, special reports and other electronic resources. The archival resources 
were underpinned by the annotated business reports by British Retail Consortium and 
UK Financial Service Authority. It extends the past research works by analysing a 
different time period related IIDTRC media reports (shown in table 29 below). It 
critically analysed the contents of the reports, the reporters/authors perspectives, and 
contexts of the IIDTRC incidents.  In retrieving the data from these sources, a search 
was conducted for articles and reports that contain but are not limited to the following 
terms in abstract, keywords and title: identity theft, insider theft, data leakages, data 
breaches, identity theft: propagation, detection, prevention; and business information 
security, information systems security management, and software security.   
 
                                                     
10 University of Central Lancashire, Preston UK 
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Organisation Archive Materials 
CIFAS  Research Reports on Staff Fraud (2009-2011 editions); Staff 
Fraudscape: Depicting the UK's staff fraud landscape (2010); 
Fraudscape: Depicting the UK's fraud landscape (2009 to 2010); Digital 
Thieves: A special Report on Online Fraud (2010); The Internal 
Betrayal: a special report on beating the growing threat of Staff Fraud 
(2010). 
 British Retail 
Consortium 
(BRC) 
Articles on Staff Fraud (2008-2011); BRC Reports (2007-2011 
editions); BRC Online archives: Press Releases (2008-2011), Company 
News (2008-2011); Media Analysis (2008-2011); and Speeches (2008-
2011). 
Biz/ed 
(www.bized.ac
.uk) 
Research Reports: News & Media Releases Archive (2008-2011 
editions), Primary Business and Management information in UK focus: 
Management Structure, Code of Conducts & Ethics; and Interpretation 
of the Mission Statement 
Biz Info.Serv UK Business information, research statistics, surveys and reports. 
Public Media Local & National Newspapers in UK; ThisDay Newspaper, DailMail 
Newspaper, The Sun Newspaper, etc.; BBC Online, Sky News Online. 
National Staff 
Dismissal 
Register 
(NSDR) 
Database of employers to share details of dismissed staff but not 
convicted in the criminal courts for offences of dishonesty related to 
IIDTRC. It aims at the retail industry, in particular, created in March 
2009 by Action against Business Crime, a consortium formed by Home 
Office and British Retail Consortium. 
 ABCP 
Archive 
Association of Business Crime Partnerships (ABCP) is an independent 
not-for-profit organisation working with business (retailers) crime 
reduction partnerships (BCRPs), police, police and other agencies to 
help business reduce the impact of crime on them. 
UK Data Collection of UK digital data in social sciences and humanities. 
 NFA Archive This collates substantial documents and reports from National Fraud 
Authority in relation to Annual Fraud Indicator, UK Fraud Prevention 
Service – CIFAS and Commercial Victimisation Survey Report.  
The Police 
Central e-
Crime Unit 
(PCeU)  
The Unit was established in September 2008, works in conjunction with 
the Metropolitan Police Computer Crime Unit of Scotland Yard. This 
provides national investigation report of the most serious cybercrime 
incidents in the UK businesses. 
Table 29: Archive Materials 
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To establish the relevance of the articles returned by the search, each of the articles 
was reviewed in full. It was critically guided by the research objectives, and the key 
issues that are imperative for the prevention of IIDTRC in the online retail. The 
dataset-like criminal profile was created from an in-depth analysis of data contained 
the archives. The profile describes common types of internal identity theft related 
crimes cases with names of individuals who have caught engaging in IIDTRC. It 
covers their age, gender, job title, motivation, how caught and lessons learnt. The 
design of this analysis is detailed in chapter 6 to reflect a diversity of IIDTRC as they 
relate to online retail. 
 
5.3.2 Semi-Structured Interview Case Design 
For the semi-structured interview, RetailGroup (renamed for anonymity) was selected.  
It was selected for semi-structured interview because it operates as a multi-brand 
comprises of five retail companies. This multi-brand structure was selected to a 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the research problem: the nature of identity 
theft related crimes (IIDTRC) in RetailGroup, status quo of IIDTRC prevention 
framework used by RetailGroup, the extent of how attributes of the role-based 
framework fit in the RetailGroup, and the evaluation of how the RetailGroup security 
management interact.  
 
5.3.2.1 RetailGroup and Security Management Structure 
RetailGroup is a leading online retailer within the British Isles, thanks to the on-going 
restructuring and modernisation of the companies. Their traditional paper-based and 
phone-in orders system have been superseded by modern e-commerce and e-tailing 
technology. The companies’ experience in the ﬁeld of e-commerce and e-tailing 
development in the UK is indicated by the fact that they have successfully acquired 
many brand names, and amalgamated the brands into its shopping networks, 
warehouses and call centres. The companies’ controls assets valued in excess of billion 
worth of revenue annually. Collectively the companies have over 11 million employees 
that handle over five millions of customers’ data with over 20 million calls and over 55 
million items per day. This research was centred on the prevention practices of the 
RetailGroup’s data security and crime prevention management (figure 14 RetailGroup 
Security management structure).  
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The typical management structure is headed by group operation director who plays a 
leading role in the integration of the businesses and is responsible for all of the group 
operations, including warehousing, contact centres, security, shipping, web and 
catalogue production, transport/logistics and the group’s extensive infrastructure and 
sites.  The management role under the group operation director is group security 
director, on whom other four management roles (head of security support, head of 
security operations, training manager, and the information security) directly report to.  
The head of security support is responsible for the security intelligence unit, internal 
frauds/crimes and investigation reports, security of workers, vetting and physical 
security administration. The head of security operation is responsible for the security of 
the control room and the companies’ regional loss prevention. The information security 
team comprises other four management roles: technical security, data security 
compliance, technical security specialists, and the compliance. RetailGroup outsources 
to renowned IT security companies which include IBM and RSA to complement their 
IT security and support. 
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Figure 13: Retail Security Management Structure 
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5.3.2.2 Access to Data in RetailGroup 
At the outset of interview data collection, the researcher made a formal agreement with 
the RetailGroup by signing an Ethic Approval Form from the University of Central 
Lancashire. This was to ensure that the research was carried out in accordance with the 
University Code of Conduct. Since the ethics of the research is important and ‘a must 
do’ in this research, it provides informed consent to the research participants and also 
respected their right to privacy. The researcher made primary contact with the top 
management of the companies. Though, RetailGroup did not provide an easy access to 
some of their top security managers, the researcher had to use this researcher sponsor 
as the gatekeeper to access the key top manager.  
As a result of this issue of access to participants, the interview data collected did not 
provide cross-section knowledge of their roles in data security and IIDTRC prevention. 
There were differences in the level of understanding of the security and crime 
prevention roles between the management that are directly involved with the 
RetailGroup security roles. To address the issue of bias due to lack of cross-section of 
interviewees, the researcher undertook telephone interviews. This was used to 
complement some cases where the face-to-face interviews were proved logistically 
impracticable.  
In total twelve semi-structured interview sessions were conducted, with nine sessions 
conducted through face to face and three by telephone. The technique to have an option 
of either face-to-face or telephone semi-structured interview enabled the researcher to 
obtain the optimum cooperation of the participants (McCrossan, 1991). As a multi-
method of data collection, this technique availed the opportunities to monitor and to 
respond to visual cues of the interviewees, and build a relevant contextual analysis 
(Burton, 2000). The researcher ensured that interviewees were not given their own 
opinion that was not relevant to the lines of enquiry. This was used to reduce bias 
related to what Weick (1995) described as the two entities of interviewees’ behaviour 
in organisation – the interviewee as him/herself and the interviewee as a representative 
of the RetailGroup under study.  
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5.3.2.3 Data Collection in RetailGroup 
A semi-structured interview was used to clarify key IIDTRC prevention issues and 
evaluate the application of the proposed role-based framework in RetailGroup. It has 
allowed the researcher to access to participants’ view and interpretations of actions and 
events (Walsham, 1995). Although the flexibility and open-ended nature of 
unstructured interview would have been helpful, it was not adopted it was not used in 
this research. This is because of its weak generalisability. Instead, the semi-structured 
availed the researcher the best access to participants’ views and interpretation of 
actions and events. As it applied to this research, Easterby-Smith, Torpe and Jackson 
(2012) suggests that semi-structured interviews are appropriate where the interviewee 
context is unclear, the step-by-step logic of situations is not clear, or the subject matter 
is confidential or sensitive as it in this research. 
 
5.3.2.4 Interview Participants in RetailGroup 
Since interview is suitable where a researcher is able to observe behaviour or feelings 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011), the researcher utilised this approach as a form of 
conversation with 12 selected participants to generate research data (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011).  The roles of the 12 participants from the RetailGroup are as shown in 
table 30 below. The 12 participant were interviewed from September 2011 to April 
2012. All the participants have worked for RetailGroup for least 5 years. They were 
aware of the importance of the data security and need for IIDTRC prevention and have 
been involved in number of IIDTRC prevention initiatives in the RetailGroup.  
In several cases, multiple interviews were conducted to reduce the bias and to increase 
the consistency and validity of the data (Yin, 1984). It enabled the researcher to ensure 
the uniformity and consistency in the data that included opinions, facts, and 
unexpected insights. Each interview lasted from a minimum of 45 minutes to a 
maximum of 1hour 30 minutes depending on the participant. 
The interviews were conducted in the respective participant business premises. This 
enabled the researcher to get information about data environment, business operations, 
the security tools and resources. While conducting interviews, the researcher followed 
a technique of “theoretical sampling” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). If the researcher 
identiﬁed a set of factors and parameters that led to a certain outcome, the researcher 
would then direct his enquiries to determine the change in the outcome, given a change 
in the set of parameters.  
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This enabled the researcher to ascertain a better understanding of the causes of the 
crimes incidents. For instance, the researcher often investigated whether the observed 
cause of a certain type of employees’ crime incident was due to lack of clear role given 
to the internal data security management team or not adhering to the security policy. In 
this manner, he could investigate whether an observed outcome had occurred 
irrespective of the security tools in place, or it was due to the unique software security 
loopholes that exist on the platform of which crime prevention team operates.  
Professional Role Management Position Mode of Interview 
IT Security Head of security support 
 
 
Face to Face 
Crimes Prevention Head of crimes investigation Face to Face 
Data Compliance Group Data Compliance 
manager 
Face to Face 
Crimes prevention Head of Crimes prevention Face to Face 
Operations Head of Security Operations Face to Face 
IT Security Technical security specialists Telephone 
Human Resources Training Manager Face to Face 
IT Security  Software Engineer Face to Face 
IT Security Compliance team manager Telephone 
IT security Technical Security Specialist Face to Face 
Crimes prevention Regional Loss Prevention 
manager 
Telephone 
Human Resources Head of Human Resources Face to Face 
Table 30: Interview Participant’s Management Positions 
5.3.2.5 Interview Protocol in RetailGroup 
A set of protocols was employed to enable the researcher to design a set of guiding 
questions for the semi-structured interview. The guiding questions helped the research 
to provide answers questions based on Role-Based Framework attributes. The 
interview questions were focused on the development of the coherent cases of the 
crimes within the companies, placing their experiences of IIDTRC in context, 
encouraging integration of their organisations’ IIDTRC incidents and recovery 
experiences, and risk management and IIDTRC preventive control measures in place to 
curb the crimes. The questions were used to explore the roles of the various 
management (as listed in table 20 above), the companies IT security structures, IT 
management processes, and their capabilities as regards to internal data security and 
IIDTRC prevention. Table 31 below detailed questions used for the interview sessions. 
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Question Tags Research Questions Research Objectives 
Q1 
Introductory 
Question 
What are the nature (causes and 
methods of propagation) of 
IIDTRC in your organisation? 
(Newman, 1984; Reith, 1956). 
To provide an account of 
the nature of IIDTRC, 
noting the socio-economic 
impact, the causes, and the 
methods of propagation of 
these crimes in a distinctive 
context from those in UK 
online retail. 
Q2 
 
 
Q3 
  I 
 
  
II 
 
What are the IIDTRC prevention 
measure/strategies in your 
organisation? (Prosch, 2009; 
Boyle, et a.l, 2007; Collins, 2003) 
What are your roles/ 
responsibilities as part of the 
management team in preventing 
IIDTRC? (Lawrence, Suddaby and 
Leca, 2009; Savirimuthu and 
Savirimuthu, 2007; Cabri et al., 
2006). 
To identify and develop a 
systematic IIDTRC 
prevention framework 
capable of synthesizing a 
clear set of role-based 
recommendations among 
the relevant management. 
Q4 
 
 
 
Q5 
 
 
Q6 
III 
 
  
 
IV 
 
  
V 
 
 
Do you collaborate with other 
management roles in implementing 
IIDTRC strategies? (Shah and 
Okeke, 2011; Salinger et al., 2008; 
Kardell, 2007).  
What are the management (s) 
issues you encounter in preventing 
IIDTRC as an individual or as a 
team? (Hinds, 2007). 
What factors affect collaborative 
roles in the IIDTRC prevention; 
what evaluation approaches used? 
(Jendly et al., 2010). 
To evaluate the 
applicability of the 
framework by examining 
the working of retail 
management from the 
perspectives of 
organisational role sharing 
backgrounds. 
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Question Tags Research Questions 
I            II 
 
I           III 
 
II           III 
 
II           IV 
 
 
 
III          V 
 
IV          V 
 
What is your most effective IIDTRC prevention strategy, and 
why? (Lacey and Cuganesan, 2005) 
How do your management roles help or hinder effective 
IIDTRC prevention in practice? (Collins, 2006)  
How does management understand and share IIDTRC 
prevention roles and what skills and expertise do they need 
for IIDTRC prevention? (Hurst, 2010)  
Are there any strategic IIDTRC prevention processes in place 
to support your management roles? (E.g. Can you describe 
how you interact with other security units in a typical 
IIDTRC incident; detection, investigation to the prosecution 
of the case (Homel, 2010; Anderson and Tresidder, 2008). 
What practices and techniques are used to 
evaluate/implement management roles in relation to IIDTRC 
prevention and internal data security (Homel et al., 2007)? 
What are the challenges of IIDTRC prevention as an 
individual or team in practice? (Boyle et al., 2007). 
Table 31: Interview Questions 
In table 31, the Roman numerals (I to V) are used to depict the related Role-base 
Framework attributes discussed in chapter 3. The questions at the outset of the 
interview covered variety of the company’s issues involving the nature of IIDTRC 
prevention extending to causes of IIDTRC, the roles and responsibilities of a crime 
prevention management, the possible challenges of crime prevention management, and 
possible areas of improvement for effective data security. By considering the boxes 
and linkages of the framework and how they are supported in the literature review and 
archival analysis, subsequent questions were derived. While flexibility was allowed by 
the researcher in the course of the interview sessions, these research questions were 
used as the topic guide for the enquiry. The similar approach of the interview sessions 
was adopted for the participant observation research discussed below. Though, in those 
cases the convergent interview was used. 
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5.3.3 Participant Observation Cases Design 
 For the participant observation, three retail companies Xtail, Ytail and Ztail (for 
anonymity) were selected to complement the data collected from the RetailGroup. The 
selected cases were designed to examine application of the role-based framework and 
to confirm the hypothesis from the literature review which underpins the theoretical 
framework discussed in chapter 3 that:  
 Collaboration of the management has impact on the management roles (IS/T 
and crime prevention) in prevention of IIDTRC; and  
 The collaboration of management roles has an impact on the implementation 
of tools required for the prevention of IIDTRC.  
Thus, it provided the answers to the research questions 2a and 2b in the chapter 1 of 
this study respectively:  
 To what extent do the attributes of the framework influence the internal 
identity theft related crimes prevention practices?  
 To what extent do the IS management influence the effectiveness of identity 
theft related crimes prevention framework implementation? 
In particular, moderate and active approaches to the participant observation were used 
to study the roles of Information Systems Audit (ISA) management on prevention of 
internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC). Data collection was carried out through 
an active participant observation in Xtail and Ytail; and moderate participant 
observation with Ztail. In all the cases, the data collected from the observation was 
triangulated with a daily reflective journal, field notes and convergent interview data. 
The choice of moderate and active participant observation in this study was to maintain 
the flexibility of this study and to provide a comprehensive investigation of the cases. 
Unlike the active participant observation, which has the advantage of allowing the 
research to make considerable time for planning and simultaneous delivery of case 
study, the moderate participant observation allowed the researcher carry out 
comprehensive case study with limited amount of preparation and time (Emerson, 
Fretz, and Shaw, 2001).  The application of the latter was valuable because this study 
was conducted within a short period of time. In addition, considering the structure of 
Ph.D. programme that allows a minimum amount of time for data collection. Moderate 
participant observation also allowed the research to collect rich and directly observed 
data for relatively low costs and minimum time.  
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Collectively, the used of active and moderate approaches of participant observation 
enabled the research to explore the practicalities of fieldwork in both familiar and 
unfamiliar business settings of Xtail, Ytail and Ztail in their operational environments.  
Xtail: Xtail is one of the largest retail companies in the UK and operates in many 
countries across Asia, Europe, and US. It has been established for more than a century 
evolving with the trend in retailing operations. It accrues approximate annual revenue 
of multi-billion pounds. Xtail has many fasciae with numerous stores spread across 
UK. It employs more than quarter a million staff that handles millions of club card 
customers’ data with over hundreds of thousands of online orders per week. Its major 
products are grocery, clothing, and home wares. It also handles financial services such 
as credit and extended warranty services. 
Ytail: Similarly, Ytail is one of the top 50 UK retail companies with a multi-billion 
pounds worth of annual revenue. It has been in operation for many decades with many 
fasciae and many stores across UK. Its employees, circa thousands, handle millions of 
customers’ data per week either online or over the phone. Ytail’s major business is 
financial services and household item sales.  
Ztail: The third company, Ztail shares a similar business operation culture with Xtail 
and Ytail. Though with lesser annual revenue, it handles thousands of the customers’ 
data.  
Since these companies have extended their wider retail business operation from 
financial services to the sourcing business operation. Their business operations include 
mail order trading via several catalogues and websites. Their financial services are 
made up of other divisions such as fraud prevention, operational risk, insurance, and 
underwriting.  
These divisions are made to offer millions of customers a variety of products including 
credit, extended warranty, insurance products and tailored ways to pay including buy 
now pay later. Their IT security, financial services team and the crimes prevention, in 
particular,do not only ensure that all the companies’ retailing operation are fully 
compliant and regulated by the UK Financial Services Authority; they are committed 
to protecting the company assets and customers data. 
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5.3.3.1 Locating Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
The audited companies - Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail were located in the cities with the high 
density of online retail companies in the Northwest of United Kingdom. The choice of 
these companies was motivated by the rationale discussed in the section 5.3 above. 
Xtail and Ytail were contacted when the researcher was working as a member of 
Information Security Research Group (ISRG) at the University of Central Lancashire.  
Then, the ISRG was working on research project identity theft prevention with number 
of retail companies across Northwest of UK. Working as a part-time research assistant 
with ISRG over a few months of weekly visits, the researcher established rapport and 
trust between the research facilitators and sponsors. With the support of research 
sponsors, snowball sampling technique (suggested by Mars, 1982) was applied to 
locate and contact Xtail, Ytail and Ztail. Thus, through the research sponsors, Ytail and 
Ztail were recruited. After a number of contacts to explain the scope of this research to 
Xtail, Ytail and Ztail, it transpired that they were interested in this research topic. In 
that, they accepted an ‘outsider’ into their companies to review the conduct of role 
their information system audit (ISA) management.  This discovery about their interest 
in the scope of this research demanded that a more cross-sectional recruitment 
approach to be adopted than case-controlled approach.  
Instead of selecting only ISA professionals as originally envisaged, the available and 
convenient individuals were selected from the mainstream management population. 
This strategy allowed the study to be conducted in its natural setting without the 
intervention of the research requesting individuals with specific characteristics. The 
research anticipated that adopting a case-controlled approach of requesting for the 
research participants with specific characteristics might introduce bias and affect the 
reliability of this research.  For the Ztail moderate participative observation, the main 
concern was to obtain a representative of various roles and settings in which the 
management worked. In this case, the sample selection was less problematic because 
the researcher relied on ‘colleagues’ from sponsoring companies who helped to select 
individuals that cooperated with the researcher. Consequently, the researchers 
inevitably encountered various situations in Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail, including attending 
meetings, business departments’ visits, and telephone requests. The researcher was 
either a participant-as-observer for the case of Xtail and Ytail, and/or an observer-as-
participant for the cases of Ztail. Thus, the researcher placed more central role on 
participation than on observation for Xtail and Ytail, and as observer-as-participant, 
more emphasis was placed on observation than on participation (Gold, 1969).  
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5.3.3.2 Challenges of Access, Ethics and Withdrawal in Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
This section reflects on the ethical issues in relation to access and withdrawal 
challenges of participant observation fieldwork the researcher experienced in Xtail, 
Ytail and Ztail. By assuming a participant observer role, the researcher was able to 
observe the professional roles and practices of the security management in the Xtail, 
Ytail and Ztail. However, the researcher has to put up with ethical issues in relation to 
the challenges of access and withdrawal in this research concealment. In doing so, the 
researcher was able to fulfil the ethical obligation by adjusting to overt and covert role 
as the research situations and circumstances required. Abiding by the ethical rules 
motivated participants to express their information systems audit roles regarding the 
prevention of internal identity theft-related crimes in the Xtail, Ytail and Ztail. In 
addition, by adjusting the level of researcher’s involvement, participating in ISA of 
Xtail and Ytail as an insider and observing in Ztail as an outsider, the researcher was 
able to adapt and respond to ethical dilemmas in Xtail, Ytail and Ztail.  
The researcher conducted the fieldwork in Xtail, Ytail and Ztail bearing in mind that 
ethics of participant observation should be cautiously addressed to the sensitivity of 
this research topic – prevention of internal identity theft related crimes, the 
vulnerability of the participants – IT security and crime prevention management, and 
the dynamism of membership role of the researcher in the fieldwork. Undertaking this 
research as a participant observer, the researcher was careful at the outset of the 
fieldwork and was prepared to use the strategy of trust and professional orientation to 
adapt to the potential issues of getting access to and withdrawal from Xtail, Ytail and 
Ztail.  
Trust aspect of access and withdrawal to Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
Participant observation cases – Xtail, Ytail and Ztail, as they are in this research 
required the fundamental need for trust between the researcher as an observer and case 
companies. Rousseau et al., (1998) defined research trust as a, 'psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behaviour of another' (Twyman, Harvey and Harries (2008, p.112). 
Sonnenwald (2003) conceptualised the need for and building of trust in organisational 
research by examining cognitive and affective trust. Sonnenwald (2003, p.3) defines 
cognitive trust as a ‘judgements about a person’s ability to execute a certain task 
effectively’ while affective trust is an ‘interpersonal bonds among individuals and 
institutions’.  
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Both concepts of trust have relevance in the context of this research. Access to the 
research subjects – Xtail, Ytail and Ztail was somewhat easy because of the trust 
between the researcher and the participants. It was eased by the fact that the researcher 
and this research gatekeeper not only worked for the same company (research 
sponsor), they shared common concerns and interests in collecting of research 
information.  
From the outset of the active participant observation study in the Xtail and Ytail, the 
researcher had to develop affective and cognitive trust with the gatekeeper to ease 
access to the Xtail and Ytail. Unlike the moderate participant observation study in the 
Ztail, where there were few common concerns and interests in access and provision of 
information. This observation reflects suggestion of Pettigrew (1999a, b) that research 
subjects of moderate participant observation do not view access to information 
provision in the same discrete way as subjects of active participant observation (Xtail 
and Ytail) and business professional might.  
Adhering to Pettigrew’s (1999a, b) suggestion, trust was developed to nurture how to 
access the information from the Xtail, Ytail and Ztail. Emphasis was given on the 
process of building trust and relationship with the Xtail, Ytail and Ztail as well as on 
collection of information from them, reflecting what O’Neill (2002, p.76) has 
suggested that researchers should:  ‘place trust...because we can trace specific bits of 
information and specific undertakings to particular sources on whose veracity and 
reliability we can run some checks. Well-placed trust grows out of active inquiry 
rather than blind acceptance…’ 
Interestingly, the challenge of getting access to the moderate participant observation in 
the Ztail accorded with the process of active inquiry suggest by O’Neill (2002), in 
which the Ztail granted access to the researcher with a few moderate enquiries and 
restrained hesitations. In addition, this experience is in accordance with suggestion by 
Keirns et al., (2013) that ability for a researcher to use trust to gain access to hesitant 
research subjects is a vital strength of participant observation. In this current research, 
participant observation had allowed the researcher to gain access, however the 
challenge, to investigate the behaviour that would have been normally restricted from 
both researchers and the outsiders in the Xtail, Ytail and Ztail.   
Hence, the researcher maintained the trust by working with the gatekeeper (research 
sponsor) in a way that the trust was not damaged by access and withdrawal of the 
researcher from the case companies. 
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Professional aspects of access and withdrawal to Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
In the Xtail and Ytail settings, a professional relation between the researcher and the 
selected Information Security Audit (ISA) management made access somewhat easier. 
The professional relationship was built on the fact that the researcher has an in-depth 
knowledge of information security auditing. This knowledge was gathered through the 
researcher’s experience while working as a research assistant in the field of identity 
theft prevention (areas of IT security) at the base university. Researchers (e.g. Wax, 
1979; Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002; Ladson-Billings, 2003) suggest that professional 
orientation is one of the personal characteristics among others – age, gender and race, 
that affects the researcher-participant relationship in field researcher.  
Age, gender and race did not matter in this research, but professional orientation did. 
As an experienced IT security professional, the researcher was able to acculturate with 
security terms of the security audit, which to some extent ease access to ISA 
management in both Xtail and Ytail. Consequently, the researcher was not perceived as 
a potential security threat to Xtail and Ytail.  Arantzamendi et al., (2012) suggest that 
professional relationship between the researcher/observer and participants establishes a 
good level of communication that would improve the confidence between both parties. 
This suggestion of relationship between observer and participants reflects what Tojar 
(2006) called reactivity – the impact of the presence of the researcher on participants’ 
behaviour, and that professional relationship between observer and research lessens 
reactivity. Taylor and Bogdan (2000) agree and suggest that establishing a good 
professional relationship with research subjects in the course of ethnographic research, 
as it is in this case, lessen reactivity.  
This professional relationship advantage lent support to the researcher’s position to 
understand security audit roles and practices of the management in Xtail and Ytail 
regarding IIDTRC prevention. Thus, enables the researcher to observe participant in 
their natural setting which also fosters a climate of trust. In the Ztail setting, access to 
ISA management (for moderate participant observation) was more difficult as was the 
withdrawal. Unlike the active observation in Xtail and Ytail, there was complication of 
access to the Ztail setting in the initial phase of the fieldwork but access restriction was 
lessened through the use of Ethical Letter from the base university and Letter of 
Introduction from this research sponsor. The combination of the trust and professional 
relationship, however, did not grant easier access to Xtail, Ytail and Ztail as did by the 
use of Ethical Letter and Letter of Introduction. 
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Ethical Letter aspect of access and withdrawal to Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
In addition to the assistance the researcher gained from the retail company that 
sponsored this research, two strategies were drawn upon to gain access to Xtail, Ytail 
and Ztail. First, an Ethical Letter, as evidence of support from the base university was 
presented to Xtail, Ytail and Ztail. Li (2008) advised that ethnographic researchers 
should prepare themselves to conduct an ethical study. And that ethical preparation 
enables researchers to eliminate and avoid ethical dilemmas regarding the sensitivity of 
the research that might restrict their access to the research subjects. In line with the Li 
(2008) suggestion, other researchers (Punch, 2000; Murphy and Dingwall, 2002; 
Lather, 2004) advocate that it important for participant observer to draw a clear line 
between the ethics and the politics of their ethnographic fieldwork. They noted that 
researchers should emphasise and supply both ethical evidence and their research 
ground in order to contest against social prejudice in relation to research access.  
From this standpoint, the researcher felt that in order to conduct an ethical study that 
guarantees unrestricted access, the Ethical Letter from the base university was given to 
Xtail, Ytail and Ztail. The presentation of the Ethical Letter prepared the researcher 
both psychologically and technically for the unexpected regarding the access the Xtail, 
Ytail and Ztail (Li, 2008).   
Secondly, the data compliance manager of the company that sponsored this research 
sent a Letter of Introduction (introducing the researcher and research aim and 
objectives) to the management of Xtail, Ytail and Ztail. Gold (1959) suggests that prior 
introduction of the researcher to the research subjects by the research sponsor makes 
the researcher/observer to gain access to situation in which researcher can collect 
information or learn about the organisation, requisite daily roles successfully. Such 
introduction, as utilised in this context, helped the researcher to gain access without 
being seen as an outsider in the Xtail, Ytail and Ztail. The researcher was permitted to 
share not only in work activities with the ISA management but also in the intimate the 
culture of the companies regarding the use of security auditing in preventing internal 
identity theft related crimes. However, Xtail and Ytail expressed concern about the 
confidentiality of the data to be collected from their companies, even with continuous 
confidentiality and anonymity assurance.  
Consequentially, perhaps because of this concern, a copy of previous IIDTRC case 
report of Xtail and Ytail that was requested by the researcher was not given after 
several attempts were made.  
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This restricted access to their IIDTRC case report reflects Li’s (2007) suggestion that 
research participants might have some reservation regarding releasing some sensitive 
information due to some objections from their cultural or organisational background.  
This issue of restricted access to the Xtail and Ytail was a concern to the Research 
Ethics Committee of the base university and research sponsor. And they had to review 
the application of this research and clarified the detail assurance on the issue of this 
research confidentiality and anonymity. The Research Ethics Committee laid more 
emphasis on the protection of the companies’ sensitive in information in relation to 
data privacy and security. Paradoxically, although access was difficult in the Xtail and 
Ytail even with the Ethical letter and the support of this research sponsor, withdrawal 
proved to be even more difficult in both, although the sponsor’s affiliation with the 
base university guaranteed the Xtail and Ytail data protection and privacy after the 
conclusion of this research.  
For the moderate participant observation in Ztail, there were fewer requirements at the 
outset of the study. Apparently, there was a less critical review of  the research 
protocol for the Ethical Approval as the researcher was not directly involved. The 
researcher was accepted not just as an outsider but as an employee from this researcher 
sponsor. The strategy of access to Ztail was suggested by de Laine (2000) that a 
possible mode of entry in sensitive organisational research (IT security in this case) is 
to move from the position of an outsider to that of an insider. This suggestion was 
applied by the researcher and having worked with the research sponsors and then has 
legitimate access. Having anticipated that acquiring ethical approval and that finding 
companies to study and that gaining their acceptance would take time.  
In addition, the researcher has anticipated that the problem of ‘sustained access to 
research subjects’ is a widely recounted issues in typical ethnographic studies (e.g. 
Wilson and Streatifield, 1997; Eager and Oppenheim, 1996; de Laine, 2000; 
Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). For instance, Wilson and Streatfield (1977) noted 
that participants feel less obtrusive in the presence of observer during interview 
meetings than in the case of participant observation, reflecting that interview avails 
sustained access than participant observation. In agreement with the Wilson and 
Streatfield (1977), Eager and Oppenheim (1996) suggest that research participants 
when working at their desks found the presence of the researcher rather unsettling, 
though the participants had established access permission with the researcher at the 
research outset.  
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Gatekeeper aspect of access and withdrawal to Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
At the outset of this study, the research sponsor was the gatekeeper for access to both 
Xtail and Xtail and Ztail. The sponsor as the gatekeeper was made aware of the 
underlying intention of the researcher - the research aim and objectives. At all times, 
the intention has to be reminded to the gatekeeper, ISA team and external auditors that 
this study is primary to the researcher's function as an information security auditor. 
Onwuegbuzie et al., (2009) advise that providing the research participants with clear 
information on the research problem, its aim and objectives and research questions is 
very important in participant observation. In addition, Van Maanen (1988) points that 
clear explanation of the importance of the research motivates the participants to be 
open, explicit in expressing their behaviours and interact freely with observer without 
holding back on their experiences.  
While the role of information system auditor assumed by the researcher granted the 
initial entry to the Xtail, Ytail and Ztail, it did not guarantee continued/sustained access 
or acceptance by the management of Xtail and Ytail or the respective audit team. 
Equally it didn't assure the complete and continued membership of the researcher with 
the management in each situation.  For instance, the head of IT security who was one 
of the three members of the audit team in Xtail rejected the request of the researcher to 
participate in the company’s webserver auditing. As it would have been in any IT 
security setting, the researcher has anticipated such rejection perhaps because of the 
sensitivity of security in relation to data privacy of the company. 
As the overt approach did not work in the auditing of Xtail’s web server, the level of 
the researcher’s involvement was adjusted from active to moderate (Spradley, 1980). 
The research still took part in observing the web server auditing, but intentionally 
limited personal involvement and expertise in the audit procedure. Instead of actively 
involving personal interactions or substantial conversations with auditors, the 
researcher mainly jotted notes about the auditing activities. In other words, the 
researcher primarily assumed a covert observer in the web server auditing, a peripheral 
professional role and a detached insider. Alder and Alder (1987; 2000) suggest that 
peripheral membership role enables the observer to be reflexive and be prepared for 
any exigency.  This adjustment not only helped the researcher to avoid ethical 
dilemmas experienced at the outset of seeking for access, but also equipped the 
researcher with much-needed psychological strength to participate in conducting ISA 
in the Xtail and Ytail as an insider and observed as an outsider.  
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Membership role aspect of access and withdrawal to Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
The researcher’s role as company’s staff, as a security auditor in the cases of Xtail and 
Ytail made permission for the study easier to grant. As the researcher was not only 
bound by the Research Ethics agreement but also with Xtail and Ytail companies’ staff 
code of conduct and confidentiality. For the moderate participative observation in 
Ztail, the management granted permission on the understanding that they would be 
observed to obtain a better understanding of their collaborative management roles in 
the prevention of IIDTRC. Researchers (e.g Spradley, 1980; Bernard, 2006) suggest 
that participant observers who acculturated themselves with the roles of the 
participants have better chances to conduct and produce valid research outcomes.  
However, the ISA management of Ztail were not shown the observation sheets used for 
field notes, for each identified IT security issues, the level of the seriousness of the 
security issue, in case these developments biased their normal roles and behaviour. 
Although, the results of the ISA and sources of the results were not reported to them; 
how and what would be done with analysis of the collected audit results were revealed 
to them. In addition, how their roles and behaviour impact the results were not 
discussed with them.  
However, there was a dilemma in conducting the participant observation; the trust that 
was built throughout the studies enabled the researcher to gather data that answered the 
research questions – 2a and 2b, stated above. The finding that the selected cases – 
Xtail, Ytail and Ztail, themselves viewed the sharing of their companies’ information as 
vital as granting access to the cases, establishing and maintaining relationship with the 
researcher is no doubt made the research more challenging to undertake. 
Notwithstanding, adhering and familiarising with suggestions by the ethnographic 
literature explored above, the researcher found it challenging to convince and lessen 
the participants concerns and interests about dilemmas in sharing their companies 
sensitive security information.  
5.3.3.3 Modelling Participant Observation in Xtail, Ytail and Ztail  
The researcher applied the Snyder model of action research (suggested by Dick, 2002) 
to extend how the role-based framework (RBF) attributes are applied as it related to 
roles of Information Security Audit (ISA) in real business context of Xtail, Ytail and 
Ztail. This model was applied to collect data for analysis of the collaborated ISA 
approach and independent (internal or external) security audit practices.  
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In addition, the research evaluated the impact of the approaches on audit performance 
and processes to identify their implications for good practice in the prevention of 
IIDTRC. This research strategy enabled the researcher to achieve the aim of examining 
the robustness of RBF and how they work in practices.  
In particular, the researcher adopted evaluation participatory action research and 
adapted the Snyder Process as recommended by Dick (2002); and elaborated on the 
importance of the Snyder Evaluation Model in evaluation participatory action research. 
The Snyder model comprises of the three evaluation sequences: process, outcome and 
short-cycle. The use of these sequences which have been applied by other researchers 
(Dick, 2001; Irani, 2002) enabled the researcher to address research issues that would 
contribute to change in organisational practices (Dick, 2001). For instance Irani, (2002) 
applied the Snyder Model to understand how activities and resources accomplish 
immediate effects, ideals and targets, in order to achieve the research aim. The 
outcome evaluation and short-cycle evaluation enable researchers to develop 
performance indicators and set up feedback mechanisms respectively. These 
suggestions by Snyder Model are utilised in this research to monitor the effects of the 
research activities and effectiveness of the ISA practices. 
The Snyder Model which is based on systems concepts and number of processes – 
inputs (resources), transformations (activities) and the outputs levels – immediate 
effects, targets and ideal, enabled the researcher to address the research problems in 
sequences. It also enabled the researcher to analyse, as discussed next in detail, how IS 
security audit tools, resources and activities accomplish the immediate effect, targets 
and ideals.  
In addition, the researcher used the outcome evaluation to develop practices and 
processes and to estimate the attributes of RBF with respect to ISA approaches – 
joint/collaborated and independent. This process enabled the researcher to monitor the 
immediate effect of RBF attributes as it relates IS security audit initiatives in the 
companies under study. By setting up feedback mechanisms, this creates an immediate 
update ISA system that hastens the audit activities. The audit feedback analysis and 
interpretation made the audit process easier to manage and reduces the number of visits 
and research cost. This strategy which is similar to total quality management (TQM), 
that was suggested by Ward, Anand and Tatikonda (2010), builds on the integrative 
and interpretive philosophy of management for improving the quality processes as 
related to time and cost (Ahire, 1997). In addition, this design enabled the researcher to 
bridge the gap between the theories and real ISA practices (Jorgensen, 1989). 
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5.3.3.4 Participant Observation Protocol in Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
Based on the Snyder evaluation steps discussed above, the study of Xtail, Ytail and 
Ztail involved data collection procedures from two sources: observation and 
convergent interviews. The data collected from these sources was built with the 
requirements of ISO 19011:2011 assessment tools and guidelines, previous 
Information Security Audit (ISA) reports of Xtail, Ytail and Ztail. The researcher built 
the evaluation of the company’s ISA practices based on the recommendation and 
requirements of ISO 19011:2011. As an assessment tool, ISO 19011:2011 is applicable 
to all companies that need to conduct IS security auditing either jointly or 
independently (external and internal) and manage an IS security audit programme. The 
researcher assumed that the auditors (and audit team) have the required competence 
needed to perform IS security audit with impartial, objective, systematic and in a well-
documented form.  
ISO 19011:2011 also required that IS security auditors have discipline-specific, sector-
specific knowledge and skills in order to carry out ISA, generate ISA findings and 
conclusions.  The definitions below summarises key audit terms adopted based on ISO 
19011:2011 guides and principles. 
IS security Audit (ISA): An evidence gathering process was used to evaluate how 
well IS security audit criteria were being met to prevent IIDTRC risk in selected 
companies (Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail) under review. IIDTRC risk is the chance that 
IIDTRC will occur or negative deviation from the objective of IIDTRC prevention. 
Three types of IS security audit are first party, second party and the third party. In this 
research practices of the first and second party were evaluated. The first party involves 
the use of internal auditors to confirm (self-declaration) the company’s IS security 
compliance, while the second party is done by customers (regulators or party that has 
formal interest in a company) on their behalf. The third party are performed by the 
independent organisations (certification bodies or registrars).  
Information Security Auditor: A person who carries out IS security audits and uses 
collective evidence for ISA evaluation to determine whether the audit criteria are met. 
ISA Auditee: An organisation or company (in this research the Xtail, Ytail, Ztail) that 
were audited. Other terms related to auditee are audit client – internal and external 
audit client, the former could either be the auditee or audit program manager, whereas 
the latter could be other parties (regulators, customers) that have a legal/contractual 
right to carry out an IS security audit. 
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ISA criteria: These are policies, procedures and requirements used as a yardstick for 
the audit evidence – how well the criteria are being implemented, applied and 
followed. Audit evidence (objective) can be records and factual statements that prove 
that something is true/false, expressed either qualitatively or quantitatively. Other 
terms related to audit criteria are: conformity (compliance) and nonconformity (non-
compliance); while the former indicates that criteria are met, and the latter indicates 
that the criteria are not met. 
ISA Plan: This describes or specifies how the auditor and audit team carry out ISA 
activities to achieve the audit objectives. It involves prioritising the audit programmes 
(set of arrangements such as setting objectives, assigning responsibilities, allocating 
resources and monitoring performance) to conform with available resources – cost, 
personnel, time, logistics, etc. 
ISA Scope:  A statement which specifies boundary and the focus of an audit 
programme. It involves defining organisation units, the locations, activities and 
processes to be covered. 
ISA Team: It is made up of two or more security auditors, audit trainees, observers (in 
some cases it involves technical experts – IT support, software engineer, inventory 
manager, etc.). In this study the researcher was part of the audit team as an observer – 
we did not perform audit functions that demand a high level of IS security audit 
competence. Technical experts support and provide expertise and information about 
the companies being audited.  
ISA Findings: This is the summary of whether the audit programme is either 
compliance (pass) or noncompliance (fail). It identifies the improvement opportunities, 
recommendations and practices that result from audit evidence.  
Audit Conclusions: This is done after the audit findings and audit objectives have 
been considered. It involves final decisions and recommendations. 
The researcher adopted the requirement of ISO 19011:2011 to ensure that the audit 
programme and evaluation processes were free from bias. In addition, to address the 
internal validity of the research findings, the ISO 19011:2011 was used to complement 
the convergent interviews. This strategy was used to check and resolve discrepancies in 
the collated data. Consequently, as suggested by Jick (1979), this approach ensures that 
data collection protocol converged with the recommendations and requirements of ISO 
19011:2011 principles. Table 32 summarises the steps of the data collection protocol.  
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Stages Procedures Activities of the Audit Programme Duration 
1 Introduction 
and  
preparation 
Scheduling ISA appointment with the key contact 
persons. Requests for the companies’ IS and ethics 
policies (The researcher gave the auditee 3 weeks of 
notice prior to visiting for the fieldwork). Going 
through their relevant information system policies and 
business ethics. Collection of necessary security 
clearance and requirements from the UK Data 
Protection Act (DPA). These activities provided the 
sound understanding of the companies under review 
and DPA clearance was used as an authority to have 
access to all IS resources. The researcher explored the 
ISA security analysis and risk management: checked 
the companies IS management to determine the size 
and prioritise the key areas for the review.  
Approx.
3 Weeks 
2 Policy and  
document 
review 
In most cases the researcher treated the companies IS 
policies and IS configurations as threats. The review 
the selected cases’ data protection policies to explore 
how the policies define the use of IS resources and 
who has access to them.  
1 week 
from the 
start of 
the 
auditing  
3 Convergent 
interview 
The researcher had questions and answers sessions 
with the selected audit team (as shown in table 23) and 
discussed the usage patterns of the IS security 
resources, the IS security policy awareness among the 
staff members and how they are communicated across 
the organisation. The researcher also attempted to 
ascertain vital information on what vital IS security 
tools, strategies, and the process used; and how 
management views the ISA.  
This approach was to avoid research bias as it relates 
to ISA implementation perceptions from management. 
In addition, the researcher asked an open-ended 
question related to key IS of the auditee for 
contingency and reporting incidents, software and 
hardware inventories, etc. 
 
Approx. 
20 to 30 
minutes 
during 
the 
auditing 
of the 
selected 
case. 
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Stages Procedures Activities of the Audit Programme Duration 
4 Observation  
and technical 
investigation 
This step involves: full code review of websites to locate 
possible developers’ errors (buffer over/underflows, poor 
coding, backdoors, etc.) which might lead to potential 
IIDTRC threat/risks; and the system logs to explore the 
usage patterns and potential vulnerabilities. The 12 major IS 
Security Priority Areas investigated are: Data Protection Act 
Documents, Data Disposal Policy, Business Continuity 
Policy, Data Field Protection, Physical Security, 
Personnel/Employee Monitoring Procedures, Websites and 
Network Security, Infrastructure (Laptops, Logical Access, 
and Servers) Security, PCI and Ofcom Compliance 
Documents.  
Approx. 
3 weeks 
with at 
least 3 
visits to 
the 
selected 
case 
5 Investigation 
and Data 
Review 
This stage involved the researcher going through the audit 
document to update the observation; and also made noted of 
critical issues to be written in detail in the audit report. The 
collated electronic version of the observation report was 
documented reference in research analysis.   
Approx. 
one  week 
from 
completion 
of Step 5 
6 Documentation  
and writing up 
After each visit, the audit reports would be documented by 
the researcher. The document was updated regularly up to 
the last audit appointment of the respective companies. The 
researcher evaluated observation with the last IS audit report 
of the auditee. All the documents collated were reviewed 
and summarised for the final audit report – detailed 
recommendations and a timeframe for the implementation. 
The summary of the report was done according to the 
priority of the security risk issues and graded using colour 
coding  for the level of associated risks – green (no risk), 
amber (low risk), red (high risk). 
Approx. 
one day 
7 Presentation 
and feedback 
report 
The presentation of the report involved the management 
staff. The expected time (depending on the level of risk) for 
the implementation of recommendations was specified. 
Approx. 
1 day  
 
8 Postreview 
and updates 
This stage involves reviewing the implementation. In some 
cases (if the implementation involves low-risk issues or 
documentation) it was done through conference calls. 
Approx. 
3 weeks 
  
Table 32: Information security audit procedural stages 
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The designed ISA procedures encompass the 8 key stages. Each of the steps, as shown 
in the table 32 above, provides the description of the actions taken by the researcher. 
The stages as shown in the table above were followed by the exchange of auditee 
contacts and audit schedules. Each of the procedures was applied to the three selected 
companies (Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail) except in some cases where the duration for 
completion of the audit activities depends on the quantity of documents and size of the 
company.  In case situations, these stages were not followed sequentially.  For 
instance, in some situation during observation the convergent interview was conducted 
before, during or after the Technical Investigation to clarify some issues prior to or 
after the investigation. The practicalities of the observation in these cases are discussed 
in the next section.  
 
5.3.3.5 Practicalities of the Participant Observation in Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
With the support of this research sponsor, a purposive sampling strategy was adopted 
to select Xtail and Ytail. An in-depth case study of Xtail and Ytail and observational 
approaches were adopted to enable the researcher to investigate the real life picture. In 
the term used by Kluckhohn (1940) he states that participant observation; 
'is the conscious and systematic sharing, in so far as circumstances permit, in the 
life activities, and on occasions in the interests and effects of a group of persons' 
(Rock 1979, p.187).   
This statement interestingly describes the situation of observation in both cases – Xtail 
and Ytail. It was through shared understanding built up over time by the researcher 
with Xtail and Ytail can practical knowledge be learned during personal encounter by 
researcher and management (Smith, 1988).  In this study, a regular contact time was 
maintained by the researcher to acquire the practical knowledge of the IIDTRC 
prevention practices and to identify the personal interaction between management and 
researcher. To avoid security and privacy issues or linguistic barriers that might have 
hindered communication in those situations, the researcher placed greater reliance on 
symbols including body languages, facial expressions, management gestures as well as 
their interaction in both Xtail and Ytail settings.   
In essence, the use of participant observation approach allowed the researcher to 
monitor these issues while studying the participants. 
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The cases of Xtail and Ytail involved working with selected management as shown in 
table 33 and active participant observation was used for both settings. The line between 
the covert and overt nature of the active participant observation in Xtail and Ytail was 
blurred due to the overwhelming nature of the audit protocols. It was difficult for the 
researcher to be introduced at every stage of the ISA without interrupting the auditing 
procedures. In the same vein, moderate participant observation was used in Ztail. In 
this setting, the nature of observation was overt. There was detail introduction for both 
the researcher and the subject before the ISA procedure.   
Cases Management Position Auditing 
Approach 
Approx. Auditing Duration 
Investigation 
 
 
Implementation 
Xtail Head of IT Support Joint party  
(internal  +  
external  + 
Researcher) 
3 days 4 days 
IS Security Auditor 
Ytail Operations Manager Second party 
(External 
Only + 
Researcher) 
 7 days 10 days 
Account General 
Manager 
Ztail Customer Acct Manager First party 
(Internal 
Only + 
Researcher) 
5 days 8 days 
Internal ISA 
Table 33: Management Positions of ISA Team and Approximate Audit Duration 
 
Table 33 shows the respective companies (Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail) with the participant’s 
management position and approximated auditing duration. Active participant 
observation involved categories of participants: Xtail and Ytail (audited companies), 
internal auditors and external auditors who have direct contact with the Xtail and Ytail. 
In these cases, the researcher assumed dual overt and covert roles. The researcher was 
one of the external auditors and at the same time an observer. With the researcher’s 
experience of IT security, the researcher participated in auditing of the both the Xtail 
and Ytail security tools (server, firewalls, and web application updates).  
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Due to the researcher’s involvement with the audit activities, the researcher was 
accepted as ‘one of’ the external auditors. And on those situations, the research 
facilitator overlooked to introduce the researcher to Xtail and Ytail. But in some 
situations where the researcher was introduced, the researcher was accepted as an 
observer and/or researcher.   
Although studies on ‘workings’ of Information Systems Audit (ISA) have been carried 
by researchers (Dittenhofer, Ramaoorti, Ziegefuss and Evans, 2010; Steinbart et al., 
2011; Wallace, Lin and Cefaratti, 2011) they were conducted through interviews (e.g. 
Steinbart et al., 2011) or quantitative survey (e.g. Wallace, Lin and Cefaratti, 2011). 
A few or no research in this area had adopted a dual role as an insider approach. By 
becoming ‘an IS auditor’ enabled the researcher to see reality of the everyday world of 
the Xtail and Ytail practices of preventing IIDTRC. It also allowed the researcher to 
interpret meanings and symbols underpinning the companies’ daily collaborative role 
and interactive responsibilities of the ISA management (Lee and Newby, 1989).  
 
5.3.3.6 Convergent Interview Protocol in Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail 
The researcher engaged the Information Systems Audit participants with convergent 
interviews via open-ended questions. The questions were developed as the interviews 
were ensuing. The open-ended questions were used for an in-depth examination of the 
ISA related organisational issues since this research is interested in the findings that 
might be used and contribute to theory building (Perry and Rao, 2003; Dick, 2001). 
Spradley (1980) suggests observation technique offers a more direct and objective 
view of the subject behaviour while interviews provide indirect means of validating the 
observed information. In total, there were 6 participants, two security auditors 
from each of the selected companies.  
In most cases, interviews were conducted in the auditee office. In some cases, 
the interviews were carried out during the auditing transient time (switching 
times from one activity to another) or after completion of the audit programme 
for the day.  The participants were interviewed on the key research questions 
summarised in table 34 below.  
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 Convergent Interview Questions Rationale 
1 What is your attitude as a part of your 
company’s management to Information 
Security Audit (ISA)? What changes 
(if any) have you witnessed over past 
years in your company?  
 
ISO 19011:2011 requires that Information 
Security Audit should be a priority of the 
management in business organisations; 
Steinbart et al., (2011) and Dean et al., 
(2012) suggest that the review of 
Information Systems and the relationship 
between Information Security Auditors 
and management should be done 
regularly. 
2 
 
Which information security audit 
frameworks(s) exist in your company 
or used in your company (if any)? 
What IS security auditing processes are 
important, and the critical success 
factors for control? What are the ISA 
measure/strategies in your company in 
relation to IIDTRC prevention? 
(Prosch, 2009; Boyle, et al., 2007; 
Collins, 2003). 
From the literature review in chapter 
Chapter 2 above, several researchers (e.g. 
Collins, 2003; Homel et al., 2007; Boyle, 
et al., 2007; Anderson and Tresidder, 
2008; Prosch, 2009; Homel, 2010) suggest 
the need for frameworks to guide policy; 
or the existence of an internal data 
protection/control framework; Lacey and 
Cuganesan (2005) suggest need for the 
management to understands most effective 
IIDTRC prevention strategy. 
3 Which information/data protection 
policies/regulations/standards (e.g. 
Data Protection Act, Ofcom, PCI) are 
most important to you?  
 
Data Protection Act and Ofcom require 
the need for businesses that holds 
consumers data to be compliance with 
regulations/standards of data protection; 
PCI requires that that businesses need to 
comply with standards and policies that 
promote effectiveness and efficiency of 
security audit services. 
4 What is the status quo of the ISA staff 
in your company?  How many IT 
staffers are dedicated to your security 
auditing and how often is it done per 
annum? What evaluation processes or 
approaches, if any, are used? (Jendly et 
al., 2010). 
Cilli (2003) suggests the need for 
businesses to answer questions related to 
fundamental IS security issue such as 
performance measurement (how well is 
the IS security auditing enhancing 
business requirement?) 
 
5 
How would you characterise the 
working relationship between the 
Information Security Audit staff and 
the IT security staff? What are your 
roles/responsibilities as part of ISA 
management in preventing IIDTRC?  
From the literature in chapter 2 several 
researchers (e.g. Cabri et al., 2006; 
Savirimuthu and Savirimuthu, 2007; 
Kardell, 2007; Salinger et al., 2008; 
Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2009; 
Hurst, 2010; Shah and Okeke, 2011) 
suggest the need for management to 
understand and share IIDTRC prevention 
roles, skills and expertise. 
Table 34: Convergent Interview Questions 
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After auditing visits which take several days; in some cases weeks depending on the 
auditing approach – either joint or independent, scheduled short-cycle feedbacks were 
conducted followed via e-mails and conference calls. This was done to enable the 
researcher to monitor the impact of the audit and implementation of the notable data 
security issues as they relate to the prevention of IIDTRC. The convergent interview 
with the IT security staff and auditors complemented the observation of the interaction 
and collaboration of the external auditors and the management of Xtail, Ytail and Ztail. 
An inductive, grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was applied in the analysis 
of the field notes and transcripts.  The categories and themes extracted from the data 
analysis were reviewed and manually analysed throughout the audit process based on 
the proposition of role-based framework. This approach allowed the emergence of 
categories and themes from the data for analysis of role-based framework that was 
discussed in chapter 3. The results of the analysis are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
5.4 Summary of Data Collection and Case Study Design 
This chapter has presented the description of the data collection methods. It has the 
practicalities of data collection protocols. It also described how the principle of data 
collection models and approaches was applied in the case studies. In summary, since 
the aim of this research is to provide a framework to prevent internal identity theft-
related crimes in the online retail companies; this chapter has presented; 
 the design of archival analysis for understanding the nature of IIDTRC, 
 the design of case studies via interview and participant observation for 
evaluation of the role-based framework, 
In addition, the designs and practicalities of these data collection methods provided a 
comprehensive view of the how this research data was collected to inform the result 
that is discussed in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6  
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
There are a number of approaches in the literature for analysing qualitative data, 
common suggested approaches are archival analysis, content analysis, experimental 
and testing programmes. These analytical approaches answer to what works, for whom, 
in what circumstances, and why (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). In dealing with the task of 
an appropriate analysis for this research, archival analysis and content analysis 
approaches have been selected. They were considered to satisfy the needs of this 
research based on the background reading of the role-based framework (RBF) 
evaluation methods discussed in Section 3.4. 
 Based on the qualitative research methodology that has been discussed in the Chapter 
2, archival analysis and content analysis were suggested as the appropriate for archival 
data and interview data respectively. These approaches appeared as the most 
appropriate for evaluating the theoretical framework and defending the outcome of this 
research. The purpose is to manage the validation of the research outcome via a cross- 
case analysis, in an attempt to confirm, prove or disprove the propositions. Hence, this 
research makes use of archival analysis and content analysis to break down the 
collected data into manageable pieces in such a way to meet the research issues and 
objectives as well as to provide answers to research questions.  
The rest of this chapter contains four sections. Section 6.2 provides the results of the 
archival data analysis. It provides the answers to what the nature of IIDTRC is like in a 
UK online retail companies and relate businesses such as banking sector. 6.3 provide 
the results of the data collected from selected case companies: RetailGroup, Xtail, 
Ytail, and Ztail. Nvivo 10 software aided the content analysis of the data collected via 
semi-structured interview while manual content analysis was used for the data from the 
participant observation cases. Some of the cases involved transcription, coding of 
recorded voices, documentation of field notes, and model representations. This strategy 
enables the research to explore further on the areas of interests of the extended 
attributes of the role-based framework. 6.4 triangulate the findings as cross cases 
analysis to examine how the themes of the collated data interplay with the RBF 
attributes and 6.5 provides the summary of this chapter. 
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6.2 Analysis of Archival Data: Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes Cases 
The number of Identity Theft Related Crimes (IIDTRC) cases recorded by fraud 
prevention bodies and law enforcement agencies  had risen by nearly by 60 per cent in 
5 years in England and Wales.  According to Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
(2014) more than 230, 000 cases of IIDTRC and employees related frauds were 
recorded in England and Wales from January to June 2014. This figure represents 59 
per cent rise in 5 years and more than a fifth on the previous 12 months. Online retail 
and banking sectors recorded a further 316,000 cases of IIDTRC and related 
employees frauds. In total over 12 million cases of IIDTRC and related employees 
fraud cases were recorded in the 12 months period, although the ONS (2014) noted that 
these figures recorded across business sectors may have overlapped. These reports 
suggest that prevalence nature of IIDTRC in UK e-business sectors. The rise in these 
crimes in both retail and banking sectors may have been due to the nature of online 
business operation of these sectors, which carry less risk of being caught. Norman 
Baker, the UK crime prevention minister and Jack Dromey, the UK shadow policing 
minister, noted that identity theft related frauds have increased by 21 per cent because 
much of these online crimes go unreported. 
This analysis was done based on the empirical data of individuals who have been 
caught perpetrated internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) in the UK. The case 
of the individuals analysed is not limited to UK online retail sector. It has included 
some cases of other sectors (e.g. banking) because of the multi-faceted operational 
nature of the retail sector business through credit/debit cards (See the Appendix 2 for 
case examples from the Banking Sector). These cases were directly or indirectly 
involved with online retail and banking sectors due to the relationships both sector 
share in their business operations. The background of this relationship has been 
discussed in Chapter 5 above.   
Although this section defines IIDTRC in the context of the online retail sector, this 
definition is extended to other sectors as illegal compromise of any information 
system, network, data, which identify the victim as the statutory owner under UK Data 
Protection Act, 1998. The victims, in this case, are the retail companies in relation to 
their customer. The compromise involves act where the suspect/perpetrator has or 
used legitimate access to IS, network, or data comprised. The suspect/perpetrator 
includes current/former employees of the victim retail companies, current/former 
consultant/contractor/partners.  
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This section deals with behind the scenes analysis of actual cases of internal identity 
theft related crimes (IIDTRC), revealing what went wrong and illustrating how the 
crimes were perpetrated; even the most unsuspecting operation. It provides the in-
depth understanding of the nature of IIDTRC in the victim companies. The aim of this 
research to provide a comprehensive framework for prevention of IIDTRC may not be 
achieved if this research does not provide real time data of where and how the 
perpetrators operate.  
If a research fails to know the companies operation’s greatest risks and vulnerabilities 
are, (Haley, 2013) suggested, such research may not have enough knowledge to 
develop and implement a realistic anti-fraud and crimes prevention framework. 
Adhering to this suggestion by Haley (2013), this section introduces a number of 
examples of individuals who have been caught attempted to and/or engaged  in internal 
identity theft related crimes and frauds. A majority of the cases analysed below were 
extracted from archives of the National Staff Dismissal Register, the Association of 
Business Crime Partnerships, and National Fraud Authority. Case analysis IIDTRC 
perpetrators cover their age (at the time of the fraud), gender, job title, description of 
the nature of the fraud (attempt), motivation, how caught and lessons learnt. The 
internal identity theft related crimes analysed in this research have been categorised 
into corporate identity theft related crimes and personal identity theft related crimes. 
Though full discussion on concepts of these categories has been reviewed in Section 
2.4.5 of Chapter 2, it is important to revisit those explanations in this section; 
Corporate Identity Theft Related Crimes: The impersonation of a company for 
financial or commercial gain. Fraudsters steal your company’s identity and/or financial 
information and use it to purchase goods and services, obtain information or access 
facilities in the company’s name. The common schemes include unauthorised 
alteration to company data/ modification of company payment instructions. 
Personal Identity Theft Related Crimes: The impersonation of another person for 
financial gain. Fraudsters steal personal identity and/or financial information and use it 
to purchase goods and services or access facilities in someone’s name; it is the use of a 
false identity or another person’s identity to obtain goods, money or services by 
deception. This often involves the use of stolen, counterfeit or forged documents such 
as passports, driving licences and credit cards. The common schemes include 
Application Fraud/Account Takeover, Present (Current) Address Fraud and Account 
Withdrawal. 
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Some of the corporate identity theft related crimes cases analysed were collected from 
the public domain (see Appendix 2). In those cases, the names of the fraudsters were 
retained. In the cases that were not in the public domain, no identifying information is 
given and all the names have been changed to protect the individuals’ privacy.  
 
Case #1 Personal Identity Theft Related Crimes in the Private Domain: Account 
Takeover 
Name ‘Jane’ 
Age 32 
Gender Female 
Job title Cashier 
Nature 
of fraud 
‘Jane’ stole numerous Credit Cards that were left by customers in a rush 
after shopping. She used the card to make purchases from her own 
company’s online portal. After several weeks the crime was not 
discovered, she continued to use the debit card to make more purchases 
from other online retail portals.  
Motivation 
 
 
Opportunity:  She had an opportunity and she took it. She believed that 
everyone in the shop could have done the same. 
Self-Justification: ‘Jane’s’ main justification was that she didn’t think 
she was doing something wrong. She had the opportunity and made use 
of it. She thought that everyone would have done the same internally and 
that could justify her fraud as the norm.  
An absence of monitoring system such as CCTV cameras: Since 
there is no surveillance in place to check the employees internal shop 
activities, ‘Jane’ was convinced that she would never be caught. 
How she 
was 
caught 
In the similar situation of stealing the customer’s credit card whenever it 
was left at the shop after shopping, this particular woman came in the 
next day as she had realised she had left her card behind, checked with 
her bank and found out it had already been used. ‘Jane’s’ company 
called the police and she got arrested. 
Lessons 
learned 
 
 
 
 
Fraudsters’ perception of barriers and lack of defence against 
crimes: Due ‘Jane’s’ company lack of a verification procedure, she 
found it easy to bypass their website defences. It was easy for her to 
defraud e-commerce sites that have no identity verification or shared 
fraud alert data which would have tripped her up. 
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Lessons 
learned 
If there was identity checks such as name and address, a complete 
identification of the individual could have emerged which would flag up 
negative fraud alerts in the customers’ databases. 
Failure of the Credit Card Companies to Report the Fraud: It was 
easy for Jane to continue her fraudulent scheme because the credit card 
companies fail to report the fraud to card owner.  
Customers Negligence: In addition, there was negligence of most 
online retail customers to check their spending regularly with their 
banks.  
Table 35: Case #1 Identity Theft Related Crimes: Account Takeover 
 
 
Case #2 Personal Identity Theft Related Crimes in the Private Domain:  
 Personal Identifiable Data Theft from Employer’s Database. 
Name ‘Smith’ 
Age 24 
Gender Male 
Job title Software Engineer 
Nature 
of fraud 
‘Smith’ gathers customers’ personal identifiable information from his 
Company’s information systems and sold them to his customer in the 
‘black market’. 
Motivation Expertise: ‘Smith’ has used his technical skills to exploit the information 
systems of his employer and stole information for his personal gains.  
The Demand for the Personal Information by Fraudsters: The huge demand 
for the online credit/debit card details has created ‘hot product’ perception 
for both ‘Smith’ and his customers.  
How he 
was 
caught 
‘Smith’ hack activities on the information systems were revealed by the 
biannual information audit. The trails of how he log into the company’s 
information database were analysed and he was arrested. During his fraud 
investigation, it was revealed that numerous customers’ card details were 
found on his personal laptop and some hidden websites that he has been 
using to sell the stolen card details. 
Lessons 
learned 
 
The absence of Regular information security audit in ‘Smith’s’ company 
allowed his lots of time to perpetrate his fraud without having been caught. 
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Lessons 
learned 
 
There is no effective security system in place to prevent ‘Smith’ from 
hacking his employer’s information systems though if it exists he would 
have used his IT skills to manoeuvre it. 
High-security surveillance should be placed on the software engineers 
because they could pose a huge security threat to companies. 
Knowing which job tasks create the greatest internal fraud risks should be 
an important component of any manager’s preventative strategies. 
 
Table 36: Case #2 Personal IDTRC:  Data Theft from Employer’s Database. 
 
Case #3 Personal Identity Theft Related Crimes in the Private Domain:  
Personal Identifiable Data Disclosure 
Name ‘Ceri’ 
Age 29 
Gender Female 
Job title Credit Card Issuance Officer 
Nature 
of fraud 
An Employee Embezzled £310,698 from an Employer. ‘Ceri’ manipulated 
a payroll and credit card scheme that led to her embezzling £310,698 from 
her small business employer over a period of five years 
Motivation Boost of Annual Salary: She was using the stolen money to boost her 
annual salary. Family Pressure: ‘Ceri’ used her Employer’s account to pay 
for daughter’s three credit card bills totalled more than £15,000. 
How she 
was 
caught 
Numerous calls from customers, complaining about non-payment. The 
calls sparked an investigation that was reported to the local police. During 
the course of the investigation, the investigation team discovered that 
‘Ceri’ had a record of the improper use of a credit card. 
Lessons 
learned 
Past behaviour is an excellent predictor of future behaviour. A thorough 
background check can provide valuable information, especially when a 
candidate is applying for a position of trust. Such an investigation would 
likely have prevented ‘Ceri’ hiring.  
The revelation of fraudulent activities by ‘Ceri’ started when the 
customers complained about not receiving their payments for 
services/goods rendered. This employer made a most positive move by not 
allowing such complaints to be investigated by the employee charged with 
processing those transactions.  
Table 37: Case #3 Personal Identity Theft Related Crimes: Data Disclosure 
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Case #4 Personal Identity Theft Related Crimes in the Private Domain:  
Account Withdrawal 
Name ‘Kathy’ 
Age 47 
Gender Female 
Job title Accountant 
Nature 
of fraud 
An accounting clerk wrote 137 retail companies’ contract payment cheque 
valued at £1.4 million and deposited them into her personal account. This 
trusted employee was given the authority to prepare cheques without 
proper internal safeguards and reasonable management oversight.  
Motivation No segregation of duties/Working alone: This individual could prepare 
and issue cheques without being scrutinised before the cheque could have 
been authorised for payment. 
Opportunity: She had the opportunity and used because she was ‘trusted’ 
by the government. 
How 
she was 
caught 
This fraud scheme was actually uncovered—strictly by accident, as a 
result of a credit union employee calling Head of Finance and asking a 
question about cheques being deposited in a personal checking account. 
Shortly afterward, it was confirmed that the account in question belonged 
to one of that county agency’s employees. At this point, government 
auditors were called in and an investigative audit was launched. 
Lessons 
learned 
 
There should be segregation of roles and duties. This would discourage the 
employees’ ideology of ‘work-alone’ that allows fraudulent activities. 
No employee should be in a position to write company cheques or make 
payments without second party confirmation that such payments are valid. 
 
Unqualified trust causes an overwhelming number of owners and 
managers to fail in their jobs because they naively assume that their 
operation is immune from internal fraud. After all, the managers might 
argue that they have loyal, long-term and highly trusted employees or 
volunteers handling their highest-risk financial activities. A few of the 
managers may understand that whenever trust is incorrectly bestowed, 
problems are likely to follow. 
Table 38: Case #4 Personal Identity Theft Related Crimes: Account Withdrawal 
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6.3 Analysis of Cases: RetailGroup, Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail 
Although data analysis of a semi-structured interview case of this nature normally 
starts after the data have been collected, the researcher started the data analysis during 
the data collection. This strategy allowed the researcher to ease the difficult task of 
dealing with huge amount of recorded data and field notes.  Having adhered to Yin 
(1994) suggestion that analysing case study data is one of the most difficult tasks in 
developing a qualitative research, the researcher used the approach of content analysis. 
This approach was used because it allowed the research to make replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their context (Elo and Kyngas, 2007). This approach enabled 
the researcher to derive knowledge, new insights and a representation of facts and 
practical guide to action (Krippendorff, 1980). Since the RetailGroup, Xtail, Ytail, and 
Ztail case studies were designed to examine the application of a role-based framework, 
the choice of content analysis allowed the researcher to test theoretical issues to 
enhance the understanding of this research problem (Yin, 2003).  
In addition, Berg (1998) suggests that content analysis can be used to examine written 
documents and transcripts of interviews and to compress many words into fewer 
content categories based on explicit rules of coding. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) agree 
with Berg (1998) and suggest three approaches to content analysis: conventional, 
directed and summative. The researcher applied conventional content analysis where 
the coding categories are derived directly from the text data built on the following 
procedures;  
i. The recorded voice data from the RetailGroup was transcribed verbatim and 
field notes from the Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail documented were stored as computer 
files;  
ii. Both computer aided software (Nvivo 10) and manual coding were used to 
ease analysis. In particular, the choice of both computerised and manual 
coding for RetailGroup was used to provide more reliable, comparative and 
complementary research results (Gibbs, 2002; Bazeley, 2007). In addition, the 
computerised coding was chosen because of the time-consuming nature of 
manual coding (Carley, 1990). Similarly, manual coding was used in Xtail, 
Ytail and Ztail. Though it was time consuming but due to the nature of the 
convergent interview in these participant observation cases, manual coding 
was deemed most suitable (Lewis and Silver, 2007).  
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iii. The coded texts in the form of words and phrases were examined for the co-
occurrence of the concepts and how they relate to each other. This is based on 
the suggestion by Smith and Humphreys (2006) that identified conceptual and 
relational analyses as the two major categories of content analysis.   
iv. The model of themes and matrix in a form of a table of the responses was 
developed. The matrix table as suggested by Huberman and Miles (1985) 
enabled the researcher to depict the main relationship between research 
questions under defined categories and themes.  
v. The deductive and inductive codes were derived. This is based on the Benard 
(2000) suggestion that  code-based content analysis enables the researcher to 
conduct deductive coding via generation of themes from the literature and 
assigning relevant concept from a set of data. Similarly, inductive coding 
allows the researcher to generate themes from the data itself which underpins 
the grounded theory approach (Richards, 2010).  
This procedural approach to the content analysis adopted allowed the researcher to 
provide a comprehensive framework to commence the data analysis (Yin, 2003). It 
also helped the researcher to connect the finding and results of this research to the 
existing body of knowledge identified in the literature review of the chapter 2 above 
(Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
6.3.1 Results and Findings from Retail Group 
In this case, coding approach helped the research to focus on phrases that are indicative 
of the research questions and objectives. Based on the procedure of content analysis 
discussed above in section 6.3, the coding scheme was re-examined by critical analysis 
of the coding results to validate the reliability. For instance, the delay that arose in 
trying to incorporate the enforcement agent into the investigation of IIDTRC incident 
was coded ‘Lack of Management Support’. Such issues are broadly categorised under 
‘Factors those affect IIDTRC Prevention’. Similarly, ‘Unclear roles and 
responsibilities’ was coded under the ‘Management roles challenges’ subcategory. The 
research eliminated each of the subcategories that did not result in an inefficiency of 
the crime prevention management or loopholes in the internal IT security tools. For 
instance, on one of the crimes incidents reported, the local distribution driver (colluded 
with suspected call centre staff) was a suspect.   
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However, since this incident involved local distribution employee under logistics 
management, this incident (though indirectly related) was considered in this analysis. 
The research questions outline in the section 5.3.2.6 of chapter 5 above were analysed 
by categorising the responses of each of the participants under themes in relation the 
research findings.  Similarly, this pattern of analysis was used for all findings from 
RetailGroup in relation to the phrases in subcategories that indicated the IIDTRC a 
prevention issues. Since each of the subcategories featured multiple issues from 
respective respondent, they represented IIDTRC prevention issues which may have 
witnessed in RetailGroup but were not speciﬁc to any single IIDTRC incidence. 
Hence, using the process of systematic coding across participants in various 
management positions, and by comparing their anecdotes and generated codes, the 
research was able to arrive following findings; 
i. Nature of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) in RetailGroup: This 
includes the causes, the Impact, the perpetration methods and prevention 
strategies in  RetailGroup: 
ii. Roles of RetailGroup management in  prevention of IIDTRC: This covers 
collaboration/support across management in implementing IIDTRC prevention 
strategies;  
iii. Challenges of implementing IIDTRC prevention in RetailGroup: This includes 
challenges that affect management as individual/team in preventing IIDTRC.  
 
6.3.1.1 Nature of IIDTRC in the RetailGroup 
The 12 management interviewed on the questions of the nature of IIDTRC in Retail 
Group provide a clear definition of IIDTRC in the context of RetailGroup. In 
particular, the Group Data Compliance manager referred to the UK Fraud Bill of 2006 
and UK Home Office definition.  
In her statement,  
“Identity theft occurs ‘when sufficient information about an identity is obtained to 
facilitate identity crimes or fraud, irrespective of whether in the case of a person, 
company, organisation or an entity…And this could lead to frauds of using a false 
identity or someone else’s details for unlawful activity. …it could be also when 
someone avoids falsely claiming that the criminal was the victim of identity 
fraud….; these frauds come in a variety of ways and for various motive.”  
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She went on to say that RetailGroup have has cases that involved using a false identity 
or someone’s personal identifiable information (PII) (e.g. name, address, date of birth) 
for financial/commercial gain. The perpetrators use the PII to buy goods or secure 
services (e.g. opening bank account for money withdrawals) or for credit cards, loan 
applications, contract services and sorts. 
Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes Perpetration in RetailGroup 
In the follow-up questions, the Group Data Compliance manager were asked to explain 
what she meant by ‘these frauds’ – the variety of ways IIDTRC are committed. She 
stated that the main techniques for stealing the customers data were: copying the 
customers details from the systems, diversion of the ordered products, selling of the 
data to the black market; organised crime - collusion, collaboration and infiltration, 
computer means, hacking, research of customers ' identity, buying customers data from 
employees with unrestricted access.  
In one of the scenario described by the Regional Loss Prevention manager, he narrated 
IIDTRC incident where an employee paid an estate management agent to lease him a 
house for the purpose of collection of the redirected ordered goods from RetailGroup. 
Most of the participants noted the social engineering which involved an employee 
revealing the customers data details to an external criminal that called the RetailGroup 
pretending to be the real customer. They also cited the cases when some external 
criminals would call into the call centres’ departments pretending to be from 
RetailGroup IT department, and then would ask for the customers’ data or password 
retrieval. In her own contribution to the question of the methods of carrying out 
IIDTRC in RetailGroup, Head of Human Resources noted that her company is always 
targeted because of the nature of their business operation. In her statement, 
“RetailGroup deals with human beings and knowledge-based design computer 
systems; these systems are not automated….there is always a need for identification 
and cross-verification, and in these processes, the customers data could be made 
vulnerable to the criminal or dishonest employees…” 
She noted that the company is working hard to reduce or minimise these incidents, 
especially in this age where RetailGroup business operation is trending speedily on 
digital means.  
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Impact of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes in RetailGroup 
A few of the participants responded to the question of the nature of IIDTRC in 
RetailGroup in relation to the impact of IIDTRC. In particular, the Regional Loss 
Prevention manager noted that RetailGroup Loss Prevention team handled hundreds of 
the cases every year, but they could not save all the incidents reports. Some of the 
incidents reports come from the call centres and from the employees handling the 
financial details of the customers. In some cases, the Regional Loss Prevention 
manager noted that RetailGroup employees may not be comfortable to report some of 
their work colleagues engaged in IIDTRC. In his statement,  
‘there have been cases when some of RetailGroup brand’s companies came on the 
national newspapers and national television stations, … and sort like that, on the 
issues related to identity theft involved with our employees…such could be a big 
blow to our businesses and marketing sector….’  
Collectively, the participants have noted similar impact of IIDTRC to RetailGroup: 
business loss, loss of customers trust, job loss, data security challenges, huge budget 
allocation goes into job recruitment, training, data security, software security, 
investigation costs, litigation cost ,  information security auditing; big challenge to the 
directors and management, damage to business name, and no records of  approximated 
companies’ loss.  
Methods of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes Prevention in RetailGroup 
On the further questions in relation to how RetailGroup prevent IIDTRC in their 
business operation, majority of the participants mentioned these practices (though with 
various opinions) which include: 
 Employees training on data protection, 
 Secured customers’ data identification, 
 RetailGroup computer use policy, 
 Effective implementation of it security tools: anti-virus and firewalls, 
intrusion detection and penetration test, 
 Restriction on the use of pen and paper and mobile phones, 
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Employees Training on data protection: In particular the Training Manager and the 
Head of Human Resources noted employees’ training as one of their key IIDTRC 
prevention strategies. When the Head of Human Resources was asked to explain more 
on how Employees Training in the RetailGroup has contributed to the prevention of 
IIDTRC, she stated that 
 ‘RetailGroup design their training resources to match the demand of the various 
operational departments…, but we focus majorly on the call centres and mail 
ordering, and less often on the IT security guys…we would always emphasised on 
Data Protection Act and the consequences…’  
She also noted that every newly employed are mandated to do the online training on 
Data Protection Act. The employees are also mandated to pass the assessment that 
follows the training, she added. When asked if there is training evaluation tools 
designed for the Retail employees in relation to IIDTRC prevention, the Head of 
Human Resources noted that there is none at the moment. In addition, none of the 
participants noted any structure for further training either on internal data security or 
IIDTRC prevention awareness. From her explanation, there was no follow up on how 
the training was perceived by the employees to enable the RetailGroup evaluate the 
impact of Employees Training in the prevention of IIDTRC. 
RetailGroup computer use policy: On the list of top-coded strategy for prevention of 
IIDTRC in RetailGroup is computer policy. All the participants but one made reference 
how vital this strategy is to RetailGroup. They noted that as an employee of 
RetailGroup, you must: have a unique employee login, be ready to change access 
password regularly, not allowed to download application from internet to the 
company’s systems, not have access to internet or social networking sites, not use 
either pen and paper or mobile phone while working (except the top managers) and 
employees must be compliance with password policy. In his response to the question 
related to the policy issues as a strategy of prevention of IIDTRC, the Compliance team 
manager said that,  
“… no employee in RetailGroup from the top management to the shop-floor 
employee is allowed to access another employee login detail or access code to 
department terminals, no matter the situation….as you could as well know that 
exchange of login access would lead to complexity if there were leakage or such 
IIDTRC incidents as you refer it…besides….,  
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…if these principles of our policy is not enforced effectively, all of us would develop 
the attitude of not taken the policy serious, I mean the ‘easy going’ culture of 
business operation…” 
This statement shows that the Compliance team manager of RetailGroup attached 
much importance to their policy implementation. But in response one of the 
participants, the Technical Security Specialist disagreed with the Compliance team 
manager, and said that ‘occasionally, if an employee is locked out, and there is need for 
the access to the system or department, we could arrange for their access…’  If the 
RetailGroup security has an exception for some managers, this might lead to some 
leakages involving the top management. These responses indicated that there were 
existing loose attitudes in relation to the RetailGroup security access and policy 
implementation, which may hamper any IIDTRC incident and render such incident 
very difficult to trace without complexity. And this suggests there is some preferential 
treatment approach in security issues in RetailGroup.  
Secure customers’ data identification: A few of the participants noted the secure 
customers’ data identification as one of the RetailGroup’s strategy in the prevention of 
IIDTRC. They emphasised that this is one of the vital strategies in RetailGroup, which 
involves the use of intelligence system in the call centres department to confirm 
customers’ identity. This is a knowledge-based system of using identifications; either of 
name, address, account number, date of birth or combination of any of any of the 
identity attributes.  The Head of Security Operations in his response to this strategy 
stated that; 
“RetailGroup has designed this system in such a way that identification processes 
and questions involve some element of complexity to deter the criminal within or 
from outside our company to access customers’ sensitive data….but the problem 
with system is that our employees a times failed to implement the processes 
effectively, they allowed or forgot…perhaps unintentionally allows customers or 
suspects to access their data without asking the security questions…”  
This response suggests that there were occasions knowledge-based systems have failed 
in RetailGroup. It also suggests that Retail Group relied heavily on this system and that 
RetailGroup is aware of the need for effectiveness of the system. Yet there is no sign in 
RetailGroup to support and improve the efficiency of the employees on how to make 
use of the system. The implication of this issue is that if the system fails and the 
company relied upon the system for security of the customers’ data, there would high 
risk of IIDTRC incident on such occasion.  
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In summary, the model below describes the nature of internal identity theft related 
crimes in RetailGroup. 
 
Figure 14: Nature of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes in RetailGroup 
 
6.3.1.2 Roles of RetailGroup Management in Prevention of IIDTRC 
All the participants agreed that sharing their roles and responsibilities in relation to 
IIDTRC prevention is vital to the success of RetailGroup in IIDTRC prevention. In 
some cases, they extended to some supporting roles that have contributed to their 
performance enhancement in RetailGroup.  
 
 
Theft of customers data (DoB, account detail, name, address) to commit fraud; theft of 
busines data; the use  of false identity or someone else’s identity details are used to carry out 
unlawful 
activity; It an incident when an employee avoids obligation/liability by falsely claiming that 
he/she was the victim of identity theft  
Nature of IIDTRC in RetailGroup  
Stealing with paper, pen, wallet, 
recording, typing and copying; 
redirecting customers order to 
different address, selling of the 
data to the black market; 
organised crime - collusion, 
collaboration and infilteration, 
computer means , hacking, 
research of customers ' identity, 
buying customers data from 
employees with unrestricted 
access 
Methods of IIDTRC 
 
Business loss, loss of 
customers trust, job 
loss, data security 
challenges, huge 
budget allocation goes 
into job recruitment, 
training, data security, 
software security, 
investigation, court ,  
information security 
auditing; big challenge 
to the directors and 
managments, no 
records of  approximate 
loss, damage to 
business name. 
Impact of IIDTRC 
Training of our employees  in relation 
to data protection pol icy ; secure 
customers data identification, IT 
security, intrusion detection, 
penetration test, antivirus, use of 
firewall,  implemenation of  
 use of Computer Policy; Restriction 
for the  use of pen, and paper 
and mobile Phones 
Prevention of IIDTRC 
 
Criminal us e the stolen data for commercial or monetary 
gain e.g. opening a bank account, applying for a loan/credit 
card, to obtain goods or access facilities or services, 
Availability of customers data because of  busines s operation 
and processes, vulnerable  data security, complexity of 
operation 
Cost  of data security; human weakeness  in relation to 
conflictingoperation's demands  they are bein placed upon; 
 family issues  and cultural backgrounds; live style, personal 
issues such as vicisitudes;  economic issues; unknown issues. 
Causes  of IIDTRC 
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As the summary of the roles collaboration, the table 44 below shows the model matrix 
mapping the participant roles in IIDTRC prevention team roles. The participant’s 
management position relate to various roles which include: Security Support (SecSup), 
IIDTRC Incident Investigation (IIDTInv), Data Compliance (DCMgt), IIDTRC 
Prevention(IDTPrv), Security Operation(SecOp), Technical Security(TecSec), Software 
Engineering(SofEng), and Human Resources (HR) denoted the team roles. 
 
        Roles 
Mgt.  
Position 
 SecSup IIDTInv 
 
 DCMgt 
 
IDTPrv 
 
 SecOp 
 
TecSec 
 
SofEng 
 
HR 
Head of security 
support 
× ×  × ×  ×  
Head of crimes 
investigation 
 ×  ×     
Group Data 
Compliance manager 
  ×      
Head of Crimes 
prevention 
 ×  ×     
Head of Security of 
Operations 
×    × ×   
Technical security 
specialists 
× ×   × × ×  
Training Manager        × 
 Software Engineer ×      ×  
Compliance team 
manager 
  ×   ×   
Technical Security 
Specialist 
×    × ×   
Regional Loss 
Prevention manager 
 ×  ×     
Head of Human 
Resources 
 ×      × 
Table 39: Matrix of Management Positions with Roles 
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The table coding analysis indicated that these roles do not necessarily related to 
individual participant’s management position on a one-to-one basis; showing that one 
participant might have covered two or more roles, or a role could have been split 
between two or more participants.  
In the statement by the Regional Loss Prevention manager, 
 “on some of the IIDTRC cases, we have to involve the crime investigation team 
(Head of security support)…once the incident have been escalated, it starts with 
the Head of security support who would do the internal incident investigation 
with his team and send the report back to me for further action to be taken…”  
And when the Regional Loss Prevention manager was asked further questions on how 
timely and efficient is this sharing of responsibility, he stated, 
 “…well it depends the impact of the case and the complexity and how many 
employees are involved…, I cannot really give the approximate time it takes 
because some of these cases take longer than expected…, There might cases the 
involve criminals from different RetailGroup branches…These issues take lots of 
resources from the company…” 
This statement suggests that issues such as the seriousness of the IIDTRC incident, 
geographical constraints and staff availability can have an impact on the setting up of 
the ideal management team for IIDTRC prevention. This statement suggests the need 
for the management roles in relation to IIDTRC prevention to be clearly considered and 
assigned appropriately with respect to the nature of IIDTRC – place, who, how and 
when the crimes were committed. In particular, the management involved need to be 
fully aware of their responsibilities. 
However, from the matrix table above, it shows there is a collaborative role sharing 
among the management, but some of the vital roles are being neglected. For instance, 
the training manager position collaborated with none of the participants but Head of 
Human Resources.   This indicated the total negligence of the role of IIDTRC 
prevention awareness in RetailGroup. Another participant role that was neglect by the 
RetailGroup is Data compliance management. This shows that less attention was given 
to the contribution of the data compliance in the IIDTRC prevention working team. 
This consequence of this negligence would lead to an overly non-compliance culture of 
the majority of the internal data security of the Retail group, of which the potential cost 
is increasing the risk associated with data leakages and IIDTRC incidents. 
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6.3.1.3 Challenges of Implementing IIDTRC Prevention in RetailGroup 
In response to the question of the major challenges issues faced by RetailGroup’s 
information systems management in the prevention of IIDTRC, the participants noted 
that the challenges are not limited to individual managers. They recognised that 
IIDTRC prevention challenges in RetailGroup also affect their collaborative 
management roles. The analysis below indicates the key issues that affect RetailGroup 
management performance goals. The participants’ views are categorised as: 
Management as an Individual Role and Management as Team Role.  
 
 
   Categories 
 
 
                                                           Sub-Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management as Team Role  
 
 
1. Inadequacy of employees 
training 
2. Internal policy 
3.  IS/T staff competence 
4.  IS/T security Complexity 
5.  Security Budgets' 
Resources Constraints: 
Finance and Time 
6. IS/T Security Tools 
 
 
 
 
Management as 
Individual Role 
 
 
 
1.  Poor  clarity of roles 
2. Poor management                   
     cooperation/support 
3. Segregated /Uncentralised roles 
4. Constant operational changes 
 
 
 
IIDTRC Prevention Challenges in RetailGroup 
 Outsourcing firms protocols 
 Inadequacy of internal data security 
management 
 Attitudes of outsourcing firms on data 
compliance 
 Indifference to compliance policies 
 
 Classes of data security cases 
 Third party data possession 
 Cultural influences and Demography 
related influences 
 Law Enforcement/Police Indifferences 
 Assessments of unsuccessful or 
Successful intervention 
 Internal data security improvements 
 Delays in crimes detection and 
investigation 
 
Crimes Incidents and Intervention 
Outcomes 
Security Strategies Issues 
 Structure of crimes prevention strategy 
 Employees’ attitudes towards data 
protection policy awareness 
 
Figure 15: Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes Prevention Challenges 
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Figure 15 below shows the model of the 10 factors that were consistently identified 
with the 12 participants, arranged in the order shown in the coded description. Unclear 
responsibilities, lack of employees/end-user awareness training and lack of 
management cooperation/support top the coded factors in both categories. 
Challenges of management in their individual roles of preventing IIDTRC  
Clarity of Roles: Some the participants were not clear with the commitment that is 
required of them in the prevention of IIDTRC. Although, a few participants explained 
how they pay attention in identifying the vulnerability by classifying the internal data 
security cases. Without clear responsibility, as indicated in RetailGroup, the overall 
IIDTRC prevention and internal data security would be handicapped. Most of the 
managers narrated stories of their experiences but were not reflective of what their key 
roles and responsibilities are in relation to IIDTRC prevention. This shows that 
participants from RetailGroup were busy with their routine of IIDTRC escalation 
process; detection, investigation, etc. They are more committed to meet their targets of 
completing investigation cases than reflecting on the requirement of their job roles. In 
RetailGroup business environment, it would not be a surprise that strategic IIDTRC 
prevention processes are put to a lower priority.  
Management Cooperation/Support: The Head of crimes investigation made 
mentioned of the difficulty his team faces in trying to build effective working 
relationship with the management of the local law enforcement agency. He noted that 
this issue often led to delays in investigation of crimes: 
 “When there is the change of the head of local area police, all the long built 
relationship and working team would breakdown…, to build up a relationship with 
the new administration is not easy! Sometimes it is not easy to find the police officer 
that would play the role of effective investigation of IIDTRC…it is always 
problem…it is, yes it is…this always lead to delays of investigation and 
prosecutions……”   
This statement suggests that establishing a lasting support with the law enforcement 
agencies is a major challenge to RetailGroup managers in their bid to prevent 
IIDTRC. This challenge is can be a major factor that may have led to the cases of 
protracted IIDTRC investigation process in the RetailGroup. The longer the 
investigation took, the more damage the perpetrators would do with the stolen 
data/information. 
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Segregation of Management Roles: There was indication that participants have 
varying perception in relation to IIDTRC prevention in RetailGroup. It was observed 
that different management roles have different perception about data security and 
regulations. The shop floor managers see internal data security regulations and IIDTRC 
prevention as the business of the top management alone. From the response of the 
Software Engineer, when asked to describe his cooperation and working relationship 
with the management, he said;  
“I would always continue with my major job roles, which is basically designing of 
‘RetailGroup’ secured systems applications, when the need for computer crimes 
issue comes up, the management handles those…”  
This statement suggests and confirms the perception of segregation of duties that many 
RetailGroup managers stick to their job roles without contributing to internal data 
security and IIDTRC prevention. 
Operational changes: Some of the participants are concerned about the operational 
changes (such as reduction in IT security budgets and shuffling of staff management 
positions) and the impacts of the IIDTRC incidents in the RetailGroup. A few of these 
participants perceived that the rate of a trend is beyond the capability of RetailGroup to 
match. For this reason, they utilize the resources they have at their disposal to 
implement the latest security tool for prevention of the IIDTRC. Other key issues that 
pose challenges in the prevention of IIDTRC in the RetailGroup include the budget 
constraints, the employees’ expertise, and pace of the evolving digital security 
technologies. In responding to the question related to challenges of implementing up-
to-date security tools, the Head of security support said  
“Well, these security tools are not cheap, and we are talking about RetailGroup of 
many branches spread across UK…., besides, the security companies never stop 
designing new product…em, we cannot go beyond the company’s budget...”  
This statement suggests the impact the operational changes have as one of the major 
challenges of RetailGroup management. 
Challenges of management in their team roles of preventing IIDTRC  
Lack of Employees/End-user Awareness Training: There were some participant 
perceptions that effort by the management toward training of the employees is 
established with independent capability.  
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It was either carried out by the human resources or never gets done. The attempts to 
educate all the employees have not yielded expected result.  They noted that the 
setbacks on the employees’ awareness training on prevention of IIDTRC may be 
associated with the cost of human resource development. Besides, most of the 
available data security policies are not clear enough to the level of understanding of the 
shop floor employees. RetailGroup may have mandatory e-learning (data protection 
policy and regulations) that was designed to meet the educational requirements and 
levels of all management and employees, but is this achievable in RetailGroup? In 
response to this question the Head of Human Resources stated:  
“We have to ensure that our employees are trained and are updated on data 
protection policy. My management team in this organisation takes these steps as 
our responsibility. We have designed a comprehensive training programme for the 
employees across security management. I spent weeks to design the structure of the 
training package myself. I want everyone, irrespective of the level, to know the 
consequences indulging in any data security violations… there should not be any 
excuse to commit internal frauds!”  
The Head of crimes Investigation corresponded and remarked: 
 “All our employees are required to go through this test and they have to pass them. 
We have their respective profile, we will always check. If any of them failed to 
attend the e-learning test, we have to find out why and encourage them to do it. It is 
not just for the security of the customers date, my team, or the organisation…it is 
for the security of their job!”  
In agreement to these anecdotes, the Software Engineer noted:  
“I have just attended one week training to update myself not only on the latest 
security resources; the training availed me the opportunity to go through the data 
security policy and sorts like…”   
These affirmations indicated there was training on data protection, done online by the 
employees, to ensure that the employee would abide by the data security policies and 
stipulations, but not particularly on IIDTRC preventions. In addition, these statements 
suggest that RetailGroup depends only on their Human Resource Management for 
IIDTRC awareness training.  
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Lack of Clarity of Data Protection Policy: Without the well-defined policy in 
RetailGroup, it may be difficult to outsource to other companies on the issues of 
IIDTRC prevention. Some of the participants noted that a majority of the third party 
companies rarely ‘buy in’ or adhere to the stipulated data security agreement. They 
handle with data internal data security with laxity. In most cases, they do not put in 
place the security checks and measures to avoid any accidental data leakages or theft 
that might arise during transactions. The Compliance team manager described the 
practices of the outsourcing companies thus:  
“When ‘RetailGroup’ outsources some of these firms to manage our customer data, 
they rarely comply with the stipulated data compliance regulation! They would only 
tick the papers to prove that all the data security checks are up to date, but during 
my visit for data security auditing, I would find out that there were some security 
laxities. All those protocols are just shown on the papers…., It is all about ticking 
paper. They don’t care about our data security, their clients... they never see this as 
their responsibility – which is their major role as our agency!”   
In agreement with the Compliance team manager, the Head of Crimes prevention noted 
that though RetailGroup have a contractual policy binding the outsourcing firms, the 
firms still treat IIDTRC prevention policy as ‘their business’ (RetailGroup business).  
To control these pervasive attitudes of the outsourcing companies, the data compliance 
management has resorted to the strategy of coercion and thorough data security 
auditing. If these strategies failed RetailGroup would revoke their business contract 
with the outsourcing firms. The RetailGroup’s Data Compliance Manager described 
her recent experience:  
“We have just revoked a contract with one of the outsourcing companies because of 
their laxity in abiding by our stipulated data security measures…We requested for 
the print out of all network security test updates of which they provided. We found 
out that there some of the test that was not successful, we then asked then to update 
that and resend the results….but they failed to implement our request. We have no 
other option than to revoke the contract!”  
These statements suggest that RetailGroup might not have adequate staff expertise and 
resources for prevention of IIDTRC since they were consistently referring to the 
outsourcing firms as the key provider of their security support,  
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Lack of Trained IS/T Staff: The instances where the respondents consistently 
referring to the partners and outsourcing agents suggest that RetailGroup could not 
provide the necessary staff expertise and resources in the prevention of IIDTRC. The 
practice of outsourcing or hiring external agent in RetailGroup may have strained the 
management effort in establishing the effective cooperation and sharing of 
responsibilities in relation to IIDTRC prevention. This issue extends to other factors in 
relation to lack effective communication and role sharing with other complementary 
management such as law enforcement agencies. As noted above, the lax attitudes of the 
outsourcing and law enforcement management in cooperating with RetailGroup is a 
major setback. The Group Data Compliance manager in her response said that:  
“Most of these agencies’ management do not have good knowledge of data security 
expertise in carrying out their responsibilities in the prevention of the IIDTRC as 
compared to what is obtainable in this organisation….” 
 She added this issue often delays investigation protocols because of roles clarifications 
issues such as ‘who does what and where do we go first’ in handling internal data 
security breaches.  
IIDTRC and IS/T Security Complexity: There was perception from the participants 
that complexities of IIDTRC issues such as the ‘seriousness’ of the crime, culture, and 
outcome of a crime incident, interfered with their security strategies.  
On the issue of incident assessment and interventions, the management is aware of the 
importance of the aftermath assessment of intervention processes of typical IIDTRC 
incidents. They also believe that it contributes to the improvement of the data security 
strategies. However, they still struggle with issues related to crimes incidents analysis 
and documentation. The Head of Security of Operations noted regrettably:  
“We have not really got documented reports of all the procedures taken during the 
investigation…, these kinds of crimes happen over and over again. Whenever we 
handed the criminal case and handed the suspected over the prosecution team, that 
closed the case…but we do not document and analysed the incidents of closed 
crimes cases….You see these could cost a lot of money, take lots of times and 
expertise. Besides we need to hire professionals to do that…”  
This statement suggests that some of the IIDTRC preventions or interventions may 
have failed in the RetailGroup because of the management perceptions in handling 
their complexities.  
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Poor  IS/T Security Tools: The participants noted that there are cases where security 
loopholes were discovered within the IT platform and were neglected because 
management viewed it as not being cost effective to upgrade or because it does not 
really constitute high risk. The IIDTRC incidents are rated from high-risk issues to low 
risk issues. Perception like this affects the roles of the data security expert in the design 
of the data security tools like encryptions for the security of such data. In addition to 
the respective management as an individual and team-oriented challenges identified in 
the analyses above, there are other issues that affect both categories of roles. Other 
notable issues perceived by the participants include; 
Poor Internal data security control and strategy: - Among the top IT security and 
crime prevention team, internal data security was their prime responsibility but their 
attitudes towards internal data security control were perceived to be in a poor state. 
Though, these management received the some level of support from other 
complimentary management such as human resources, software engineering and 
network/web administrators, there is no collaborative strategy within RetailGroup. This 
issue has led these complimentary management team to place a lot of emphasis on 
abiding by the data security policies of RetailGroup but neglecting the key aspect of IT 
security which internal security control.  
Management attitudes towards IIDTRC interventions outcomes: The management 
were aware of the importance of the aftermath assessment of intervention processes of 
typical IIDTRC incidents; and its contribution to the improvement of the data security 
strategies. Though the top management from both the IT security and crime prevention 
team meet as frequent as possible to reassess their performance in the prevention of 
crimes, they still struggle with issues related to crimes incidents analysis and 
documentation.  
It was observed that some of the crimes prevention or intervention failed because of 
inadequate resources – money and security experts.  They participants cited some cases 
where some security loopholes were discovered within the IT platform; these loopholes 
were neglected because the organisation viewed it not being cost effective to upgrade 
or because it does not really constitute high risk. The IIDTRC incidents are rated from 
high-risk issues to low risk issues. If the crimes involve theft or loss of with certain 
attributes of personally identifiable data, then it is then classified as high/low-risk 
crime.  
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Cultural orientation of the management: Drawing from the interviews of the 
RetailGroup’s information systems (IS) security and crimes prevention management, 
cultural orientation has been identified as one of the major challenges of preventing 
IIDTRC in the retail companies. This finding from the RetailGroup suggests that the 
cultural orientation of the management affects their information security roles in 
preventing internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC). Tsai (2001) explains that 
cultural orientation is the degree to which employees are inclined and a way of actively 
engaged in the norms, practices and traditions of a specific organisational culture.  
Cameron and Quinn (1999) throws more light on the issues of culture within the 
organisation by defining organisational culture as a set of shared assumptions, beliefs, 
practices and values that direct and shape members behaviour and attitudes. These 
definitions of aspects of culture within organisational setting provided an insight to the 
finding of this research where one of the major challenges in preventing IIDTRC is 
caused by the cultural influence of IS security managers. Based on this finding, it is 
worth concluding that the cultural orientation of IS security management could be the 
root of other challenging issues.  
Other key challenges of preventing IIDTRC that embedded in the management cultural 
orientation of the RetailGroup are: management believes that IS security is a complex 
issue; constraints in getting adequate budget for IT security; lack of clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, internal security policies and strategies and perceived IIDTRC 
incidents.  
There exist a belief by IS security and crime prevention management of the 
RetailGroup that prevention of IIDTRC is a complex security issue. The crime 
prevention managers are inclined to treat information security regarding the prevention 
of IIDTRC as troublesome and often depend on software security. Consequently, the 
management resists new policies that might be strategic in preventing IIDTRC. This 
belief reflects reason for Chia et al., (2003) argument that without change in cultural of 
orientation of IS security managers, the enforcement of new policies regarding 
computer related crimes prevention might not be optimal. 
In the same vein, the cultural orientation of the management regarding the prevention 
of IIDTRC constitutes to constraints in getting adequate budget for IT security in the 
RetailGroup. For example, the management of the RetailGroup are inclined to treat 
spending related to IT security as a financial burden to their company and are often 
reluctant to support IIDTRC prevention initiatives. Instead of investing to improve 
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their IIDTRC prevention strategies, the management relies on their managerial 
experience and contingency plans. This is evidenced by the comment of the 
RetailGroup’s Head of Security Operations (HoSO) regarding his belief in the 
importance of investing in IIDTRC incidents analysis and documentation. The HoSO 
stated that; 
“We have not really got documented reports of all the procedures taken during the 
investigation…, these kinds of crimes happen over and over again. Whenever we 
handled the criminal case and handed the suspected over to the prosecution team, 
that closed the case…but we do not document and analysed the incidents of closed 
crimes cases….You see these could cost a lot of money, take lots of times and 
expertise. Besides we need to hire professionals to do that…”  
This statement suggests that some of the IIDTRC preventions may have failed in the 
RetailGroup because of the management cultural orientation that there is no need to 
invest in innovative IT security initiatives if there is no apparent security threat. This 
evidence corresponds to Straub’s (1986) argument that some business organisations 
neglect the strategic IS security practices because they have not had any major loss to 
computer crimes related threats. In addition, this evidence support the findings by the 
PriceWaterCoopers’ (PWC) (2014) Survey that more than 56 per cent of business 
organisations did not carry out any security checks of there IS security infrastructure, 
instead they only rely on contingency plans.  
In some cases, PWC (2014) further added, online retail companies apparently consider 
themselves ‘not rich enough’ to bear the cost of IS security. Other companies often 
argue that the cost of IT security investment outweighs the benefits.  However, the 
HoSO of the RetailGroup defended the position of top management for not investing in 
security tools recommended (for preventing IIDTRC) by their IT security managers. 
The HoSO argued that in most cases there is no clear information that suggests that 
there is a substantial impact of existing IT security invested in preventing IIDTRC. 
This evidence is drawn from HoSO’s statement that; 
“RetailGroup operates on different security strategies in terms of the resources: 
soft and hard, and the degree of the access the companies grant to management 
over IS security investment. Management are supposed to report/publish the impact 
of their security strategies in preventing IIDTRC but when this reporting is not 
done it would be hard to evaluate the benefits of IS security investment and 
strategies”.  
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In this manager’s view, the management should work collaboratively with the top 
management by updating them with information on how the implemented security tools 
have impacted on the IIDTRC prevention. This view suggests that if RetailGroup has 
cultural orientation for providing a collaborative support and opportunity from top 
management (on IS security strategies regarding prevention of IIDTRC) with clearer 
roles, RetailGroup would be less prone to IIDTRC. This is because decision-making on 
crimes prevention would be more distributed in the RetailGroup although the top 
management retains oversight and accountability for IS security/compliance investment 
probity. 
 
Other effects of the cultural orientation of management on IIDTRC prevention 
In addition, there was evidence by the RetailGroup that the cultural orientation of the 
security management can weaken the security strategies in preventing IIDTRC. The 
RetailGroup was restricted to their internal data security strategies and policies. The 
implementation of their security policies was directed by internal RetailGroup’s 
requirement but not from the belief in the importance of security practices. In this case, 
the RetailGroup management considers innovative information security strategies as 
inconvenience. This finding corresponds to the Maynard and Ruighaver’s (2006) 
conclusion that a number of business organisations are forced to conform to existing 
internal data security compliance and security roles. This conclusion is evidenced by 
the comment of the RetailGroup’s data compliance manager;  
 “We are extraordinarily well-organised security management team, and every 
member of our management team work for what it’s worth in their roles in 
preventing IIDTRC. People have been very hard working, but we’re moving beyond 
the point where grace will win the day if managers begin to switch their roles”. 
This comment shows that RetailGroup managers are explicitly empowered to intervene 
and make independent decisions in order to address challenging data security issues, 
but this can militate against them following if they consider alternatives to their 
existing roles and responsibilities. Similarly, a comment from the Software Engineer 
from the RetailGroup reaffirms that the issue of cultural orientation has impacts on the 
roles and responsibilities of security management and security managers are more 
concerned about his or her peculiar roles.  
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This is evidenced by the comment from of the Software Engineer, when asked to 
describe his cooperation and working relationship with the other management team, the 
Software Engineer said;  
“I would always continue with my major job roles, which is basically designing of 
‘RetailGroup’ secured systems applications, when the need for computer crimes 
issue comes up, the management handles those…”  
This statement corresponds to perceptions of the RetailGroup’s Data Compliance 
manager that the cultural orientation of the management. These perceptions revealed 
the common belief in the RetailGroup that each manager has to stick to their job roles 
with little or no contribution to the collaborative effort regarding internal data security 
and IIDTRC prevention. Only the top management are involved in designing and 
implementing security strategies in preventing IIDTRC. The shop floor managers see 
internal data security regulations and IIDTRC prevention as the business of the top 
management alone. 
However, Popa and Doinea (2007) argue that issue of cultural orientation where only 
the top managers are concerned with the issues of IIDTRC incident might linked to 
perception of top managers regarding the sensitive and complex nature of IIDTRC.  
Popa and Doinea (2007) suggest that some businesses managers often do not trust the 
capabilities of the shop floor security and data compliance management. In some cases, 
companies perceive data security issues regarding IIDTRC prevention as a complex 
security practice that requires the expertise of top data security management.  In 
agreement to Popa and Doinea (2007), Koh et al., (2005) suggests that because of 
nature of IS security in business organisation only small group of management is 
involved in implementing IS security strategies against IIDTRC and this could pose a 
major challenge in the business organisations. Hence, the issue of addressing the 
increasing workloads of preventing IIDTRC with a few management teams requires a 
strategic balance between company owners and the management.  
Furthermore, some RetailGroup security management believes that amount of attention 
that would be given to particular IIDTRC incident would depend on the nature and the 
class of the incidents. This issue of IIDTRC incidents’ characteristics and 
classification was discussed above as it has an influence on the amount of effort the law 
enforcement agency/police input in IIDTRC investigation.  
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In the same vein, security management believes that some IIDTRC incidents should be 
treated with respect to the IIDTRC incident profile - ‘who is’ the perpetrator, ‘where’ 
the perpetrator comes from and what ethnic origin is the perpetrator. The IS security 
management is inclined to think that some employees with some cultural features are 
more prone to perpetrating IIDTRC than others. Because of the cultural influence in the 
way the IS security management handles IIDTRC incidents, some of the incidents are 
not given due attention because the suspect is from ‘developed’ countries or ethnic 
‘majorities’. The RetailGroup’s Head of Crimes Investigation remarked: 
“Most crimes incidents we have observed are often perpetrated by the employees 
from the ‘minority ethnic groups’…although, sometimes there are bad ones from 
this country, but their cases are not as ‘that bad’ compared to that of those from 
those ‘minorities’.”  
This statement reveals that the cultural orientation of the IS security and crime 
prevention management of the RetailGroup influences their roles in preventing 
IIDTRC. This statement suggests that some of the crime prevention managers seemed 
to believe that employees from the ‘developing’ or ‘less developed’ countries are more 
susceptible to crimes than those from developed countries. Drawing upon this remark, 
this research explains that security and crime prevention management held a biased 
view of the employees as a consequence of only coming into contact with non-abiding 
law abiding employees from minority ethnic background. This finding is in line with 
the suggestion by Westley (1970) which explains that security officers within the 
occupational roles of control often experience hostility from the environment with 
ethnic minority in which they operation causing them to perceive them as environment 
prone to crimes.  
In a similar study, Skolnick (1966) explains that security officers respond to crimes 
incidents in a way that predict situations and perpetrators which present the greatest 
risk to the security management. Skolnick (1966) suggests that security officers refers 
such perpetrators as the ‘symbolic assailant’, which means a profile of individual 
whose appearance, ethnic background, demeanour represents an indicator of criminal, 
irrespective of whether the individual actually commits crimes. Having this 
occupational culture, Cosgrove (2011) argues that the security officers are inclined to 
be suspicious in identifying abnormal crimes related activities. In doing so, the security 
officers gather information on innocent individuals which officers may have assumed 
to be at the risk of offending in a way that satisfies perception of the symbolic assailant.  
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Previous literature on how the cultural orientation undermines security 
compliance with rules/regulations 
Previous studies (e.g. Westley, 1970; Cain, 1973; Waddington, 1999a; Scerra, 2011) 
refer this perception as a culture of ‘racial and ethnic minorities prejudice’ which is 
common not only in the police occupation but also in the related crimes prevention 
setting. In particular, Scerra (2011) characterises this issue of cultural orientation of the 
crime prevention managers in managing IIDTRC as ‘investigating stereotypes’; where 
the crime prevention managers use stereotypes in dealing with their roles, functions and 
practices. This issue has also been noted by Sanders and Young (2002) that cultural 
orientation of police work in UK affects the way police label suspects based on their 
race and subsequent group. The suspects who fall within marginalised groups in society 
are often vulnerable to prosecution even when they are not guilty (Engel et al., 2002).  
However, this research cannot fully provide answers to question of why IS security and 
crimes prevention managers of RetailGroup act the way they do without considering 
the meaning the managers ascribe to their actions and the retail business environments. 
IS security and crime prevention management in the RetailGroup is moulded as 
multicultural professionals that comprise of individuals from multi-facet cultural 
backgrounds. Newburn and Webb (1999) argue that the issue of cultural orientation is 
synonymous with challenge commonly experienced by security managers in preventing 
of business or corporate crimes. They suggest that one of the major factors that 
encourage a cultural perception of management in the prevention of crimes is a high 
degree of internal solidarity and secrecy within the security management. They further 
added that any attempt to curb this influence in a business organisation results in 
cynicism and displeasure.  Similarly, Paoline (2003) argues that crimes prevention 
managers develop cultural oriented attitudes, norms and values in relation to their 
occupation as means of adapting to demand of their work and also a means to cope 
with the scrutiny of their organisational environment.  
In addition, McConville and Shepherd (1992) had discussed cultural orientation 
regarding security management as an occupational issue which common in the crimes 
prevention settings. They argued that what some lower level and shop floor crime 
prevention managers learn in their occupation is the need to keep their mouth shut 
about unethical security practices, including those in breach of the security compliance 
rules, which experienced managers deem necessary in discharging security 
management roles and responsibilities.  
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In doing this, Reiner (1992, p.93) argues that the crimes prevention managers at all 
levels tend to adopt secrecy as ‘a protective armour shielding them from public 
knowledge of ‘culturally oriented unethical security’ infractions’. Newburn and Webb 
(1999) further added that it is not just about secrecy, but organisational or occupational 
level of bureaucracy, strong bond of loyalty, rated integrity of leadership, solidarity of 
characteristics work subcultures, moral career stages of the security managers and 
perception of legitimate opportunities.  
Other sociological studies (e.g.Van Maanen, 1974; Manning, 1989) argue that crimes 
prevention managers form culturally oriented unethical security attitudes, beliefs and 
values due to the challenging experiences associated with their occupation of crimes 
prevention. These studies suggest that working in crimes prevention setting with 
limited cultural training and a remit for reassurance are likely to be overwhelmed by 
strains associated with the crimes prevention.  
 
Implication of the cultural orientation in the IIDTRC prevention 
The implication of these issues linked to the cultural influence could be significant on 
prevention of corporate crimes such as IIDTRC. The culturally oriented unethical 
security practices within ‘crime prevention management culture’ has been identified in 
several report (e.g Criminal Justice System) and official enquiries as both encouraging 
and facilitating inefficiency and hampering security strategies and management effort 
in crimes prevention (Newburn and Webb, 1999). Fitzgerald (2007) points to the 
causes of these cultural issue to wider crime prevention challenges which include: 
inadequacy of educational training of the security managers (especially with regard to 
culturally oriented unethical security training); abuse of management authority, 
inadequacy of crimes prevention management or poor security management; disregard 
for honesty and the truth in crimes investigation; contemptuous attitude to criminal 
justice system by the crimes prevention manager and rejection of criminal justice 
system application to crimes prevention.  
Moreover, Roukis (2006) suggests that lack of emphasis on the intentions of the 
employees towards ethical security practices could lead to an absence of organisational 
transparency. Lack of transparent security practices of management could lead to 
criminal behaviour; especially when there are occupational challenges and work 
pressure are hard on the security management.  
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Roukis (2006) further added that in a highly challenging occupational environmental of 
crimes prevention, a security manager might be tempted to commit IIDTRC such as 
intellectual property crimes, fraudulent manipulation of company stocks and paying 
bribe to business contractors. Roukis recommends that it is vital to get rid of ambiguity 
from business operational environments and to foster cultural oriented managerial and 
organisational transparency ingrained where defined ethical practices is a corporate 
priority. In support of Roukis (2006) recommendation, other researchers (e.g. London, 
1999; Dion, 2008) suggests that a ‘principled leadership’ could be the way for security 
managers to apply clearly defined culturally oriented ethical business values in their 
occupational life such as fairness, honesty, kindness and mutual respect.  
With principled management integrated with moral courage (use of inner principles to 
do good regardless the personal risks), Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007) suggest, the 
managers would be able to make security decisions on prevention of IIDTRC ‘in the 
light of what is good’ for the cross-functional management team despite personal risks 
of cultural orientation. Punch (1994) suggests that the impact of cultural orientation 
influence in crime prevention can be removed by taking authority to make decisions 
out of the hands of top managers. (Criminal Justice Commission, 1997) recommends 
that cultural influences can also be reduced by rotating on a regular basis the roles and 
position of security managers in ‘high risk’ or sensitive areas. 
The finding from the interviews of RetailGroup has provided the knowledge on the 
impact of the cultural orientation of IS security and crimes prevention managers in the 
roles and practices of IIDTRC prevention. It has unveiled that the cultural orientation 
of the management has a huge influence on their roles in the prevention of the IIDTRC. 
Cultural orientation regarding the organisational culture of the retail companies may 
not be separated from the IS security management. This analysis of the views from 
RetailGroup shows that various interpretations of IS security management are cultural 
constructs underpinned by core assumptions and values held by members of IS security 
management in different roles. These values portrayed by the IS management arise 
from cultural, ethical, organisational and social dimensions. Drawing from this research 
findings, one could add that issues of cultural orientation of management in an 
organisation are socially induced. Thus, criminal events and preventions, the issues of 
IIDTRC as in this research, are connected to fundamental features of the societal 
culture that hosts the business organisation. For an effective prevention of IIDTRC in 
the retail companies, this finding from the RetailGroup suggests that there is a need for 
a change in the cultural attitudes.  
 Page 187 of 328 
 
This is in line with Braithwaithe’s (1989) argument that there is a strong need for a 
‘change’ within organisation culture in preventing crimes. Braithwaithe (1989) 
suggests that the increased emphasis on managerial responsibility embedded in 
understanding of cultural influence aimed at ensuring compliance is more likely to 
have long-lasting benefits in preventing corporate or business crimes than other 
deterrence via the threat of prosecution. Slapper and Tombs (1999) argue that any 
focus on prevention of corporate business related crimes implies to examine the crimes 
inwardly in terms of organisational culture. Organisations present moral value which 
can symbolise specific organisational identities of their management and employees. 
Based on this argument, Dahler-Larsen (1997) concludes that management and 
employees have a role and responsibility to play in the way the organisational 
operations justify their decision and action regarding security and crimes prevention 
practices.  
The knowledge of the impact of cultural orientation of management as a challenge on 
the prevention of IIDTRC in a particular retail company – the RetailGroup would equip 
IS security managers with a valuable tool for managing the multicultural dimension of 
the management workforce. This knowledge would also equip the management to 
develop a strategic cross-functional and socio-cultural skills needed for preventing 
IIDTRC, investigating IIDTRC incidents and prosecuting IIDTRC perpetrators. This 
research, in line with the findings from previous studies (e.g. Skolnick, 1966; Manning, 
1995), suggests a link between culture and security practices which is a huge challenge 
to security management. This suggestion calls for greater precision in future studies to 
unveil the ‘contours of the impact of the culture in crimes prevention’, especially 
investigating those aspects of the occupational security cultures undermining 
compliance with rules/regulations. 
 
Law Enforcement Agency/Police Indifference: Police indifference is one of the 
major challenges identified in this research, which the security management in the 
RetailGroup remarked that it is affecting their effort in preventing IIDTRC in their 
company. Many of the managers interviewed noted that there is a perception that the 
police officers treat some IIDTRC incidents with indifference. This attitude of 
indifference is rooted in the perception by the police that there are areas within UK 
where crimes are believed to be more prevalent than others.  
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For instance, crimes incidents reports from cities such as London, Birmingham, 
Manchester and Glasgow are given priority by the police response team because the 
cities are seen as sites of notoriety for crimes. If IIDTRC incidents reported to the 
police falls outside these cities, then the police would treat the incidents with disregard.  
Berki (1986) refers this kind of indifference from formal state security officers as 
‘malevolent indifferent’; which can contribute to feeling of insecurity to not only the 
citizens but also to businesses. Berki (1986, p.11) explains further that indifference is 
the disregard meted out to citizens with implied feeling  and intention that their 
interests, desires and security should not count at all and should not be treated in the 
same way as other citizens.  
This perception of disregarding crime report from smaller cities or small business 
sectors is affecting the police collaboration in preventing IIDTRC in the retail 
companies. In response to the question of ‘what is the attitude of the police in assisting 
the RetailGroup in fighting IIDTRC’, the Regional Loss Prevention manager stated: 
“We have very good relationship with the police…, with my twelve years of 
experience in the law enforcement agencies we direct our efforts to major cities… - 
London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Birmingham and ‘crimes’ hot spot’, 
in the business environment, the banking sector has been a big target compared to 
other businesses.” 
This issue of indifferences in some cases is a misconception, which often lead to 
negligence on the part of management efforts in preventing IIDTRC in the online retail 
(Prenzler, 2009). This misconception may interfere in some ways the law enforcement 
agency view the crimes in the society which may lead to cases of IIDTRC from the 
small cities being neglected to the detriment of the businesses in those cities. The 
incidents of IIDTRC may continue to increase in the online retail companies unless the 
police changes their attitude of indifference to crimes investigation and give equal 
attention to every crime irrespective of cities or the sector the crimes were committed, 
whether they are high profile crime or low profile crime. This research suggests that 
police are overwhelmed with the perception that since other crimes are rampant in 
bigger cities so would be the IIDTRC. This suggestion points to the reason the police 
believe that IIDTRC crime can be tackled like any other crime. And this evidence 
corresponds to researcher’s (e.g. Flanagan, 2008; Rix et al., 2009) suggestions that 
police rarely cooperate in investigating IIDTRC because these crimes emerge from 
retail sector which is a small sector compared to banking sector.  
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In addition, Ashworth (2005) notes that police would rather get themselves involve 
with high value or violence crimes. Bamfield (2012) agrees with Ashworth (2005) and 
argues that although retail crimes such as internal identity theft related crime might be 
important to the police but may not be one of the top priorities central to their crime 
prevention strategies. The issue of police indifference in cooperating with retail 
management in combating IIDTRC might leave the management open to potential 
litigation for unlawful arrest. This might be the case if a suspected IIDTRC perpetrator 
was arrested without police cooperation and held for somewhat too long.  
When the Head of Crimes Investigation from RetailGroup was asked about the how the 
RetailGroup cope without the police cooperation during the investigation of IIDTRC 
incidents, he noted that; 
“The impact of IIDTRC consisting of losses from disruption caused by an arrest 
without police cooperation harms the relationship between the employees and 
security managers”.  
Reflecting on this response one can deduce that lack of interest shown by the police in 
investigating IIDTRC creates a serious challenge for security managers in the retail 
companies. This observation corresponds to suggestion of Walker et al., (2009) that 
police indifference in cooperating with retail managers in combating IIDTRC has much 
impact on business organisation than the loss accrued through the loss of their business 
assets.  However, Bamfield (2012) suggests that the issues of police indifference linger 
in the retail companies because the police often criticise retailer’s crime prevention 
policy. And, in particular, that prevention of crimes (IIDTRC as it in this research) 
requires specific crime prevention policy changes for the retailers to receive substantial 
police cooperation. This suggestion by Bamfield (2012) supports Seneviratne (2004) 
arguments that police should be liable to their own decision whether to adopt a 
particular policy or prosecuting a perpetrator. And that it is the responsibility of the 
police to post their men to crimes incident, but in whatever crimes detection and 
prosecution, police are not the servant to anyone, except for the law itself.  
Interestingly, these arguments tend to defend the police indifference in investigating of 
crimes and also points to the reason behind the attitude of the police regarding their 
indifference in preventing IIDTRC.  
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In addition, Bamfield (2012) suggests that other issues such as individual decisions, 
corporate culture, operational shortages, may contribute to the police indifference 
attitude in preventing IIDTRC in the retail companies. 
Retail companies are not alone in facing the challenge of police indifference in their 
effort to prevent IIDTRC. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in 2010 Report 
(A Frontline Force: Proposals for More Effective Policing) suggests that there are 
concerns about police inefficiency in crime prevention across business sectors. The 
concerns are worsened by other related issues such as police costs, weak strategic 
police leadership, inefficiency in their organisational structure and complexity of 
dealing with crime investigation where police spend lots of time dealing with minor 
crimes cases (Carter, 2003; Berry et al., 2009; CBI, 2010).  
The Home Office (2011a) policy statement (A New Approach to Crimes) raised similar 
concerns about police indifference in getting grips with the prevention of crimes. 
Comparatively, the CBI’s report and Home Office’s policy statements seem to defend 
the ways things are being done in the police. They argue that the issues of inefficiency 
and bureaucracy in particular within the police contribute to their indifference attitudes 
towards crime prevention. 
Notwithstanding that bureaucracy exists in every institution that deals with crimes 
(Bamfield, 2012), it is vital that police should have a specific ways of dealing with 
IIDTRC in the retail companies. There should be a procedure agreed upon by both the 
retail management and police to minimise the issues of bureaucracy in investigating 
and prosecuting the IIDTRC perpetrators. Provision of clear roles and responsibilities 
between the police and retail management would reduce the brick-wall that might be 
encountered by the police during IIDTRC investigation. Clarifying on the role of the 
both parties would reduce the amount of time spent on particular IIDTRC incident.  
For instance, it could reduce the amount of paperwork regarding IIDTRC incident and 
witness reports. Consequently, clarifying the roles of the police would reduce the 
bureaucracy that might have given birth to indifference, which may curb the impact of 
the IIDTRC in the retail companies. However, this suggestion would only work 
effectively if there are an existing relationship and collaboration between a retail 
company and the local police. The Head of Crimes Investigation from RetailGroup 
noted the difficulty his management team faces in trying to build effective working 
relationship with the local law enforcement agency;  
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 “When there is the change of the head of local area police, all the long built 
relationship, and working team would breakdown…, to build up a relationship with the 
new administration is not easy! Sometimes it is not easy to find the police officer that 
would play the role of effective investigation of IIDTRC…it is always a problem…it is, 
yes it is…this always lead to delays of investigation and prosecutions……”   
This remark suggests that retail management needs to work collaboratively with the 
local police. Another option that would change the police indifference in preventing 
IIDTRC is to establish a system where the retail security officers and police would 
work together. This kind of system (Project Griffin) was initiated in the case of 
counter-terrorism where police, business and the private sector security, emergency 
services and local authorities are coordinated to protect UK cities from terrorism 
(Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS), 2012).  
There should be law police enlistment of retail security officers to enable the retail 
security management work collaboratively with them in protecting retail information 
systems while preventing IIDTRC. Such collaboration ingrained with good relationship 
would enable the police to understand the retail operations, reduce the potential 
IIDTRC investigation bureaucracy and thus change the police indifference attitude in 
preventing IIDTRC in the retail companies. 
 
6.3.2 Summary of Results from RetailGroup  
The findings from the RetailGroup have provided an insight of the nature of internal 
identity theft-related crimes in a typical UK online retails company. In particular, the 
finding suggests that RetailGroup may understand the features of internal identity theft 
related crimes (IIDTRC); there are still challenges that require their management 
attention. One of the major challenges is the lack of clarity of management 
responsibility with regard to data security and prevention of IIDTRC. There is also an 
issue of unclear internal policy and varying understanding of data security related 
issues across the levels of employees. There are instances of varying security strategies 
attributed to the nature of the crimes, the law enforcement indifferences to issues of 
IIDTRC and cultural orientation of the perpetrators.  These varying issues and 
segregated data security roles weaken implementation of data security strategies. On 
the other hand, this case study suggested that training of employees is very difficult to 
achieve in RetailGroup due the time and cost associated implications.  
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RetailGroup may have incentives to invest the significant resources in training their IT 
security and crimes prevention employees, but budget constraints and operational 
changes are still the challenges to deal with. As a result, they continue to adopt 
coercive data security strategy approaches which pay off on short term basis.  
However, while RetailGroup IIDTRC prevention issues may be an extreme case, 
perceptions of participants and findings discussed above cannot be considered 
complete representative of IIDTRC prevention management issues in the UK online 
retail sector. The purpose of this case study was not to identify all the features of the 
nature of IIDTRC and the complete list of IIDTRC prevention challenges in online 
retail companies. It was used to bridge of the research gaps identified in the literature 
review above.  
In addition, the findings from the RetailGroup provided the background for the 
confirmation of the assumptions that was conceptualised by the role-based framework 
(RBF) in chapter 3. Since this analysis is limited to the context of RetailGroup, it was 
used explore and generate some significant issues for further investigation.   
To investigate on how the retail management could minimise the impact of these 
IIDTRC prevention challenges, the RBF approach was applied in analysis of the 
information security audit conducted in the three retail companies: Xtail, Ytail and 
Ztail. The next section provides the results. 
 
6.4 Results from Xtail, Ytail and Ztail: Cross Case Analysis 
This chapter analyses the data from Xtail, Ytail and Ztail collected through participant 
observation and convergent interview. The practicalities of participant observation 
have been discussed in section 5.3.3.5 and manual content analysis, as discussed in 
section 6.3 above, was used for the convergent interview. The cases of Xtail, Ytail and 
Ztail were used to extend the application of role-based framework. Yin (1994) and 
Huberman and Miles (1994) suggested that that investigating multiple cases enables the 
researcher to build a logical and multiple chains of evidence to establish theoretical 
assumption. Hence, this chapter identifies the chain of evidence for the analysis of all 
the cases on the basis of the Role-based framework. This section investigates the RBF 
proposition that:  
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 Collaboration of the management has impact on the management roles (IS/T 
and crime prevention) in prevention of IIDTRC; and  
 The collaboration of management roles has an impact on the implementation 
of tools required for the prevention of IIDTRC.  
Thus, it provided the answers to the research questions 2a and 2b in the chapter 1 of 
this study respectively:  
 To what extent do the attributes of the framework influence the internal 
identity theft related crimes prevention practices?  
 To what extent do the IS management influence the effectiveness of identity 
theft related crimes prevention framework implementation? 
The investigations were based on: how robust are the conducted Information Security 
Audit (ISA) evaluation, measured on the three key criteria – time, logistics, 
effectiveness; does it meet the objectives of intended auditee company? What was the 
relationship between the auditor and auditee compared to the status quo? Was there 
anything new compared to what the auditee was used to?  
The taxonomies of the related findings to these questions are presented in tables with 
respect to Xtail, Ytail and Ztail, and results of the cases are interpreted in relation to 
their commonalities and their differences. This approach enabled the researcher to 
focus on the status quo of the auditee past audit practices and compare them with what 
was observed. Hence, the generated codes from the interviews and results from the 
observation were compared to provide a comprehensive research results.   
The researcher analysed collated data based on the stipulations of ISO 19011:2011 
described 5 above. However, in some procedures where convergent interview were 
impractical field notes were used to capture critical data regarding the authority 
expressed by the participating companies.  
 
 
6.4.1 Management Collaboration for IIDTRC Prevention in Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
To investigate the extent to which Xtail, Ytail and Ztail management collaborated to 
discharge their responsibilities of information systems audit given the potential for 
internal identity theft-related crimes in their companies, the researcher evaluated the 
following ISA main procedures based on the stipulations of ISO 19011:2011.  
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Cases Management 
Position 
ISA Approach Approx. Auditing Duration 
Investigation 
 
 
Implementation 
Xtail Head of IT Support Joint Party  (internal  +  
external  + Researcher) 
3 days 4 days 
IS Security Auditor 
Ytail Operations Manager Second party (External 
Only + Researcher) 
 7 days 10 days 
Account General 
Manager 
Ztail Customer Acct 
Manager 
First party (Internal 
Only + Researcher) 
5 days 8 days 
Internal ISA 
 
Table 40: ISA Team and Duration of Cases (Xtail, Ytail, Ztail) 
The findings from Xtail, Ytail and Ztail reveal that their management recognise the 
importance of the Information Systems Audit (ISA) needed to protect their customers’ 
data from Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes (IIDTRC) and data leakages Table 40 
shows the respective companies (Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail) with the participant’s 
management position, ISA approaches and approximated auditing duration.  
IS security priority areas 
investigated 
Are they Applicable to the Companies? 
Xtail Ytail Ztail 
Legal and data Protection Yes Yes Yes 
Data Yes Yes Yes 
Disposal Yes Yes Yes 
Business Continuity Yes Yes No 
Data Field Yes No No 
Physical Security Yes Yes Yes 
Personnel  Yes Yes Yes 
Websites Yes Yes No 
Network Yes No No 
Infrastructure (Laptops, 
Logical Access, Servers) 
Yes Yes for Laptops; No for 
Servers and Logical Access 
No 
PCI Yes Yes Yes 
OfCom Yes Yes Yes 
Table 41: ISA Priority Areas in Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail 
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The use of the collaborated ISA approach by Xtail was been boosted by the audit team 
members – IS security auditor and head of IT support, where the essential skills were 
applied to provide satisfactory ISA assessment. However, Ytail’s and Ztail’s scopes of 
using the audit team comprised of customer account management led to protracted 
audit duration; since the customer account manager could not provide answers to the 
technical IS/IT security related risks. This issue of using an unskilled audit team that 
was unaware of emerging ISA techniques resulted in non-assessment of some IS 
priority areas (as shown in table 41 above) which may pose IIDTRC risks.  
The Ytail and Ztail’s lack of Information Security (IS) investment justification centred 
on investing in respectively second party audit and first party audit might have been 
appraised using the collaborated ISA approach adopted by Xtail. For instance, timely 
audit planning, satisfactory audit criteria, comprehensive audit scope and organised 
audit team (although acknowledged in some cases Ytail) were not readily meet by Ytail 
and Ztail.  Hence, to investigate the extent to which Xtail, Ytail and Ztail management 
collaborated to discharge their responsibilities of information systems audit given the 
potential for internal identity theft-related crimes in their companies; the researcher 
evaluated the following ISA main procedures based on the stipulations of ISO 
19011:2011:  
i. Audit Plan 
ii. Audit Criteria 
iii. Audit Scope  
iv. Audit Team 
v. Audit Duration (Time) 
vi. Audit Findings 
vii. Audit Conclusions 
 
Audit Plan: For the Xtail, the planning was timely and detailed. Both the auditor and 
auditee cooperation was smooth. The verification by the external auditor noted that the 
necessary resources were available and the needed tools were in place. As for Ytail, the 
necessary planning was done by the external auditor. The expected completion date for 
the auditing was extended. Most of the auditing tasks were left to the external auditor. 
In Ztail, though the planning was timely but did not meet compliance requirements 
because it was limited to the objectives that were only applicable to the auditee. The 
internal auditor in Ztail noted that their practices were based on the stipulations from 
the Ztail top management. 
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Audit Criteria: Xtail met all audit criteria. The resources (technical and human) were 
identified and put in place before the commencement of the audit. The objectives of the 
audit activities were clearly defined. All the policy documents were complete and were 
up to date. The audit compliance requirements were met. The last audit conclusion and 
the implementation made after that was presented. In Ytail the policy documents were 
not available. In some cases, they made calls to request for the documents. Some of the 
issues related to role clarification – ‘who does what’ extended the audit programmes 
duration.  The management of the Ytail was not coordinated.  
The audit personnel records were not established and maintained. The visiting data 
compliance manager noted that change is required to the IS management.  Similarly, 
for the Ztail, the relevant ISA documents were available. Audit criteria were reserved 
for security infrastructure and issues that would benefit their company.   
For instance, there is no policy initiated by the company that covers ‘Data Field’, 
‘Business Continuity’, ‘Network’ and ‘Server’ element of ‘Infrastructure’ (as marked 
No in table 46 above). The auditee customer account manager noted that ‘Ztail’ is only 
concerned about the data they pulled from the main server. Since they do not store the 
customers data on their system – ‘make use of only the pulled data’; it is the 
responsibility of the IS security management in their head office. This observation was 
noted as a major issue.  
Audit Scope: Xtail presented a comprehensive organisational chart showing the 
responsibility of each component. The platform was set for the audit activities. The 
contribution of the head of the IT Security support combined with the internal auditor 
was good. In Ytail, although there was apparently 3 weeks of notice before the audit 
commenced, there was no arrangement put in place that explains the organisational 
structure. For instance, the HR office was locked for hours when we visited to ask for 
the policy covering ‘sacked employee leaving procedure’. Similarly, we could not get 
access to infrastructure, data field information, etc. (as marked No in table 46). The 
Ztail’s management structure was well presented. They went far as ensuring that all the 
necessary management team was available when needed. We observed that the internal 
auditor had prepared the management team ahead of the audit. This was noticeable 
from the body language of some of the management. There were panics, disarray and 
jittery in some cases. 
Audit Team: In the same vein, Xtail recorded the as the best audit team. They had a 
comprehensive audit plan and audit criteria. The team communication was smooth. 
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Xtail’s audit team had good knowledge of the organisation structure and units. 
Technical support was available throughout the audit activities and programme.  
In the case of the Ytail communication between the operation manager and customer 
account manager was not coherent. There were cases of shifting responsibilities. For 
instance, when asked about their Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI 
DSS) compliance, their reactions show that they do not know the consequences of not 
being compliant to PCI. The external auditor noted the issues as high risk and was 
reflected in their audit report. They were asked to treat the issue with urgency. 
Although there was smooth communication at the earlier stage of the audit in Ztail, but 
it started to break down at the investigation and document review stage of the audit. 
The internal auditor relinquished most of the responsibilities to their companies head 
office. Some of notable non-compliance issues we observed were shifted to the 
responsibility of the top management. The team always tried to avoid taken 
responsibility for IIDTRC risk issues raised.   
Audit Duration (Time): It took approximately 7 workings days for the audit in Xtail – 
including the time for the implementation IIDTRC risk issues, feedbacks, audit reports 
and conclusions. This excludes the time for the notification of the audit appointments 
and preparations. This observation reveals that it took almost one-fifth of the audit 
duration for Xtail to complete the ISA tasks, even to some level of satisfaction. In 
Ytail, it took about 17 working days to sort all audit issues: from implementation to the 
feedback. In some cases, the external auditor coerced the Ytail with a strict deadline. 
Not as much longer in Ztail, it took about 13 working days to implement all the notable 
recommendations noted in Xtail and Ytail. 
Audit Findings: Xtail made the IS Security Priority Areas (shown in the table 46 
above) available for investigation. Most of the colour coding was shown in green with 
few in amber. This shows that there was a low risk of IIDTRC related issues. In 
contrast, Ytail could not provide answers to areas such as ‘Data Field’, ‘Websites’, 
‘Network’ and some elements of the ‘Infrastructure’ (Logical Access, Servers). Similar 
to Ytail, Ztail could not provide security assurance on the following: Business 
Continuity, Network, Data Field, Websites, and Infrastructures. 
Audit Conclusions: The observation from Xtail above revealed that Xtail conducted a 
robust ISA in the prevention of IIDTRC, having met all the audit objectives with all 
the IT essential IT security tools and resources made available.  
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As for the Ytail, their approach and audit procedure were poor. Most of the 
responsibilities were left for the external auditor.  It would lead the company to spend 
more for the audit since it involves a protracted period due to delays and poor 
planning. Similar to Ytail, the Ztail audit team was protective in their approach. This 
perception affected the audit objective. There were issues of inconsistencies and 
shifting responsibilities on the significant IIDTRC risk issues. 
 
6.4.2 Factors that Influence the ISA Performances in the Xtail, Ytail and Ztail 
The use of convergent interview to investigate what have influenced the performance 
of Xtail, Ytail and Ztail in their used of the Information Systems Audit (ISA) to prevent 
Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes (IIDTRC) revealed the following key factors; 
 Clarity of Auditors Roles 
 Audit Attitudes and Auditors Perception  
 IT Security Knowledge 
Clarity of Auditors Roles: Clarity of Auditors Roles was mentioned as being vital to 
the performance of Xtail. For instance, the Head of Security Support in Xtail stated: 
 “Auditor should be explaining what security controls are in use in their auditee 
companies, and why the controls, prior to the start of security audit…”  
On the other hand, the security auditor in Xtail agreed with Head of Security Support 
and expressed her displeasure with the quality of external auditor contracted to their 
company. She noted that it is important that the information security auditor should be 
very clear in explaining what is needed to be reviewed and why. These statements from 
the Xtail suggest that organisational structure may have an effect on the auditor’s 
performance their discharge of their roles and responsibilities.  
Audit Attitudes and Auditors Perception: Both auditors and security professionals 
noted that auditor's attitude and perception about the role of ISA in the prevention of 
internal identity theft related crimes were important. In response to question of his 
perception in collaborating with auditee, the external auditor in the Ytail stated that;  
“Although this is not always the case, with my experience most of IT security 
professionals in the auditee see us as collaborators..., this experience has made me  
believe collaborating with professionals helps to take effective review of security issues 
and tries to integrate system-wide to leverage existing human and IT resources, …” 
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In contrast to this view, when the operation manager at Ytail was asked why there is no 
IT/IS professional in their audit team, he answered that;  
“….it is the job of the external ISA auditors…., we paid for these issues to be sorted 
by them (external auditors)…one thing about most of these auditors...or such 
bodies…is that they can never be pleased...though some of them are very easy to 
get on with…sometimes you won’t be lucky to have nice ones around…”  
This statement suggests that some of the auditee companies are left with no option than 
to abandon their companies ISA or related checks to the regulatory bodies.  In addition, 
these statements suggest that there is a perception of low expectations of ISA services 
by this manager and also that paying for ISA services might be enough for their 
company’s data security. This perception that paying for ISA checks to the external 
bodies is enough for effective internal data security seems to contribute to the poor 
audit performance observed in both cases (Ytail and Ztail). It also shows that attitudes 
of some external auditors in auditee companies could bring negative impact to the audit 
performance. This suggests the reasons for the lack of planning, inconsistencies and 
lack of cooperation between the external auditor and audit team.  
 
Information Systems Security Knowledge 
The influence of Information Systems Security Knowledge on the performance of 
Xtail, Ytail and Ztail in their used of the Information Systems Audit (ISA) to prevent 
Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes (IIDTRC) is based on Xtail’s audit scope. Xtail 
utilised the expertise of their head of IT security support and matched his role with 
their internal auditor to create a strong internal IS control system. The audit team 
brought the potential IIDTRC risks in there at the forefront of the external auditor and 
demonstrated the strategies on which they are working to resolve the flaws. This 
practice enables both the external and internal auditor to work cooperatively and timely 
to resolve the potential IIDTRC issues.  
From the investigated practices of Ytail and Ztail, there are ISA issues related to poor 
planning, inconsistencies and shifting of responsibilities in either case. These issues 
have a great impact in meeting the aims and objectives of the ISA. It put a question 
mark on the relationship between the auditors and auditee companies. In both cases, 
the auditors shifted their responsibilities to the companies’ management team. They are 
entangled in the perception of seeing their workings of the ISA as status quo routine 
services. These practices affected their performance of the audit checks.   
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In both cases, the IS priority areas were unchecked because ‘there was no one’ 
answerable to these issues. The loopholes that pertain to these unchecked priority areas 
pose high potential risks of IIDTRC and data leakages to both companies; compared to 
the observations from Xtail. This observation shows, perhaps in case of Ytail, that 
members of the team did have much knowledge of the IT/IS security related issues.  
6.4.3 Impacts of ISA Approaches in IIDTRC Prevention in Xtail, Ytail, Ztail  
The outcome of the investigation on how robust the Information Security Audit (ISA) 
conducted in the cases meets the objectives of audited companies was analysed based 
on the three key criteria: time, logistics and effectiveness. The finding from the 
comparative analyses of Xtail, Ytail and Ztail suggests that cost reduction and internal 
security control were identified as the major impacts of using different ISA approaches 
in the prevention of internal identity theft-related crimes. 
Cost Reduction Benefits: The use of first party audit and second party audit in 
respective cases of Ytail and Ztail allowed for the perceived ISA cost benefits of not 
paying for the IT management. However, subjectively, these companies incurred 
indirect costs of protracted audit duration and potential IIDTRC risks compared to 
Xtail. Xtail utilised the combined support of their Head of IT security, security auditor 
and the external auditor to ease the burden of audit roles and responsibilities. The ideal 
of combined support enabled Xtail to prepare the audit plan in advance to the meet the 
audit criteria and expected targets.  When the internal auditor of Xtail was asked about 
their roles in meeting the objectives of the audit criteria, she noted that her audit team 
knew the inspection process in advance.  In her words,  
“We would always check the previous examination manual and audit checklist. …in 
some cases, we do obtain the documents from the IS security audit regulatory body. 
Besides, we often attend some ISA professional workshops. These practices 
prepared us ahead to work with the external auditors as this…”   
This statement suggests that Xtail audit team has good knowledge of the changes in 
their company and IS business environments. Xtail have endeavoured to enforce and 
update recommendable priorities within the audit regulatory agency. This attribute 
facilitated their audit performance and provided room for suggestions and new 
requirements. They were open to accommodate new ideas by detailing some of the 
problems they had in the past and how they tackle them. This demonstrated their level 
of integrity and competence, not only to the external auditor, but to the Xtail as their 
organisation.  
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Benefit of Internal Security Control Assurance: It was observed that sound internal 
security control attributed to Xtail’s robust practices of meeting audit criteria. They 
presented audit log documents and follow-up processes were established while 
ensuring their audit compliance and proactive check to IIDTRC risks. Xtail’s audit 
team also noted that the absence of evidence for the internal audit programme could be 
a sign of deficiency and such an issue can create bias between them and the visiting 
auditor. It might extend the audit duration and incur more costs, not only for the 
auditor but also for the logistics – disruption of business activities.  Xtail noted that 
using a collaborated audit approach pays in reducing the IIDTRC risk as it avails the 
opportunity to leverage on the audit skills lacking in their company. It is availed them 
to the audit assessment tools such as software to meet the advancing IS/IT world. The 
Xtail’s head of IT security supported this view while discussing their audit plan, he 
noted; 
 “…You don’t have to be spending money on every IT programme and chips…they 
are money……in some cases it doesn’t worth investing….”  
This statement suggests that the management of Xtail is still reluctant in investing in 
improving their IT security programme, and that some of investment on the effective 
internal security tools do not worthwhile.  
 
6.4.4 Summary of Xtail, Ytail and Ztail Cases Analysis 
The analysis of the results across the cases draw a line between collaborated and 
independent audit approach which weigh how the management of Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail 
prevent internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) based on the evaluated audit 
practices – plan, criteria, scope, duration, etc. The approach of the collaborated audit 
observed in Xtail provides ISA team with an assurance that the audit report, efficiency 
and effectiveness of the audit operations are in compliance with ISA regulations.  The 
result has suggested that the collaborated ISA approach adopted by Xtail enhances the 
management effort in building a strong work ethics that was shown by their level of 
integrity and competence. And this is evidence by their performance in meeting the 
information security requirement in the prevention of IIDTRC.  
In addition, the collaborated ISA approach enabled the Xtail audit team to detect 
loopholes in their IT security systems and tackle them effectively. 
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Collectively, these attributes of collaborative ISA suggest that a directed the 
management effort established in the Xtail provided them with an effective internal 
security control and improved risk assessment against IIDTRC. These findings suggest 
that if the management can take control of internal IS security issues, it would ease the 
ISA procedures, reduce the audit time and cut down logistics.  
The collaborated ISA approach can also promote the sharing of security expertise and 
IT skills that can contribute to effective ISA in the prevention of IIDTRC. It vital to 
note that collaborated ISA idea enhances the chance to identify IIDTRC risks as 
evidence in the case of Xtail which have shown that integration between audit and IT 
security management at Xtail contributed to  robust ISA. In contrast, in the Ytail and 
Ztail where the audit practices and management roles sharing functionality were not 
collaborated, the impact of ISA in IIDTRC prevention could not be realised. 
Collaboration can make it possible for management to share their roles/responsibilities 
in relation to IIDTRC prevention, thereby improving the likelihood that effective 
IIDTRC prevention implementations. The analysis of the results from these cases 
suggests that effective information security audit in relation to the prevention of 
IIDTRC depends on the collaboration of management effort and roles. The IIDTRC 
prevention requires that the management efforts and roles among the IT security and 
crime prevention management should be shared with one another. 
 
6.5 Summary of Data Analysis and Results 
This chapter has provided an analysis of the result of the data collected from the 
archival cases and selected cases: RetailGroup, Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail. The findings 
from the archival analysis have provided evidence that corporate and personal identity 
theft related crimes perpetrated through account take over and account withdrawal as 
the common in the online retail sector.  The findings from the RetailGroup provided 
some results which complement the results of the archival cases. Though, there were 
some issues the respondents passively addressed. For instance, there was no 
information from the RetailGroup to indicate the number of cases of IIDTRC in their 
organisation. They also avoided providing answers the nature of IIDTRC prevention 
tools they are using in their organisation. Perhaps, these issues were passively treated 
due to security concerns. The results from the RetailGroup has provided insight about 
the challenges faced by the IS security management on implementing IIDTRC 
prevention strategies.  
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The results showed that challenges identified here were encountered by the IS security 
management, as an individual and as a team in carrying out their IIDTRC related roles 
and responsibilities. In addition, the findings from the RetailGroup has provided the 
empirical background on how the RBF attributes could be applied to managed the 
identified challenges. 
The findings from the Xtail, Ytail and Ztail have shown how the management can use 
the collaborative concept of role-base framework (RBF) to tackle the identified 
challenges. As a complementary evidence, the results of the cases (Ytail and Ztail) 
confirmed the basic evidence of the challenges IS security face as identified in 
RetailGroup. The comparative analyses of these cases showed that collaborative roles 
sharing could improve the likelihood of the management performance in 
implementation of IIDTRC prevention practices.  
Xtail case indicated that collaborative roles sharing the attribute of RBF could enhance 
IS security management performance in the IIDTRC prevention. That is, it provides 
the answer that there is a likelihood of the impact of collaboration of management on 
their performance in implementing their roles and responsibilities in relation to 
IIDTRC prevention. These findings cases provided the insight on the important of RBF 
attributes of collaborative roles sharing. This triangulation of empirical evidence on the 
nature of IIDTRC and application of role-based framework in relation to internal 
identity theft related crimes prevention in online retail companies provide the 
background for the discussion in chapter 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page 204 of 328 
 
CHAPTER 7 
RESEARCH DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the results of the study. It relates the findings to the empirical 
suggestions reviewed in chapter two.  It provides critiques of the findings and 
discusses how the research results differ or agree with past empirical studies done in 
the areas of identity theft prevention. Based on the findings from chapter six, this 
chapter extends the discussion of the place of the role-based framework (RBF) in the 
prevention of the Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes (IIDTRC) in online retail 
sector. The discussions are presented in four sections.  
First, it provides an overview of the study, including a problem statement and major 
methods involved in this research. Second, it discusses online retail as a site for 
understanding the multi-faceted nature of the IIDTRC. Third, it discusses the 
challenges identified in chapter six that impact on the extent to which management act 
in preventing IIDTRC. Four, this chapter discusses benefits and implications of using 
RBF to tackle the identified challenges. Majority of this section is devoted to a 
summary and discussion of the four RBF propositions. And this concludes the 
discussion of the pertinence of the results of the role of security management in 
preventing internal identity theft-related crimes in online retail. 
 
7.1 Summary of the Research Problem and Methodology 
Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes (IIDTRC) in e-businesses has risen by nearly 60 
per cent in five years across UK. Over 230, 000 cases of IIDTRC and employees 
related frauds were recorded in England and Wales from January to June 2014 (Office 
of National Statistics, 2014). British Retail Consortium (BRC) (2013) and Kroll Global 
Fraud Report (2013) placed the UK online retail as one of e-business sectors where the 
IIDTRC are prevalent with the IIDTRC incidents rising to 80 per cent compared to 
other retail frauds. As the IIDTRC incidents are increasingly impacting the socio-
economic, cultural and managerial fabric of the online retail, urgent efforts are being 
made to strategize all possible security resources – human, technological and process – 
to prevent the recurring incidents. All the strategies and tools that are increasingly 
being mobilised in the prevention of IIDTRC are placed as the roles of online retail 
security management.  
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The assumptions are that security management is ideally positioned;  
 to reach employees as well colleagues in developing the essential skill to 
prevent IIDTRC, 
 to play an important role in providing essential data security information, and 
 to implement essential security tools and/contribute to attitude change that will 
allow retail companies to protect their Information Systems (IS) infrastructure.  
Information Security management are considered the ‘window of hope’ in preventing 
the IIDTRC because of their statutory jobs roles of ensuring effective data security 
against data theft and data leakages (ACFE, 2014). Along with data compliance 
management, human resource management and law enforcement agencies, information 
security management are assumed to have essential skills required to integrate people, 
processes and technology for prevention of IIDTRC in online retail companies (Valrie 
and Rabih, 2013). In spite of this important role of information security management, 
however, the bulk of the research on identity theft prevention has focused on generic 
preventive strategies and tools rather on the management themselves that implement 
the tools.  
A few studies have examined the current and potential role of security management in 
the prevention of IIDTRC in a defined business setting like online retail. And, in 
general, there appears to be an implicit assumption on the part of practitioners in 
information systems that provided management are given clear roles and are 
collaborative in prevention of IIDTRC, they will – regardless of their individual 
management roles – ensure that security tools are implemented effectively to protect 
online retail companies’ IS infrastructure.  
The overall purpose of this study was to provide a framework for prevention of 
IIDTRC in online retail companies and to understand how the framework can be 
applied to the online retail IS security management. In this manner, this study sought to 
fill the gap in the research on roles of IS security management in the identity theft 
prevention which has typically focused on cataloguing IIDTRC prevention strategies, 
but without relating them directly to management practices and roles. The assumption 
of this study was that a better understanding of the nature of IIDTRC in online retail 
and the contextual practices that influence management collaboration in carrying out 
their roles could provide a key input into the design of practical strategies that will 
strengthen the management performance of IIDTRC prevention.   
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Acknowledging that the integration of practices and theories in studies of IIDTRC in 
online retail setting is generally lacking (Kardell, 2007; ACFE, 2014), Role-based 
framework and organisational role theory were used as basis for the inquiry into 
collaborative roles of management in prevention of IIDTRC. Other important issues 
which could impact roles of information systems security management were identified 
and operationalized in the course of this study based on an extensive review of the 
extant literature as well as on the interview discussions and observations in the data 
collection phase. In this manner the following issues were identified as possible 
predictors of management impact to prevent IIDTRC in online retail; understanding of 
the nature of IIDTRC, challenges of preventing IIDTRC, and collaborative roles 
sharing in implementing of IIDTRC prevention practices. Previous studies have 
typically examined identity theft prevention in online retail from the perspective of 
generic framework intent (built on the external factors and on the concept software 
security); neglecting the unique operationalizing nature retained by every business 
sector, internal activities of the employees and impact of management roles.  
However, discussions with the management during the data collection phase of this 
study had However, discussions with the management during the data collection phase 
of this study had indicated that prevention issues of the identity theft related crimes 
was context specific, involve either external and internal of activities of employees or 
combination of both, and could be built on the collaborative roles of all the 
management – human resources, information systems security and crime prevention. 
This study thus departed from the approach taken by other studies by operationalizing 
the predicted management issues ‘collaborative management roles for IIDTRC 
prevention’ in terms of three major issues: understanding the nature of IIDTRC in 
online retail, the clarity of  management roles and practices in prevention of IIDTRC, 
and collaboration of the management in implementing the security tools and strategies.  
These issues underpin the concept of role-based framework (RBF) which assumes that 
the integration of management roles in a collaborative approach would be beneficial in 
implementing IIDTRC prevention practices.  In practice, however, the literature review 
has shown that management role collaboration is affected by number of attributes 
including people, operations, processes, organisational roles, and technology and 
management characteristics. These factors also have also been shown in the previous 
studies (e.g. Biegelman, 2009; Shah and Okeke, 2011; Steinbart, Raschke, Gal and 
Dilla, 2012) to be relevant to the success of information systems (IS) security in 
organisations. 
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Hence, the applicability of RBF was evaluated through the field work to investigate if  
effective IS security as being argued by the suggestions of these previous is likely to be 
subjected to clarity of integrated shared roles the IS security management uphold. This 
study was conducted in the Northwest of UK among the management of online retail 
companies.  A non-experimental qualitative research design was used to examine the 
difference issues that were identified as being potentially important to security 
management in preventing IIDTRC. Data were obtained by conducting interviews 
containing predominantly structured questions in four selected companies. Although 
the study was conducted mainly through interview, participant observation techniques 
were used to: inform the study framework evaluation phase; to aid conceptual 
framework extension; and to assist in the clarification and interpretation of the results 
of this study. This study was conducted in two phase.  
The – archival analysis – phase took place over a period of eight weeks between the 
months of December 2011 and April 2012. During the archival analysis, examples of 
individuals who have been caught attempted to and/or engaged in internal identity theft 
related crimes and frauds were discussed based on their age (at the time of the fraud), 
gender, job title/e-business sector, description of the nature of the fraud (attempt), 
motivation, how caught and lessons learnt. The second phase took place from May 
2012 to September 2012, and covered 20 weeks period during which semi-structured 
interview were conducted (with 12 security and crime prevention managers) as well 
observation of six information security audit personnel. In addition, convergent 
interview was conducted with the six security information audit personnel.  
 
7.2 Online Retail as a Site of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes 
The finding shows that online retail customers are not only victims of IIDTRC. The 
online retail companies suffer a great impact from these crimes. The archival result 
shows that stealing of credit and debit card details, corporate and personal account 
manipulation and account withdrawal are major identity theft crimes in the retail 
sector. This finding agrees with research reports (e.g. Kroll, 2011; CIFAS, 2012) that 
customers’ payment card numbers and details are the major targets. It also agrees with 
the suggestions by Hinds (2007) and Mitnick (2002) that data tampering and copying 
are key methods of carrying of IIDTRC.   
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These suggestions indicate that corporate account details are also at risk as customers’ 
personal identifiable information (PII). The impacts from IIDTRC are inestimable as 
suggested by the examples of the cases of individual that were caught; although the 
indicators of the impacts of IIDTRC incidents are not released to the public may be due 
to the privacy-related issues as it was seen in the archival analysis that some of the 
cases were not in the public domain (Hastings and Marcus, 2006). This finding agrees 
with the suggestions by other researchers (e.g. Stickley, 2009; Hurst, 2010; Shah, 
Okeke and Ahmed, 2013) that companies might not be encouraged to reveal the 
impacts of IIDTRC as  such publicity might bring some irreparable dent and damages 
to their companies’ brand. This issue of protecting the victim companies’ brand and 
reputation is one of the major factors that have led to increasing incidents of IIDTRC 
in online retail sectors. Without reliable data on IIDTRC incidents, it would be difficult 
if not impossible to provide a contextual IIDTRC preventive measure (Laudise, 2008).  
Other factors that were identified as the major factors of increasing IIDTRC in retail 
sector include;  
 Retail business operations; 
 Over-dependency of information security management on software security;  
 Perceptions of the nature of IIDTRC in online retail; 
 Lack of IIDTRC incidents analysis; 
 Absence of human-centred security in online retail; 
Lack of reliable data about internal identity theft-related crimes incidents: 
The finding of the archival analysis was based on the few available data at the public 
and private research domain. This unavailability of data arises from three causes: 
online retail companies rarely share data on IIDTRC incidents; online retail companies 
gather data on IIDTRC incidents for narrow purposes and; IIDTRC perpetrators always 
act to conceal their trails.  First, IIDTRC incidents data are withheld due to concern 
over brand reputation, copycat activities and publicity. Perhaps, also due to privacy 
related issues. Few available data were shared under guarantees of confidentiality and 
under restricted-use agreements. IIDTRC incidents data are only available if there is no 
other option. With these limited access issues, IIDTRC incidents data discussed here 
were rarely available to the researchers. Second, the retail companies have no 
motivation to share data on related to IIDTRC incident. They are only provided for 
selected cases of forensic investigation or legal proceedings.  Sometimes, the available 
data were not organised. In some cases, the databases were not accessible. These issues 
made the archival collation and analysis bit intensive research.  
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Third, most of the IIDTRC perpetrators are skilled enough to cover their trails before 
the detection. In some cases, it takes a short period of time to carry out a successful 
attack. Perpetrators often devised and conceal their perpetration trails. These issues 
contribute to incomplete data capture on their methods of their IIDTRC threats. This 
was noted by researchers (Newman and McNally, 2005) as one of the setbacks of 
identity theft prevention research. However, this study used this archival analysis 
strategy to deliver valuable insights despite the deficiencies in the data material.  
Retail business operations: The archival analysis suggests that retail business 
operations are one of the major factors that accounts for the increasing cases of IIDTRC 
in online retail. The case examples analysis suggest that the use of credit and debit 
cards through mobiles phones have encouraged successful perpetration of IIDTRC in 
online retail compared to other sectors (Meulen, 2006; Forrester and Seeburger, 2013). 
In particular, the archival analysis suggests that desk-based employees that carry out 
most of the end-user online trading through credit or debit cards are more liable to 
IIDTRC than employees from other departments. This trend is followed by 
finance/accounting operation employees and upper executive management. These 
findings suggest that most employees in online retail operation are a potential threat to 
the identity properties because of the situational or the opportunistic nature of that their 
job roles. 
The findings suggested that more attention should be given to the operational 
departments, IT departments and management positions, other than to age and gender. 
Thus, these findings suggested that the characteristics of the IIDTRC perpetrators are 
not likely to be classified based on gender but on their operational departments and 
management. This contradicts the suggestion by the CIFAS (2010) that youths have 
more tendencies to indulge in IIDTRC than adults. In addition, the finding from the 
archival analysis suggests IIDTRC perpetrators are not likely to be categorised based 
on their genders. For instance, from the archival analysis, the age of perpetrators span 
across late 20s to late early 50s, and there was almost no significant margin between the 
numbers of male or female perpetrating IIDTRC in the business organisations.  
Over-dependency of the retail information security managers on software security 
This issue of management relying too much on the software security for prevention of 
IIDTRC was confirmed in the archival cases analyses which suggest that management 
of the companies leaves the activities of the employees to be monitored by security 
systems.  
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This is one of the major issues since the information systems are designed by some of 
the employees, the perpetrators may be as skilled as those that designed the security 
software. For the instance, the case of ‘Mr. Smith’ in the archival analysis cases, a 
software engineer who stole the customers’ card details for his financial gain. The 
detection capability of software security cannot match the effectiveness of the use of 
monitoring and security audit as have seen this example of ‘Mr. Smith’ because he has 
the skills to cover his fraud trails.  
This finding agrees with the study by Allen et al., (1999) and Hofmeyr, and Forrest and 
Somayaji, (1998) that there might the need for the contributions of the software security 
in preventing IIDTRC but cannot equate the human security through monitoring and 
security audit. In addition, this finding suggests that over-reliance on software security 
creates the perception that adequate security are in place. This perception is misleading 
in a way the IS security management neglect the implication such as – the cost of 
maintaining software, updating them and technical-know-how. These findings 
suggested that the way forward for effective internal data security is by developing and 
empowering the end-users through human-centred security such as monitoring and 
security audit.  
Perceptions of the IIDTRC perpetrators in online retail 
The management from the RetailGroup often referred the perpetrators of IIDTRC as 
the employees from the operational departments – call centres. The management that 
were interviewed perceived themselves as the ‘clean employees’ that rarely indulge in 
IIDTRC. This perception of varying understanding of the contextual issues of IIDTRC 
was suggested by Raab (2008) that different business organisation stakeholders 
perceive IIDTRC differently. Johns (1987) and Thompson and Mchugh (2009) agree 
with this suggestion and that the perceptions of seeing low-level employees as the 
potential IIDTRC perpetrators cause gross negligence of the top management who use 
their position to perpetrate these crimes.  
Researchers (Koops et al., 2008; Josselson and McAdams and Lieblich, 2006; 
Newman and McNally, 2005), have suggested that the varying concept of IIDTRC is 
one of the major setbacks of IIDTRC prevention. This study has reaffirmed that these 
varying concepts might be resolved by sector-based research on IIDTRC prevention, as 
done in this research. Perhaps it is through sector-based research like this online retail 
case that these issues could be rectified and resolved holistically.  
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Lack of IIDTRC incidents analysis: Another notable finding from this RetailGroup 
is that it has apparently no culture of crimes incidents analysis or strategy assessment. 
The management accepted that the prosecution of criminals closes the particular crimes 
incidents case. They noted that the IIDTRC case reports are documented for meeting 
reports but not really for analysis and assessment. They also believe that reoccurring 
incidents of these crimes avail them the opportunity to get experience on the intricacy 
of such crimes. This is contrary to the suggestions of RBF which emphasizes the 
importance of crimes incident assessment. RBF suggests that effective crime incident 
analysis and assessment reduces the risks and costs of similar crimes in the future. It 
also serves as a model or a clue for the crime prevention management. In agreement 
with the RBF recommendation, McLaren et al., (2011) noted that for organisation to 
compete in a highly dynamic security marketplace, they must frequently adapt and 
align their security strategies and information system by continuous strategy analyses.  
Some researchers (e.g. Lu and Ramamurthy, 2011; Ransbotham, Mitra and Ramsey, 
2011), have also pointed out that that IT assessed security capability and empirical 
examination of vulnerability data disclosure mechanisms are enablers of firms’ agility 
against any security threats. These strategies boost business organisation’s security 
proactive stance and decrease the volume of exploitation attempts. Yet counter to these 
suggestions, the researcher found out that the crime prevention management in this 
study regarded experiences as the preferred method of improving their data security and 
crime prevention strategies, due to the cost of hiring experts or professionals to manage 
either their internal data security strategies or crimes incidents analyses. As also noted 
by KPMG (1997) and Ernst & Young (1998), prevention of IIDTRC requires effective 
data security risk management within the business organisations in which the analysis 
of the strategies adopted are in-lieu with the extent of the risks involved.  
However, while these researchers suggest that it is the responsibility of management to 
educate employees on data security policy and that the analyses of crimes incidents 
cases are more likely to lead to effective prevention of IIDTRC, this research indicates 
that incident case analysis are not implemented due to some constraints such as finance, 
inadequacy of management, lack of strategy performance measures, inadequacy of 
management and employees’ attitudes.   Ekblom (2002) and Clarke and Eck (2003) 
noted that availability of resources, finance and staffing are among the greatest 
challenges of the crimes prevention within any socio-economic setting, even if there 
exist the clearer strategic crime prevention plans.  
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From this study, it was observed the management also faced the challenges of 
classifying the different types of IIDTRC risks/incidents. This view has a great impact 
in the allocation of the available resources. They struggle to determine priorities and 
areas of assistance in terms of immediate prevention action (low cost action and high 
risk/impact) and long-term interventions (deterrence law and penal reform, major 
policy changes and planning). 
Absence of human-centred security in the online retail: The findings suggest that 
the human roles still play the huge part in preventing of IIDTRC in online retail. The 
12 archival cases examples show that report from customers, law enforcement agencies 
and security audit are the methods through which the IIDTRC perpetrators were 
caught. These agree with the suggestions of Moore (2005) and Cappelli et al., (2006), 
that the responsibilities of IIDTRC prevention lie with the human-centred security.  
There is the need that concerns should also be directed to employees’ operational 
policies and monitoring of the IS security infrastructure. It emphasises the need for 
retail companies to invest in employees training.   
Researchers (e.g. Haagman and Wilkinson, 2011; Waker, 2006; Mercuri, 2005) 
suggest that employees’ training is one of the vital instruments of IIDTRC prevention 
practice. The policy is very salient at any stage of IS security implementation of which 
without clear IS security policy the IT governance of the online retail would not hold 
water (Leon, 2008). Sommer (2012) and Meyers and Rogers (2004) suggests that an 
effective policy implementation is the root on which other IIDTRC prevention 
practices needed to be built on to achieve an efficient information security.  
 
7.3 Lessons from Internal Identity Theft-Related Crimes Cases 
The case analysis based on the profile of the individuals caught perpetrating IIDTRC 
provided a more general characteristics and additional insights of the nature of IIDTRC 
in the online retail.  The IIDTRC cases describe variable such as age and sex of 
perpetrator and department of work/job role, but do not presume that this suggests a 
clear individual IIDTRC perpetrators characteristics that could be acted upon. Rather 
than retail companies infer the characteristics of the IIDTRC perpetrators describe in 
this research, the findings suggest the need to compare them to their individual 
company to determine if or/and why the same perpetrator may or may not depart from 
what was suggested in this case examples.  
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Based on the nine case examples analysed in the section 6.3 above, this research draws 
the following major characteristics of the IIDTRC perpetrators; 
 Perpetrators are not necessarily technical oriented to carry out IIDTRC. 
 The nature of IIDTRC perpetrated by managers is comparatively different 
from IIDTRC by shop floor employees. 
 Most of the IIDTRC incidents were detected by customer complaints, 
information systems audit and colleagues. 
Perpetrators are not necessarily technical oriented to carry out IIDTRC: This 
characteristic of the IIDTRC perpetrators suggests that the seemingly least-threatening 
employees – the call centres employees without technical knowledge or privileged 
access to retail information systems can still cause significant damage. In particular, 
the case of ‘Jane’ (See Section 6.3: Case #1 Personal Identity Theft Related Crimes in 
the Private Domain: Account Takeover) who stole numerous Credit Card that was left 
by customers in a rush after shopping. She might not have the technical capabilities of 
the software engineers, but she used her call-centre skills to use the stolen cards to 
make purchases from her own company’s online portal. 
This finding reinforces the recommendation of the role-based framework that retail 
companies need to adhere to good security principles across all the levels of employees 
irrespective of their job roles. Hence, this study recommends that companies guide 
their policies and practices by restricting all levels of employees’ access control.  In 
addition, retail companies should assume that potential IIDTRC perpetrator will 
leverage exploitable IS security vulnerabilities within the research of most non-
technical employees (Fichtman, 2001).  And there is no amount of IIDTRC prevention 
systems will defend against such perpetrator. Therefore, online retail companies can 
only begin to minimise cases of IIDTRC if it continually strengthens their policies on 
the principle of trusted information systems security and access control mechanisms.  
 
The nature of IIDTRC perpetrated by managers is comparatively different from 
IIDTRC by shop floor employees: Though the business activities and access to 
information systems by managers and shop floor employees may have differed at 
times, managers caused the damages in relation to IIDTRC and evaded being detected 
for longest amount of time. This finding is evidenced by the case of Jessica Harper; the 
head of the Lloyds Banking Group’s Online Security (see the case #1 of Appendix 3). 
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In addition, this characteristic suggests the employees of certain job roles such as 
accountancy and software engineers pose different threats different from the 
employees at the call centres position.  It behoves the companies to consider auditing 
the activities of employees in relation to features of their job roles. It is essential for e-
business companies including financial organisations to develop policies and clearly 
enforce them to the entire employee with respect to their job roles and business 
operation but with equal disciplinary actions. 
Therefore, a corollary to this varying nature of IIDTRC perpetrators is that practice 
should be put in place in the companies to disallow regular exception handling or the 
case of ‘different rules for different employees’. In addition, companies should greatly 
limit the amount of trust they give to employees at the management level. There should 
be granular access control that is effective enough to provide only necessary access to 
the employees in management positions. This study, based on the archival analysis 
findings, suggests that employees in the management position were not closely 
examined or monitored by the victim companies until it is too late. There should no 
case of ‘sacred cow’; no employee should monitored with preference because of their 
management position or because an employee makes more money to the company than 
the other employees.  
Some of the IIDTRC incidents were detected through customer complaints, 
information systems audit and colleagues: The case examples indicate that technology 
played a very small role in enabling the victim companies to detect IIDTRC. However, 
by itself this conclusion could be explained by other factors. Perhaps technological 
approach was largely successful at detecting IIDTRC before more damage was done 
therefore reducing the impact of the crimes. Additionally, even if the technologically 
based security systems had been in place, it could be that the systems were out-dated or 
perhaps have not been installed properly. In the nine case examples discussed in 
Section 6.3, the victim companies were much successful at detecting IIDTRC by 
conducting audits, monitoring the employees’ suspicious behaviour and questioning 
the employees’ abnormal activities. 
Retail companies should establish an anonymous and open communication channel to 
encourage their employees to report suspicious colleagues carrying out IIDTRC. There 
should be frequent impromptu and routine information security audit in place to review 
the operational activities of all employees. There should be a ‘no exception rule’ no 
matter the position of the employee in implementing the checks and audit processes.  
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7.4 Review and Discussion of the Research Propositions  
Four propositions were formulated for this study. For all the four propositions, the 
predicted role-based framework attributes are; 
Proposition 1:  Organisations with greater collaboration of management roles are 
more likely to have effective implementation of IS security strategies required for the 
prevention of IIDTRC; Management with greater interaction implementing data 
security roles are likely to achieve organisational goal on IIDTRC prevention;  
Proposition 2:  The greater the inter-dependency of management in carrying out 
IIDTRC prevention roles, the greater the efficiency in IIDTRC prevention. A 
collaborative relationship between the management and employees is likely to improve 
the employees’ compliance with Information Systems security policies. The 
collaborative relationship is likely to improve the effectives of internal data security by 
directing attention to the IIDTRC risks; 
Proposition 3:  Organisations with greater integration of the management are more 
likely to have effective collaboration between management roles (IS/T and crime 
prevention team) in prevention of IIDTRC;   
Proposition 4:  Management with shared understanding of data security operations 
are more likely to achieve better security strategy in the prevention of IIDTRC. 
Management role sharing is likely to affect the level of performance management in 
preventing IIDTRC.Clearly defining the scope of purpose of IIDTRC prevention 
practices is likely to result in more collaboration and improve performance by the IS 
security management roles; 
In this current study, these propositions are grouped under the heading ‘collaborative 
management roles for IIDTRC prevention’. Each of the propositions was analysed 
from perspectives of different attributes of role-based framework by contrasting 
independent/individual management roles with collaborative management roles.  
In addition, the analysis was extended to the influence of role-based framework on the 
resource efficiency, IS security enhancement and IS security management support.  
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Proposition 1: Organisations with greater collaboration of management roles are 
more likely to have effective implementation of IS security strategies required for the 
prevention of IIDTRC; 
Discussions and Implications 
This is one of the key attributes of RBF which conceptualises the collaboration of 
management for implementation of data security practices for prevention of IIDTRC. 
Online retail companies often neglected collaborative attributes in implementing these 
practices across their operations, as well as process and technologies. The finding from 
the RetailGroup suggests that the management take sharing of the IIDTRC prevention 
practices for granted. They handle IIDTRC prevention in relatively independent and 
predictable ways across their operations while implementing their roles. In particular, 
the case of Xtail suggests that it is vital for the security management their roles and 
practices within the operational environment. Evidences by the Ytail and Ztail show 
that companies that neglect utilising IS management collaborative capabilities usually 
encounter the challenges identified in RetailGroup. 
One of the implications of the lack of collaboration in implementing the IIDTRC 
prevention practices is the issue of misunderstanding in the interpretation of IT security 
terms. The effect of this misunderstanding can lead to a breakdown and management 
override. This issue was observed in Ztail where the internal auditor was protective and 
shifting the responsibility to the company’s top management. For instance Ztail, the 
internal auditor could not resolve issues related to the IS priority areas; instead he left 
the responsibility to the head of management.  The observation recorded in companies 
Ytail and Ztail shows a complete breakdown in communication among the audit team.  
These observations provided insights to PWC’ ISBS report that 56 per cent of business 
managers do not work together with their information security auditors. Instead, they 
leave the responsibility to the information security auditors or rather rely on the 
contingency plans, with the sole intentions to cut cost or invest less in IT security 
maintenance. This issue was also noted by Potter and Waterfall (2012) that less than 
half of the large companies and only a quarter of small ones are collaboratively 
measuring the coordination of their regulatory data compliance and security 
management.  
Moreover, this issue of perception of ISA costs corresponds to the suggestions of Chris 
Porter of PWC ISBS (2012) that most managers often fail to evaluate their ISA 
investment.  
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Based on the perception of the operation manager of Ytail that the approach of the first 
party audit seems to pay-off by hiring the external auditor, but apparently, the cost of 
the expended time for the audit and poor audit execution outweigh the benefits of the 
approach. The operation manager failed to evaluate the pros and cons of paying for the 
external IS security auditor. This observation confirms Cilli (2003) suggestions that IS 
management of online retail fail to provide answers to ISA effectiveness and efficiency 
related questions such as IS security awareness, control and profiling; and performance 
measurement.  
According to the Nieminski (2008), the effective internal control management equips 
the ISA team to be detective, corrective and preventive to the IIDTRC threats. She 
further suggested that any crack in the internal control management of the ISA team 
often lead to limited judgement, breakdowns, management override.  
Another notable implication of lack of collaboration of management in implementing 
effective IIDTRC prevention practices is that companies are likely to develop data 
security practices that align with the IIDTRC prevention challenges they face. Since 
such practices lead to a perception of improved IS security, the management may begin 
to take the challenges for granted. This perception would lead to the development of 
culturally unethical security practices among the management. Consequently, it then 
leads to development of internalised IIDTRC prevention practices that are difficult to 
change. For instance, in both Ytail and Ztail they relied on the independent ISA from 
the outsourcing companies. This finding suggested the perception that paying for the 
ISA checks to the external bodies is enough for effective internal data security. This is 
observed from the statement made by the operation manager that due to the fact their 
Ytail has paid for the audit, the external auditor bears the whole internal IS security 
responsibility. This perception contributed to the poor performance of the auditee Ytail.  
This is because there was no shared responsibility of ISA procedures within the 
management. The external auditor worked with the available IS resources and 
information at the disposal to justify the cost of the services being paid for. This 
observation agrees with suggestions of ACFE (2012) and ISBS (2012) that perception 
of the high cost of data compliance management and that adequate security checks are 
already in place often contributes to defectives in the internal data security of most 
online retail companies.  
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In order for crimes prevention managers to deliver and counter this challenge of 
culturally oriented unethical security practices, Innes (2004) suggests that the crimes 
prevention managers must be integrated into ethical occupational and organisational 
culture. This suggestion reaffirms the proposition of the Role-based framework that 
effective integration of cross-functional management team can enhance the 
management performance in preventing IIDTRC. In order to support the integration 
and execute the roles of their work efficiently, this suggestion requires that 
management will endorse the ethical cultural attitudes, beliefs and values to which they 
are exposed. In other words, the management will have to construct ethical cultural 
meanings that reflect their occupational responsibilities that are compliant to IIDTRC 
prevention practices.  
However, this proposition of a commitment to IIDTRC prevention might not work for 
all cases. The strict compliance with the rules of security may encourage managers not 
to believe in themselves or not following their instinct in managing IIDTRC cases they 
considered as a suspicious activity.  
An attempt to abide by strict compliance rules may develop a perception of which 
managers conceive as shared understanding of avoiding the potential for deviation from 
security compliance rules and to avoid scrutiny from their top managers. The shared 
understanding between the security managers would be focused on their occupational 
goal of ‘getting the job done’, avoid criticism from the top managers by sticking to the 
clear security rules of the shared culture. This perception is what Van Maanen (1974) 
calls ‘cover your ass; characteristic of the security culture; which means “good story 
maxim”. That is, the security managers would make a conceivable story to cover them 
for everything they do while on their duty in the name of abiding by culturally oriented 
security practices and security compliance rules.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The discussion of how the cultural orientation of management impacts the practices of 
IIDTRC prevention in the RetailGroup and by drawing from suggestions of previous 
studies on how this issue affect crimes preventions in crimes’ general sense indicates 
that there is strong need for change in retail companies’ security strategy (to included 
clearly defined ethically security practices).  
Importantly, the major change should be the review of the existing security culture, 
policies, procedures, structures and systems.  
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Previous studies (e.g. McDonald and Nijhof, 1999; Roukis, 2006; Sekerka and 
Bagozzi, 2007) argue that implementing an effective ethics programme in an 
organisation would make the management and employees aware of formal 
organisational goals, IIDTRC prevention goal in this case, and their informal norms.  
Pelletier and Bligh (2006) recommends that business organisations should have a 
suitable procedures and systems for ethical decision-making regarding their employees 
roles and responsibilities. This suggestion which corresponds with the suggestion of 
this research asserts that establishing and putting emphasis procedures and systems 
would enhance necessary skills for ethical practices in the retail companies.  
Moreover, there is the need for retail companies to invest in collaborative management 
approach in the prevention of the IIDTRC.  This practice can improve the overall IS 
security effectiveness and reduce the impact of the identified challenges of preventing 
IIDTRC in the online retail companies. Additional benefit may accrue from these 
practices when supplemented with collaborative ISA by the management. However, 
the benefits might depend on the level of IT skills of the management, the perception 
of the management roles, top management support and the organisational operations. 
The findings from the cases (Xtail, Ytail and Ztail) confirmed that collaborative roles 
sharing attributes of RBF would enhance the likelihood of effective and strategic 
prevention of IIDTRC in online retail. It suggests that collaborated approach where 
internal and external audit work together is a more robust audit practice than 
first/second party audit that entail either an internal or external auditor. 
The collaborative approach is more effective in putting a check on the internal control 
of IS in a company. This practice would enable the data security audit team to stay 
abreast of the evolving IIDTRC. It would improve sustainable internal control 
management through an effective collaboration of essential IS/IT skills in the ISA 
team. The collaborative functions between IS auditor and IS/IT support encourages 
two-way communication which is vital for keeping a spotlight on any potential 
IIDTRC risks. It will encourage online retail managers to hire and incorporate the 
skilled IS/IT professional in ISA team. It will also enhance the management capability 
to counter the trending cases of IIDTRC resulting from increasing migration of 
businesses into the digital realm. 
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Proposition 2:  The greater the interdependency of management in carrying out 
IIDTRC prevention roles, the greater the efficiency in IIDTRC prevention. A 
collaborative relationship between the management and employees is likely to 
improve the employees compliance with IS security policies. The collaborative 
relationship is likely to improve the effectiveness of internal data security by 
directing attention to the IIDTRC risks and minimize the challenges encountered by 
the management; 
Discussion and Implication 
Based on the discussions above, the impact of the IIDTRC prevention challenges that 
are encountered by IS security and crime prevention management can be minimised by 
effective management interaction. This key attribute of the RBF suggests that 
management interaction can positively impact the management performance by 
minimising the impact of the challenges (e.g. lack of clarity of roles, lack of 
management support, segregated authority, and operational changes) encountered by 
the management on IIDTRC prevention. These identified challenges are suggested to 
the consequences of lack of interaction between management roles. Each management 
(or complementary group) works independently to its data security roles.  Management 
often sticks to their roles and practices as they are used to working in their operational 
environments. If there is no management interaction, conflicts beg the question of 
which IIDTRC prevention practice to follow. Reconciling these differences and 
resolving how to act in the face of unfamiliar management often lead to extra work and 
misunderstanding. Hence, the extra cost to data security implementation in terms of 
money, quality and time. The issue of lack of clarity of roles and lack of management 
support evidenced from security auditing in Ytail and Ztail would have been avoided if 
there was effective interaction of roles across the audit team. The presence of skilled 
and experienced management could have resolved the clarity of roles and support 
issues.  
As evidenced by the Xtail, the collaborative roles sharing could impact the 
performance in implementing data security tools. Unlike the Ytail and Ztail where there 
were independent handling of IIDTRC prevention roles as a result of ignorance on the 
part of the audit team on how to go by their roles’ interaction followed in their roles 
differences. This suggested the fact that a different role that exists in different online 
retail operations with different IS capability can be resolved relatively through 
collaborative role sharing. The two differing perspectives about IIDTRC prevention 
responsibilities contribute to a setback in the prevention of these crimes.  
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This uneven clarity of crime prevention strategies and paralleled sharing of roles 
among the management has led to inefficiency and poor performance in implementing 
internal data security tools and strategies. This finding confirms the assumption of the 
organisation role theory that unclear roles and responsibilities of the management may 
create ambiguity in the prevention of IIDTRC in an organisation.  
To tackle this problem, top management has to embark on e-learning test and criminal 
law course to enlighten employees on the data security policy and IIDTRC prevention 
awareness. The data compliance and IT security management have also designed 
auditing routines and used coercive strategy to ensure that the outsourcing firms are 
abiding by norms of data security policy. The learning approach adopted by the top 
management agrees with the recommendation of the RBF approach; which explains the 
impact of clear roles and responsibilities across all the actors involved in prevention of 
IIDTRC in the online retail. In their work, Han, Kauffman and Nault (2011) and 
Zhang, Agarwal, and Lucas, (2011) also noted that investing in training of 
management and employees have a positive and economically meaningful contribution 
to industry towards achieving business objectives.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
These findings suggest that collaborative audit approach is a more robust practice in 
detecting IIDTRC risks and their preventions. In addition these findings suggest that an 
effective collaboration of the audit team would provide better returns on outputs, cost, 
quality, resources, and time which neither independent external audit nor internal audit 
would comparatively provide. This study suggests that engaging in either an 
independent external audit or internal audit would require more work on the security 
auditor’s part in carrying out internal control management and audit plans accordingly.  
Although, ISO 19011: 2011 and ACFE (2012) suggest that there is a chance for 
external ISA auditors to detect IIDTRC risks, this study suggested that such a chance 
still depends on the cooperation of auditee management. Similarly, engaging in 
independent internal audit would do little to meet the expectations of the IS security 
audit regulatory bodies; as seen in the case of Ytail. This suggests that the effective 
exchange of data security strategies between the external and internal auditing should 
be paramount in companies that are working together to improve their internal data 
security.  
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Proposition 3: Organisations with greater integration of the management are more 
likely to have an effective collaboration between management roles (IS/T and crime 
prevention team) in prevention of IIDTRC; 
Discussions and Implications 
The goal of preventing IIDTRC in online retail depends on how the roles (Security 
Support, IIDTRC Incident Investigation, Data Compliance Management, IIDTRC 
Prevention, Security Operation, Technical Security, Software Engineering, and Human 
Resources) interact with each other. The effectiveness of their interaction can be 
measured by the extent on how they reduce the impact of their challenges posed by 
IIDTRC such lack of resources, IIDTRC prevention and data protection policy, IS/T 
Security complexity, lack of clarity of roles, segregated authority, and operational 
changes. The evidence from the RetailGroup that the management are not well-
resourced or do not act in a support capacity.  
There were always need for the secondary considerations for capabilities and support 
capacities and changing of processes from the complementary management such as 
law enforcement agency. For instance, the Head of crimes investigation noted the 
difficulty his team faces in trying to build effective working relationship with the 
management of the local law enforcement agency.  
He noted that this issue often led to delays during investigation of crimes;  
 “When there is the change of the head of local area police, all the long built 
relationship and working team would breakdown…, to build up a relationship with 
the new administration is not easy! Sometimes it is not easy to find the police 
officer that would play the role of effective investigation of IIDTRC…it is always 
problem…it is, yes it is…this always lead to delays of investigation and 
prosecutions……”   
This statement suggests the challenge of establishing lasting support with the law 
enforcement agencies and RetailGroup. And in the online retail environment like this, 
this situation often leads to the protracted investigation process, and much damage 
would be done to RetailGroup. The longer the investigation took, the more damage the 
IIDTRC perpetrators would do with the stolen data/information (Lacey and Cuganesan, 
2005).  
The implication of these observations is the failure of adequate investigation and 
remediation measures to IIDTRC incidents subsequently detected.  
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These observations have the implication on the internal security controls and processes 
employed by the online retail security management. For instance, the statement made 
by the head of IT security support of Xtail  that, “…you don’t have to be spending 
money in every IT programme and chips…they are money……in some cases it doesn’t 
worth investing….”; provided the answer why some companies still fall prey to the 
IIDTRC, amidst all of the security controls. These occur because of weak internal data 
control systems and out-dated intrusion prevention controls attributed to cost and lax 
attitudes of management investing in security resources.  
This observation corresponds to the Steinnon (2006) report that some companies fail to 
identify IIDTRC risks because the security controls are not keeping pace with the 
evolving technology used by the perpetrators of these crimes; instead, the evolving 
security threatening technologies make the crimes mechanisms easier. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
With the lack of resources, other roles and responsibilities would be affected. The 
ripples of this challenge would impact how the management learn, learn and react to 
the IIDTRC incidents. It would also affect how the IS security management implement 
controls and processes in anticipation of the IIDTRC risks.  
The impact of the lack of resources would be huge on the management if there is no 
support of  the internal and external cross-functional management team – IT security, 
crime prevention and law enforcement agencies, as have seen in the above discussion. 
These findings suggest the need for the IS security and crime prevention management 
roles to be mastered by the cooperative effort of the management team. The mastery 
roles attributed to the RBF requires an effective assurance on the security of the 
company PII/D assets. Thus, the management would be encouraged to update the 
security tools and data compliance regulations to reduce evolving IIDTRC risks.  
For instance, the collaborative ISA approach adopted by Xtail enabled them to build a 
strong workforce that was shown by their level of integrity and competency in 
prevention IIDTRC. The audit team of Xtail took control of the internal IS security 
issues which ease the audit activities, reduce the expended audit time and cut down 
logistics related audit protocols. Hence, collaborated ISA enhances the chance to 
identify IIDTRC risks.  Hooks and Kaplan and Schultz (1994) suggest that IIDTRC 
risks could be detected and put under control if the organisation and external auditor 
work together.  
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If the audit team focused more on internal control, they could easily control the 
organisation’s data environment, improve risk assessment and ISA monitoring and 
enhance the team’s communication. Johnson and Rudesill (2012) agree with this 
suggestion that business owners, management and data security auditors should share 
the responsibility of IIDTRC prevention.  
There is the need for every unit of the IS management to liaise with each other, 
prioritise the internal data security and control strategies and be a watch-dog to the 
business. There should be coordinated approach toward assigning the responsibility of 
IS security. The crack that was often created due to a split in roles of data security can 
be corrected by effective integration, coordination and communication with the 
management, external auditing, IT experts and internal auditing.  
 
Proposition 4:  Management with shared understanding of data security operations 
are more likely to achieve better security strategy in the prevention of IIDTRC. 
Management collaborative role sharing is likely to affect the level of performance 
management in preventing IIDTRC. Clearly defining the scope of purpose of 
IIDTRC prevention practices is likely to result in more collaboration and improve 
performance by the IS security management roles; 
Discussions and Implications 
The matrix table of management roles in chapter 6 is not merely to draw attention to 
the fact that differences exist between cross-functional IS management team – an 
observation that is quite intuitive for most IS security practitioners. By understanding 
the issue of IS security management on implementing IIDTRC prevention as resulting 
from team challenges (e.g. internal policy, is/t staff competence, is/t security 
complexity, security budgets, is/t security tools), provides a clear understanding of 
application of rbf in resolving these challenges. 
By analysing the challenges the IS security managers face in preventing the IIDTRC, 
this research provides a robust framework to understand and solve the identified 
challenges. Understanding the attributes of RBF and how it fit into different business 
operation can minimise these challenges. This agrees with the suggestion by the 
researchers (e.g. Homel, 2010; Anderson and Tresidder, 2008) that identifying the 
IIDTRC prevention challenges can be addressed by understanding the roles of IS 
security management; as an individual and a team. 
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Lack of management support between management IS security implementation has 
been a significant challenge. The cases of Ytail and Ztail indicated that the issues of 
segregated data security roles have an impact in the allocation of the available 
resources. Researchers (Lacey, and Cuganesan, 2005) have noted that these varying 
and segregated data security issues can weaken implementation of data security 
strategies by increasing the time for data security implementation as well the cost.  
These issues could lead to IT budget related issue which was noted as one of the 
IIDTRC prevention challenges by the RetailGroup. The implication of this finding is 
that sharing of the roles by Xtail provided the opportunity to leverage on their 
management capability. Thus, improving the performance of the management and 
resolving the issue of segregation of management and reduction on cost and time.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
These observations draw a line between the benefits of RBF and the other IIDTRC 
prevention frameworks. The collaborative roles sharing attributes of RBF adopted by 
Xtail is suggested to be the robust and more efficient in prevention IIDTRC in online 
retail. The use of the collaborative role sharing ISA approach by Xtail was enhanced by 
the audit team members aligned with skills contributing immensely to their satisfactory 
ISA assessment. This finding agrees with suggestions of Steinbart, et al., (2012), that 
the relationship between the IS security auditors affects the quality of the ISA 
practices. The RBF attribute regarding the collaborative roles sharing audit observed in 
Xtail encourages a reliable audit report, efficiency and effectiveness of the audit 
operations and compliance with applicable ISA regulations.  
This RBF attributes sum up the objectives of ISO 19011:2011 and also defined the 
processes of effective internal IS security control management. This is consistent with 
the suggestion by SANS Institute report by Kee (2001) that effective internal IS 
security control management is a vital tool for reducing online retail’s data leakages 
and IIDTRC risks. It noted that it is the responsibility of the internal audit team to 
highlight the significant data security risks, identify the flaws in data compliance 
controls, policies and regulations and presents them to the management. As also 
suggested by Asare and Wright (2004), effective fraud risk assessments are directly 
associated with an effective collaboration of the fraud specialists practices. The audit 
criteria attributed to the robust security audit practice of Xtail is their proactive and 
effective internal IS security control. 
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7.5 Summary of the Discussions 
This research discussion have contributed to the suggestions by researchers (e.g. 
Wright, 1998; Jamieson et al., 2008) that available IIDTRC prevention have 
concentrated only on generic framework without paying attention to the specific 
business context. While some (e.g. Niekerk and Solms, 2010; Bishop and Gates, 2008; 
Jamieson et al., 2009) concentrated on the soft-based security frameworks, and others 
(e.g. Currie et al., 1999) on the specific context of the business operational 
environment of the crimes. In particular, this research has provided sector-based 
understanding of the issues of IIDTRC prevention. It introduced the notion of 
integrating process and technology approaches to IIDTRC prevention.  
The notion was centred on people, the capacity of IS security management. These three 
categories, particularly the people-centred security, subsume most concept of the role-
based framework. The IS security practitioners can now evaluate their roles capacity 
on prevention of IIDTRC specific to their business operation. The concept is opposed 
to broadly evaluating the management roles based on a generic framework or software-
based security.  
Adopting the concept of RBF in this study lead to redefining the capability of IS 
security management by examining the workings of a collaborated management roles 
approach compared to the independent management roles approach in prevention of 
IIDTRC, action research has enabled the researchers to established practical results. It 
has availed opportunity for the researchers and business practitioners to engage in 
action that brings about change and knowledge through learning. This contribution to 
knowledge has succeeded in shedding light on the workings and practices of both 
first/second party and joint ISA. It will provide a basis for further research in areas of 
roles of IS security audit in the prevention of IIDTRC in the online retail. Although, 
RBF might not be a universally applicable concept, IS security managers in e-
businesses can benefit greatly from these insights. For example, as a first step, IS 
security managers can classify each management roles and match them with 
responsibilities matrix. This could likely produce better roles alignment within the IS 
security management team handling IIDTRC prevention issues. The challenges in 
preventing the IIDTRC can be solved through clear information regarding different 
responsibilities of the IS security managers. RBF thus provides a model where 
information systems security practitioners and researchers can understand the root 
cause of issues on prevention of IIDTRC.  
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Practitioners can design strategic IIDTRC prevention roles that can minimise of each 
category of IS security management challenge. This RBF approach counter-argues the 
over-dependence on software security and one-framework-fits-all approaches for 
prevention of IIDTRC. These issues could be more difficult to resolve. In addition, the 
issue of aligning the management with suitable IIDTRC roles to make up the 
management team is most difficult to resolve. Resolving such issue involves in-depth 
case studies. This issue was observed in Xtail case of participant observation. Xtail 
easily dealt with issues that arose due to ISA roles alignment, but was passive in 
addressing the IS security budget in relation to updating security tools. Thus, the 
implication of alignment issues resulted in a greater expense of time and poor ISA 
audit in both Ytail and Ztail.  
These issues may have a heterogeneous effect across online retail companies, 
suggesting that some may have utilise the collaborative role sharing in their ISA while 
others did not.  In addition, this research confirms Baskerville and Pries-Heje (1999)’s 
suggestion that action research provides researchers with highly practical results when 
rigorous attention is given to theory development. It contributes to the knowledge that 
qualitative research based on limited cases (Xtail, Ytail, and Ztail) might be generalised 
to theory, but not by population as sought by survey research. 
It agrees with Yin (1989)’s argument that limited-case qualitative research does not 
seek the same sort of generalisability attributed to the population as done in the survey 
of quantitative research. It enables the researchers to develop the ideas that generalise 
the cases under study to theory.  As noted by Strauss and Corbin (1990), the findings 
of the research based on grounded theory approach constitute a theoretical formulation 
of the reality under investigation, rather than consisting of a set of numbers, or a group 
of loosely related themes. The case study approach has availed the researcher the idea 
to develop a theory by repeatedly using cycle of inductive and deductive thought. This 
cycle is repeated in an effort to ground the theory in the data.  
The grounded theory approach has been applied in this research to define units of 
analysis. This approach provided more rigorous approaches to theory development. It 
avails the researcher the technique for integration of with action research and case 
studies because they are suitable for holding data collation and theory formulation in a 
reciprocal relationship (Baskerville and Pries-Heje, 1999). Researchers (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990; Glaser and Strauss, 1967) suggested that grounded theory is a ‘constant 
comparative method’ that alternated the comparison of theory to reality and the 
building of the theory.  
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As this research involves careful collation and analysis of empirical data, it began with 
an understanding of the nature of prevention of IIDTRC and then grounded based on 
the extension of the role-based framework (RBF). Using grounded theory in this 
context, enabled the researcher to first develop the conceptual categories from the 
empirical data (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). It enabled the researcher to 
clarify and elaborate these categories, and makes new observation through field work. 
This was applied to develop a theory that is ‘grounded’ and directly relevant to the IS 
security strategies for prevention of IIDTRC in online retail companies. From these 
perspectives, the use of the grounded theory holds a promising potential for conducting 
practical oriented research in the business information systems research. 
 
7.6 Summary of the Implications 
This study has several implications for understanding the practices of identity theft 
prevention. It identifies the attributes that can enhance effective implementation of 
IIDTRC prevention practices, which has received little IS research attention. The result 
shows that RBF explains the impact of integration of management on security 
implementation towards IIDTRC prevention. For comparison, none of the available the 
identity theft prevention frameworks studies (e.g. Gates and Jacob, 2008; Currie et al., 
1999) explained this pattern. Thus, researchers can apply integrated IS security 
attribute of RBF in future studies. While the findings of this study are in line with 
previous suggestions (e.g. Vasiu, 2004; Ji, Smith-Chao and Min, 2008; Gercke et al., 
2011), they also show some unique relationship that were not tested previously. 
Although, some IS security researchers (e.g. Cappelli et al., 2006; Gercke et al., 2011) 
suggest independent management as an effective practice for the IIDTRC prevention.  
Role-based framework (RBF) has differentiated the objective measures of coordination 
and integrated management context from the dynamic measures of IS security 
implementation. As a result, it was possible to investigate the likely net impact of 
integrated coordination of management on implementing IIDTRC prevention practices. 
Among all the attributes of RBF, the significant influences are effective integration 
management and efficient collaboration roles. This finding reflects the unique IS 
security management characteristics of e-businesses in general and the online retail, in 
particular, which tends to counter the challenges of IIDTRC prevention (Okeke and 
Shah, 2012).  
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Hence, the analysis of the application of the RBF in the information systems audit of 
the three selected retail companies suggests to have a sufficient explanatory potential 
that reflect the practical characteristics of IS security management essential for 
prevention IIDTRC beyond online retail.   
In terms of empirical results, not all the results found here might applicable to all 
sectors and regions of the world. It is anticipated that if this study were conducted in 
other countries in Europe, which share similar online retail operation like UK, the 
findings might be similar. 
In addition, given the proportion of cooperation of companies in the sample, it is not 
surprising that IS security suggested here will be fully established. These firms have 
the motivations and resources to invest in innovations that can facilitate both short-
term and long-term IS security implementation. Other online companies with 
approximate size like these would experience similar outcomes. If this study were 
replicated in American countries, Pacific and Africa, the findings might be different. 
This is because different countries have different access to online retailing IS 
infrastructure with difference e-business operation. Online retail, by its nature, is one 
of the e-businesses that are most vulnerable to internal identity theft-related crimes 
(IIDTRC). This study has provided answers on the nature of IIDTRC in online retail 
and development of a framework for the prevention of IIDTRC. The analysis of the 
archival documents has accounted for these crimes nature. In a bid, for the retail 
stakeholders to combat these crimes, technology-based software security are 
commonly used, leaving the contribution of the human elements in security 
implementation less researched. It shows that integrated IS security approach to 
prevention of IIDTRC within the online retail sector is at the initial state of maturity. 
Drawing from the recommended practices of identity theft prevention, a role-based 
framework is developed and empirically evaluated.  
This study shows that RBF attributes effects of integrated IS security management and 
sharing of data security roles among management. It was indicated that both attributes 
are perceived to impact the implementation of IIDTRC prevention practices. In terms 
of the RBF attributes impact on prevention of IIDTRC, this research shows that 
integration of IS security management and complementary management, perceived 
collaboration of their roles, and leveraging on their capabilities and expertise can play 
a role in implementing IIDTRC prevention strategies and practices. As a corollary, this 
research implies that it is the roles of security and crime prevention management to 
work with the employees, outsourcing firms and law enforcement agencies.  
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It behoves the management to train and enforce data security regulations. Although, it 
is less practicable for the management team to implement the best data security 
practices by employees’ trainings, software security and security 
compliance/regulatory strategy. Proactive strategy such as vulnerability testing on 
network and web platform, staff vetting and profiling, and customers’ IIDTRC 
awareness campaign might serve as better strategies.  
In summary, this research has a number of implications for academia and business 
managers.  For the academia, this research has the following theoretical implications: 
 This research has drawn major characteristics of the IIDTRC perpetrator – 
Perpetrators are not necessarily technical oriented to carry out IIDTRC; the 
Nature of IIDTRC perpetrated by Managers is comparatively different from 
IIDTRC by shop floor Employees and Majority of IIDTRC Incidents were 
detected through Customer Complaints, Information Systems Audit and 
Colleagues Suspicions. Further research can be designed to examine these 
characteristics to identify if there is theoretical basis for explaining them 
 This research integrates the concepts of human-centred security with 
technology and process. Through critical explanation of the management roles 
while applying organisational role theory in a IS security context, it clarifies 
the role of collaborative management in establishing effective IIDTRC 
prevention with can promotes the employees’ capabilities in maintaining the 
availability, confidentiality and integrity of online retail IS infrastructure;  
 It has contributed to existing knowledge of organisational roles theory by 
applying it to analyse management roles in the prevention of IIDTRC. It sheds 
light on the contribution of management roles that facilitates the 
implementation of the IS security processes. It has analysed the management 
roles collaboration using the concept of the RBF. It adds to organisational role 
theory by building on the on-going discourse of how the business 
environments and organisation operations affect management performance. 
Thus, bridges the gap that exists in the domain of organisational roles 
perspectives in IS security management;  
 From the research methodology perspectives, this study contributes to the 
advancement of the interpretive research in IS security management 
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This study has provided the research setting for applying an interpretive 
methodology to link a theory to practical analysis of IS security. It 
demonstrates that mixed method case studies are valuable to provide insights, 
and interpret relationships between theoretical attributes and constructs; 
 It also confirms Baskerville and Pries-Heje (1999)’s suggestion that 
participation observation research provides researchers with highly practical 
results when rigorous attention is given to theory development. It contributes 
to the knowledge that qualitative research based on limited cases (Xtail, Ytail, 
and Ztail) might be generalised to theory, but not by a population as sought by 
survey research. It agrees with Yin (1989)’s argument that limited-case 
qualitative research does not seek the same sort of generalisability.  
For the business managers, this research offers relevant practical implications. The 
contributions of this study depend on the capability of online retail managers to be able 
to deploy the role-based framework attributes. The findings of this research suggest 
areas that managers could find vital in securing the IS infrastructure.  
The key areas are collaborative information security audit and employees’ training. 
The areas can be used to guide online retail companies in deploying an effective IS 
security against IIDTRC. Highlights of other practical implications are as follows;  
 The IS security implementation for the prevention of IIDTRC is not primarily one 
manager’s roles and responsibilities. It is more of collaborative and participative 
processes.  
 The archival case examples of the IIDTRC perpetrators have provided a 
description of variables such as age and sex of perpetrators and department of 
work/job role. Retail companies can infer the characteristics of the IIDTRC 
perpetrators describe in this research and compare them to their individual 
company to determine if or/and why the same perpetrator may or may not depart 
from what was suggested in this case examples.  
 The implementation of security practices in online retail companies is not 
dependent only on hierarchical structured management but across the management. 
It is the responsibility of every employee to protect the organisation against 
IIDTRC and data leakages.  
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 This research suggests HR and data compliance managers play major roles in the 
prevention of IIDTRC. Their roles are evidenced by the IIDTRC prevention 
awareness, recruitment processes, clarification of data security policy, counselling 
and monitoring of the employees business operations. 
 Human-centred security is an integral component of effective internal data security 
against IIDTRC. Thus, it stands to reason that it pays to invests in end-user 
development and management roles sharing.  These practices can improve the 
overall effectiveness of online retail companies IS security in preventing IIDTRC. 
Additional benefit may accrue from these practices when supplemented with 
collaborative ISA by the management. The benefits depend upon the level of 
management skills, their perception of their roles, top management support and the 
organisational operations. 
 Integration of all the components of the IS security infrastructure in online retail is 
imperative for the effective IIDTRC prevention. Thus, equal attention should be 
given to security technology, the implementation processes and management roles. 
 The relevance of clarity of roles across Information Systems security management 
in the prevention of IIDTRC. This research suggests the importance to enforce of 
clarity of IS security policy across the employees through training and information 
security audits. The attributes of RBF are influenced by effective collaboration, 
communication, enforcement, sharing and reporting of IIDTRC issues. 
The next chapter concludes this research by looking at contributions, limitations and 
general lessons which can be drawn from this research for future research plans.  
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CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
To large extent software security and generic framework for prevention of the Internal 
Identity Theft Related Crimes (IIDTRC) have been previously developed. These 
preventions, however, do not provide the appropriate Information Systems (IS) 
security needed in the online retail. This issue necessitates the relevance of this 
research to provide a comprehensive IIDTRC prevention framework. This research has 
recognised the imperative to include roles of management in ensuring the effective 
prevention of the IIDTRC in online retail. Thus, this research provided a role-based 
framework (RBF) as a tool for the effective prevention of IIDTRC. It has provided the 
necessary elements that can optimise the contribution of the IS security management in 
order to implement IIDTRC prevention practices. Therefore, this research is 
significant. It has looked into the IS security issues in the context of online retail 
companies and provided a framework for prevention of IIDTRC.  
This research has achieved this aim through the four objectives that were set out in 
chapter 1. First, it has provided the understanding of the nature of IIDTRC in online 
retail. This objective was achieved through the contribution of the results from the 
archival analysis which complements the suggestions provided in the literature review. 
Second, it has identified an applicable framework for prevention of IIDTRC by 
extending the application of the role-based framework (RBF). This was done through 
the case studies analysis on how RBF can be applied by the online retail IS security 
management. The remainder of this chapter discusses contributions of this research, its 
limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
8.2 Research Contribution 
The primary contribution of this research is that it has provided an analytical nature of 
IIDTRC in online retail. And has extended the application of the role-based framework 
(RBF) to the management in carrying out the responsibilities and practices in the 
strategic prevention of IIDTRC in online retail. This framework helps to structure the 
key management roles and practices in the online retail information security 
management. And emphasised the theoretical implication of these roles based on the 
organisational role theory.  
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For the information systems management in online retail to implement effective 
systems security for prevention of IIDTRC, the strategy of management works in 
unison with clarity of roles should be adopted to reduce the impact of the challenges 
that can hinder the IIDTRC prevention framework implementation. This is evidenced 
by the suggestion that collaborative Information Systems security Audit (ISA) which 
involves cross-functional crimes prevention team can enhance management 
performance in achieving the IIDTRC prevention goal.  
Since a few online retail companies may have incentives to invest resources in their IT 
security, using collaborative role sharing approach could minimise the impact of these 
challenges. And such retail companies may be able to reap the benefits of such 
investment on the long-term. Software security and coercive data security controls 
have been the strategies most online retail may adopt. The RBF approach along with 
coercion and training can enhance long-term as well as immediate effective internal 
data security and crimes prevention. As a corollary, this research implies that it is the 
roles and responsibility of top security and crime prevention management who are 
likely to work with the employees, outsourcing firms and law enforcement agencies, to 
encourage them to adhere to data security strategies and policies. Thus, it behoves the 
retail IS security management to prevent IIDTRC by training the employees and 
enforcing data security policies and regulations.  
It is evidence in this research that it is less practicable to expect the management team 
to easily transfer and share their best data security practices by only trainings and 
coercive strategy. Proactive actions such as effective staff vetting and profiling, and 
customers’ IIDTRC awareness campaign might also serve as an effective measure to 
prevent crimes. In addition, a proactive vulnerability test on both the network and web 
platform might serve as a better practice to prevent IIDTRC loopholes and internal data 
leakages.  
In summary, this research has contributed to the knowledge of the prevention of 
internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) in online retail. It has shown that in the 
increasing incidents of IIDTRC in online retail, the strategic collaborative management 
capability can improve IS security. This research suggests that the use of human-
centred security can enhance the IS security efficiency and performance in preventing 
IIDTRC. By extending the used of the role-based framework (RBF), this research has 
suggested the benefit of integrating management roles in implementing IS security 
practices.  
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Hence, this research contributes to both information systems security management and 
identity theft prevention research in online retail in the following dimensions; 
 
i. The archival analysis results suggest that IIDTRC incidents are not prevented 
because the management depends on the technological capabilities of software 
security. And they neglect the monitoring and security audit capabilities which 
were revealed to have been used to detect the majority of IIDTRC cases. This 
suggests that it requires comprehensive IS security management attention for 
effective IIDTRC prevention practices to be implemented.  
ii. The finding of this research contributes to new insights into the sector-based 
study of identity theft, which has not been delineated by the previous studies. It 
has distinctly describes the issues that could help the understanding of the 
complex nature of identity theft related crimes in the retail sector. It has 
answered the question of what the profile of a typical internal identity theft 
perpetrator looks like in the retail sector by providing the in-depth case 
examples. 
iii. The IS security implementation inertia that online retail companies face in the 
revention of IIDTRC vis-à-vis the challenges is reflected in the negative 
linkage between management independent roles and team roles. Perceived 
collaboration of roles within the IS security management and complementary 
management (HR and law enforcements) and support from the top management 
play a significant role in effective implementation of IIDTRC prevention 
strategy.  
iv. This research presented a conceptual framework by combining organisational 
role theory and IIDTRC prevention practices to develop a role-based 
framework (RBF). This framework provides descriptive and practical 
recommendations for the IIDTRC prevention strategy that have been suggested 
to reduce employees’ tendency to indulge in IIDTRC.  
This contributes new insights into the influence of the IS security and crime 
prevention management roles in the prevention of IIDTRC.  And has provided 
the theoretical lens that may also be used in other related IS security studies in 
similar context for deeper understanding of identity theft prevention. 
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v. Based on the role-based framework (RBF) concept, the clarity of roles, roles 
sharing and perceived collaboration within the operation of IS security 
management have been suggested to have impact on the prevention of IIDTRC 
in online retail companies. Among these attributes, clarity of roles and 
perceived collaboration have the strongest effect. To some extent, the perceived 
collaboration of management roles can be a very effective implementation 
security strategy for the prevention of IIDTRC when mediated through 
managerial competence and aligned complementary management interaction. A 
greater degree of perceived collaboration in the prevention of IIDTRC is 
associated more with interaction and less with managerial competence.  
The latter attribute can be leverage through effective sharing of roles and better 
interaction among IS security management. The perceived collaborative roles among 
management, as an attribute of RBF, explain the influence of interdependency of 
management in carrying out IIDTRC prevention roles; 
i. In terms of practice, this study has identified that online retail IS security 
management are posed with various challenges that affect the IIDTRC 
prevention. However, the effective alignment of expertise, integration of 
management and collaborative of management roles, plays a great impact in 
managing the identified challenges.  
ii. This study indicates that integration of IS security management has an impact 
on the collaboration of their roles. It suggests that leveraging on their 
capabilities and expertise can play a role in implementing IIDTRC prevention 
strategies and practices. These are important to create a strategic internal 
security controls which can build resilient IS security.  
iii. The relationship effects of the RBF attributes to the implementation of IIDTRC 
prevention practices indicate a possible relationship between IS security and 
complementary management influences worth exploring in future studies. 
Previous studies (e.g. Gates and Jacobs, 2008; Andi, 2009; Bielski, 2008) that 
recommended management effects on the IIDTRC prevention strategies have 
not evaluated this possible relationship that might exist between IS security 
management and complementary management. It offers a new contribution to 
the field of IS security management and may provide opportunities for further 
research in identity theft prevention.  
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Having summarised the contributions of this research, it is importance to show how the 
research objectives outlined in the formulation of this research have been met. Hence, 
the outcome of this research in relation to meeting the research objectives is presented 
in table 42 below. 
Research Objectives Chapters and 
Sections 
Provide understanding of the nature of IIDTRC in online retail. Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 6.2 
Identify a framework for prevention of IIDTRC in online retail. Chapter 3 
Evaluate the resulting framework to understand how the attributes 
of the framework impact on online retail companies’ IIDTRC 
prevention practice. 
Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5 and 
Section 6.3 
Examine how the IIDTRC prevention framework can be applied 
by the online retail IS security management. 
Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7   
Table 42: Research Objectives and their Respective Discussion Chapters  
The first objective of this research was met with the completion of chapter 2 and 
section 6.2 where the nature of IIDTRC in the online retail was studied and analysed. 
The multi-faceted nature of IIDTRC – the methods of perpetration, case examples of 
IIDTRC perpetrators, their motivations and how they were detected, were examined 
and the need for research on this subject was established. The examination of the 
existing literature in chapter 2 set the requirements for the research.  
The second objective refers to the IIDTRC prevention framework identification part of 
this research. In particular, Chapter 3 provided this identification and extension of the 
framework that form the role-based framework as the resulting outcome. The third 
objective covered the evaluation of the role-based framework. The discussions of the 
approaches that were used the evaluation of the role-based framework and research 
outcome were presented in the Chapter 4 and chapter 5 respectively. Chapter 5, in 
particular, presented the results of the empirical research and evaluation outcomes of 
the research. The discussions of the research outcome, which satisfied the requirements 
of the fourth objectives, were presented in chapter 7.  
In addition, the contributions discussed have provided insights to the research questions 
set out in chapter 1. The insights are summarised in relation to the research questions as 
shown in table 43 below. 
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Research Questions Research Insights 
What is the nature 
of IIDTRC in online 
retail?  
 
Explanation of the nature of internal identity theft in online 
retail. It has provided knowledge of the nature of IIDTRC in 
online retail. It addressed the methods used by perpetrators in 
carrying out IIDTRC and provided the analysis of the 
recommended IIDTRC prevention practices. 
What framework 
can be used to 
prevent IIDTRC?   
Synthesis of the recommended identity theft prevention 
practices into the role-based framework by defining the 
attributes of the role-based framework into integrated IS 
security management construct and identifying and validating 
elements to apply the attributes. This research has gone 
beyond the research of software-based security and unravels 
the important of management roles in the application IIDTRC 
prevention framework. It uses the concept of role-based 
framework (RBF) to guide the collaborative sharing of roles 
across IS security management. 
How can online 
retail companies 
achieve a practical 
IIDTRC prevention 
with respect to the 
attributes of the 
resulting IIDTRC 
framework? 
The empirical evidence on the handling of IIDTRC incidents 
by the IS security and crime prevention management was 
conducted by qualitative case studies. It used the 
organisational role theory to analyse and guide every stage of 
the investigation. It has evaluated the impact of attributes of 
role-based framework on internal identity theft prevention 
practices in online retail companies. In addition, it contributes 
to the knowledge of collaborative IS security management in 
the prevention of IIDTRC and adding to sector-based 
attributes of RBF in e-business knowledge of identity theft 
prevention. 
Table 43: Research Question and Research Contributions 
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8.3 Limitations of the Research 
The limitations of this study were seen in the two areas – theoretical and 
methodological. Theoretically, this study relies primarily on organisational role theory 
and suggestions of the other literature (criminology, IS security, and psychology).  
Since the literature might be limited to their beliefs, their suggestions and constructs on 
the issues of IIDTRC prevention practices may differ since they originate from 
different domains. Other theoretical constructs may overlap as shown in Role-Based 
Framework. The possible differing beliefs were not examined in this study.  
Methodologically, this research used an interpretive approach. The findings and 
discussions are based on the interpretation of the researcher.  
The researcher may introduce bias by favouring data that supports preconceived ideas 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As a result, there is possibility that other researchers would not 
interpret the data in the same way. Thus replicating the data collated in this research 
would be problematic. In addition, it is possible to question the validity of the findings 
because of the interview bias. As noted by Easterby-Smith et al., (1991), research 
participants may introduce their own answers that may lead to bias views of the inquiry 
under study. This may have resulted to inconsistencies in the responses accrued from 
the interviews respondents.  
The archival analysis is limited to the information contained in retail companies’ 
reports and documents retained in the electronic archive. It could not depict what was 
said in the meeting were the reports was presented, nor was it possible to interview the 
authors of the documents about their experience on the nature of IIDTRC in their 
companies. The archival research design centres only on analysing a series of the 
nature of IIDTRC in the online retail companies. It did not provide answers to the roles 
that were taken by the companies’ management in preventing IIDTRC. For example, it 
did not answer questions related to why some IIDTRC were handled by IT security 
while others were done by the crime prevention, and why some IIDTRC incidents 
reported while others were not.   
The archival analysis based on the reports might not have a fact-finding nature of the 
IIDTRC in retail companies, but instead addresses issues and practices in handling the 
incidents of the crimes. There are well-known victimising effects for the companies 
affected by IIDTRC, and potentially victimising effects of the documented reports 
linked to such companies; but in the absence of in-depth interviews, the archival 
analysis cannot determine the actual impact of such victimising effects.  
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It is possible, however, to draw inferences from the analyses of the nature of IIDTRC 
and their measures based on the both approaches – archival analysis and interviews. 
The case studies design has some limitation. It is designed based on relatively small 
number of cases and participants. This affects the generalisability, reliability and 
validity of the research findings.   
Although, the case-control approach was sought, it is important to recognise that the 
sample population is small to provide generalizable representative data on the 
perception of the management.  
The scope of this research is limited to mostly key IS/T and crime prevention 
management such as IT security officers, operational managers, HR managers, and key 
law enforcement agents. In terms of this sample size, though the focus research was on 
the population of the management in four selected companies, a larger sample size is 
desired for a greater external validity of the findings. Future research with larger 
sample size is therefore needed to test if the findings are replicable. This study has 
considered the online retail of UK as one example of the retail industry. These 
limitations imply that findings documented here should be generalized with 
carefulness.  
The findings of this study are not the complete cases but can be the considerable 
insights into the issues of IIDTRC encountered by the management in online retail 
companies. While RetailGroup case analyses were not extreme, the codes categories 
summarised above could not be considered complete representative of IIDTRC 
prevention management issues. In addition, the case selection was restricted to retail 
companies that share relatively similar business operation and management culture, 
and, therefore, the findings cannot be overgeneralised to all retail industries.  
Although, the cooperation of these companies was great, some of their audit result 
sheets were not released to the research team. The companies perhaps viewed releasing 
some of these confidential documents as a security risk and might portray them in an 
unfavourable light. This limited the interpretation on some investigated security issues. 
Also, while assurances of anonymity and confidentiality were upheld throughout the 
research, we would not ignore participants’ bias in the interview sessions. These 
research constraints risk the validity of the findings. Besides, the above limitations 
threaten the repeatability of this study. Repeatability might be impossible due to its 
contextual nature.  
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8.4 Further Research 
Nevertheless, both the online retail and single country focus do not lead to suspect that 
Role-based framework might not be applicable to other industries and countries. 
Further studies covering other sectors of e-business and several countries would shed 
light on interesting questions such as; 
i. Does the pattern of the RBF attributes identified in online retail prevail in the 
prevention of IIDTRC in other sectors?  
ii. What other relationship exist and how are they different from the attributes 
those emerged in this study.  
RBF attributes described in this study can constitute a guide much further studies. RBF 
can be applied in further research to identify and evaluate the effectiveness of IIDTRC 
prevention strategies in e-businesses.  
To achieve this aim, the research objectives of the research can be set as follows;  
i. A systematic review of literature on the nature of practices of IIDTRC 
prevention in e-businesses;  
ii. Use multi-method approaches with multivariate statistical analysis (e.g 
SPSS/STATA) to establish the roles of information systems management in 
implementing internal data security and IIDTRC prevention;  
iii. Use Amos 17.0 to analyse the impact of the perception of the roles of data 
security management and crime prevention reference groups on IIDTRC 
prevention;  
iv. Provide a model for prevention of IIDTRC based on RBF attributes. The 
research may be carried out as a comparative case study. It will analyse 
incidents/cases that fit the definition of IIDTRC in selected retail/banking 
industry and the related prevention strategies.  
The incidents/cases will be identified through semi-structured interview, questionnaire, 
and primary source materials (via Lexis-Nexis databases) such as UK National Staff 
Dismissal Register, National Fraud Authority (NFA) archive, The Association of 
Business Crime Partnerships archive; and other secondary source materials such as 
public reporting, business crime reports, and web resources.  
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The criteria for the select cases will be based on: IIDTRC occurred in UK businesses 
(retail/banking). The findings from these cases will be described using system dynamic 
model which would be discussed with the team of researchers to determine the pattern 
of IIDTRC incidents/cases and to validate the insights of the findings.  
The validation will provide generalised finding with a degree of confidence in 
understanding the complex nature of IIDTRC prevention on which RBF implementation 
would be built. RBF can be used as a model for analysing the roles of management in 
the prevention of IIDTRC, to provide useful insight into the alignment of IS and crimes 
prevention management to best roles to handle IIDTRC risks.   
Finally, RBF would be evaluated to draw the boundary to its applicability so that all the 
attributes necessary to generate and understand the prevention strategies of IIDTRC are 
implemented effectively. This evaluation approach will enable the researchers to 
include/exclude practical constraints – administrative, cultural, operational and policy-
related factors. It will also enable the researcher to delineate the assumptions (human 
resources roles, environmental design, policies, business culture, etc.) made in this 
current research design.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Review Framework 
A1: Scope of the Review 
In the review of the literature, the following were explored: most cited definitions of 
identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC), situations that encourages employees to 
perpetrate IIDTRC online retail, the state of IIDTRC in UK, and other countries, the 
method of propagation of this crimes and their corresponding recommend 
countermeasures.  
A2: Lines of Enquiry 
 What is the extent of internal identity theft related crimes (IIDTRC) in UK? 
What are the methods used by employees to steal/accidental leak customers’ data? 
What are the methods that are being used to prevent IIDTRC in UK or elsewhere? 
Who is responsible for preventing IIDTRC in online retail?  
What stage has the online retail companies reached in developing its IIDTRC 
prevention capacity?  
What IS security practices/strategies in place in terms of IIDTRC prevention 
framework, e.g. departmental responsibility, IT security tools, laws, monitoring 
systems, policies, human resources, programmes and training? 
What are the major IIDTRC concerns the online retail has or wishes to tackle? 
What are the main vulnerabilities at greatest risk of lapsing into IIDTRC or becoming 
the subject of IIDTRC victimization?  
What are the main areas of concentration of IIDTRC problems?  
What are the main retail business operations affected by the IIDTRC incidents?  
What online management capability and capacity exist to develop and sustain strategic 
IIDTRC prevention? 
What exists in terms of recent or current human resources, technical or procedural 
assistance in preventing IIDTRC? 
What is the principle/rule of law in prevention of IIDTRC in online retail?  
What is the nature of human-centred action/roles in preventing IIDTRC?  
What is the state of collaboration among the management in preventing IIDTRC? 
What is the nature of principle of strategic IIDTRC prevention accountability and 
sustainability? 
Are there existing evidence-based practices in the online retail companies on 
prevention of IIDTRC?  
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A3: Search Strategy 
Based on the general research framework and advised from my research director, most 
of the best sources for the review were selected and assessed, by browsing of relevant 
websites and through structured searching by applying online information and library 
services.  
The most key websites included are those of UK government law enforcement 
agencies, in particular are those of UK Home Office, UK Cards Association, Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Metropolitan Police, National Fraud Authority; 
renowned research and consulting agencies in particular are those of Credit Industry 
Fraud Avoidance System, Financial Services Authority, Experian, Equifax, Kroll, 
CIPD, British Bankers Association, etc.; among other institutions’ websites: website 
(http://www.identitytheft.org.uk). Other includes the Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance 
System (CIFAS), United Kingdom Home Office, Financial Fraud Action United 
Kingdom, United Kingdom Cards Association, Equifax, Experian, Royal Mail, 
CallCredit, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Driver and Vehicle 
Licensing Agency (DVLA), Identity and Passport Service (IPS), Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA), Metropolitan Police, City of London Police, Scottish Business 
Crime Centre, Financial Services Authority (FSA), British Banker’s Association 
(BBA), British Security Industry Association (BSIA), National Fraud Authority 
(NFA). In the course of most searches of online resources and databases, index 
searching and a combination of free text were used. Best articles published between 
2000 till dates are considered in most searches.  
A4: Selected Cases 
Some of the relevant cases of IIDTRC reported in online companies in UK are deemed 
imperative in this review. Studying of the cases and incidents of research problems 
helps to analyse that problem based on the facts. The actual and exemplary record of 
incidents may be helpful as the guidelines towards carrying out an intensive study of 
all aspects of problem selected for the research. It helps researchers and law 
enforcement agencies to understand the relationship of the causal factors interlinked.  
The case studies narrated above are published by the CIFAS is the United Kingdom’ 
Fraud Prevention Service CIFAS in conjunction with Charted Institute of Personal and 
Development. 
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Appendix 2:  Summary of Management Challenges in Preventing IIDTRC 
The diagram summarises the challenges have been the most problematic issues 
observed in the RetailGroup. 
 
 
               Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Sub-Categories 
 
 
      
 
 
                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management Challenges in Preventing Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes 
 Assessments of unsuccessful or 
Successful IIDTRC 
intervention 
 Challenges of managing third 
party data possession 
 Cultural influences and 
demography related influences 
 Delays in crimes detection 
and investigation 
 Issues of classifying of data 
security cases 
 
IIDTRC Incident/Intervention Outcomes 
 Structure of crimes prevention 
strategy 
 Inadequacy of internal data security 
management 
 Indifference to Compliance Policies 
 Attitudes of outsourcing firms on 
data compliance 
 Employees’ attitudes towards data 
protection policy awareness 
 Law Enforcement/Police 
Indifferences 
 
Issues of Security Strategies 
• Complexity of implementing IIDTRC prevention best 
practices/standards/key performance indicators 
• Security  budgeting resource-constraints: finance and time 
• Operational changes/Keeping up with technological advances 
• Inadequacy of employees’ awareness/training methods 
• Strategic planning and regulatory/compliance Issues 
• IIDTRC assessments/Internal policy issues 
• IS/T staff competence/Clarity of roles 
• Management cooperation/support 
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Appendix 3: Case Examples of IIDTRC Perpetrators in Banking Sector 
Case #1 Personal Identity Theft Related Crimes in the Public Domain: 
Account Takeover/Account Withdrawal 
Name Jessica Harper 
Age 50 
Gender Female 
Job title Head of Online Security/Lloyds Banking Group 
Nature of 
fraud 
Jessica Harper defrauded her Employer of almost £2.5 million in 2012. 
She submitted 93 false and doctored invoices to herself £2, 463, 750. 
She created a dummy bank account in the name of IT firm which 
carried out work for Lloyds.  
Motivation 
Expertise: She knew her job very well that she could create a dummy 
account that did not look suspicious and detectable to her employer. 
Family and Social Issues: She gave the money to her friends and her 
three brothers for them to buy properties. Perception of ‘Not being 
paid enough’ at Lloyds: Jessica denied personally benefiting from the 
fraud and argued that  “she deserved the money for showing "loyalty" 
to the firm when she could earn four times as much elsewhere”, 
Southwark Crown Court heard that Harper told police. She also argued 
that he deserved the money for working such long hours, getting up at 
5.30am and getting home at around 8pm for a salary of between 
£60,000 and £70,000 that is not enough to carter for her family needs. 
Perceived Opportunity: She had an opportunity to be the head of 
online security and she perceived that she was above the law and 
abused her position. Detective Chief Inspector Robin Cross, from the 
Fraud Squad, said "This is a serious abuse of position by a senior 
employee who should be protecting the bank and its customers against 
fraud”. 
 
How she 
was caught 
Jessica’s fraud activities were identified and detected following an 
internal audit by the bank. During the investigation, it was discovered 
that she had previously pleaded guilty to a single charge of fraud by 
abuse of position and a second charge of money laundering, both 
between 28
th
 December, 2007 and 21
st
 December, 2011. 
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Lessons 
learned 
i. Being head of security does necessarily exempt individual from 
committing fraud. 
ii. Past behaviour could be a good predictor of future behaviour.  
iii. Jessica Harper had been indicted in fraudulent act but her employer 
ignored the red flag and still her job. A thorough background can 
provide valuable information, especially when a candidate is 
applying for a position of trust.  
iv. Lack of adequate supervisory oversight and monitoring was another 
weakness factor. It took a “tipster’s” report to identify this two-year 
scheme. Letting your staff know that “surprise” audits are part of 
your responsibilities to prevent internal fraud and embezzlement is 
known to be an effective strategy—that is, providing those surprise 
audits are regularly performed. 
v. Oversight: Most glaring observation was that this perpetrator had 
sole oversight of the company’s finances, and no one ever scrutinised 
her management activities till her fraud was revealed. 
vi. Employers should apply a strict policy of internal controls, 
collaboration of duties and supervisory oversight irrespective of the 
employee position to improve company’s anti-fraud programme. 
vii. No employee, manager or other person should have the authority to 
place any business project with any company, acknowledge receipt of 
that project and approve payment for service without employer’s 
official authorised approval. 
 
 
Case #2 Corporate Identity Theft Related Crimes in the Public Domain: 
Fraudulent use of company data 
Name Jérôme Kerviel 
Age 33 
Gender Male 
Job title Desk trader/Banking - Société Générale 
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Nature of 
fraud 
Manipulation of the share prices/hedging and price exploitation to 
make big profits; caused £7 billion losses in 2008 to Société 
Générale.  Convicted for “abuse of confidence and illegal access to 
computers”. Unauthorised and concealed trading that led to persistent 
unfavourable market. 
Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
Expertise: Kerviel knew the timing of the nightly reconciliation 
process of the day’s trades by Eliot (back-office trade booking 
system), so with his back-office credentials was able to delete and re-
enter these unauthorised transactions without being noticed. 
He sometimes used fake counter-party information. Colleagues 
described him as a "computer genius" who was allegedly able to hack 
into the bank's computers to hide his trading, until he slipped-up. 
Ambitious for promotion: Kerviel acknowledged that he was wrong 
and that he has committed errors but noted that “he was serious and 
efficient at work and the fact that my bosses protected me and I was 
promoted during my short career shows this," he says. "What's more, 
I never stole a single centime."  He was promoted to the bank's Delta 
One trading team in 2005, which specialises in the futures markets.  
Avoided holidays to cover his frauds: Kerviel took just four days of 
vacation in 2007; he worked around the clock of the year to prevent 
comprehensive audit that might uncover his fraud. 
How he 
was caught 
Kerviel's complex hidden deals were unravelled when he was trading 
above the bank's market value. He failed to disable the bank's 
automatic alert system and his irregular trading suddenly showed up 
and he was arrested. There should be provision for anonymous 
reporting across the departments. Non-segregated duties with poor 
internal policy and regulatory compliance and documentation. 
Lessons 
learned 
i. This fraud involves the accounting department and this confirms 
ACFE report cited in section 2.4.4 of literature review that over 
30 per cent of the cases were committed by employee in the 
accounting department.  
ii. It is worth noting that Kerviel took just four days of vacation in 
2007. It is important to require all accounting, financial and 
purchasing personnel to take a month off every year to avail the 
opportunities to audit their work activities.  
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Case # 3 Corporate Identity Theft in Cases in the Public Domain: 
 Fraudulent use of company data and unauthorised alteration to company data 
Name Kweku Adoboli 
Age  32 
Gender Male 
Job title Desk trader/Banking 
Nature 
of fraud 
Manipulation of the share prices/hedging and price exploitation to make big 
profits. Setting up of secret bank account nickname ‘umbrella’ to hide 
losses, which exploded after his big-ever trade went sour in 2011. Caused 
the Swiss bank $2.3 billion loss in 2012. 
Motivation Management Support: Mr Adoboli line of defence was that UBS’s 
management had encouraged him to take greater risk bring in higher profits. 
Mr Adoboli received only a warning for exceeding risk limits in January 
2011.  
Expertise: He used his IT expertise to manipulate the system and hid the 
fraud trails for long time. A mechanism for verifying trades was 
mysteriously switched off until his fraudulent activities were exposed. 
How  he 
was 
caught 
The bank back office discovered fake trades were booked to offset the risk 
created, which peaked at $12 billion in August 2011. This exposure led to 
his arrest in 2011. 
Lessons 
learned 
i. There was no mechanism in place that monitored Adobori’s fraudulent 
trade exploits. There was no follow up control after warning was issued 
in 2011. Every business manager must ensure that appropriate internal 
controls, segregation of duties and supervisory oversight are in place 
and consistently enforced. For a single employee to have been able to 
prepare and issue millions of trade logs and later deposit those same 
fraudulent checks into his created secret personal bank account, 
obviously suggests that critical accounting safeguards were either not in 
place or seriously ignored. 
ii. Even if the above two steps had not been in place, had this individual’s 
managers known what tasks to oversee and verify, and performed those 
tasks, this blatant crime would have been prevented or quickly detected. 
iii. It is also worth noting that previous financial audits also failed to 
identify that anything was amiss. Few managers recognise that it is 
common practice for an auditor’s “scope of audit” not focus on detecting 
fraud, and this is another valid reason why management role in the fraud 
preventive process is so important. 
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                           Case #4 Corporate Identity Theft Related Crimes in the Public Domain: 
 Unauthorised alteration to company’s information systems 
Name John Rusnak 
Age 37 
Gender Male 
Job title Desk trader/Banking – Allied Irish Banks (AIB) 
Nature 
of fraud 
Bank fraud over a trading scam that cost Allied Irish Banks (AIB) nearly 
$700m in trading losses. Mr Rusnak allegedly ran up the losses while 
trading the Japanese Yen. When the trades went against him he allegedly 
used fraudulent measures to cover up the losses. He also created bogus 
broker confirmations to validate his deals. Manipulation of the Value at 
Risk calculation system: Mr. Rusnak manipulated the trading software 
systems used by the Allfirst and AIB to monitor his trading. He did the 
scheme by directly manipulating the inputs into the calculation of the 
VaR that were used by an employee in Allfirst’s risk-control group.  
Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ambition to get promoted: Prosecutors claimed that his activities 
helped him to earn salary and bonuses totalling $850,000 between 1997 
and 2001. 
Absence of trade monitoring system in AIB:  Lack of trade 
monitoring system in the AIB led to the failure of the bank management 
to scrutinise bogus option with Asian counterparts. He took advantage of 
an even bigger hole in the control environment – a failure in the back-
office to obtain transaction confirmations. 
Negligence from management:  John Rusnak was showing a yearly 
profit for 5 years straight. He became untouchable in organisational 
politics because he appeared to be so good. The back office staff 
eventually gave up raising flags on his trading practices as they were 
continually shot down by management. With executive backing, the 
treasury back office could have assisted with detecting John Rusnak’s 
fraud. 
Lack of management experience on foreign exchange trading: His 
supervisors were not experienced in foreign exchange trading. They did 
not adequately supervise his activities. A knowledgeable supervisor 
would have seen that the deep-in-the-money bogus options as it in 
Rusnak’s case. 
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How he 
was caught 
Rusnak frauds was revealed when AIB requested that he should 
release some of the capital to ease its trading balance sheet but 
Rusnak was not able to  do that because of the heavy skew towards 
the forex market and that was how his whole fraudulent activities 
tumbled down on him and he was caught. 
Lessons 
learned 
i. The failure of the back office to attempt to confirm bogus options 
with Asian counter parts and obtain foreign exchange rates from 
an independent source. 
ii. There was no internal audit of treasury operations to look 
Rusnak’s transactions to see if they had been properly confirmed. 
iii. In addition, AIB missed opportunities by ignoring problems 
ranging from problems of confirming trades and with Mr. 
Rusnak’s personality to warnings that there was a possibility that 
Mr. Rusnak could be manipulating foreign exchange rates.  
iv. It is vital to note that AIB stock fell sharply which proved more 
robust than Barings that was grounded after the Nick Leeson 
scandal. In all this was lost to the stake holders of AIB. 
 
 
 
 
Case #5 Corporate Identity Theft Related Crimes in the Public Domain:  
Unauthorised alteration to company data/ modification of company payment 
instructions 
Name Nicholas Leeson 
Age 27 
Gender Male 
Job title Desk trader/Banking – Baring the then UK’s oldest investment bank 
Nature of 
fraud 
Account fraud and forgery which involved hiding mistakes made by 
the 12 order fillers who worked on the trading floor. Rather, than 
reporting it to his bosses in London, Leeson hid the losses in a separate 
account known as the 'five eights' account.   
Mr. Leeson intentionally used the Barings’ error accounts to hide the 
losses amounting to £827 million ($1.4 billion!) that led to 1995 
collapse of Barings Bank. 
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Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negligence of the supervisors: Leeson’s superior knew, or should 
have known what the trader was up to, having been provided with 
advance notice concerning his activities. Since Barings allowed him to 
trade and settle his trades by the end of 1994 Leeson had racked up 
than £200 million in losses. 
 
No segregation of roles/power:  Leeson Case demonstrates what can 
happen when one individual is entrusted with too much power. There 
was no closer monitoring of his trading procedures: testing of 
positions, analysis of daily settlements and margin calls, as well as 
analysis of position and market concentration.  
Overwhelmed by the banking business culture: He continued to try 
and trade his way out of losses, behaviour he puts down to part 
youthful bravado and the banking culture at the time. He argued that 
there were some of his colleagues on the trading floor making mistakes 
and those mistakes very stupidly made their way back into the five 
eights account. Lesson said "I suppose for me as well I thought 'well 
it's probably not such a big deal, I got out of it once I can do it again 
and that was as stupid as it could possibly get". But when he to get all 
of the losses back - it had been as high as $20 million. 
How he 
was 
caught 
A routine audit by the bank as result of wiped-off of seven per cent of 
market because of the Kobe earthquake at the end of January 1995. 
Leeson said that “the bank was running out of money or had run out of 
money, it was impossible to build the position anymore, markets were 
falling, and everything is going against me. I'm not sure if Kobe 
necessarily was the final nail in the coffin if you like but it certainly 
didn't help”. 
Lessons 
learned 
i. If there was collaboration of roles among the traders, and 
promotion of information sharing among trading exchanges, 
Leeson’s fraud would have been detected earlier.  
ii. There was no upgraded clearing system and procedures that 
incorporated the real time settlement and critical risk management 
systems. 
iii. This case emphasised the need for banking companies to devise a 
comprehensive internal risk analysis procedures to identify high 
risk accounts. 
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Appendix 4: Publications 
 
Portions of this thesis are published in these research papers. 
Okeke, R. I and Shah, M. H. (2015), System Security: Theft Prevention, Book to be 
published by July 1st, 2015, Routledge 
Shah, M. H. and Okeke, R. I. (2014). Role-Based Framework as a Model for Analysing 
Prevention of Internal Identity Theft Related Crimes (submitted to Information Systems 
Security for review).  
Shah, M. H. and Okeke, R. I. and Ahmed, R. (2013). ‘Issues of Privacy and Trust in E-
Commerce: Exploring Customers’ Perspectives’, Journal of Basic and Applied 
Scientific Research, 3(3), pp. 571-577. 
Shah, M. H. and Okeke, R. I. (2013). Role of Digital Forensic in Identity Theft Related 
Crimes Investigation: The Challenges and Solutions. (Submitted to 4th IBT 
International Conference).  
Shah, H. M. and Okeke, R. I. (2011). A framework for internal identity theft 
prevention in retail industry. In Paper presented in Intelligence and Security 
Informatics Conference (EISIC). 
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Appendix 5: NVivo Nodes 
 
Internal identity theft related crimes 
 
Words Coded 1,049 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:51 Paragraphs 29 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 10:19 Coding 18 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 14 
 
Cases Coded 14 
 
Identity theft 
 
Words Coded 189 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:53 Paragraphs 8 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 14:20 Coding 4 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 4 
 
Cases Coded 4 
 
Causes v motives of identity theft crimes 
 
Words Coded 1,734 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:55 Paragraphs 47 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 16:19 Coding 23 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 17 
 
Cases Coded 16 
 
Perpetrators of identity theft crimes 
 
Words Coded 1,792 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:52 Paragraphs 15 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 10:41 Coding 16 
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References 
 
Sources Coded 10 
 
Cases Coded 10 
 
carrying out identity theft crimes -Methods of 
 
Words Coded 261 
 
Created 08/04/2012 15:59 Paragraphs 3 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 14:25 Coding 3 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 3 
 
Cases Coded 3 
 
Internal identity theft - prevention 
 
Words Coded 1,153 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:53 Paragraphs 21 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 14:25 Coding 16 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 12 
 
Cases Coded 12 
 
Security - measures - controls 
 
Words Coded 2,026 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:55 Paragraphs 44 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 12:05 Coding 30 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 19 
 
Cases Coded 19 
 
different roles for different management 
 
Words Coded 362 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:53 Paragraphs 3 
 
Coded 
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Modified 16/06/2012 14:20 Coding 3 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 3 
 
Cases Coded 3 
 
Identity theft prevention practices 
 
Words Coded 541 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:54 Paragraphs 13 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 14:25 Coding 9 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 8 
 
Cases Coded 8 
 
Data security implementation processes 
 
Words Coded 219 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:54 Paragraphs 14 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 08/06/2012 15:15 Coding 6 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 5 
 
Cases Coded 5 
 
Management support in implementing data security 
 
Words Coded 945 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:51 Paragraphs 33 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 14:25 Coding 16 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 9 
 
Cases Coded 9 
 
performance vs challenges – of management 
 
 Words 
Coded 
1
,
5
6
1 
 
C
r
e
a
t
e
d 
 
18/05/20
12 13:54 
 
 Paragraphs 
 
3
6 
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Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 14:25 Coding 30 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 20 
 
Cases Coded 20 
 
Resources for prevention of identity theft crimes 
 
Words Coded 109 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:54 Paragraphs 5 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 14/06/2012 14:28 Coding 3 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 2 
 
Cases Coded 2 
 
Prevention of identity theft – roles in  
 
Words Coded 215 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:54 Paragraphs 5 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 16:21 Coding 5 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 4 
 
Cases Coded 4 
 
Responsibilities of preventing crimes 
 
Words Coded 783 
 
Created 20/03/2012 13:59 Paragraphs 3 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 10:19 Coding 3 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 3 
 
Cases Coded 3 
 
Management involvement – what it is 
 
Words Coded 171 
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Created 18/05/2012 13:55 Paragraphs 3 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 09/05/2012 14:27 Coding 3 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 2 
 
Cases Coded 2 
 
Team vs individual who is more effective 
Words Coded 387 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:53 Paragraphs 8 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 09/05/2012 14:21 Coding 8 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 4 
 
Cases Coded 4 
Team – performance of 
 
Words Coded 302 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:53 Paragraphs 11 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 16:19 Coding 8 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 8 
 
Cases Coded 8 
 
Role sharing – identity prevention process 
 
                                                       Words 
Coded 2,406 
 
     Created   18/05/2012 13:53 Paragraphs           64 
 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 14:25   Coding               37 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded           19 
 
Cases Coded              18 
 
Management roles – clarity of  
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Words Coded    17 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:55 Paragraphs 1 
 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 14/06/2012 10:38 Coding 1 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 1 
 
Cases Coded 1 
 
Identity theft prevention strategy 
 
Words Coded       1,617 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:51 Paragraphs          53 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 10/08/2012 15:57 Coding                  35 
 
References 
Sources Coded     22 
 
Cases CodedV     21 
 
Role sharing vs management interaction 
 
Words Coded   279 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:53 Paragraphs 6 
                                                                               
 Coded 
 
Modified 09/05/2012 11:55 Coding 4 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 2 
 
Cases Coded 2 
 
 
Identity theft prevention policy 
 
Words Coded 533 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:54 Paragraphs 23 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 12:05 Coding 8 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 6 
 
Cases Coded 6 
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Management performance evaluation 
 
Words Coded 0 
 
Created 28/02/2012 09:52 Paragraphs 0 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 28/02/2012 09:52 Coding 0 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 0 
 
Cases Coded 0 
 
Management performance – evaluation of 
 
Words Coded 380 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:54 Paragraphs 5 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 11/06/2012 17:49 Coding 4 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 3 
 
Cases Coded 3 
 
Relationships 
 
Words Coded 3,535 
 
Created 08/06/2012 14:50 Paragraphs 63 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 10/08/2012 15:57 Coding 60 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 18 
 
Cases Coded 18 
 
Team management challenges 
 
Words Coded       300 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:54 Paragraphs          3 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 14:25 Coding                 4 
 
References 
Sources Coded   3 
 
Cases Coded      3 
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Supports 
 
Words Coded 2,369 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:53 Paragraphs 58 
 
      Coded 
 
Modified 10/08/2012 15:57 Coding 43 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 20 
 
Cases Coded 20 
 
Management operation 
 
 
Words Coded   3,148 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:52Paragraphs 89 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 16/06/2012 16:19 Coding 58 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded                23 
 
Cases Coded                   22 
 
Management-employee collaboration 
 
Words Coded 0 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:50 Paragraphs 0 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 18/05/2012 13:50 Coding 0 
 
References 
 
          Sources Coded                      
0 
               Cases Coded               0 
 
Identity theft prevention practices 
 
Words Coded 26 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:50 Paragraphs 1 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 10/06/2012 14:55 Coding 1 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 1 
 
Cases Coded 1 
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Collaborative management – effects of 
 
 
Words Coded 220 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:52 Paragraphs 2 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 14/06/2012 14:28 Coding 2 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 2 
 
Cases Coded 2 
 
Roles sharing - benefits 
 
Words Coded 385 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:53 Paragraphs 10 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 10/08/2012 15:57 Coding 7 
 
References 
 
Sources Coded 5 
 
Cases Coded 5 
 
Management skills in organisation – effects of 
 
Words Coded 226 
 
Created 18/05/2012 13:51 Paragraphs 11 
 
Coded 
 
Modified 14/06/2012 11:01 Coding 7 
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